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This chapter offers an explication and defence of Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's critique of the traditional philosophical conception of religion — the view that the proposition ‘God exists’ is a pseudo-scientific hypothesis to be investigated either empirically or metaphysically. Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein are shown to challenge the idea that as regards religious faith only two options are possible — either adherence to a set of metaphysical beliefs (with certain ways of acting following from these beliefs) or passionate commitment to a ‘doctrineless’ form of life. Their alternative conception is defended against the charges of ‘fideism’ and ‘irrationalism’.

This chapter is divided into the following sections: should religion be taught?; indoctrination or self-development?; celebrating diversity; the role of tradition; and Australian individualism. The issue of whether religion is a public or private matter becomes particularly controversial when its place in schools is considered. The second section examines the fear of indoctrination as opposed to developing understanding of a religion. The third section argues that the celebration of diversity may be a political aim in society where a government may be afraid of smouldering racial and religious tensions. The fourth section argues that one's own traditions, beliefs, and conceptions of society should be the starting point of finding the truth. The last section of the chapter examines an Australian educationalist's concerns on teaching religion.

In religious epistemology there is a significant amount of focus on religious knowledge, but much less attention has been paid to religious understanding. This is unfortunate. It is unfortunate not just because religious understanding is an interesting topic but also because religious understanding is more epistemically valuable than religious knowledge. This chapter presents two reasons for thinking this is the case. The first is that the connection between understanding and action gives us reason to think this, and the second is that understanding plays a more important role in a religious context. Following this, the chapter argues that we ought to reconsider skeptical arguments against religious belief because although they may undermine knowledge, they may not undermine understanding—the chapter offers an example of a skeptical argument where focusing on understanding rather than knowledge provides us with a straightforward response.

This chapter presents a case study of the Jewish High School in Berlin — the only Jewish secondary school in contemporary Germany. The focus is on the re-establishment of this school in 1993 and the associated hopes of the religious community, on the one hand, and the religious self-understanding and expectations of the pupils regarding religious education, on the other hand. The chapter begins by setting out current developments in the Jewish educational system in Germany and the hopes that Jewish parents and religious communities have of it. It then gives an account of the re-establishment of the Berlin Jewish High School and its Jewish profile. Next, the chapter presents quantitative data that provide an insight into the religious self-understanding of the young Jews in the school. The analysis focuses on the similarities and differences between young Jewish people from German and Soviet backgrounds. Afterward, a qualitative analysis of the expectations and desires of the pupils in relation to their religious education is provided. Finally, the chapter discusses what, realistically, might be the outcomes of an approach to Jewish religious education that embraces a student community so diverse in religious, cultural, and social terms.

Human evaluations in religion, as in the arts, history, morality, politics, and philosophy, differ widely, in part because of different personal experiences, social histories, and forms of education. This suggests that seeking understanding is difficult and gradual, in religion as well as in other areas, and a full grasp of truth probably remains a future goal. In religion, three main factors—the rise of science, of critical historical research, and of a greater understanding of diverse religions—suggest the adoption of a more global perspective. One may be committed to a specific religious tradition, yet accept that no religion has a final, inerrant, or complete grasp of truth. An expansive global religious understanding might see the grounding of religion in apprehensions of transcendent meaning and value, and be attentive to the variety of such apprehensions in the religions of the world.

David Burrell uses the image of a transformative pilgrimage to capture what is at issue when the notion of religious understanding is introduced. This chapter challenges the naturalist’s objection to the very idea of there being a journey in this sense, grants with John Cottingham that the transformation is moral and spiritual, and considers what it could mean for such understanding to be theoretical as well as practical. Further questions arise concerning the “fuel” of this transformative journey, and Levinas claims that it is motivated by desire. This chapter considers the merits of his position and concludes that it offers the shape for a model of religious understanding which can genuinely appeal to an expansive, i.e., nonscientistic, naturalist.

The Introduction sets the philosophical stage for the volume as a whole by describing the present state of play in contemporary philosophy of religion and situating the authors’ own conception of the subject, and making clear how this conception bears upon the supposed divide between analytic and continental philosophy. It then turns to the naturalistic strand of the authors’ thinking, distinguishing it from scientism, and clarifying its theistic implications. This “expansive” naturalism is seen to be compatible with Cottingham’s “humane” philosophy of religion, and it grants us the right to say that the concept of the divine is already implicated in our understanding of nature. There follows an account of how the different chapters are to be related and distinguished.

This chapter considers what kind of understanding is required if the religious or spiritual life is to be ordered not only to moral, but also aesthetic goods. It addresses three questions. First: how might aesthetic goods contribute to spiritual well-being? Second, what must the spiritual or religious person understand if their life is to be directed to these spiritually significant aesthetic goods? And finally: how is this understanding to be realized if its object is as described in our response to this second question? The chapter proposes that a deeper appreciation of the spiritual significance of aesthetic goods yields a new and fruitful perspective on the bodily and perceptual character of religious understanding.

This chapter seeks to show how the spiritual practice of an “active” or “engaged” love is integral to the sort of “epistemology of involvement” through which we come to a religious understanding of the world. Such an understanding is one that gives proper recognition to the sacred or reverence-worthy character of the world. The chapter discusses how a religiously inflected language of love and the practice it informs can transfigure the world for us and enable its sacred or reverence-worthy character to come into view (supposing it is there in any case). It also seeks to show how this is connected to a process of spiritual formation (or Bildung).

For adults, extraordinary agents, like God, are distinctively different from ordinary agents, and the brain is distinctively different from the mind. Preschool theory of mind—explored and explained in prior chapters—provides the platform on which older children build conceptions of God, brain, omniscience, and soul. These further cognitions depend on children’s own spontaneous ideas but also on culturally supported beliefs transmitted by others. Fueled by these sources—their own ideas and those of others—older children’s conceptions go beyond the ordinary to wrestle with the extraordinary, go beyond awareness of the limits of everyday agents to imagine and think about more limitless, transcendent agents and mentation. In this way social cognition moves from the intuitive to the reflective and even counterintuitive. In summary, the chapter describes four progressive levels of theory of mind development: infant cognitions, preschool intuitive theories, later reflective ideas, and (for some adults) reflective theories.