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Under the constitutional law of the United States, government is not required to grant conscience-protecting exemptions. However, when it chooses to grant some such exemptions, government may not privilege religious conscience over secular conscience or disfavor secular conscience relative to religious conscience. In short, government may not discriminate against secular conscience. Moreover, under the political morality of human rights—in particular, under the human right to religious and moral freedom—government should not disfavor secular conscience relative to religious conscience. In that sense, and to that extent, the constitutional law of the United States and the political morality of human rights are aligned.

This chapter examines the issue of safeguarding religious belief and its practice, with particular emphasis on where to draw the line between religious practices we may not share but must tolerate, and those that cannot be allowed in a democratic society. It considers the right to ‘inner’ freedoms to believe and the external freedom to manifest beliefs within the context of human rights, what limits there have to be for respecting conscience, and when individual consciences should or should not be accommodated. It also discusses dignity and equality and how they could trump religious freedom, along with John Locke's views about religious toleration and his distinction between the importance of freedom in religion and issues concerning the ‘public good’. The chapter asks whether religious beliefs and sincerity are enough or whether they should be manifested. Finally, it explores the issue of religious conscience in the domain of medical ethics.

This chapter traces the appearance of Muslims in debates over religious plurality and the clerical oath. As the new constitution at last came into force, revolutionary France was assailed by problems from within and without. The euphoria of success turned into fears of invasion and counterrevolution, and universality was increasingly expressed by the influential group of deputies known as the Girondins as a need to defend France by attacking the enemies of the Revolution. In this context, Muslims did not disappear from revolutionary concerns but were instead invoked repeatedly by counterrevolutionary writers, at first as threatening or ridiculous examples of the consequences of religious liberty, and then—as the religious tide began to turn against them—as precedents for their claims to freedom of religious conscience. In response, revolutionaries affirmed the new pluralism, suggesting that Muslims did indeed possess these rights, insofar as they did not disturb the civic order in the manner of “refractory” priests.

This chapter examines how the priority of the religious over the political should be interpreted when laws clash with a religious conscience. More specifically, it asks whether law should take precedence over religion in this case. It first considers what Charles Taylor, the Canadian philosopher and social theorist, has called the modern ‘disenchanted’ world in relation to the transcendental features of human rights. It then explores the idea that societies are placed in a pre-existing reality that has moral import before turning to a discussion of whether religious people deserve exemption or exceptions from generally applicable laws. It also looks at the debates over religious freedom and equality involving the Quakers in Pennsylvania during the War of Independence. Finally, the chapter explains how different legal systems seem unable, or unwilling, to recognise the problems arising from religious beliefs as well as the argument that religion must take priority over all social concerns.

This chapter examines the foundations of equality and freedom and their relation to the principles of democracy. It first considers the link between democracy and religious principles, suggesting that democracy needs religion to teach its citizens how to act not only for their own good but also in the wider interest. It then explores the argument that, just because a certain set of beliefs produced modern ideas about democracy, the latter needs those ideas for its continued justification. It also discusses the idea that religion cannot be rationally based, rationally argued for, and rationally criticised, with emphasis on how the alleged intrinsic irrationality of religious belief appears to undermine its credibility. The chapter concludes by emphasising the essence of religious freedom; the ramifications of equality and freedom for human dignity and human rights; and the importance of freedom of religious conscience to the pursuit of equality.

This chapter examines the necessary limits to religious freedom, first by discussing the issue of religious conscience and whether and how far it should be accommodated by the law. It then considers religious toleration in relation to respect for others and ideas of human dignity, how a law may place substantial burdens on those with particular religious beliefs, and racial versus religious discrimination. It also explores issues of religious freedom that can cause a conflict between churches, especially the Roman Catholic Church, and secular laws, along with the right of church and religious organisations to be in control of their own affairs. Finally, the chapter analyses the question of how far religious believers can depart from the norms of the society of which they are members and still demand ‘reasonable’ accommodation.

This chapter examines religious freedom as a human right and the need to accord special protection to religion. It considers the implications of a single-minded pursuit of equality for human rights and the principles of democracy, along with the idea of a secular state that is neutral to all religion. It looks at modern human rights law and how it is supposed to protect religious beliefs as well as religious conscience, the failure of courts in different jurisdictions to respect the apparent dictates of conscience when they are in conflict with public policy, and the profound connection between religious understandings and human nature. It argues that real sticking points of conscience, and especially objections arising from important religious beliefs, must be respected in a democracy.