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A Two-Tiered Relevant Alternatives Theory

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199557912
eISBN:
9780191743290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues for the replacement of the relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge with two-tiered view that is cast along the same lines. This two-tiered relevant alternatives ... More


The Relevant Alternatives Account of Perceptual Knowledge

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199557912
eISBN:
9780191743290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter suggests that the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination fits very neatly with an intuition that is widespread in epistemology, what is referred to as the core ... More


Contextualism

Jason Stanley

in Knowledge and Practical Interests

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199288038
eISBN:
9780191603679
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199288038.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter introduces the thesis of contextualism about knowledge attributions, which is the view that the proposition expressed by a sentence such as ‘John knows that the bank is open at 2 p.m. ... More


Introduction: Contextualism, Invariantism, Skepticism, and What Goes On in Ordinary Conversation

Keith DeRose

in The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199564460
eISBN:
9780191721410
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

In this initial exposition of contextualism, the view is explained and distinguished from other views, and especially from its rival, invariantism, whose two main forms, classical invariantism and ... More


Relevant Alternatives and Closure

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199557912
eISBN:
9780191743290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter begins with a discussion of the closure principle and the problem it poses for the relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge. It then turns to a new position known as ... More


Epistemic Luck

Duncan Pritchard

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can ... More


Scepticism Comes Alive

Bryan Frances

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
October 2005
ISBN:
9780199282135
eISBN:
9780191602917
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199282137.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The nagging voice of the sceptic has always been present in epistemology. Over the last thirty years or so, philosophers have thought of several promising ways to counter the radical sceptic. For ... More


Closure and Context

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I critically examine two of the main responses to the closure-based sceptical argument. In particular, I look at the case that has been made for the rejection of closure by, for example, Fred Dretske ... More


Tracking over the Rivals

Sherrilyn Roush

in Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199274734
eISBN:
9780191603228
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199274738.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that the new tracking view is superior to externalist rivals: process reliabilism, the safety view, and the relevant alternatives view. This is because of the generality problem, ... More


Neo-Mooreanism

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I contend that in so far as the contemporary debate about scepticism has formulated the sceptical problem correctly, and in so far as one is entitled to adopt epistemological externalism as part of ... More


Formal Problems About Knowledge

Roy Sorensen

in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195130058
eISBN:
9780199833481
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195130057.003.0020
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In ”Formal Problems about Knowledge,” Roy Sorensen examines epistemological issues that have logical aspects. He uses Fitch's proof for unknowables and the surprise test paradox to illustrate the ... More


Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence

Alvin Goldman

in Williamson on Knowledge

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199287512
eISBN:
9780191713620
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

It is difficult to reconcile Williamson's rejection of ‘decompositional’ analyses with his positive proposals for an ‘account’ of knowledge. After arguing that epistemologists should remain ... More


Moral Scepticism

Russ Shafer-Landau

in Moral Realism: A Defence

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199259755
eISBN:
9780191601835
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199247293.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Presents and tries to defuse some classic arguments for moral scepticism, and against the possibility of moral knowledge. Considers the regress argument, an argument from relevant alternatives, and a ... More


How Live Hypotheses Sabotage Knowledge

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
October 2005
ISBN:
9780199282135
eISBN:
9780191602917
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199282137.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The argument template used to generate the new sceptical arguments is presented. In doing so, what it means for a hypothesis to be “live”, what it means for someone to be a “mere mortal” with regard ... More


Austinian semantics

Krista Lawlor

in Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199657896
eISBN:
9780191748127
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657896.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In the second chapter, we build on Austin’s insight about how the truth (or falsity) of an utterance is determined. The key insight is that the truth of an utterance depends on the situation the ... More


Contextualism

Ernest Sosa

in Knowing Full Well

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691143972
eISBN:
9781400836918
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter considers the extent to which contextualism constitutes a further rival view in epistemology proper, and offers reasons to doubt that it is. Contextualism has gained center stage in ... More


When Experts Make Mistakes

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
October 2005
ISBN:
9780199282135
eISBN:
9780191602917
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199282137.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The main themes of the book are introduced in a preliminary and intuitive way.


Diagnosing Salient Alternative Effects

Mikkel Gerken

in On Folk Epistemology: How we Think and Talk about Knowledge

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780198803454
eISBN:
9780191841637
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198803454.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 10 addresses the salient alternative effects on knowledge ascriptions by developing the epistemic focal bias account. According to this account, denials of knowledge in the face of a salient ... More


The Consistency of Scepticism and Knowledge

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
October 2005
ISBN:
9780199282135
eISBN:
9780191602917
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199282137.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

It isn’t clear what scepticism really is. Perhaps it’s the thesis that certain knowledge attributions are false. Then again, it might be that even though knowledge attributions are true pretty much ... More


Fallibilism and Multiple Paths to Knowledge

Wesley H. Holliday

in Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 5

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
April 2015
ISBN:
9780198722762
eISBN:
9780191794087
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that epistemologists should replace a “standard alternatives” picture of knowledge, assumed by many fallibilist theories of knowledge, with a new “multipath” picture of knowledge. ... More


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