Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues for the replacement of the relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge with two-tiered view that is cast along the same lines. This two-tiered relevant alternatives ...
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This chapter argues for the replacement of the relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge with two-tiered view that is cast along the same lines. This two-tiered relevant alternatives theory is very much in accord with commonsense; conforms to the basic thought that underlies the core relevant alternatives intuition, which is that one can have knowledge without having to rule out far-fetched error-possibilities; and accommodates the thought that alternatives can be made relevant in other ways than by one's environment, though it does so in such a way as to keep the demands on our discriminative powers realistic.Less
This chapter argues for the replacement of the relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge with two-tiered view that is cast along the same lines. This two-tiered relevant alternatives theory is very much in accord with commonsense; conforms to the basic thought that underlies the core relevant alternatives intuition, which is that one can have knowledge without having to rule out far-fetched error-possibilities; and accommodates the thought that alternatives can be made relevant in other ways than by one's environment, though it does so in such a way as to keep the demands on our discriminative powers realistic.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter suggests that the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination fits very neatly with an intuition that is widespread in epistemology, what is referred to as the core ...
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This chapter suggests that the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination fits very neatly with an intuition that is widespread in epistemology, what is referred to as the core relevant alternatives intuition. This intuition states that in order to know a proposition, p, what is required is that one is able to rule out all those not-p alternatives that are (in some sense to be specified) relevant. What is not required is that one is able to rule out the irrelevant alternatives.Less
This chapter suggests that the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination fits very neatly with an intuition that is widespread in epistemology, what is referred to as the core relevant alternatives intuition. This intuition states that in order to know a proposition, p, what is required is that one is able to rule out all those not-p alternatives that are (in some sense to be specified) relevant. What is not required is that one is able to rule out the irrelevant alternatives.
Jason Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288038
- eISBN:
- 9780191603679
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288038.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter introduces the thesis of contextualism about knowledge attributions, which is the view that the proposition expressed by a sentence such as ‘John knows that the bank is open at 2 p.m. ...
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This chapter introduces the thesis of contextualism about knowledge attributions, which is the view that the proposition expressed by a sentence such as ‘John knows that the bank is open at 2 p.m. EST on October 3, 2006’ varies depending upon the context of its utterance. Different versions of the thesis are explained.Less
This chapter introduces the thesis of contextualism about knowledge attributions, which is the view that the proposition expressed by a sentence such as ‘John knows that the bank is open at 2 p.m. EST on October 3, 2006’ varies depending upon the context of its utterance. Different versions of the thesis are explained.
Keith DeRose
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199564460
- eISBN:
- 9780191721410
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
In this initial exposition of contextualism, the view is explained and distinguished from other views, and especially from its rival, invariantism, whose two main forms, classical invariantism and ...
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In this initial exposition of contextualism, the view is explained and distinguished from other views, and especially from its rival, invariantism, whose two main forms, classical invariantism and subject-sensitive invariantism, are explained. The various views are discussed largely by reference to how they handle examples that display an important feature of the ordinary usage of ‘know(s)’: that what speakers are happy to call ‘knowledge’ in some contexts they won't count as such in others. After various preliminary issues are addressed and a brief history of contextualism is provided, the relation between contextualist solutions to philosophical skepticism and contextualism's roots in what transpires in ordinary, non-philosophical conversation is discussed.Less
In this initial exposition of contextualism, the view is explained and distinguished from other views, and especially from its rival, invariantism, whose two main forms, classical invariantism and subject-sensitive invariantism, are explained. The various views are discussed largely by reference to how they handle examples that display an important feature of the ordinary usage of ‘know(s)’: that what speakers are happy to call ‘knowledge’ in some contexts they won't count as such in others. After various preliminary issues are addressed and a brief history of contextualism is provided, the relation between contextualist solutions to philosophical skepticism and contextualism's roots in what transpires in ordinary, non-philosophical conversation is discussed.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter begins with a discussion of the closure principle and the problem it poses for the relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge. It then turns to a new position known as ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of the closure principle and the problem it poses for the relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge. It then turns to a new position known as contrastivism, which denies the closure principle. According to the contrastivist, knowledge is to be always understood contrastively, in the sense that one never knows that p simpliciter. Instead, one knows that p rather than each one of a set of contrasts (i.e., alternatives) to p, where knowing that a proposition obtains rather than one of the contrasts is explicitly understood in terms of discriminating the target proposition from the specified contrasts.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of the closure principle and the problem it poses for the relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge. It then turns to a new position known as contrastivism, which denies the closure principle. According to the contrastivist, knowledge is to be always understood contrastively, in the sense that one never knows that p simpliciter. Instead, one knows that p rather than each one of a set of contrasts (i.e., alternatives) to p, where knowing that a proposition obtains rather than one of the contrasts is explicitly understood in terms of discriminating the target proposition from the specified contrasts.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280384
- eISBN:
- 9780191602290
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019928038X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can ...
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One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.Less
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.
Bryan Frances
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199282135
- eISBN:
- 9780191602917
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282137.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The nagging voice of the sceptic has always been present in epistemology. Over the last thirty years or so, philosophers have thought of several promising ways to counter the radical sceptic. For ...
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The nagging voice of the sceptic has always been present in epistemology. Over the last thirty years or so, philosophers have thought of several promising ways to counter the radical sceptic. For instance, facts about the reliability of cognitive processes, principles determining which possibilities must be ruled out in order to have knowledge, and principles regarding the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. In this research monograph, Bryan Frances presents a new argument template for generating new kinds of radical scepticism, ones that hold even if all the clever anti-sceptical fixes such as contextualism, relevant alternatives theory, and reliabilism defeat the traditional sceptic. However, the new sceptical conclusions are quite different from traditional scepticism. Although the new sceptic concludes that people don’t know that fire engines are red, that people sometimes have pains in their knees, or even that people believe that fire engines are red or that knees sometimes throb, people admit that they know millions of exotic truths, such as the fact that black holes exist. One can know about the existence of black holes, but not about the colour of one’s shirt or even about what one believes regarding the colour of one’s shirt. The new sceptical arguments proceed in the usual way (here’s a sceptical hypothesis; one can’t neutralize it, one has to be able to neutralize it to know P; so one doesn’t know P), but the sceptical hypotheses plugged into it are “real, live” scientific-philosophical hypotheses often thought to be actually true, such as error theories about belief, colour, pain location, and character traits. Frances investigates the questions, ‘Under what conditions do we need to rule out these error theories in order to know things inconsistent with them?’ and ‘Can we rule them out?’Less
The nagging voice of the sceptic has always been present in epistemology. Over the last thirty years or so, philosophers have thought of several promising ways to counter the radical sceptic. For instance, facts about the reliability of cognitive processes, principles determining which possibilities must be ruled out in order to have knowledge, and principles regarding the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. In this research monograph, Bryan Frances presents a new argument template for generating new kinds of radical scepticism, ones that hold even if all the clever anti-sceptical fixes such as contextualism, relevant alternatives theory, and reliabilism defeat the traditional sceptic. However, the new sceptical conclusions are quite different from traditional scepticism. Although the new sceptic concludes that people don’t know that fire engines are red, that people sometimes have pains in their knees, or even that people believe that fire engines are red or that knees sometimes throb, people admit that they know millions of exotic truths, such as the fact that black holes exist. One can know about the existence of black holes, but not about the colour of one’s shirt or even about what one believes regarding the colour of one’s shirt. The new sceptical arguments proceed in the usual way (here’s a sceptical hypothesis; one can’t neutralize it, one has to be able to neutralize it to know P; so one doesn’t know P), but the sceptical hypotheses plugged into it are “real, live” scientific-philosophical hypotheses often thought to be actually true, such as error theories about belief, colour, pain location, and character traits. Frances investigates the questions, ‘Under what conditions do we need to rule out these error theories in order to know things inconsistent with them?’ and ‘Can we rule them out?’
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280384
- eISBN:
- 9780191602290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019928038X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
I critically examine two of the main responses to the closure-based sceptical argument. In particular, I look at the case that has been made for the rejection of closure by, for example, Fred Dretske ...
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I critically examine two of the main responses to the closure-based sceptical argument. In particular, I look at the case that has been made for the rejection of closure by, for example, Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick, and examine the so-called ‘sensitivity’ condition on knowledge that they advocate in this respect. I then evaluate this approach in the light of the attributer contextualist response to scepticism, as developed by such figures as Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose and David Lewis. In both cases I argue that these anti-sceptical approaches suffer by being motivated by diverse and incompatible intuitions, principally as regards their ambivalent endorsement of epistemological externalism. An exploration of the relationship between the sceptical problem and the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction is thus presented.Less
I critically examine two of the main responses to the closure-based sceptical argument. In particular, I look at the case that has been made for the rejection of closure by, for example, Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick, and examine the so-called ‘sensitivity’ condition on knowledge that they advocate in this respect. I then evaluate this approach in the light of the attributer contextualist response to scepticism, as developed by such figures as Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose and David Lewis. In both cases I argue that these anti-sceptical approaches suffer by being motivated by diverse and incompatible intuitions, principally as regards their ambivalent endorsement of epistemological externalism. An exploration of the relationship between the sceptical problem and the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction is thus presented.
Sherrilyn Roush
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274734
- eISBN:
- 9780191603228
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274738.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the new tracking view is superior to externalist rivals: process reliabilism, the safety view, and the relevant alternatives view. This is because of the generality problem, ...
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This chapter argues that the new tracking view is superior to externalist rivals: process reliabilism, the safety view, and the relevant alternatives view. This is because of the generality problem, and treatments of reflective knowledge, lottery propositions, direction of fit with the world, the power property, and knowledge of logical and other necessary truths. A new view of logical truth is introduced, which is in keeping with the tracking view that knowledge is a matter of responsiveness to the way the world is.Less
This chapter argues that the new tracking view is superior to externalist rivals: process reliabilism, the safety view, and the relevant alternatives view. This is because of the generality problem, and treatments of reflective knowledge, lottery propositions, direction of fit with the world, the power property, and knowledge of logical and other necessary truths. A new view of logical truth is introduced, which is in keeping with the tracking view that knowledge is a matter of responsiveness to the way the world is.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280384
- eISBN:
- 9780191602290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019928038X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
I contend that in so far as the contemporary debate about scepticism has formulated the sceptical problem correctly, and in so far as one is entitled to adopt epistemological externalism as part of ...
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I contend that in so far as the contemporary debate about scepticism has formulated the sceptical problem correctly, and in so far as one is entitled to adopt epistemological externalism as part of one’s anti-sceptical strategy, one should reject both the arguments for non-closure and for attributer contextualism, and advance, instead, a version of neo-Mooreanism that turns on the so-called ‘safety’ condition on knowledge. I explore the implications of this approach for the sceptical problem, including the manner in which it needs to be distinguished from the type of response to scepticism that is associated with G. E. Moore’s famous proof of an external world. A key component of this argument in this respect is an account of the conversational rules that govern our ascriptions of knowledge that can do justice to the intuitions that motivate attributer contextualism, while also explaining why the kind of anti-sceptical assertions made by Moore are so problematic. As regards the latter, I enlist elements of Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore’s response to the sceptic from On Certainty. I conclude that what these considerations highlight is a deep and important (and also surprising) truth about the structure of reasons.Less
I contend that in so far as the contemporary debate about scepticism has formulated the sceptical problem correctly, and in so far as one is entitled to adopt epistemological externalism as part of one’s anti-sceptical strategy, one should reject both the arguments for non-closure and for attributer contextualism, and advance, instead, a version of neo-Mooreanism that turns on the so-called ‘safety’ condition on knowledge. I explore the implications of this approach for the sceptical problem, including the manner in which it needs to be distinguished from the type of response to scepticism that is associated with G. E. Moore’s famous proof of an external world. A key component of this argument in this respect is an account of the conversational rules that govern our ascriptions of knowledge that can do justice to the intuitions that motivate attributer contextualism, while also explaining why the kind of anti-sceptical assertions made by Moore are so problematic. As regards the latter, I enlist elements of Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore’s response to the sceptic from On Certainty. I conclude that what these considerations highlight is a deep and important (and also surprising) truth about the structure of reasons.
Roy Sorensen
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130058
- eISBN:
- 9780199833481
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130057.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In ”Formal Problems about Knowledge,” Roy Sorensen examines epistemological issues that have logical aspects. He uses Fitch's proof for unknowables and the surprise test paradox to illustrate the ...
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In ”Formal Problems about Knowledge,” Roy Sorensen examines epistemological issues that have logical aspects. He uses Fitch's proof for unknowables and the surprise test paradox to illustrate the hopes of the modal logicians who developed epistemic logic, and he considers the epistemology of proof with the help of the knower paradox. One solution to this paradox is that knowledge is not closed under deduction. Sorensen reviews the broader history of this maneuver along with the relevant alternatives model of knowledge which assumes that ”know” is an absolute term like ”flat.” Sorensen argues that the difference between epistemic absolute terms and extensional absolute terms gives rise to an asymmetry that undermines recent claims that there is a structural parallel between the supervaluational and epistemicist theories of vagueness, and he suggests that we have overestimated the ability of logical demonstration to produce knowledge.Less
In ”Formal Problems about Knowledge,” Roy Sorensen examines epistemological issues that have logical aspects. He uses Fitch's proof for unknowables and the surprise test paradox to illustrate the hopes of the modal logicians who developed epistemic logic, and he considers the epistemology of proof with the help of the knower paradox. One solution to this paradox is that knowledge is not closed under deduction. Sorensen reviews the broader history of this maneuver along with the relevant alternatives model of knowledge which assumes that ”know” is an absolute term like ”flat.” Sorensen argues that the difference between epistemic absolute terms and extensional absolute terms gives rise to an asymmetry that undermines recent claims that there is a structural parallel between the supervaluational and epistemicist theories of vagueness, and he suggests that we have overestimated the ability of logical demonstration to produce knowledge.
Alvin Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199287512
- eISBN:
- 9780191713620
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
It is difficult to reconcile Williamson's rejection of ‘decompositional’ analyses with his positive proposals for an ‘account’ of knowledge. After arguing that epistemologists should remain ...
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It is difficult to reconcile Williamson's rejection of ‘decompositional’ analyses with his positive proposals for an ‘account’ of knowledge. After arguing that epistemologists should remain interested in sufficiency conditions, this chapter challenges the sufficiency of Williamson's safety-based account. Examination of cases suggests that the safety-based account is probably inferior to two of its reliabilist ‘cousins’: the relevant-alternatives approach and the reliable-process approach. The remainder of the chapter offers reasons to doubt Williamson's ‘evidence equals knowledge’ thesis. Interpreting evidence as non-inferential propositional justifiedness is at least as promising as interpreting evidence as knowledge. The case of the diffident doxastic agent — whose reluctance to believe is compatible with an abundance of evidence — helps support this claim.Less
It is difficult to reconcile Williamson's rejection of ‘decompositional’ analyses with his positive proposals for an ‘account’ of knowledge. After arguing that epistemologists should remain interested in sufficiency conditions, this chapter challenges the sufficiency of Williamson's safety-based account. Examination of cases suggests that the safety-based account is probably inferior to two of its reliabilist ‘cousins’: the relevant-alternatives approach and the reliable-process approach. The remainder of the chapter offers reasons to doubt Williamson's ‘evidence equals knowledge’ thesis. Interpreting evidence as non-inferential propositional justifiedness is at least as promising as interpreting evidence as knowledge. The case of the diffident doxastic agent — whose reluctance to believe is compatible with an abundance of evidence — helps support this claim.
Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247293.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Presents and tries to defuse some classic arguments for moral scepticism, and against the possibility of moral knowledge. Considers the regress argument, an argument from relevant alternatives, and a ...
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Presents and tries to defuse some classic arguments for moral scepticism, and against the possibility of moral knowledge. Considers the regress argument, an argument from relevant alternatives, and a vicious circle argument, and tries to show why we can continue to justifiably believe moral claims even in the absence of a decisive means of undermining these sceptical arguments.Less
Presents and tries to defuse some classic arguments for moral scepticism, and against the possibility of moral knowledge. Considers the regress argument, an argument from relevant alternatives, and a vicious circle argument, and tries to show why we can continue to justifiably believe moral claims even in the absence of a decisive means of undermining these sceptical arguments.
Bryan Frances
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199282135
- eISBN:
- 9780191602917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282137.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The argument template used to generate the new sceptical arguments is presented. In doing so, what it means for a hypothesis to be “live”, what it means for someone to be a “mere mortal” with regard ...
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The argument template used to generate the new sceptical arguments is presented. In doing so, what it means for a hypothesis to be “live”, what it means for someone to be a “mere mortal” with regard to a live hypothesis, what it means to be able to “rule out” a hypothesis are explained. The key premises of the argument: the Modesty Principle, the Live Hypothesis Principle, and the Mere Mortal Premiss are formulated. Roughly put, if one is a mere mortal with regard to a live hypothesis H, then in order for one to know something P obviously inconsistent with H, one needs to be able to rule out or neutralize H. But since one is a mere mortal, one can’t neutralize H; so one does not know P.Less
The argument template used to generate the new sceptical arguments is presented. In doing so, what it means for a hypothesis to be “live”, what it means for someone to be a “mere mortal” with regard to a live hypothesis, what it means to be able to “rule out” a hypothesis are explained. The key premises of the argument: the Modesty Principle, the Live Hypothesis Principle, and the Mere Mortal Premiss are formulated. Roughly put, if one is a mere mortal with regard to a live hypothesis H, then in order for one to know something P obviously inconsistent with H, one needs to be able to rule out or neutralize H. But since one is a mere mortal, one can’t neutralize H; so one does not know P.
Krista Lawlor
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199657896
- eISBN:
- 9780191748127
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657896.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In the second chapter, we build on Austin’s insight about how the truth (or falsity) of an utterance is determined. The key insight is that the truth of an utterance depends on the situation the ...
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In the second chapter, we build on Austin’s insight about how the truth (or falsity) of an utterance is determined. The key insight is that the truth of an utterance depends on the situation the utterance is about. In determining the truth or falsity of a knowledge claim, the situation is an epistemic one, and includes the set of reasonable alternatives to p. In this way, we build reasonable alternatives into the foundation of an Austinian semantic theory for knowledge claims. The resulting theory allows us to incorporate an element of invariantism into a broadly contextualist view—specifically, the Austinian maintains that the meaning and the semantic content of ‘knows’ is invariant, while allowing for context sensitivity of the truth values of knowledge claims.Less
In the second chapter, we build on Austin’s insight about how the truth (or falsity) of an utterance is determined. The key insight is that the truth of an utterance depends on the situation the utterance is about. In determining the truth or falsity of a knowledge claim, the situation is an epistemic one, and includes the set of reasonable alternatives to p. In this way, we build reasonable alternatives into the foundation of an Austinian semantic theory for knowledge claims. The resulting theory allows us to incorporate an element of invariantism into a broadly contextualist view—specifically, the Austinian maintains that the meaning and the semantic content of ‘knows’ is invariant, while allowing for context sensitivity of the truth values of knowledge claims.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691143972
- eISBN:
- 9781400836918
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers the extent to which contextualism constitutes a further rival view in epistemology proper, and offers reasons to doubt that it is. Contextualism has gained center stage in ...
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This chapter considers the extent to which contextualism constitutes a further rival view in epistemology proper, and offers reasons to doubt that it is. Contextualism has gained center stage in epistemology mainly through its way with the skeptic, from the early days of “relevant alternatives” to more recent incarnations. Contextualism in epistemology concerns mainly threshold-setting mechanisms. The words involved, mainly the verb “to know” and its cognates, mark whether the subject lies above a threshold along one or more dimensions. While this chapter proceeds with an acceptance of the elements of contextualism, the chapter also enters some doubts about its implications for epistemology proper.Less
This chapter considers the extent to which contextualism constitutes a further rival view in epistemology proper, and offers reasons to doubt that it is. Contextualism has gained center stage in epistemology mainly through its way with the skeptic, from the early days of “relevant alternatives” to more recent incarnations. Contextualism in epistemology concerns mainly threshold-setting mechanisms. The words involved, mainly the verb “to know” and its cognates, mark whether the subject lies above a threshold along one or more dimensions. While this chapter proceeds with an acceptance of the elements of contextualism, the chapter also enters some doubts about its implications for epistemology proper.
Bryan Frances
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199282135
- eISBN:
- 9780191602917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282137.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The main themes of the book are introduced in a preliminary and intuitive way.
The main themes of the book are introduced in a preliminary and intuitive way.
Mikkel Gerken
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198803454
- eISBN:
- 9780191841637
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198803454.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 10 addresses the salient alternative effects on knowledge ascriptions by developing the epistemic focal bias account. According to this account, denials of knowledge in the face of a salient ...
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Chapter 10 addresses the salient alternative effects on knowledge ascriptions by developing the epistemic focal bias account. According to this account, denials of knowledge in the face of a salient alternative often amount to false negatives. But while this is argued to be central to a comprehensive diagnosis, it is recognized that other psychological factors may also influence this class of judgments, and some of these are discussed. Furthermore, the epistemic focal bias account is integrated with a number of assumptions drawn from cognitive pragmatics. In this manner, Chapter 10 provides an empirical account and philosophical diagnosis of the puzzling pattern of knowledge ascriptions constituted by salient alternative effects.Less
Chapter 10 addresses the salient alternative effects on knowledge ascriptions by developing the epistemic focal bias account. According to this account, denials of knowledge in the face of a salient alternative often amount to false negatives. But while this is argued to be central to a comprehensive diagnosis, it is recognized that other psychological factors may also influence this class of judgments, and some of these are discussed. Furthermore, the epistemic focal bias account is integrated with a number of assumptions drawn from cognitive pragmatics. In this manner, Chapter 10 provides an empirical account and philosophical diagnosis of the puzzling pattern of knowledge ascriptions constituted by salient alternative effects.
Bryan Frances
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199282135
- eISBN:
- 9780191602917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282137.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It isn’t clear what scepticism really is. Perhaps it’s the thesis that certain knowledge attributions are false. Then again, it might be that even though knowledge attributions are true pretty much ...
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It isn’t clear what scepticism really is. Perhaps it’s the thesis that certain knowledge attributions are false. Then again, it might be that even though knowledge attributions are true pretty much when common sense says they’re true, the facts that make them true are impoverished compared to what anyone thought. For instance, if it turned out that all true beliefs had only piddling amounts of warrant and knowledge is mere true belief, then although knowledge attributions would be true, the sceptic would still win. These matters are explored and it is argued that even if live scepticism is false, since her central thesis ‘The overall warrant possessed by the beliefs targeted by the live skeptical hypotheses is anemic compared to that had by our other beliefs that amount to knowledge and aren’t targeted by any live skeptical hypotheses’ may still be true, she may still win the battle with the critic of live skepticism.Less
It isn’t clear what scepticism really is. Perhaps it’s the thesis that certain knowledge attributions are false. Then again, it might be that even though knowledge attributions are true pretty much when common sense says they’re true, the facts that make them true are impoverished compared to what anyone thought. For instance, if it turned out that all true beliefs had only piddling amounts of warrant and knowledge is mere true belief, then although knowledge attributions would be true, the sceptic would still win. These matters are explored and it is argued that even if live scepticism is false, since her central thesis ‘The overall warrant possessed by the beliefs targeted by the live skeptical hypotheses is anemic compared to that had by our other beliefs that amount to knowledge and aren’t targeted by any live skeptical hypotheses’ may still be true, she may still win the battle with the critic of live skepticism.
Wesley H. Holliday
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198722762
- eISBN:
- 9780191794087
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that epistemologists should replace a “standard alternatives” picture of knowledge, assumed by many fallibilist theories of knowledge, with a new “multipath” picture of knowledge. ...
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This chapter argues that epistemologists should replace a “standard alternatives” picture of knowledge, assumed by many fallibilist theories of knowledge, with a new “multipath” picture of knowledge. The chapter first identifies a problem for the standard picture: fallibilists working with this picture cannot maintain even the most uncontroversial epistemic closure principles without making extreme assumptions about the ability of humans to know empirical truths without empirical investigation. The chapter then shows how the multipath picture, motivated by independent arguments, saves fallibilism from this problem. The multipath picture is based on taking seriously the idea that there can be multiple paths to knowing some propositions about the world. An overlooked consequence of fallibilism is that these multiple paths to knowledge may involve ruling out different sets of alternatives, which should be represented in a fallibilist picture of knowledge. The chapter concludes by considering inductive knowledge and strong epistemic closure from this multipath perspective.Less
This chapter argues that epistemologists should replace a “standard alternatives” picture of knowledge, assumed by many fallibilist theories of knowledge, with a new “multipath” picture of knowledge. The chapter first identifies a problem for the standard picture: fallibilists working with this picture cannot maintain even the most uncontroversial epistemic closure principles without making extreme assumptions about the ability of humans to know empirical truths without empirical investigation. The chapter then shows how the multipath picture, motivated by independent arguments, saves fallibilism from this problem. The multipath picture is based on taking seriously the idea that there can be multiple paths to knowing some propositions about the world. An overlooked consequence of fallibilism is that these multiple paths to knowledge may involve ruling out different sets of alternatives, which should be represented in a fallibilist picture of knowledge. The chapter concludes by considering inductive knowledge and strong epistemic closure from this multipath perspective.
