John V. Kulvicki
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290758
- eISBN:
- 9780191604010
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019929075X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This book argues that what it is to be a picture does not fundamentally concern how such representations can be perceived, but how they relate to one another syntactically and semantically. This kind ...
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This book argues that what it is to be a picture does not fundamentally concern how such representations can be perceived, but how they relate to one another syntactically and semantically. This kind of approach, first championed by Nelson Goodman in his Languages of Art, has not found many supporters in part because of weaknesses with Goodman’s account. It is shown that a properly crafted structural account of pictures has many advantages over the perceptual accounts that dominate the literature on this topic. Part I (Chapters 1-5) presents the account and draws out some of its immediate consequences. In particular, it explains the close relationship between pictures, diagrams, graphs, and other kinds of non-linguistic representation. Also, it undermines the claim that pictures are essentially visual by showing how many kinds of non-visual representations, including audio recordings and tactile line drawings, are genuinely pictorial. Part II (Chapters 6-10) shows that the structural account of depiction can help to explain why pictures seem so perceptually special. Part III (Chapters 11-12) provides a new account of pictorial realism and shows how accounting for realism relates to an account of depiction in general.Less
This book argues that what it is to be a picture does not fundamentally concern how such representations can be perceived, but how they relate to one another syntactically and semantically. This kind of approach, first championed by Nelson Goodman in his Languages of Art, has not found many supporters in part because of weaknesses with Goodman’s account. It is shown that a properly crafted structural account of pictures has many advantages over the perceptual accounts that dominate the literature on this topic. Part I (Chapters 1-5) presents the account and draws out some of its immediate consequences. In particular, it explains the close relationship between pictures, diagrams, graphs, and other kinds of non-linguistic representation. Also, it undermines the claim that pictures are essentially visual by showing how many kinds of non-visual representations, including audio recordings and tactile line drawings, are genuinely pictorial. Part II (Chapters 6-10) shows that the structural account of depiction can help to explain why pictures seem so perceptually special. Part III (Chapters 11-12) provides a new account of pictorial realism and shows how accounting for realism relates to an account of depiction in general.
John V. Kulvicki
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290758
- eISBN:
- 9780191604010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019929075X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Intuitively, pictures resemble what they depict. This chapter explains the role of resemblance in depiction, given the structural account presented in Chapters 2 and 3. Mimesis is defined as a ...
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Intuitively, pictures resemble what they depict. This chapter explains the role of resemblance in depiction, given the structural account presented in Chapters 2 and 3. Mimesis is defined as a systematic, semantically relevant sharing of properties between a picture and what it depicts. It is argued that all transparent representational systems are mimetic, but not all mimetic systems are transparent. This leads to a distinction between pictures and images: images are mimetic but not necessarily transparent. Examples include fMRI images, radar weather images, and so on. It is also argued that not all representations that share properties with what they represent are mimetic.Less
Intuitively, pictures resemble what they depict. This chapter explains the role of resemblance in depiction, given the structural account presented in Chapters 2 and 3. Mimesis is defined as a systematic, semantically relevant sharing of properties between a picture and what it depicts. It is argued that all transparent representational systems are mimetic, but not all mimetic systems are transparent. This leads to a distinction between pictures and images: images are mimetic but not necessarily transparent. Examples include fMRI images, radar weather images, and so on. It is also argued that not all representations that share properties with what they represent are mimetic.
Dominic Lopes
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199272037
- eISBN:
- 9780191699566
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272037.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind
Resemblance and pictures are intuitively linked together. Some design-subject resemblances are obviously representation-dependent. The resemblance theory holds that people understand what pictures ...
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Resemblance and pictures are intuitively linked together. Some design-subject resemblances are obviously representation-dependent. The resemblance theory holds that people understand what pictures represent by recognizing their similarity to their subjects. But while intuition tells that pictures resemble their subjects, it is unable to distinguish representation-dependent from representation-independent resemblances. Resemblance is inextricably connected to depiction, but it remains to be seen whether one understands pictures by noticing resemblances or notices resemblances as a result of understanding pictures. In this chapter, the author illustrates how the three versions of the resemblance theory, postulating objective resemblances, subjective resemblances, and system-relative resemblances failed to meet the independent challenge posed at the beginning of this chapter.Less
Resemblance and pictures are intuitively linked together. Some design-subject resemblances are obviously representation-dependent. The resemblance theory holds that people understand what pictures represent by recognizing their similarity to their subjects. But while intuition tells that pictures resemble their subjects, it is unable to distinguish representation-dependent from representation-independent resemblances. Resemblance is inextricably connected to depiction, but it remains to be seen whether one understands pictures by noticing resemblances or notices resemblances as a result of understanding pictures. In this chapter, the author illustrates how the three versions of the resemblance theory, postulating objective resemblances, subjective resemblances, and system-relative resemblances failed to meet the independent challenge posed at the beginning of this chapter.
John V. Kulvicki
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290758
- eISBN:
- 9780191604010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019929075X.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter shows that the account of picture perception and pictorial content sheds light on the debate between the two most popular theories of picture perception: the recognition theory due to ...
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This chapter shows that the account of picture perception and pictorial content sheds light on the debate between the two most popular theories of picture perception: the recognition theory due to Flint Schier and Dominic Lopes, and the experienced resemblance view due to Robert Hopkins. Though the present account sides with Lopes overall, Hopkins has captured something important about how we come to know pictures’ contents.Less
This chapter shows that the account of picture perception and pictorial content sheds light on the debate between the two most popular theories of picture perception: the recognition theory due to Flint Schier and Dominic Lopes, and the experienced resemblance view due to Robert Hopkins. Though the present account sides with Lopes overall, Hopkins has captured something important about how we come to know pictures’ contents.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245871
- eISBN:
- 9780191598630
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245878.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The Uses of Sense presents a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, concentrating on themes concerning representation, truth, and objectivity. It offers a particular ...
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The Uses of Sense presents a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, concentrating on themes concerning representation, truth, and objectivity. It offers a particular understanding of the radical break Wittgenstein made with what is still the conventional understanding as to what it is for a representation to be true—an understanding manifest in standard treatments of the relation between meaning and truth. On the new view, for any specifiable way things may be represented as being, there are various possible understandings as to what it is for things to be that way; in representing things as that way, one may so represent them on any of these understandings. So it is only where there is a given occasion for representing things in that way that such a representation may bear the sort of understanding that permits engagement with truth. This view of how representation works allowed Wittgenstein a new and fruitful view of scepticism of various forms—metaphysical as well as epistemological. The book sets out in detail what that new view comes to.Less
The Uses of Sense presents a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, concentrating on themes concerning representation, truth, and objectivity. It offers a particular understanding of the radical break Wittgenstein made with what is still the conventional understanding as to what it is for a representation to be true—an understanding manifest in standard treatments of the relation between meaning and truth. On the new view, for any specifiable way things may be represented as being, there are various possible understandings as to what it is for things to be that way; in representing things as that way, one may so represent them on any of these understandings. So it is only where there is a given occasion for representing things in that way that such a representation may bear the sort of understanding that permits engagement with truth. This view of how representation works allowed Wittgenstein a new and fruitful view of scepticism of various forms—metaphysical as well as epistemological. The book sets out in detail what that new view comes to.
Bas C. van Fraassen
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199278220
- eISBN:
- 9780191707926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278220.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
Resemblance is certainly not the be all and end all of representation. Even when representation is not purely symbolic, distortion and unlikeness can play a crucial role in how the representing is ...
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Resemblance is certainly not the be all and end all of representation. Even when representation is not purely symbolic, distortion and unlikeness can play a crucial role in how the representing is achieved. When resemblance is in fact the vehicle of representation, the representation relation derives from selective resemblance and selective non-resemblance, and just what the relevant selections are must be highlighted in such a way as to convey their role. If the selection or the highlighting is indicated by signs placed in the artifact itself, these need to be meaningful in order to play their role, and so the task of identification is pushed back but reappears as essentially unchanged. Thus, what determines the representation relationship can at best be a relation of what is in the artifact to factors neither in the artifact itself nor in what is being represented.Less
Resemblance is certainly not the be all and end all of representation. Even when representation is not purely symbolic, distortion and unlikeness can play a crucial role in how the representing is achieved. When resemblance is in fact the vehicle of representation, the representation relation derives from selective resemblance and selective non-resemblance, and just what the relevant selections are must be highlighted in such a way as to convey their role. If the selection or the highlighting is indicated by signs placed in the artifact itself, these need to be meaningful in order to play their role, and so the task of identification is pushed back but reappears as essentially unchanged. Thus, what determines the representation relationship can at best be a relation of what is in the artifact to factors neither in the artifact itself nor in what is being represented.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138924
- eISBN:
- 9780199786480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138929.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter clarifies the notion of simulation and explores the relationship between simulating and theorizing. Generic simulation is the resemblance or imitation of one thing by another, so mental ...
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This chapter clarifies the notion of simulation and explores the relationship between simulating and theorizing. Generic simulation is the resemblance or imitation of one thing by another, so mental simulation is the resemblance or imitation of one mental process by another. For example, visual imagery may simulate vision by using much of the same neural machinery that vision uses. The main empirical question here is whether third-person mindreading is substantially based on attempts to simulate selected processes and states in the head of a target. The possibility of limited compatibility between simulation and theorizing undercuts arguments that mental simulation inevitably “collapses” into theorizing, and the prospects for simulation-theory hybrids are explored.Less
This chapter clarifies the notion of simulation and explores the relationship between simulating and theorizing. Generic simulation is the resemblance or imitation of one thing by another, so mental simulation is the resemblance or imitation of one mental process by another. For example, visual imagery may simulate vision by using much of the same neural machinery that vision uses. The main empirical question here is whether third-person mindreading is substantially based on attempts to simulate selected processes and states in the head of a target. The possibility of limited compatibility between simulation and theorizing undercuts arguments that mental simulation inevitably “collapses” into theorizing, and the prospects for simulation-theory hybrids are explored.
J. Patrick Hornbeck II
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199589043
- eISBN:
- 9780191594564
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589043.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
What is a lollard? Generations of historians and propagandists, bishops and inquisitors, theologians and polemicists have asked this question about the dissenters who began to trouble the English ...
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What is a lollard? Generations of historians and propagandists, bishops and inquisitors, theologians and polemicists have asked this question about the dissenters who began to trouble the English church in the late fourteenth century; indeed, much of the contested historiography of the English Reformation has turned on its answer. This is a book not only about lollards but about the terms and categories that have been used to describe them. It argues that the members of the dissenting communities of fourteenth‐, fifteenth‐, and sixteenth‐century England did not subscribe to a static set of theological ideas but, instead, departed from the consensus of the late medieval church in a host of diverse and evolving ways. The beliefs of individual dissenters were conditioned by a number of social, textual, and cultural factors, including the ideas they discussed with other members of their local communities, the texts to which they had access, and the influence of mainstream religion and spirituality. Careful attention to these dynamics at the local level, as well as to the theological content implicit in Wycliffite texts and ecclesiastical records, can disclose the ways in which dissenting beliefs changed over time and varied from individual to individual and community to community. By undertaking detailed studies of lollard beliefs about salvation, the Eucharist, marriage, the clergy, and the papacy, and by juxtaposing lollards' own texts with the records of their trials, the book seeks to uncover, and where possible to explain, the many divergent strands of lollard belief.Less
What is a lollard? Generations of historians and propagandists, bishops and inquisitors, theologians and polemicists have asked this question about the dissenters who began to trouble the English church in the late fourteenth century; indeed, much of the contested historiography of the English Reformation has turned on its answer. This is a book not only about lollards but about the terms and categories that have been used to describe them. It argues that the members of the dissenting communities of fourteenth‐, fifteenth‐, and sixteenth‐century England did not subscribe to a static set of theological ideas but, instead, departed from the consensus of the late medieval church in a host of diverse and evolving ways. The beliefs of individual dissenters were conditioned by a number of social, textual, and cultural factors, including the ideas they discussed with other members of their local communities, the texts to which they had access, and the influence of mainstream religion and spirituality. Careful attention to these dynamics at the local level, as well as to the theological content implicit in Wycliffite texts and ecclesiastical records, can disclose the ways in which dissenting beliefs changed over time and varied from individual to individual and community to community. By undertaking detailed studies of lollard beliefs about salvation, the Eucharist, marriage, the clergy, and the papacy, and by juxtaposing lollards' own texts with the records of their trials, the book seeks to uncover, and where possible to explain, the many divergent strands of lollard belief.
J. Patrick Hornbeck II
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199589043
- eISBN:
- 9780191594564
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589043.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
The etymology of the term lollard remains a source of dispute among scholars: was it coined in the heat of the academic controversies in the University of Oxford in which John Wyclif and his ...
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The etymology of the term lollard remains a source of dispute among scholars: was it coined in the heat of the academic controversies in the University of Oxford in which John Wyclif and his followers played such a prominent role, or was it a pre‐existing term of abuse only retroactively applied to Wycliffites and their supporters? Examining the ways in which discourses about lollardy have inadvertently shaped our assumptions and research agendas, this chapter proposes a new model for thinking about the category ‘lollardy’, a model that draws not only on the traditional disciplines of literary, historical, and theological studies but also on those of psychology and biology. This model has the potential not to solve the mystery of which inhabitants of late medieval England were and were not lollards but, rather, to help students of lollardy ask more helpful questions of the sources.Less
The etymology of the term lollard remains a source of dispute among scholars: was it coined in the heat of the academic controversies in the University of Oxford in which John Wyclif and his followers played such a prominent role, or was it a pre‐existing term of abuse only retroactively applied to Wycliffites and their supporters? Examining the ways in which discourses about lollardy have inadvertently shaped our assumptions and research agendas, this chapter proposes a new model for thinking about the category ‘lollardy’, a model that draws not only on the traditional disciplines of literary, historical, and theological studies but also on those of psychology and biology. This model has the potential not to solve the mystery of which inhabitants of late medieval England were and were not lollards but, rather, to help students of lollardy ask more helpful questions of the sources.
Catherine Baroin
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199582570
- eISBN:
- 9780191595271
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582570.003.0002
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, European History: BCE to 500CE
A Roman citizen of high birth must remember his ascendants' names and political career. This family memory is composed not only of knowledge, but of acts, because remembering one's forefathers ...
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A Roman citizen of high birth must remember his ascendants' names and political career. This family memory is composed not only of knowledge, but of acts, because remembering one's forefathers involves imitating them and taking them as one's model (exemplum) in war, in politics, and in one's moral life. This is expressed by a metaphor: ‘following in one's ancestors' footsteps’ (vestigia sequi). On the other hand, if to remember is to imitate, to imitate is to be like (similis), not only regarding moral behaviour and acts, but also physically; in fact, a son has to be the image (imago) of his father. Gentilician identity is thus constructed doubly: on the one hand, the identity of a young noble stems from his name and the story of his family; on the other, this identity depends on his ‘being like’ and ‘acting like’.Less
A Roman citizen of high birth must remember his ascendants' names and political career. This family memory is composed not only of knowledge, but of acts, because remembering one's forefathers involves imitating them and taking them as one's model (exemplum) in war, in politics, and in one's moral life. This is expressed by a metaphor: ‘following in one's ancestors' footsteps’ (vestigia sequi). On the other hand, if to remember is to imitate, to imitate is to be like (similis), not only regarding moral behaviour and acts, but also physically; in fact, a son has to be the image (imago) of his father. Gentilician identity is thus constructed doubly: on the one hand, the identity of a young noble stems from his name and the story of his family; on the other, this identity depends on his ‘being like’ and ‘acting like’.
Véronique Dasen
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199582570
- eISBN:
- 9780191595271
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582570.003.0006
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, European History: BCE to 500CE
Scattered and debated iconographical documents relate to the imagines maiorum, those wax portraits of office-holding ancestors which were kept in the homes of the elite. A number of plaster masks of ...
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Scattered and debated iconographical documents relate to the imagines maiorum, those wax portraits of office-holding ancestors which were kept in the homes of the elite. A number of plaster masks of children, often very young, have been found in tombs of the imperial period in Rome and in the provinces. These artefacts come from non-elite families and raise a number of questions relating to commemorative practices as well as to the status of children in lower social orders. Why and in what circumstances were these plaster moulds realized? On a living or a dead child? Was a wax or plaster portrait produced from these moulds? These unusual and little known funerary portraits allow us to revisit the need of memorials and the importance of mimesis in Roman society, and throw an unexpected light on the reworking of aristocratic imagery in freedmen's families.Less
Scattered and debated iconographical documents relate to the imagines maiorum, those wax portraits of office-holding ancestors which were kept in the homes of the elite. A number of plaster masks of children, often very young, have been found in tombs of the imperial period in Rome and in the provinces. These artefacts come from non-elite families and raise a number of questions relating to commemorative practices as well as to the status of children in lower social orders. Why and in what circumstances were these plaster moulds realized? On a living or a dead child? Was a wax or plaster portrait produced from these moulds? These unusual and little known funerary portraits allow us to revisit the need of memorials and the importance of mimesis in Roman society, and throw an unexpected light on the reworking of aristocratic imagery in freedmen's families.
Bas C. van Fraassen
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199278220
- eISBN:
- 9780191707926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278220.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
Resemblance comes in, not when we are answering the question — What is representation? — but rather when we address How does this or that representation represent, and how does it succeed? The ...
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Resemblance comes in, not when we are answering the question — What is representation? — but rather when we address How does this or that representation represent, and how does it succeed? The various modes of representation here distinguished include imaging, picturing, and scaling. Imaging is representation that is effected through resemblance; picturing is imaging that carries the hallmarks of perspectivity. Mathematical representation of nature includes much imagery, and has so far always involved some features that, in retrospect, with hindsight, were seen as necessary failures in resemblance. Such representations can fall short through idealization, but can also achieve their success through systematic distortion.Less
Resemblance comes in, not when we are answering the question — What is representation? — but rather when we address How does this or that representation represent, and how does it succeed? The various modes of representation here distinguished include imaging, picturing, and scaling. Imaging is representation that is effected through resemblance; picturing is imaging that carries the hallmarks of perspectivity. Mathematical representation of nature includes much imagery, and has so far always involved some features that, in retrospect, with hindsight, were seen as necessary failures in resemblance. Such representations can fall short through idealization, but can also achieve their success through systematic distortion.
Malcolm Budd
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199556175
- eISBN:
- 9780191721151
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556175.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter offers an account of the way a picture looks when it is seen as a depiction of its subject. The account — a perceived-resemblance account — is based on the idea of seeing one thing as ...
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This chapter offers an account of the way a picture looks when it is seen as a depiction of its subject. The account — a perceived-resemblance account — is based on the idea of seeing one thing as looking like another in a specific manner, namely as looking like the two-dimensional appearance of the picture's subject. This notion is elucidated in terms of a distinction between a perceiver's visual field and visual world. The chapter demonstrates that one advantage of the theory developed in it is that it yields easily a plausible account of naturalistic depiction. It concludes by showing that it accounts for many of the most significant and distinctive features of pictorial representation.Less
This chapter offers an account of the way a picture looks when it is seen as a depiction of its subject. The account — a perceived-resemblance account — is based on the idea of seeing one thing as looking like another in a specific manner, namely as looking like the two-dimensional appearance of the picture's subject. This notion is elucidated in terms of a distinction between a perceiver's visual field and visual world. The chapter demonstrates that one advantage of the theory developed in it is that it yields easily a plausible account of naturalistic depiction. It concludes by showing that it accounts for many of the most significant and distinctive features of pictorial representation.
Beth A. Berkowitz
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195179194
- eISBN:
- 9780199784509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179196.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter explores the relationship between rabbinic execution and Roman execution, asking how the rabbinic experience of Roman execution may have shaped the Rabbis’ own laws of execution. It ...
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This chapter explores the relationship between rabbinic execution and Roman execution, asking how the rabbinic experience of Roman execution may have shaped the Rabbis’ own laws of execution. It focuses on a text from the Mishnah and Tosefta that features a dispute about the proper method of decapitation according to rabbinic law. It suggests that the barely concealed subtext of this dispute is whether rabbinic power should model itself on Roman power, or reject it entirely. It then considers whether other rabbinic laws of execution may be driven by the same concern. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the quandaries the Rabbis faced as a minority group within the Roman Empire.Less
This chapter explores the relationship between rabbinic execution and Roman execution, asking how the rabbinic experience of Roman execution may have shaped the Rabbis’ own laws of execution. It focuses on a text from the Mishnah and Tosefta that features a dispute about the proper method of decapitation according to rabbinic law. It suggests that the barely concealed subtext of this dispute is whether rabbinic power should model itself on Roman power, or reject it entirely. It then considers whether other rabbinic laws of execution may be driven by the same concern. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the quandaries the Rabbis faced as a minority group within the Roman Empire.
Ann Garry
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199855469
- eISBN:
- 9780199932788
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199855469.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Both traditional philosophy and feminist philosophy stand to gain in richness, inclusivity, and applicability to real life by reflecting intersectional analyses in their theories. I encourage such ...
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Both traditional philosophy and feminist philosophy stand to gain in richness, inclusivity, and applicability to real life by reflecting intersectional analyses in their theories. I encourage such reflection by advocating a concept of intersectionality based on family resemblance analyses. I caution against asking too much of intersectionality or of the metaphors used to explain it: intersectionality provides standards for the uses of methods or frameworks rather than theories of power, oppression, agency, or identity. I test my approach against María Lugones's argument in “Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System” (Hypatia 2007) to determine, in particular, whether we can successfully resist a move to create multiple genders for women. If we can resist this move, then we can answer the objection that intersectionality fragments women both theoretically and politically. My intention is to present a modest and flexible concept of intersectionality that can be of use to many kinds of philosophers and other theorists.Less
Both traditional philosophy and feminist philosophy stand to gain in richness, inclusivity, and applicability to real life by reflecting intersectional analyses in their theories. I encourage such reflection by advocating a concept of intersectionality based on family resemblance analyses. I caution against asking too much of intersectionality or of the metaphors used to explain it: intersectionality provides standards for the uses of methods or frameworks rather than theories of power, oppression, agency, or identity. I test my approach against María Lugones's argument in “Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System” (Hypatia 2007) to determine, in particular, whether we can successfully resist a move to create multiple genders for women. If we can resist this move, then we can answer the objection that intersectionality fragments women both theoretically and politically. My intention is to present a modest and flexible concept of intersectionality that can be of use to many kinds of philosophers and other theorists.
Kenneth P. Winkler
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235095
- eISBN:
- 9780191598685
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235097.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter explores the difference between two kinds of signs that Berkeley followed Locke in recognizing: words and ideas. I argue that Berkeley does not assume that ideas are images of things but ...
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This chapter explores the difference between two kinds of signs that Berkeley followed Locke in recognizing: words and ideas. I argue that Berkeley does not assume that ideas are images of things but concludes it, as part of a deliberate attempt to explain how at least some of our thoughts succeed in referring to the world. For Berkeley, representation—the intentionality or ‘aboutness’ of thought—is sometimes a matter of resemblance.Less
This chapter explores the difference between two kinds of signs that Berkeley followed Locke in recognizing: words and ideas. I argue that Berkeley does not assume that ideas are images of things but concludes it, as part of a deliberate attempt to explain how at least some of our thoughts succeed in referring to the world. For Berkeley, representation—the intentionality or ‘aboutness’ of thought—is sometimes a matter of resemblance.
Robert Macfarlane
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199296507
- eISBN:
- 9780191711916
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296507.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century and Victorian Literature
This chapter argues that a shift in literary theory occurred as a result of certain common historical experiences. Wider cultural-historical developments pressed upon the literary idea of ...
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This chapter argues that a shift in literary theory occurred as a result of certain common historical experiences. Wider cultural-historical developments pressed upon the literary idea of originality, such that it came to be perceived no longer as a rigid category, wholly incompatible with literary resemblance, but as a pliant and versatile quality which could inhere even in writing that was self-consciously allusive, echoic, or otherwise derived from earlier literature.Less
This chapter argues that a shift in literary theory occurred as a result of certain common historical experiences. Wider cultural-historical developments pressed upon the literary idea of originality, such that it came to be perceived no longer as a rigid category, wholly incompatible with literary resemblance, but as a pliant and versatile quality which could inhere even in writing that was self-consciously allusive, echoic, or otherwise derived from earlier literature.
Werner Sollors
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195052824
- eISBN:
- 9780199855155
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195052824.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, African-American Literature
A light-skinned woman gives birth to a dark child; a dark mother gives birth to a light child. In both cases, the husband has the same color as the mother. Aristotle utilized the story of the woman ...
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A light-skinned woman gives birth to a dark child; a dark mother gives birth to a light child. In both cases, the husband has the same color as the mother. Aristotle utilized the story of the woman of Elis in order to provide the explanation of what came to be called atavism, which literally means “great-grandfather-ism,” a descendant's surprising “resemblance to grand-parents or more remote ancestors rather than to parents.” Physical traits may skip one, two, or even many generations. Interestingly, Ovid utilized a story of Aurora's giving birth to Memnon in a similar method and inferred that this may have been an adultery case, since the poet addresses Aurora and wishes that he could also hear from her husband Tithonus.Less
A light-skinned woman gives birth to a dark child; a dark mother gives birth to a light child. In both cases, the husband has the same color as the mother. Aristotle utilized the story of the woman of Elis in order to provide the explanation of what came to be called atavism, which literally means “great-grandfather-ism,” a descendant's surprising “resemblance to grand-parents or more remote ancestors rather than to parents.” Physical traits may skip one, two, or even many generations. Interestingly, Ovid utilized a story of Aurora's giving birth to Memnon in a similar method and inferred that this may have been an adultery case, since the poet addresses Aurora and wishes that he could also hear from her husband Tithonus.
Steven D. Johnson and Florian P. Schiestl
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- December 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732693
- eISBN:
- 9780191796975
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732693.003.0001
- Subject:
- Biology, Plant Sciences and Forestry, Ecology
This chapter focuses on the historical development of ideas about mimicry, including the discovery of floral mimicry, and provides an overview of the key concepts in mimicry research. It defines ...
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This chapter focuses on the historical development of ideas about mimicry, including the discovery of floral mimicry, and provides an overview of the key concepts in mimicry research. It defines terms used in mimicry as used throughout the book. The mimicry concepts described include adaptive resemblance, cognitive misclassification of mimics by operators, the differences between convergent and advergent evolution, and the roles of honest signals and reliable cues in model organisms. This chapter also clarifies concepts relating to imperfect and accurate mimicry, as well as frequency dependence. The applicability of the concepts of Batesian and Müllerian mimicry to pollination systems is discussed.Less
This chapter focuses on the historical development of ideas about mimicry, including the discovery of floral mimicry, and provides an overview of the key concepts in mimicry research. It defines terms used in mimicry as used throughout the book. The mimicry concepts described include adaptive resemblance, cognitive misclassification of mimics by operators, the differences between convergent and advergent evolution, and the roles of honest signals and reliable cues in model organisms. This chapter also clarifies concepts relating to imperfect and accurate mimicry, as well as frequency dependence. The applicability of the concepts of Batesian and Müllerian mimicry to pollination systems is discussed.
Georges Dicker
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195381467
- eISBN:
- 9780199897124
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381467.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter argues that while Berkeley's arguments against the theory of primary and secondary qualities may count against certain versions of the theory, they don't refute Locke's version, ...
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This chapter argues that while Berkeley's arguments against the theory of primary and secondary qualities may count against certain versions of the theory, they don't refute Locke's version, especially when modernized as proposed in Chapter 1. Berkeley's first argument is that since (a) one cannot abstract a primary quality (e.g., shape) from a secondary quality (e.g., color), and (b) secondary qualities are only ideas in the mind, so are primary qualities. Locke would reject (b), since for him secondary qualities are “powers” in objects. But there are complications, since the manifest aspect of a secondary quality is not a mere power. Dicker argues that ultimately, Berkeley's argument shows only that the manifest aspect of a color cannot exist apart from the visual manifest aspect of a shape, and doesn't support idealism. Berkeley's second, relativity argument is invalid and shows only that primary qualities would be mind-dependent if secondary qualities were.Less
This chapter argues that while Berkeley's arguments against the theory of primary and secondary qualities may count against certain versions of the theory, they don't refute Locke's version, especially when modernized as proposed in Chapter 1. Berkeley's first argument is that since (a) one cannot abstract a primary quality (e.g., shape) from a secondary quality (e.g., color), and (b) secondary qualities are only ideas in the mind, so are primary qualities. Locke would reject (b), since for him secondary qualities are “powers” in objects. But there are complications, since the manifest aspect of a secondary quality is not a mere power. Dicker argues that ultimately, Berkeley's argument shows only that the manifest aspect of a color cannot exist apart from the visual manifest aspect of a shape, and doesn't support idealism. Berkeley's second, relativity argument is invalid and shows only that primary qualities would be mind-dependent if secondary qualities were.
