Patrick Dattalo
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195315493
- eISBN:
- 9780199865475
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315493.001.0001
- Subject:
- Social Work, Research and Evaluation
Sample size determination is an important and often difficult step in planning an empirical study. From a statistical perspective, sample size depends on the following factors: type of analysis to be ...
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Sample size determination is an important and often difficult step in planning an empirical study. From a statistical perspective, sample size depends on the following factors: type of analysis to be performed, desired precision of estimates, kind and number of comparisons to be made, number of variables to be examined, and heterogeneity of the population to be sampled. Other important considerations include feasibility, such as ethical limitations on access to a population of interest and the availability of time and money. The primary assumption of the book is that, within the context of ethical and practical limitations, efforts to obtain samples of appropriate size and quality remain an important and viable component of social science research. This text describes the following available approaches for estimating sample size in social work research and discusses their strengths and weaknesses: power analysis; heuristics or rules-of-thumb; confidence intervals; computer-intensive strategies; and ethical and cost considerations. In addition, strategies for mitigating pressures to increase sample size, such as emphasis on model parsimony (e.g., fewer dependent and independent variables), simpler study designs, an emphasis on replication, and careful planning of analyses are discussed. The book covers sample-size determination for advanced and emerging statistical strategies, such as structural equation modeling, multi-level analysis, repeated measures MANOVA, and repeated measures ANOVA which are not discussed in other texts.Less
Sample size determination is an important and often difficult step in planning an empirical study. From a statistical perspective, sample size depends on the following factors: type of analysis to be performed, desired precision of estimates, kind and number of comparisons to be made, number of variables to be examined, and heterogeneity of the population to be sampled. Other important considerations include feasibility, such as ethical limitations on access to a population of interest and the availability of time and money. The primary assumption of the book is that, within the context of ethical and practical limitations, efforts to obtain samples of appropriate size and quality remain an important and viable component of social science research. This text describes the following available approaches for estimating sample size in social work research and discusses their strengths and weaknesses: power analysis; heuristics or rules-of-thumb; confidence intervals; computer-intensive strategies; and ethical and cost considerations. In addition, strategies for mitigating pressures to increase sample size, such as emphasis on model parsimony (e.g., fewer dependent and independent variables), simpler study designs, an emphasis on replication, and careful planning of analyses are discussed. The book covers sample-size determination for advanced and emerging statistical strategies, such as structural equation modeling, multi-level analysis, repeated measures MANOVA, and repeated measures ANOVA which are not discussed in other texts.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated ...
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This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated games and reputations, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout; they are interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications of the theory. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games as well as those using repeated games as tools in more applied research. The classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring are presented, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. More recent developments are also presented, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. The book provides an integration of game theory and economics, moving from the theory of repeated games to the study of economic relationships.Less
This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated games and reputations, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout; they are interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications of the theory. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games as well as those using repeated games as tools in more applied research. The classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring are presented, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. More recent developments are also presented, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. The book provides an integration of game theory and economics, moving from the theory of repeated games to the study of economic relationships.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter introduces the basic unifying principle of work in repeated games and reputations, namely that continuation play in repeated interactions can be used to create intertemporal incentives ...
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This chapter introduces the basic unifying principle of work in repeated games and reputations, namely that continuation play in repeated interactions can be used to create intertemporal incentives (incentives that could not arise in an isolated interaction). The prisoners’ dilemma, oligopoly and “product-choice” game illustrate.Less
This chapter introduces the basic unifying principle of work in repeated games and reputations, namely that continuation play in repeated interactions can be used to create intertemporal incentives (incentives that could not arise in an isolated interaction). The prisoners’ dilemma, oligopoly and “product-choice” game illustrate.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter introduces the basic concepts of a stage game, repeated game with perfect monitoring, subgame-perfect equilibrium, and the one-shot deviation principle; introduces the use of automata to ...
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This chapter introduces the basic concepts of a stage game, repeated game with perfect monitoring, subgame-perfect equilibrium, and the one-shot deviation principle; introduces the use of automata to represent strategy profiles; and introduces the concepts of decomposability, enforceability, and self-generation. Readers can either proceed to the next chapter, or if particularly interested in games with public monitoring, proceed directly to Chapter 7.Less
This chapter introduces the basic concepts of a stage game, repeated game with perfect monitoring, subgame-perfect equilibrium, and the one-shot deviation principle; introduces the use of automata to represent strategy profiles; and introduces the concepts of decomposability, enforceability, and self-generation. Readers can either proceed to the next chapter, or if particularly interested in games with public monitoring, proceed directly to Chapter 7.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter explores the meaning and interpretation of an infinitely repeated game. It examines finitely repeated games and infinitely repeated games with declining discount factors, and the ...
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This chapter explores the meaning and interpretation of an infinitely repeated game. It examines finitely repeated games and infinitely repeated games with declining discount factors, and the implications of refining the notion of subgame perfection to require renegotiation proofness.Less
This chapter explores the meaning and interpretation of an infinitely repeated game. It examines finitely repeated games and infinitely repeated games with declining discount factors, and the implications of refining the notion of subgame perfection to require renegotiation proofness.
Marcia Cavell
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287086
- eISBN:
- 9780191603921
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287082.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses Freud’s thoughts about memory and the inter-related concepts of remembering, repeating, and working through. Freud believes that the present mind contains the past, though ...
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This chapter discusses Freud’s thoughts about memory and the inter-related concepts of remembering, repeating, and working through. Freud believes that the present mind contains the past, though often in unrecognizable form. Remembering — unlike its avoidance, repetition — allows for working through: clarifying, and integrating into the fabric of the mind, something previously warded off. The concepts of repression, remembering, repetition, working through, transference, and mourning together draw a conceptual map that Freud continually refined.Less
This chapter discusses Freud’s thoughts about memory and the inter-related concepts of remembering, repeating, and working through. Freud believes that the present mind contains the past, though often in unrecognizable form. Remembering — unlike its avoidance, repetition — allows for working through: clarifying, and integrating into the fabric of the mind, something previously warded off. The concepts of repression, remembering, repetition, working through, transference, and mourning together draw a conceptual map that Freud continually refined.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0017
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter presents examples of finitely repeated perfect-monitoring games of the type in which reputation arguments were first introduced, including the prisoners’ dilemma with a tit-for-tat ...
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This chapter presents examples of finitely repeated perfect-monitoring games of the type in which reputation arguments were first introduced, including the prisoners’ dilemma with a tit-for-tat commitment type and the chain store game. It also presents an example of a reputation result for a finitely repeated game of imperfect monitoring.Less
This chapter presents examples of finitely repeated perfect-monitoring games of the type in which reputation arguments were first introduced, including the prisoners’ dilemma with a tit-for-tat commitment type and the chain store game. It also presents an example of a reputation result for a finitely repeated game of imperfect monitoring.
Julian C. Knight
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199227693
- eISBN:
- 9780191711015
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227693.003.0007
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics, Disease Ecology / Epidemiology
The discovery and characterisation of tandem repeat DNA has been of fundamental importance in the analysis of human genetic variation. The nature and origins of satellite, minisatellite, and ...
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The discovery and characterisation of tandem repeat DNA has been of fundamental importance in the analysis of human genetic variation. The nature and origins of satellite, minisatellite, and microsatellite DNA are reviewed. The diverse applications arising from study of highly polymorphic tandem repeats are described including application to mapping the human genome and disease genes, to forensic practice through techniques such as DNA fingerprinting, and to studies of human origins and evolutionary relationships. The consequences for gene expression are reviewed, including at the variable number tandem repeat upstream of the insulin gene associated with type 1 diabetes. The role of tandem repeats in human disease is discussed, including unstable trinucleotide repeat expansions seen in neurological diseases. Gain of function effects through polyglutamine expansions in Huntington disease and other conditions; loss of function mechanisms involving Fragile X and Friedrich ataxia; and RNA-mediated mechanisms seen in myotonic dystrophy are all reviewed.Less
The discovery and characterisation of tandem repeat DNA has been of fundamental importance in the analysis of human genetic variation. The nature and origins of satellite, minisatellite, and microsatellite DNA are reviewed. The diverse applications arising from study of highly polymorphic tandem repeats are described including application to mapping the human genome and disease genes, to forensic practice through techniques such as DNA fingerprinting, and to studies of human origins and evolutionary relationships. The consequences for gene expression are reviewed, including at the variable number tandem repeat upstream of the insulin gene associated with type 1 diabetes. The role of tandem repeats in human disease is discussed, including unstable trinucleotide repeat expansions seen in neurological diseases. Gain of function effects through polyglutamine expansions in Huntington disease and other conditions; loss of function mechanisms involving Fragile X and Friedrich ataxia; and RNA-mediated mechanisms seen in myotonic dystrophy are all reviewed.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195178111
- eISBN:
- 9780199783670
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
The folk theorem shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in indefinitely repeated games — a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism. The same theorem offers a solution ...
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The folk theorem shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in indefinitely repeated games — a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism. The same theorem offers a solution to various other social mysteries. Who guards the guardians? How are authority, blame, courtesy, dignity, envy, friendship, guilt, honor, integrity, justice, loyalty, modesty, ownership, pride, reputation, status, trust, virtue, and the like to be explained as emergent phenomena? How do beliefs that many people privately know to be false survive?Less
The folk theorem shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in indefinitely repeated games — a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism. The same theorem offers a solution to various other social mysteries. Who guards the guardians? How are authority, blame, courtesy, dignity, envy, friendship, guilt, honor, integrity, justice, loyalty, modesty, ownership, pride, reputation, status, trust, virtue, and the like to be explained as emergent phenomena? How do beliefs that many people privately know to be false survive?
Marian Stamp Dawkins
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198569350
- eISBN:
- 9780191717512
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198569350.003.0006
- Subject:
- Biology, Animal Biology
An important part of the planning of any project is the construction of a detailed protocol or research plan. This should be detailed enough that someone else could read it and see exactly what was ...
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An important part of the planning of any project is the construction of a detailed protocol or research plan. This should be detailed enough that someone else could read it and see exactly what was done. Decisions need to be made about the following: (i) the number of independent statistical units in the study (sample size); (ii) the number and type of observational samples that will be taken from each independent unit; (iii) the length and interval between these samples; (iv) whether there will be repeat observations on the same animal; (v) whether it will be necessary to recognize individual animals; and (vi) the order in which observations will be made. It is very important to try out this protocol with a pilot study to make sure that it is realistic and feasible. The protocol may need to be altered in the light of a preliminary study.Less
An important part of the planning of any project is the construction of a detailed protocol or research plan. This should be detailed enough that someone else could read it and see exactly what was done. Decisions need to be made about the following: (i) the number of independent statistical units in the study (sample size); (ii) the number and type of observational samples that will be taken from each independent unit; (iii) the length and interval between these samples; (iv) whether there will be repeat observations on the same animal; (v) whether it will be necessary to recognize individual animals; and (vi) the order in which observations will be made. It is very important to try out this protocol with a pilot study to make sure that it is realistic and feasible. The protocol may need to be altered in the light of a preliminary study.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300574
- eISBN:
- 9780199783748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0011
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter studies games played by the same players over and over again. The strategies in repeated games are modeled as finite automata, and a version of the folk theorem is proved. This says that ...
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This chapter studies games played by the same players over and over again. The strategies in repeated games are modeled as finite automata, and a version of the folk theorem is proved. This says that full cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome in a repeated situation under suitable conditions. The folk theorem is perhaps the most important result that game theory has to offer to social philosophy. Its relevance to social contract theory is briefly explored by showing how it can explain such emergent phenomena as trust, authority, and altruism. The chapter ends by drawing attention to the fact that Axelrod's claims for the strategy tit-for-tat are seriously misleading.Less
This chapter studies games played by the same players over and over again. The strategies in repeated games are modeled as finite automata, and a version of the folk theorem is proved. This says that full cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome in a repeated situation under suitable conditions. The folk theorem is perhaps the most important result that game theory has to offer to social philosophy. Its relevance to social contract theory is briefly explored by showing how it can explain such emergent phenomena as trust, authority, and altruism. The chapter ends by drawing attention to the fact that Axelrod's claims for the strategy tit-for-tat are seriously misleading.
Robert J. Shiller
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294184
- eISBN:
- 9780191596926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294182.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics, Financial Economics
When creating indices intended for use in cash settlement of futures contracts (or perpetual claims or options, or swaps, or other over‐the‐counter forward contracts or retail insurance contracts), ...
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When creating indices intended for use in cash settlement of futures contracts (or perpetual claims or options, or swaps, or other over‐the‐counter forward contracts or retail insurance contracts), it is critical that that each index represents value associated with a standard claim on future income (or services). The contract settlement must reflect the price of claims on income streams, so that the market can be used to hedge the risk associated with the claims, but the problem is that the available observations on prices or incomes may apply to dissimilar claims, and that standardization in the indices used to settle contracts is essential to liquidity in these markets. This chapter first reviews some existing index number methods, and then extends these methods to deal with the problems described. Chain index and hedonic index number methods are reviewed, and ordinary repeated‐measures indices (like the repeat sales indices) are shown to be in a sense a special case of these, and to have strong parallels to some existing indices used to settle contracts. The last part of the chapter introduces the hedonic repeated‐measures index to allow for control of changing price of quality variables, while retaining the repeated‐measures design.Less
When creating indices intended for use in cash settlement of futures contracts (or perpetual claims or options, or swaps, or other over‐the‐counter forward contracts or retail insurance contracts), it is critical that that each index represents value associated with a standard claim on future income (or services). The contract settlement must reflect the price of claims on income streams, so that the market can be used to hedge the risk associated with the claims, but the problem is that the available observations on prices or incomes may apply to dissimilar claims, and that standardization in the indices used to settle contracts is essential to liquidity in these markets. This chapter first reviews some existing index number methods, and then extends these methods to deal with the problems described. Chain index and hedonic index number methods are reviewed, and ordinary repeated‐measures indices (like the repeat sales indices) are shown to be in a sense a special case of these, and to have strong parallels to some existing indices used to settle contracts. The last part of the chapter introduces the hedonic repeated‐measures index to allow for control of changing price of quality variables, while retaining the repeated‐measures design.
Robert J. Shiller
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294184
- eISBN:
- 9780191596926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294182.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics, Financial Economics
This chapter addresses the fact that creating index numbers for settlement of contracts requires some judgement, and that no single method is likely to be applicable to all circumstances—there are ...
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This chapter addresses the fact that creating index numbers for settlement of contracts requires some judgement, and that no single method is likely to be applicable to all circumstances—there are trade‐offs, and choices have to be made with limited information. Before applying a repeated‐measures method like the ones defined in the preceding chapter, a decision has to be made as to whether there are enough repeated measures to ensure that the standard errors are not going to be too high, and whether there is enough unmeasured quality variation across subjects to warrant the increase in error variances caused by the addition of many subject dummies. A choice has to be made as to which kinds of hedonic variables, if any, to include in the analysis, and not all quality measures are appropriate for index number construction, so a choice needs to be made as to whether these variables or the subject dummies are to be constrained in any of various ways. Prior information of an imprecise nature may be used to put probabilistic, rather than rigid, restrictions on the regression coefficients. There are also some fundamentally different variants of the hedonic repeated‐measures regression methods that could be considered, methods in which quality is inferred as an observed factor associated with each subject (factor analytic methods), and methods in which a separate selection equation is used to correct for possible selection bias in the mechanism by which it is determined which subjects are to be measured (selection bias correction methods).Less
This chapter addresses the fact that creating index numbers for settlement of contracts requires some judgement, and that no single method is likely to be applicable to all circumstances—there are trade‐offs, and choices have to be made with limited information. Before applying a repeated‐measures method like the ones defined in the preceding chapter, a decision has to be made as to whether there are enough repeated measures to ensure that the standard errors are not going to be too high, and whether there is enough unmeasured quality variation across subjects to warrant the increase in error variances caused by the addition of many subject dummies. A choice has to be made as to which kinds of hedonic variables, if any, to include in the analysis, and not all quality measures are appropriate for index number construction, so a choice needs to be made as to whether these variables or the subject dummies are to be constrained in any of various ways. Prior information of an imprecise nature may be used to put probabilistic, rather than rigid, restrictions on the regression coefficients. There are also some fundamentally different variants of the hedonic repeated‐measures regression methods that could be considered, methods in which quality is inferred as an observed factor associated with each subject (factor analytic methods), and methods in which a separate selection equation is used to correct for possible selection bias in the mechanism by which it is determined which subjects are to be measured (selection bias correction methods).
Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195153859
- eISBN:
- 9780199834051
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195153855.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion in the Ancient World
The Mandaean ritual of Mašbuta or baptism is described. This is a process of immersion in running water (which is the form that the Lightworld takes on earth), and is not an initiatory baptism, but ...
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The Mandaean ritual of Mašbuta or baptism is described. This is a process of immersion in running water (which is the form that the Lightworld takes on earth), and is not an initiatory baptism, but rather repeated immersions that mark preparations and rehearsals for entry into the Lightworld – an entry that only happens properly at the death of the body. After an outline of the proceedings at a Mašbuta, specific interpretations and interpretative problems associated with it are addressed. It is argued that the Mašbuta is best understood within the greater horizon of Mandaean cosmology, as one of the means of constantly recreating the laufa (the connection between earth and the Lightworld).Less
The Mandaean ritual of Mašbuta or baptism is described. This is a process of immersion in running water (which is the form that the Lightworld takes on earth), and is not an initiatory baptism, but rather repeated immersions that mark preparations and rehearsals for entry into the Lightworld – an entry that only happens properly at the death of the body. After an outline of the proceedings at a Mašbuta, specific interpretations and interpretative problems associated with it are addressed. It is argued that the Mašbuta is best understood within the greater horizon of Mandaean cosmology, as one of the means of constantly recreating the laufa (the connection between earth and the Lightworld).
Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195153859
- eISBN:
- 9780199834051
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195153855.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion in the Ancient World
Investigates another creation of the Mandaean laufa (the connection between earth and the Lightworld), that of the masiqta or death mass. The specific masiqta described here is the Ṭabahata masiqta, ...
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Investigates another creation of the Mandaean laufa (the connection between earth and the Lightworld), that of the masiqta or death mass. The specific masiqta described here is the Ṭabahata masiqta, the masiqta of the Parents’, an event that only occurs once a year, on the last day of the five‐day intercalary period Panja; it takes even longer than a regular masiqta (which takes 12 hours) . This is a double masiqta, performed in two parts, the first of which has two segments. The account relies on Drower's fieldwork accounts, and on her editions and translations of Mandaean texts. Prayers, priestly instructions, commentaries, and activities are laid out in conjunction with one another to show the complex interactions of religious thought, imagery, and ritual proceedings.Less
Investigates another creation of the Mandaean laufa (the connection between earth and the Lightworld), that of the masiqta or death mass. The specific masiqta described here is the Ṭabahata masiqta, the masiqta of the Parents’, an event that only occurs once a year, on the last day of the five‐day intercalary period Panja; it takes even longer than a regular masiqta (which takes 12 hours) . This is a double masiqta, performed in two parts, the first of which has two segments. The account relies on Drower's fieldwork accounts, and on her editions and translations of Mandaean texts. Prayers, priestly instructions, commentaries, and activities are laid out in conjunction with one another to show the complex interactions of religious thought, imagery, and ritual proceedings.
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151250
- eISBN:
- 9781400838837
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151250.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based ...
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This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based models in explaining human cooperation. It first provides an overview of folk theorems and their account of evolutionary dynamics before discussing the folk theorem with either imperfect public information or private information. It then considers evolutionarily irrelevant equilibrium as well as the link between social norms and the notion of correlated equilibrium. While the insight that repeated interactions provide opportunities for cooperative individuals to discipline defectors is correct, the chapter argues that none of the game-theoretic models mentioned above is successful. Except under implausible conditions, the cooperative outcomes identified by these models are neither accessible nor persistent, and are thus labeled evolutionarily irrelevant Nash equilibria.Less
This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based models in explaining human cooperation. It first provides an overview of folk theorems and their account of evolutionary dynamics before discussing the folk theorem with either imperfect public information or private information. It then considers evolutionarily irrelevant equilibrium as well as the link between social norms and the notion of correlated equilibrium. While the insight that repeated interactions provide opportunities for cooperative individuals to discipline defectors is correct, the chapter argues that none of the game-theoretic models mentioned above is successful. Except under implausible conditions, the cooperative outcomes identified by these models are neither accessible nor persistent, and are thus labeled evolutionarily irrelevant Nash equilibria.
C. J. Brainerd and V. F. Reyna
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195154054
- eISBN:
- 9780199868384
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195154054.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter describes the historical roots of false-memory research. Although the systematic study of false memory in normal subjects is a comparatively recent phenomenon, the history of psychology ...
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This chapter describes the historical roots of false-memory research. Although the systematic study of false memory in normal subjects is a comparatively recent phenomenon, the history of psychology presents a few examples of connected programs of research on this topic. The three most comprehensive examples are discussed: Alfred Binet's career-long interest in the suggestive forms of questioning that are commonplace in the legal arena, Jean Piaget's studies of constructive memory in children, and F. C. Bartlett's studies of repeated recall of narrative text by adults.Less
This chapter describes the historical roots of false-memory research. Although the systematic study of false memory in normal subjects is a comparatively recent phenomenon, the history of psychology presents a few examples of connected programs of research on this topic. The three most comprehensive examples are discussed: Alfred Binet's career-long interest in the suggestive forms of questioning that are commonplace in the legal arena, Jean Piaget's studies of constructive memory in children, and F. C. Bartlett's studies of repeated recall of narrative text by adults.
Paul Seabright
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199240708
- eISBN:
- 9780191718106
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199240708.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Common sense would suggest people who have cooperated in the past would find it easier to cooperate in the future. This chapter examines a number of issues related to cooperation and trust with ...
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Common sense would suggest people who have cooperated in the past would find it easier to cooperate in the future. This chapter examines a number of issues related to cooperation and trust with regard to individual rationality and formation of collective action institutions, both (game-) theoretically and empirically. A cooperative outcome is one of many equilibria possible in a repeated game (i.e., while each game is unique, players can remember each other's strategies in previous rounds). A player's decision on whether or not to cooperate depends on pay-offs from that cooperation and the degree of trust. Repetition seems to do two things: first, by allowing the possibility of retaliation it transforms the game such that cooperation is rational, and second, because both players now know this, it increases the likelihood that other players will cooperate, and thus, making cooperation individually rational. Some of the conjectures identified from the theoretical model are also examined with data from milk-producers' cooperative societies in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Some policy implications are discussed.Less
Common sense would suggest people who have cooperated in the past would find it easier to cooperate in the future. This chapter examines a number of issues related to cooperation and trust with regard to individual rationality and formation of collective action institutions, both (game-) theoretically and empirically. A cooperative outcome is one of many equilibria possible in a repeated game (i.e., while each game is unique, players can remember each other's strategies in previous rounds). A player's decision on whether or not to cooperate depends on pay-offs from that cooperation and the degree of trust. Repetition seems to do two things: first, by allowing the possibility of retaliation it transforms the game such that cooperation is rational, and second, because both players now know this, it increases the likelihood that other players will cooperate, and thus, making cooperation individually rational. Some of the conjectures identified from the theoretical model are also examined with data from milk-producers' cooperative societies in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Some policy implications are discussed.
Martin S. Jaffee
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195140675
- eISBN:
- 9780199834334
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195140672.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
Introduces key technical terms referring to the composition and transmission of oral tradition, and proposes a general theoretical model for studying the various elements of Jewish oral tradition in ...
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Introduces key technical terms referring to the composition and transmission of oral tradition, and proposes a general theoretical model for studying the various elements of Jewish oral tradition in particular. The most important technical terms are: “oral‐literary tradition” (defined as “verbal products of a culture that have pretensions beyond everyday speech”); “oral‐performative tradition” (defined as “the sum of performative strategies” for transmitting the content of oral‐literary tradition); and “text‐interpretive tradition” (defined as “the body of interpretive understandings that arise from multiple performances of a text”). The theoretical model of oral tradition employed here enables studies of the interrelationships among three dimensions of Jewish oral tradition: the textual substance of the tradition, the social settings for its transmission, and, most importantly, the ideological system by which the texts of oral tradition are represented. For rabbinic Judaism, the concept of Torah in the Mouth and the description of the earliest rabbinic text (the Mishnah) as repeated tradition are the crucial ideological elements under study.Less
Introduces key technical terms referring to the composition and transmission of oral tradition, and proposes a general theoretical model for studying the various elements of Jewish oral tradition in particular. The most important technical terms are: “oral‐literary tradition” (defined as “verbal products of a culture that have pretensions beyond everyday speech”); “oral‐performative tradition” (defined as “the sum of performative strategies” for transmitting the content of oral‐literary tradition); and “text‐interpretive tradition” (defined as “the body of interpretive understandings that arise from multiple performances of a text”). The theoretical model of oral tradition employed here enables studies of the interrelationships among three dimensions of Jewish oral tradition: the textual substance of the tradition, the social settings for its transmission, and, most importantly, the ideological system by which the texts of oral tradition are represented. For rabbinic Judaism, the concept of Torah in the Mouth and the description of the earliest rabbinic text (the Mishnah) as repeated tradition are the crucial ideological elements under study.
Franklin E. Zimring, Gordon Hawkins, and Sam Kamin
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195171174
- eISBN:
- 9780199849765
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171174.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
“Getting tough on crime” has been one of the favorite rallying cries of American politicians in the last two decades, and “getting tough” on repeat offenders has been particularly popular. “Three ...
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“Getting tough on crime” has been one of the favorite rallying cries of American politicians in the last two decades, and “getting tough” on repeat offenders has been particularly popular. “Three strikes and you're out” laws, which effectively impose a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence at the moment of a third felony conviction, have been passed in twenty-six states. California's version of the “three strikes” law, enacted in 1994, was broader and more severe than measures considered or passed in any other state. This book provides an examination of the actual impact this law has had. This book looks at the origins of the law in California, compares it to other crackdown laws, and analyzes the data collected on crime rates in Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco in the year before and the two years after the law went into effect. Chapters show that the “three strikes” law was a significant development in criminal justice policy making, not only at the state level, but also at the national level. It concludes with an examination of the trend toward populist initiatives driving penal policy.Less
“Getting tough on crime” has been one of the favorite rallying cries of American politicians in the last two decades, and “getting tough” on repeat offenders has been particularly popular. “Three strikes and you're out” laws, which effectively impose a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence at the moment of a third felony conviction, have been passed in twenty-six states. California's version of the “three strikes” law, enacted in 1994, was broader and more severe than measures considered or passed in any other state. This book provides an examination of the actual impact this law has had. This book looks at the origins of the law in California, compares it to other crackdown laws, and analyzes the data collected on crime rates in Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco in the year before and the two years after the law went into effect. Chapters show that the “three strikes” law was a significant development in criminal justice policy making, not only at the state level, but also at the national level. It concludes with an examination of the trend toward populist initiatives driving penal policy.
