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A Case for the Psychological Reality of Language

Michael Devitt

in Ignorance of Language

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199250967
eISBN:
9780191603945
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199250960.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter begins with the popular “Representational Theory of the Mind” (RTM), according to which a thought involves a mental representation. It then follows Fodor in arguing for the controversial ... More


The representational theory of the visual mind

PIERRE JACOB and MARC JEANNEROD

in Ways of Seeing: The scope and limits of visual cognition

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
April 2010
ISBN:
9780198509219
eISBN:
9780191584909
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198509219.003.0002
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Psychology

This chapter sketches and argues for a view called the ‘representational theory of the visual mind’ (RTVM). RTVM is not so much a scientific theory that leads to testable predictions, as a picture or ... More


LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

Jerry A. Fodor

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199548774
eISBN:
9780191721106
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language

This book presents a new development of the famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. The book defends ... More


Facing Facts

Stephen Neale

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199247158
eISBN:
9780191598081
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199247153.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This book is an original examination of attempts to dislodge a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations of slices of reality. Representations ... More


Introduction

Jerry A. Fodor

in LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199548774
eISBN:
9780191721106
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language

This introductory chapter begins with the author's evaluation of his book The Language of Thought (LOT 1). It contends that the language-of-thought hypothesis endorsed in LOT 1 was not just any old ... More


LOT Meets Frege's Problem (Among Others)

Jerry A. Fodor

in LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199548774
eISBN:
9780191721106
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language

There are two closely related issues that a theory of intentional mental states and processes might reasonably be expected to address: Frege's problem and the problem of publicity. This chapter shows ... More


Locality

Jerry A. Fodor

in LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199548774
eISBN:
9780191721106
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language

There are increasingly good reasons to doubt that the ‘classical’ representational theory of mind (RTM) language of thought (LOT) computational theory of mind (CTM) model is anything like a general ... More


Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong

Jerry A. Fodor

Published in print:
1998
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198236368
eISBN:
9780191597404
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198236360.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have ... More


Introduction

Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dołęga, and Tobias Schlicht

in What are Mental Representations?

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
June 2021
ISBN:
9780190686673
eISBN:
9780190686703
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190686673.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In the introduction we overview the main debates about mental representations. In the first part we focus on three questions. First, what explanatory role do mental representations play in different ... More


Metacognition as Cognition about Cognition: Attributive Views

Joëlle Proust

in The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199602162
eISBN:
9780191758096
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199602162.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Four claims are shared by attributivist views about metacognition. According to them, the processes for metacognitive evaluation are not specialized in self-evaluation, evaluation is performed ... More


Folk Psychology and Its Ontology

Peter Langland-Hassan

in Explaining Imagination

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
September 2020
ISBN:
9780198815068
eISBN:
9780191852886
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198815068.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The question of whether imagination can be reduced to other folk psychological states will turn, in part, on what we take those other states to be—on how we view their ontological status. There are ... More


Working Assumptions

Jerry A. Fodor and Zenon W. Pylyshyn

in Minds without Meanings: An Essay on the Content of Concepts

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780262027908
eISBN:
9780262320320
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262027908.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter considers some of the working assumptions about mental representations in relation to language. It begins by assuming that behaviorism is false root and branch; in the paradigm cases, ... More


Transparency and the Unity of Experience

John O’Dea

in The Case for Qualia

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262232661
eISBN:
9780262286497
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.003.0017
Subject:
Philosophy, General

The main focus of this chapter is the theory of phenomenal unity as proposed by Michael Tye. Michael Tye is a representationalist who holds the view that phenomenal properties are intentional ... More


Conclusion: Reconciling the Manifest and Scientific Images

Murray Smith

in Film, Art, and the Third Culture: A Naturalized Aesthetics of Film

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
April 2017
ISBN:
9780198790648
eISBN:
9780191837791
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790648.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Aesthetics

Understanding art and aesthetic experience involves, in large measure, setting individual works in the context of larger regularities and patterns of behaviour. That said, we may need to live with ... More


What Structure Lurks in the Minds of Men?: Frege vs. Fodor

Charles Travis

in The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198783916
eISBN:
9780191826566
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

An idea of Wittgenstein’s: Given the questions (e.g.) belief ascriptions speak to, there is no reason to expect what they ascribe to correspond in any interesting or significant way with any ... More


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