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Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated ... More


 How Long Is Forever

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0004
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter explores the meaning and interpretation of an infinitely repeated game. It examines finitely repeated games and infinitely repeated games with declining discount factors, and the ... More


 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0002
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter introduces the basic concepts of a stage game, repeated game with perfect monitoring, subgame-perfect equilibrium, and the one-shot deviation principle; introduces the use of automata to ... More


 Introduction

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter introduces the basic unifying principle of work in repeated games and reputations, namely that continuation play in repeated interactions can be used to create intertemporal incentives ... More


 Finitely Repeated Games

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0017
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter presents examples of finitely repeated perfect-monitoring games of the type in which reputation arguments were first introduced, including the prisoners’ dilemma with a tit-for-tat ... More


 Repeating Yourself

Ken Binmore

in Playing for Real: Game Theory

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780195300574
eISBN:
9780199783748
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0011
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter studies games played by the same players over and over again. The strategies in repeated games are modeled as finite automata, and a version of the folk theorem is proved. This says that ... More


Reciprocity

Ken Binmore

in Natural Justice

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195178111
eISBN:
9780199783670
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0005
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

The folk theorem shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in indefinitely repeated games — a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism. The same theorem offers a solution ... More


Is Co-operation Habit-Forming?

Paul Seabright

in The Environment and Emerging Development Issues: Volume 2

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199240708
eISBN:
9780191718106
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199240708.003.0002
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

Common sense would suggest people who have cooperated in the past would find it easier to cooperate in the future. This chapter examines a number of issues related to cooperation and trust with ... More


Cooperative Homo economicus

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis

in A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691151250
eISBN:
9781400838837
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691151250.003.0005
Subject:
Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought

This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based ... More


Compliance and the Strategy of Reciprocity

Scott Barrett

in Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
October 2005
ISBN:
9780199286096
eISBN:
9780191602832
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199286094.003.0010
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

The theory developed in Chapter eight assumes that treaty participants always comply with their obligations. In this chapter, compliance is enforced endogenously. The main conclusion is that a ... More


Games, Conventions, and Public Goods

Ian Malcolm David Little

in Ethics, Economics, and Politics: Principles of Public Policy

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
August 2004
ISBN:
9780199257041
eISBN:
9780191601293
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199257043.003.0009
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare

Game theory analyses the best behaviour of individuals when this depends on the reaction of others. The prisoners’ dilemma is the best‐known theorem, and has been thought to be an important reason ... More


Relationships and Contracts

John Kay

in Foundations of Corporate Success: How Business Strategies Add Value

Published in print:
1995
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198289883
eISBN:
9780191718205
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019828988X.003.0004
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

Following an understanding of the relationships that form a firm, two main types of commercial relationships are recognized. Spot contracts refer to agreements for immediate exchanges, whereas ... More


Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships

Bhaskar Dutta, Debraj Ray, and Kunal Sengupta

in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198287629
eISBN:
9780191595912
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198287623.003.0005
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

In this chapter, the authors use a model of an infinitely repeated principal‐agent relationship where they explore the conditions under which labour contracts with threats of sacking or contract ... More


Repeating Yourself

Ken Binmore

in Playing for Real Coursepack Edition: A Text on Game Theory

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
April 2015
ISBN:
9780199924530
eISBN:
9780190261399
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199924530.003.0008
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter discusses the games played in real life with emphasis on how these are played. It examines reciprocity as the glue that holds human societies together, as the key to human cooperation, ... More


Fragmented Markets: Labour

Pranab Bardhan and Christopher Udry

in Development Microeconomics

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198773719
eISBN:
9780191595929
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198773714.003.0004
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

Outlines models that tackle the puzzle of wage rigidity existing under conditions of severe unemployment or underemployment in developing countries. It begins with efficiency wage models of ... More


Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation

David M. Kreps

in A Course in Microeconomic Theory

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
May 2021
ISBN:
9780691202754
eISBN:
9780691215747
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Discontinued
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691202754.003.0014
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter reviews the concepts of cooperation and reputation. It begins by looking at the game called the prisoners' dilemma. The basic structure of options and payoffs that characterize this game ... More


Trust and reputations

E. McCready

in Reliability in Pragmatics

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
March 2015
ISBN:
9780198702832
eISBN:
9780191772399
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198702832.003.0003
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics

This chapter explores the phenomena of hedging and disclaimers. It proposes an analysis of them on which they serve to protect the reputation of the speaker from damage resulting from speaking ... More


Consenting to Lose or Expecting to Win? Inter-temporal Changes in Voters’ Winner–Loser Status and Satisfaction with Democracy

Eric Chang, Yun-han Chu, and Wen-chin Wu

in Elections and Democracy: Representation and Accountability

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2014
ISBN:
9780198716334
eISBN:
9780191784934
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716334.003.0012
Subject:
Political Science, International Relations and Politics

This chapter extends the winner–loser gap thesis by analysing how inter-temporal changes in voters’ winner–loser status over time affect their democratic support in emerging democracies. The chapter ... More


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