Paul Corner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198730699
- eISBN:
- 9780191741753
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198730699.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
The enigma of how ordinary people related to would-be totalitarian regimes is still far from being resolved. The tension between repression and consensus renders analysis difficult; where one ends ...
More
The enigma of how ordinary people related to would-be totalitarian regimes is still far from being resolved. The tension between repression and consensus renders analysis difficult; where one ends and the other begins is never easy to determine. In the case of fascist Italy, recent scholarship has tended to tilt the balance in favour of popular consensus for the regime, identifying in the ideological and cultural aspects of Mussolini's rule a ‘political religion’ which bound the population to the fascist leader. This book presents a different picture. While in no way underestimating the force of ideological factors, the book argues that ‘real existing Fascism’, as lived by a large part of the population, was in fact an increasingly negative experience and reflected few of those colourful and attractive features of fascist propaganda which have induced more favourable interpretations of the regime. Distinguishing clearly between the fascist project and its realisation, the study examines the ways in which the fascist party asserted itself at the local level in the widely-differing areas of Italy, at its corruption and malfunctioning, and at the mounting wave of popular resentment against it during the course of the 1930s which, in effect, signalled the failure of the project. The study, based largely on archival material, concludes by suggesting that the abuse of power by fascists at the local level mirrors a wider problem related to the utilisation of power within Italy, both past and present.Less
The enigma of how ordinary people related to would-be totalitarian regimes is still far from being resolved. The tension between repression and consensus renders analysis difficult; where one ends and the other begins is never easy to determine. In the case of fascist Italy, recent scholarship has tended to tilt the balance in favour of popular consensus for the regime, identifying in the ideological and cultural aspects of Mussolini's rule a ‘political religion’ which bound the population to the fascist leader. This book presents a different picture. While in no way underestimating the force of ideological factors, the book argues that ‘real existing Fascism’, as lived by a large part of the population, was in fact an increasingly negative experience and reflected few of those colourful and attractive features of fascist propaganda which have induced more favourable interpretations of the regime. Distinguishing clearly between the fascist project and its realisation, the study examines the ways in which the fascist party asserted itself at the local level in the widely-differing areas of Italy, at its corruption and malfunctioning, and at the mounting wave of popular resentment against it during the course of the 1930s which, in effect, signalled the failure of the project. The study, based largely on archival material, concludes by suggesting that the abuse of power by fascists at the local level mirrors a wider problem related to the utilisation of power within Italy, both past and present.
Robert C. Solomon and Fernando Flores
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195161113
- eISBN:
- 9780199869220
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195161114.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Everyone agrees that trust is essential for decent human relationships, but our understanding of trust too often collapses in platitudes and falsehoods. It is typically treated as some sort of ...
More
Everyone agrees that trust is essential for decent human relationships, but our understanding of trust too often collapses in platitudes and falsehoods. It is typically treated as some sort of inarticulate bond between people, a social “glue” or interpersonal lubricant. In what Francis Fukuyama has famously called “high trust” societies, it functions as a kind of cultural “atmosphere” or “climate.” In personal relationships, we usually confuse trust with an unthinking, taken‐for‐granted attitude of unquestioning acceptance, or what we call “simple trust,” like the trust of a child for its parents. In business, we too readily conflate trust with contractual agreements and the enforcement that goes along with them. What we argue in this book is that trust is first of all a matter of decision, commitment, and action, whether in an intimate relationship like a marriage or in the businesslike atmosphere of a corporation. We introduce the notion of authentic trust, trust that is neither naïve nor “blind” but trust with its eyes wide open. It is a risky and uncertain world, but trust is what allows us to navigate it successfully, together. Our aim is not only to understand trust but also to give the reader the tools to build and maintain trust in personal and business relationships and to restore trust even when it has been lost or betrayed. Building Trust has grown out of many decades of experience, consulting with both corporations and couples.Less
Everyone agrees that trust is essential for decent human relationships, but our understanding of trust too often collapses in platitudes and falsehoods. It is typically treated as some sort of inarticulate bond between people, a social “glue” or interpersonal lubricant. In what Francis Fukuyama has famously called “high trust” societies, it functions as a kind of cultural “atmosphere” or “climate.” In personal relationships, we usually confuse trust with an unthinking, taken‐for‐granted attitude of unquestioning acceptance, or what we call “simple trust,” like the trust of a child for its parents. In business, we too readily conflate trust with contractual agreements and the enforcement that goes along with them. What we argue in this book is that trust is first of all a matter of decision, commitment, and action, whether in an intimate relationship like a marriage or in the businesslike atmosphere of a corporation. We introduce the notion of authentic trust, trust that is neither naïve nor “blind” but trust with its eyes wide open. It is a risky and uncertain world, but trust is what allows us to navigate it successfully, together. Our aim is not only to understand trust but also to give the reader the tools to build and maintain trust in personal and business relationships and to restore trust even when it has been lost or betrayed. Building Trust has grown out of many decades of experience, consulting with both corporations and couples.
Gabriele Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198235804
- eISBN:
- 9780191604058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235801.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Pride is vice which most patently involves consciousness of self and self-evaluation. The assessment of its nature and implicit harm will depend on the features of the self set out in the preceding ...
More
Pride is vice which most patently involves consciousness of self and self-evaluation. The assessment of its nature and implicit harm will depend on the features of the self set out in the preceding chapter. There are different types of pride and, as in the case of envy, not all of them are corruptive.Less
Pride is vice which most patently involves consciousness of self and self-evaluation. The assessment of its nature and implicit harm will depend on the features of the self set out in the preceding chapter. There are different types of pride and, as in the case of envy, not all of them are corruptive.
Gabriele Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198235804
- eISBN:
- 9780191604058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235801.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The structural similarities between the different vices means that there will be overlaps between them, or that those in the grip of one of these vices should also naturally be exposed to another. ...
More
The structural similarities between the different vices means that there will be overlaps between them, or that those in the grip of one of these vices should also naturally be exposed to another. One example is the relation between resentment and envy. The resentful and the envious share feelings of impotence and of hostility towards others. These are miserable feelings, and suffering them will reinforce both their sense of failure and their vengeful attitude towards the world. The avaricious, envious, proud, and resentful can all be said to be inordinate in their desire to have a certain position for themselves secured or maintained. Covetousness is a prominent component of lust and gluttony, and thus be that which links these to the other vices.Less
The structural similarities between the different vices means that there will be overlaps between them, or that those in the grip of one of these vices should also naturally be exposed to another. One example is the relation between resentment and envy. The resentful and the envious share feelings of impotence and of hostility towards others. These are miserable feelings, and suffering them will reinforce both their sense of failure and their vengeful attitude towards the world. The avaricious, envious, proud, and resentful can all be said to be inordinate in their desire to have a certain position for themselves secured or maintained. Covetousness is a prominent component of lust and gluttony, and thus be that which links these to the other vices.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187427
- eISBN:
- 9780199786596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187423.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter asks what blaming someone adds to believing that he has acted badly. It examines three of the most popular accounts of the additional element: roughly, those which construe it as a ...
More
This chapter asks what blaming someone adds to believing that he has acted badly. It examines three of the most popular accounts of the additional element: roughly, those which construe it as a public expression of one’s disapproval, as a belief that the agent’s misdeeds have marred his moral record, and as a negative emotional reaction. Of these familiar accounts, each is shown to be inadequate.Less
This chapter asks what blaming someone adds to believing that he has acted badly. It examines three of the most popular accounts of the additional element: roughly, those which construe it as a public expression of one’s disapproval, as a belief that the agent’s misdeeds have marred his moral record, and as a negative emotional reaction. Of these familiar accounts, each is shown to be inadequate.
Carl A. Raschke
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780231173841
- eISBN:
- 9780231539623
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231173841.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
An understanding of the political as simply the symbolic interactivity that warrants a more purposeful and self-conscious strategy of “living together” is not in itself sufficient. Moreover, when ...
More
An understanding of the political as simply the symbolic interactivity that warrants a more purposeful and self-conscious strategy of “living together” is not in itself sufficient. Moreover, when these mechanisms of solidarity are themselves vitiated by economic forces, especially as “natural” tendencies are manipulated and corrupted by the intervention of the state—the political itself becomes increasingly problematic. At that point, political economy itself breaks down and what James Joyce termed the “terror of history” rears its monstrous head. Statecraft seems to substitute for the political, but in the vacuum of the latter an even darker specter is gestating. It is the specter of the militant, the specter of revolution.Less
An understanding of the political as simply the symbolic interactivity that warrants a more purposeful and self-conscious strategy of “living together” is not in itself sufficient. Moreover, when these mechanisms of solidarity are themselves vitiated by economic forces, especially as “natural” tendencies are manipulated and corrupted by the intervention of the state—the political itself becomes increasingly problematic. At that point, political economy itself breaks down and what James Joyce termed the “terror of history” rears its monstrous head. Statecraft seems to substitute for the political, but in the vacuum of the latter an even darker specter is gestating. It is the specter of the militant, the specter of revolution.
D. D. Raphael
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199213337
- eISBN:
- 9780191707544
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213337.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Smith's lectures on jurisprudence contain some references to the impartial spectator, but with no suggestion, as in the Moral Sentiments, of the notion as especially attached to judgements about ...
More
Smith's lectures on jurisprudence contain some references to the impartial spectator, but with no suggestion, as in the Moral Sentiments, of the notion as especially attached to judgements about one's own actions.Less
Smith's lectures on jurisprudence contain some references to the impartial spectator, but with no suggestion, as in the Moral Sentiments, of the notion as especially attached to judgements about one's own actions.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199247493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594830
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses P. F. Strawson's well known article ‘Freedom and Resentment’. It sets out Strawson's position and raises a number of doubts. Strawson argues, among other things, that our ...
More
This chapter discusses P. F. Strawson's well known article ‘Freedom and Resentment’. It sets out Strawson's position and raises a number of doubts. Strawson argues, among other things, that our commitment to belief in freedom is founded in our emotions and in particular in our emotional reactions to others, such as gratitude and resentment. This, he says, is the fundamental reason why we could never give up belief in freedom. Strawson also questions whether it would be rational to give up belief in freedom, if one discovered that determinism was true and accepted that it was incompatible with freedom. He compares our commitment to belief in freedom to our non-rational commitment to inductive practices.Less
This chapter discusses P. F. Strawson's well known article ‘Freedom and Resentment’. It sets out Strawson's position and raises a number of doubts. Strawson argues, among other things, that our commitment to belief in freedom is founded in our emotions and in particular in our emotional reactions to others, such as gratitude and resentment. This, he says, is the fundamental reason why we could never give up belief in freedom. Strawson also questions whether it would be rational to give up belief in freedom, if one discovered that determinism was true and accepted that it was incompatible with freedom. He compares our commitment to belief in freedom to our non-rational commitment to inductive practices.
Charles Goodman
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195375190
- eISBN:
- 9780199871377
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195375190.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
Although Buddhist texts don’t explicitly discuss the problem of free will, they stake out a number of theoretical views that commit them to a certain answer to this problem. Buddhist texts clearly ...
More
Although Buddhist texts don’t explicitly discuss the problem of free will, they stake out a number of theoretical views that commit them to a certain answer to this problem. Buddhist texts clearly present both the universal causality and predictability in principle forms of determinism, and they reject the agent causation necessary for most forms of libertarianism. They also reject the appropriateness and reasonableness of participant reactive attitudes such as anger and resentment. Although having, or appearing to have, some of these attitudes might sometimes be helpful, feeling them always involves delusion. As a result, we should understand the entire Indian Buddhist tradition as committed to hard determinism. Some have objected that hard determinism denounces attitudes that we are in fact unable to abandon. But through meditation practice, Buddhists hold that we can eliminate anger and resentment, resulting in a better, gentler way to live that is also more theoretically defensible.Less
Although Buddhist texts don’t explicitly discuss the problem of free will, they stake out a number of theoretical views that commit them to a certain answer to this problem. Buddhist texts clearly present both the universal causality and predictability in principle forms of determinism, and they reject the agent causation necessary for most forms of libertarianism. They also reject the appropriateness and reasonableness of participant reactive attitudes such as anger and resentment. Although having, or appearing to have, some of these attitudes might sometimes be helpful, feeling them always involves delusion. As a result, we should understand the entire Indian Buddhist tradition as committed to hard determinism. Some have objected that hard determinism denounces attitudes that we are in fact unable to abandon. But through meditation practice, Buddhists hold that we can eliminate anger and resentment, resulting in a better, gentler way to live that is also more theoretically defensible.
Bernard Capp
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199255986
- eISBN:
- 9780191719592
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199255986.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Early Modern History, Social History
This chapter explores how servants in early modern England might hope to improve their situation or vent their frustrations and resentment. Although they were vulnerable and often exploited, it does ...
More
This chapter explores how servants in early modern England might hope to improve their situation or vent their frustrations and resentment. Although they were vulnerable and often exploited, it does not follow that servants were necessarily passive or helpless. In fact, their situation obliged them to develop survival skills, and many also engaged in covert forms of resistance.Less
This chapter explores how servants in early modern England might hope to improve their situation or vent their frustrations and resentment. Although they were vulnerable and often exploited, it does not follow that servants were necessarily passive or helpless. In fact, their situation obliged them to develop survival skills, and many also engaged in covert forms of resistance.
Mark Edele
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199237562
- eISBN:
- 9780191717185
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237562.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter focuses on one of the ‘problem groups' among veterans: the disabled. They were in a paradoxical position. On the one hand, they were the only subgroup of veterans with a continued legal ...
More
This chapter focuses on one of the ‘problem groups' among veterans: the disabled. They were in a paradoxical position. On the one hand, they were the only subgroup of veterans with a continued legal status in postwar society. However, welfare policies were constructed with the intention to put as many of the ‘Invalids of the Patriotic War’ to work as possible and welfare institutions were underdeveloped and severely dysfunctional. As a result, many disabled veterans became marginalized in postwar society. The continuing symbolic affirmation of their special status combined with this experience of neglect to produce severe resentment, which would fuel much of the beginning veterans' movement in the 1950s and 1960.Less
This chapter focuses on one of the ‘problem groups' among veterans: the disabled. They were in a paradoxical position. On the one hand, they were the only subgroup of veterans with a continued legal status in postwar society. However, welfare policies were constructed with the intention to put as many of the ‘Invalids of the Patriotic War’ to work as possible and welfare institutions were underdeveloped and severely dysfunctional. As a result, many disabled veterans became marginalized in postwar society. The continuing symbolic affirmation of their special status combined with this experience of neglect to produce severe resentment, which would fuel much of the beginning veterans' movement in the 1950s and 1960.
Michael Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This chapter argues for a kind of ‘equal protection’ for retributive justice amongst the kinds of justice. Other forms of justice – distributive, corrective, natural right, promissory – have ...
More
This chapter argues for a kind of ‘equal protection’ for retributive justice amongst the kinds of justice. Other forms of justice – distributive, corrective, natural right, promissory – have respected places within our pantheon of plausible theories of legal institutions. The question put is why retributive justice has in modern times been so discriminated against. A variety of explanations are considered; the emotional nature of retributive judgments is ultimately singled out. That emotional nature is given extended treatment, along Nietzschean lines. Despite the conceded force of many of the Nietzschean objections to the emotional basis for retributive judgments, a virtuous emotional base for retributive judgments is argued to lie in feelings of guilt.Less
This chapter argues for a kind of ‘equal protection’ for retributive justice amongst the kinds of justice. Other forms of justice – distributive, corrective, natural right, promissory – have respected places within our pantheon of plausible theories of legal institutions. The question put is why retributive justice has in modern times been so discriminated against. A variety of explanations are considered; the emotional nature of retributive judgments is ultimately singled out. That emotional nature is given extended treatment, along Nietzschean lines. Despite the conceded force of many of the Nietzschean objections to the emotional basis for retributive judgments, a virtuous emotional base for retributive judgments is argued to lie in feelings of guilt.
Michael Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
A fundamental division within the theory of responsibility is between those who think that causation of a harm attempted or culpably risks increases blameworthiness, and those who think it does not. ...
More
A fundamental division within the theory of responsibility is between those who think that causation of a harm attempted or culpably risks increases blameworthiness, and those who think it does not. This is the issue commonly called ‘moral luck.’ The chapter first seeks to recast the problem, finding it to be ill-cast as a problem of luck. It then defends the view that causation of a harm matters to overall blameworthiness. It does so after rejecting all extent arguments for this conclusion in the existing literature, arguing not just that they are bad but that they are hopeless. The defense offered in the chapter is first put in foundationalist justificatory mode and then in non-foundationalist justificatory mode.Less
A fundamental division within the theory of responsibility is between those who think that causation of a harm attempted or culpably risks increases blameworthiness, and those who think it does not. This is the issue commonly called ‘moral luck.’ The chapter first seeks to recast the problem, finding it to be ill-cast as a problem of luck. It then defends the view that causation of a harm matters to overall blameworthiness. It does so after rejecting all extent arguments for this conclusion in the existing literature, arguing not just that they are bad but that they are hopeless. The defense offered in the chapter is first put in foundationalist justificatory mode and then in non-foundationalist justificatory mode.
R. Jay Wallace
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Consider a teenage girl who is contemplating motherhood. Prior to her becoming pregnant, it seems that she might truly judge that it would be a bad thing on balance to have a child at this stage in ...
More
Consider a teenage girl who is contemplating motherhood. Prior to her becoming pregnant, it seems that she might truly judge that it would be a bad thing on balance to have a child at this stage in her life. After giving birth as a teenager, however, she might also truly judge that it is not a bad thing on balance that her child exists. These attitudes have commonly been thought to be in tension with each other. This chapter argues, however, that when correctly interpreted in deliberative terms, as judgments about the agent's reasons, the apparent conflict disappears. Giving birth changes the girl's situation, in ways that give rise to corresponding changes in her reasons for action and for various emotional responses. A consequence of this analysis, however, is that there may be mistakes or errors in deliberation that the agent is unable to regret having made. The teenage mother ought not to having conceived and given birth to a child at that stage in her life; and yet, as a mother, she can hardly regret having made the wrong decision in this particular matter. This raises large questions about the relation between justification and regret. Williams argues in ‘Moral Luck’ that our decisions can be justified or ‘unjustified’ retroactively through intervening circumstances that make regret either impossible or unavoidable. The chapter challenges Williams' assumption that justification and regret are necessarily connected in this way, and shows that the things that drive a wedge between justification and regret need not have anything to do with epistemic luck.Less
Consider a teenage girl who is contemplating motherhood. Prior to her becoming pregnant, it seems that she might truly judge that it would be a bad thing on balance to have a child at this stage in her life. After giving birth as a teenager, however, she might also truly judge that it is not a bad thing on balance that her child exists. These attitudes have commonly been thought to be in tension with each other. This chapter argues, however, that when correctly interpreted in deliberative terms, as judgments about the agent's reasons, the apparent conflict disappears. Giving birth changes the girl's situation, in ways that give rise to corresponding changes in her reasons for action and for various emotional responses. A consequence of this analysis, however, is that there may be mistakes or errors in deliberation that the agent is unable to regret having made. The teenage mother ought not to having conceived and given birth to a child at that stage in her life; and yet, as a mother, she can hardly regret having made the wrong decision in this particular matter. This raises large questions about the relation between justification and regret. Williams argues in ‘Moral Luck’ that our decisions can be justified or ‘unjustified’ retroactively through intervening circumstances that make regret either impossible or unavoidable. The chapter challenges Williams' assumption that justification and regret are necessarily connected in this way, and shows that the things that drive a wedge between justification and regret need not have anything to do with epistemic luck.
Patrick Coleman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589340
- eISBN:
- 9780191723322
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589340.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, European Literature, 18th-century Literature
This chapter analyzes Rousseau's evolving relationship with his public by examining the distinctions he draws between good and bad anger, between righteous indignation and self-centered resentment. ...
More
This chapter analyzes Rousseau's evolving relationship with his public by examining the distinctions he draws between good and bad anger, between righteous indignation and self-centered resentment. The different ways anger is discussed and displayed in the two Discours, in the Lettre à d'Alembert, in Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse, and in Émile, serve to legitimize the low-born author's critique of social conventions and to provoke his readers to action. Yet, they also illustrate Rousseau's belief that a Senecan transcendence of emotion is a key both to social harmony and to the inner equilibrium of the self, and equanimity no less than a Juvenalian capacity for anger is set up as evidence of the author's claim to cultural authority. The tension between these two attitudes is shown to be a primary source of dynamism in Rousseau's work.Less
This chapter analyzes Rousseau's evolving relationship with his public by examining the distinctions he draws between good and bad anger, between righteous indignation and self-centered resentment. The different ways anger is discussed and displayed in the two Discours, in the Lettre à d'Alembert, in Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse, and in Émile, serve to legitimize the low-born author's critique of social conventions and to provoke his readers to action. Yet, they also illustrate Rousseau's belief that a Senecan transcendence of emotion is a key both to social harmony and to the inner equilibrium of the self, and equanimity no less than a Juvenalian capacity for anger is set up as evidence of the author's claim to cultural authority. The tension between these two attitudes is shown to be a primary source of dynamism in Rousseau's work.
Patrick Coleman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589340
- eISBN:
- 9780191723322
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589340.003.0006
- Subject:
- Literature, European Literature, 18th-century Literature
This chapter examines the relationship between righteous anger and envious resentment in Diderot's satire Le Neveu de Rameau. The issue is explored in terms of whether one's personal dignity and ...
More
This chapter examines the relationship between righteous anger and envious resentment in Diderot's satire Le Neveu de Rameau. The issue is explored in terms of whether one's personal dignity and independence can be credibly asserted, or whether there is no escape from humiliating dependence. The chapter then argues that this is an issue not only for Rameau but for the philosopher as well, who is reluctant to acknowledge his dependence on others for the material of his thought. Should the moralist therefore be grateful to those who furnish him a stimulus to reflection, thereby allowing him to avert the danger of solipsism, just as the rich man should be not be angry at the fool who amuses and fleeces him, but grateful for the lessons he learns? Diderot's countermove is to highlight the sublimity of the mind's ability to contemplate the most intellectually disturbing or morally threatening features of his world, so that external dependence is outweighed by the genius's inner independence. Like the artistic genius, the philosopher transcends both anger and gratitude through aesthetic apprehension.Less
This chapter examines the relationship between righteous anger and envious resentment in Diderot's satire Le Neveu de Rameau. The issue is explored in terms of whether one's personal dignity and independence can be credibly asserted, or whether there is no escape from humiliating dependence. The chapter then argues that this is an issue not only for Rameau but for the philosopher as well, who is reluctant to acknowledge his dependence on others for the material of his thought. Should the moralist therefore be grateful to those who furnish him a stimulus to reflection, thereby allowing him to avert the danger of solipsism, just as the rich man should be not be angry at the fool who amuses and fleeces him, but grateful for the lessons he learns? Diderot's countermove is to highlight the sublimity of the mind's ability to contemplate the most intellectually disturbing or morally threatening features of his world, so that external dependence is outweighed by the genius's inner independence. Like the artistic genius, the philosopher transcends both anger and gratitude through aesthetic apprehension.
Jill Stauffer
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780231171502
- eISBN:
- 9780231538732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231171502.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Shows how revision—living the meaning of the past in the present moment in different ways—is possible and why it relies not only the will of one person but on a large number of human beings taking ...
More
Shows how revision—living the meaning of the past in the present moment in different ways—is possible and why it relies not only the will of one person but on a large number of human beings taking responsibility for the building and repair of worlds and selves. Thus it helps to show that responsibility for recovery from violence must be widely shared rather than remaining a narrow legal concern.Less
Shows how revision—living the meaning of the past in the present moment in different ways—is possible and why it relies not only the will of one person but on a large number of human beings taking responsibility for the building and repair of worlds and selves. Thus it helps to show that responsibility for recovery from violence must be widely shared rather than remaining a narrow legal concern.
Jeffrie G. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195178555
- eISBN:
- 9780199850129
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178555.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
We have all been victims of wrongdoing. Forgiving that wrongdoing is one of the staples of current pop psychology dogma; it is seen as a universal prescription for moral and mental health in the ...
More
We have all been victims of wrongdoing. Forgiving that wrongdoing is one of the staples of current pop psychology dogma; it is seen as a universal prescription for moral and mental health in the self-help and recovery section of bookstores. At the same time, personal vindictiveness as a rule is seen as irrational and immoral. In many ways, our thinking on these issues is deeply inconsistent; we value forgiveness yet at the same time now use victim-impact statements to argue for harsher penalties for criminals. Do we have a right to hate others for what they have done to us? This book has a skeptical view when it comes to our ideas on both emotions. The book proposes that vindictive emotions (anger, resentment, and the desire for revenge) actually deserve a more legitimate place in our emotional, social, and legal lives than we currently recognize, while forgiveness deserves to be more selectively granted. The book grounds the views expressed herein on careful analysis of the nature of forgiveness, a subtle understanding of the psychology of anger and resentment, and a fine appreciation of the ethical issues of self-respect and self-defense. It also uses examples from law, literature, and religion to make various points.Less
We have all been victims of wrongdoing. Forgiving that wrongdoing is one of the staples of current pop psychology dogma; it is seen as a universal prescription for moral and mental health in the self-help and recovery section of bookstores. At the same time, personal vindictiveness as a rule is seen as irrational and immoral. In many ways, our thinking on these issues is deeply inconsistent; we value forgiveness yet at the same time now use victim-impact statements to argue for harsher penalties for criminals. Do we have a right to hate others for what they have done to us? This book has a skeptical view when it comes to our ideas on both emotions. The book proposes that vindictive emotions (anger, resentment, and the desire for revenge) actually deserve a more legitimate place in our emotional, social, and legal lives than we currently recognize, while forgiveness deserves to be more selectively granted. The book grounds the views expressed herein on careful analysis of the nature of forgiveness, a subtle understanding of the psychology of anger and resentment, and a fine appreciation of the ethical issues of self-respect and self-defense. It also uses examples from law, literature, and religion to make various points.
Robert C. Solomon
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195368536
- eISBN:
- 9780199852031
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368536.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses several rather nasty and double-edged emotions, double-edged in that they tend to be remarkably self-destructive even as they are aimed at bringing down other people. These ...
More
This chapter discusses several rather nasty and double-edged emotions, double-edged in that they tend to be remarkably self-destructive even as they are aimed at bringing down other people. These include envy, spite, jealousy, resentment, and vengeance.Less
This chapter discusses several rather nasty and double-edged emotions, double-edged in that they tend to be remarkably self-destructive even as they are aimed at bringing down other people. These include envy, spite, jealousy, resentment, and vengeance.
Robert C. Solomon
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195160147
- eISBN:
- 9780199835065
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195160142.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This is a different kind of book about Nietzsche. It is about Nietzsche as a personal role model and a guide to a “rich inner life” and focuses neither on Nietzsche’s biography nor on the usual ...
More
This is a different kind of book about Nietzsche. It is about Nietzsche as a personal role model and a guide to a “rich inner life” and focuses neither on Nietzsche’s biography nor on the usual scholarly questions about “what Nietzsche really meant” but on Nietzsche’s effects on his readers and students. Nietzsche is an example as well as a promulgator of “passionate inwardness,” a life distinguished by its rich passions, deep emotions, exquisite taste, and a sense of personal elegance and excellence. He urges us to embrace an unusually powerful sense of personal virtue and integrity, like that of Socrates and the ancient Stoics, who also focused their attention on that “health of the soul” that was more or less independent of external forces and fortune. But where the Stoics identified virtue and the health of the soul with a sort of peace of mind (ataraxia), Nietzsche rather urges us toward an energetic “Dionysian” life, filled with enthusiasm. A virtuous life is a creative life, a life of exquisite good taste. Since our modern world so celebrates the very opposite, “celebrity,” fame and public display, vulgarity, and mass culture, many of Nietzsche’s efforts make him seem like a snob, an elitist. But this is to misunderstand him.Less
This is a different kind of book about Nietzsche. It is about Nietzsche as a personal role model and a guide to a “rich inner life” and focuses neither on Nietzsche’s biography nor on the usual scholarly questions about “what Nietzsche really meant” but on Nietzsche’s effects on his readers and students. Nietzsche is an example as well as a promulgator of “passionate inwardness,” a life distinguished by its rich passions, deep emotions, exquisite taste, and a sense of personal elegance and excellence. He urges us to embrace an unusually powerful sense of personal virtue and integrity, like that of Socrates and the ancient Stoics, who also focused their attention on that “health of the soul” that was more or less independent of external forces and fortune. But where the Stoics identified virtue and the health of the soul with a sort of peace of mind (ataraxia), Nietzsche rather urges us toward an energetic “Dionysian” life, filled with enthusiasm. A virtuous life is a creative life, a life of exquisite good taste. Since our modern world so celebrates the very opposite, “celebrity,” fame and public display, vulgarity, and mass culture, many of Nietzsche’s efforts make him seem like a snob, an elitist. But this is to misunderstand him.
