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A view growing in popularity in current philosophical literature is the ‘reliable informant view of knowledge attributions’ (RIVKA), according to which the purpose of knowledge attributions is to identify/flag reliable informants. One feature of our knowledge ascriptions that has gone largely unnoticed in this literature, however, is that knowledge is attributed, not only to individuals, but also to groups. This observation can be combined with the RIVKA, resulting in the following group version of the view: G-RIVKA: the purpose of group knowledge attributions is to identify/flag reliable informants. The chapter argues that the G-RIVKA, and therefore the RIVKA, is false. It proposes alternatives to both the RIVKA and the G-RIVKA, the ‘reliable source of information view of knowledge attributions’ — the RSIVKA — and its group counterpart — the G-RSIVKA — according to which a central purpose of knowledge attributions, individual or group, is to identify/flag reliable sources of information.

This chapter provides a preliminary statement and defense of the book’s central hypothesis, namely: the purpose of the concept of knowledge is to identify reliable informants. This hypothesis is used to yield a systematic account of knowledge and knowledge claims. We start with the idea of an individual inquirer who needs an informant to satisfy her own need for information; then we imagine a more complex situation in which a community of individuals collaborate to pool and share information. As our interest in information becomes more socially directed, it becomes vital that we identify individuals who are sufficiently reliable for members of our community. After outlining this thought, this chapter defends it from objections. For example, what should we say about people who seem not to qualify as reliable informants and yet clearly have knowledge? Also, does this view lead to skepticism? And doesn’t all this rely on dubious quasi-historical postulations? This chapter provides answers to these (and other) questions.

This introductory chapter outlines the main aim of the book, which is to reveal the nature, purpose, and significance of knowledge by investigating why humans think and speak of knowing. Hannon calls this “function-first epistemology.” At the core of this book are two broad proposals. First, we can make progress in epistemology by taking a function-first approach. Second, the function of the concept of knowledge is to identify reliable informants (a practice that is vital for human survival, cooperation, and flourishing). These ideas are borrowed from Edward Craig’s genealogy of knowledge, but Hannon also highlights some important differences between these two approaches. After situating “function-first epistemology” within the broader theoretical context, a summary of each chapter is provided. The introduction ends by encouraging scholars to apply this “function-first” methodology to other areas of philosophy.

This chapter defends “communal impurism.” According to this view, a true belief amounts to knowledge partly due to practical (or nonepistemic) factors. “Communal impurism” is based on our need to identify reliable informants to members of our community. Knowers must be sufficiently reliable to serve as actionable sources of information for members of their community, yet impurists claim the level of justification required for knowledge is partly fixed by an individual’s practical reasoning situation. Thus, a knower must meet a communal standard for knowledge and yet the threshold for knowledge is partly determined by an individual’s practical reasoning situation. These ideas are reconciled in the following way: there is a communal standard for knowledge that is needed to promote a deep kind of coordination in our epistemic practices, and yet an individual’s stakes may trump the communal standard when it is not sufficiently demanding for the relevant practical reasoning situation.

Can we learn something interesting about knowledge by examining our concept of knowledge? Quite a bit, many argue. It is argued here that the concept of knowledge is of little epistemological interest. This chapter critically examines one interesting defense of the view that the concept of knowledge is of great epistemological interest: Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the State of Nature. Craig argues that a proper understanding of knowledge is achieved by a distinctive form of conceptual investigation. On his view, the concept of knowledge is tied in an important way to that of a reliable informant. A minimalist view of concepts is presented and defended where there is little value to be found in examining our concept of knowledge. Along the way, considerations to do with the social construction of concepts and of knowledge itself are discussed, as well as the view that knowledge is a natural kind.