William Fish
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195381344
- eISBN:
- 9780199869183
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The idea of a disjunctive theory of visual experiences first found expression in J. M. Hinton's pioneering 1973 book Experiences. The first monograph in this exciting area since then, this book ...
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The idea of a disjunctive theory of visual experiences first found expression in J. M. Hinton's pioneering 1973 book Experiences. The first monograph in this exciting area since then, this book develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed accounts of the three core kinds of visual experience—perception, hallucination, and illusion—and an explanation of how perception and hallucination could be indiscriminable from one another without having anything in common. In the veridical case, it contends that the perception of a particular state of affairs involves the subject's being acquainted with that state of affairs, and that it is the subject's standing in this acquaintance relation that makes the experience possess a phenomenal character. It argues that when we hallucinate, we are having an experience that, while lacking phenomenal character, is mistakenly supposed by the subject to possess it and shows how this approach is compatible with empirical research into the workings of the brain. It concludes by offering a novel treatment of the many different types of illusion that we can be subject to, which accounts for many illusions, not as special cases of either veridical perception or hallucination but rather as mixed cases that involve elements of both.Less
The idea of a disjunctive theory of visual experiences first found expression in J. M. Hinton's pioneering 1973 book Experiences. The first monograph in this exciting area since then, this book develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed accounts of the three core kinds of visual experience—perception, hallucination, and illusion—and an explanation of how perception and hallucination could be indiscriminable from one another without having anything in common. In the veridical case, it contends that the perception of a particular state of affairs involves the subject's being acquainted with that state of affairs, and that it is the subject's standing in this acquaintance relation that makes the experience possess a phenomenal character. It argues that when we hallucinate, we are having an experience that, while lacking phenomenal character, is mistakenly supposed by the subject to possess it and shows how this approach is compatible with empirical research into the workings of the brain. It concludes by offering a novel treatment of the many different types of illusion that we can be subject to, which accounts for many illusions, not as special cases of either veridical perception or hallucination but rather as mixed cases that involve elements of both.
Jonathan Cohen
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This book offers a new approach to longstanding philosophical puzzles about what colors are and how they fit into the natural world. The author argues for a role-functionalist treatment of color — a ...
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This book offers a new approach to longstanding philosophical puzzles about what colors are and how they fit into the natural world. The author argues for a role-functionalist treatment of color — a view according to which colors are identical to certain functional roles involving perceptual effects on subjects. The author first argues (on broadly empirical grounds) for the more general relationalist view that colors are constituted in terms of relations between objects, perceivers, and viewing conditions. He responds to semantic, ontological, and phenomenological objections against this thesis, and argues that relationalism offers the best hope of respecting both empirical results and ordinary belief about color. He then defends the more specific role-functionalist account by contending that the latter is the most plausible form of color relationalism.Less
This book offers a new approach to longstanding philosophical puzzles about what colors are and how they fit into the natural world. The author argues for a role-functionalist treatment of color — a view according to which colors are identical to certain functional roles involving perceptual effects on subjects. The author first argues (on broadly empirical grounds) for the more general relationalist view that colors are constituted in terms of relations between objects, perceivers, and viewing conditions. He responds to semantic, ontological, and phenomenological objections against this thesis, and argues that relationalism offers the best hope of respecting both empirical results and ordinary belief about color. He then defends the more specific role-functionalist account by contending that the latter is the most plausible form of color relationalism.
JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
In summary, the start of this essay provided two accounts of the nature of color in terms of a distinction between relationalist accounts and non-relationalist accounts. A novel taxonomy of the ...
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In summary, the start of this essay provided two accounts of the nature of color in terms of a distinction between relationalist accounts and non-relationalist accounts. A novel taxonomy of the theoretical landscape is then offered that puts forward color relationalism. A series of challenges concerning relationalism is then examined and considered to be unsuccessful by the author. Having argued for the claim that one should embrace a relationalist ontology of color, several objections about relationalism are investigated. The accusation that color relationalism is inconsistent with the ordinary color phenomenology, or that it cannot be coherently combined with plausible theories of the nature of color phenomenology is also explored. Further, the role functionalist form of relationalism is defended and compared with other forms of color relationalism that have attracted philosophical adherents.Less
In summary, the start of this essay provided two accounts of the nature of color in terms of a distinction between relationalist accounts and non-relationalist accounts. A novel taxonomy of the theoretical landscape is then offered that puts forward color relationalism. A series of challenges concerning relationalism is then examined and considered to be unsuccessful by the author. Having argued for the claim that one should embrace a relationalist ontology of color, several objections about relationalism are investigated. The accusation that color relationalism is inconsistent with the ordinary color phenomenology, or that it cannot be coherently combined with plausible theories of the nature of color phenomenology is also explored. Further, the role functionalist form of relationalism is defended and compared with other forms of color relationalism that have attracted philosophical adherents.
Ian Hinckfuss
- Published in print:
- 1975
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245193
- eISBN:
- 9780191680854
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245193.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book addresses the philosophical problems of space and time. Roughly speaking, Chapters 1, 2, and 3 deal with space, and Chapters 4, 5, and 6 deal with time. These problems perhaps arise merely ...
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This book addresses the philosophical problems of space and time. Roughly speaking, Chapters 1, 2, and 3 deal with space, and Chapters 4, 5, and 6 deal with time. These problems perhaps arise merely by virtue of the way in which the language is constructed. The business of providing means for the elimination of certain expressions from the descriptions of the world is often called reduction. Thus, relationalism is a reductionist programme. Moreover, an overview of the chapters included in the book is provided.Less
This book addresses the philosophical problems of space and time. Roughly speaking, Chapters 1, 2, and 3 deal with space, and Chapters 4, 5, and 6 deal with time. These problems perhaps arise merely by virtue of the way in which the language is constructed. The business of providing means for the elimination of certain expressions from the descriptions of the world is often called reduction. Thus, relationalism is a reductionist programme. Moreover, an overview of the chapters included in the book is provided.
Gordon Belot
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199595327
- eISBN:
- 9780191729157
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199595327.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Relationalism about space is a venerable doctrine that is enjoying renewed attention among philosophers and physicists. Relationalists deny that space is ontologically prior to matter and seek to ...
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Relationalism about space is a venerable doctrine that is enjoying renewed attention among philosophers and physicists. Relationalists deny that space is ontologically prior to matter and seek to ground all claims about the structure of space in facts about actual and possible configurations of matter. Thus, many relationalists maintain that to say that space is infinite is to say that certain sorts of infinite arrays of material points are possible (even if, in fact, the world contains only a finite amount of matter). This book investigates the distinctive notion of geometric possibility that relationalists rely upon. Its over‐arching strategy is to examine the prospects for adapting to the geometric case the standard philosophical accounts of the related notion of physical possibility. The central chapters of the book examine Humean, primitivist, and necessitarian accounts of physical and geometric possibility.Less
Relationalism about space is a venerable doctrine that is enjoying renewed attention among philosophers and physicists. Relationalists deny that space is ontologically prior to matter and seek to ground all claims about the structure of space in facts about actual and possible configurations of matter. Thus, many relationalists maintain that to say that space is infinite is to say that certain sorts of infinite arrays of material points are possible (even if, in fact, the world contains only a finite amount of matter). This book investigates the distinctive notion of geometric possibility that relationalists rely upon. Its over‐arching strategy is to examine the prospects for adapting to the geometric case the standard philosophical accounts of the related notion of physical possibility. The central chapters of the book examine Humean, primitivist, and necessitarian accounts of physical and geometric possibility.
Gordon Belot
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199595327
- eISBN:
- 9780191729157
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199595327.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter provides a brief overview of the preceding chapters. It gives some concluding thoughts about substantivalism, relationalism, modality, and the laws of nature.
This chapter provides a brief overview of the preceding chapters. It gives some concluding thoughts about substantivalism, relationalism, modality, and the laws of nature.
JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
An argument for color relationalism based on the phenomenon of perceptual variation, which the author considers as the core argument for relationalism is presented in this chapter. Several different ...
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An argument for color relationalism based on the phenomenon of perceptual variation, which the author considers as the core argument for relationalism is presented in this chapter. Several different forms of this argument are demonstrated and in every instance, the author argues the evidence favors a relational, rather than an anti-relational, conception of color. The chapter begins with an illustrative instance and a general form with multiple instances of the argument. Then, the author extends the argument form to a number of independent factors: inter-species differences, interpersonal differences, and intrapersonal differences. This chapter concludes with an assertion that one should accept a relational understanding of colors. Also, several puzzles about color in the philosophical literature that turn on perceptual variation phenomena and in which relationalism provides an elegant and unified resolution is presented in the latter part of this chapter.Less
An argument for color relationalism based on the phenomenon of perceptual variation, which the author considers as the core argument for relationalism is presented in this chapter. Several different forms of this argument are demonstrated and in every instance, the author argues the evidence favors a relational, rather than an anti-relational, conception of color. The chapter begins with an illustrative instance and a general form with multiple instances of the argument. Then, the author extends the argument form to a number of independent factors: inter-species differences, interpersonal differences, and intrapersonal differences. This chapter concludes with an assertion that one should accept a relational understanding of colors. Also, several puzzles about color in the philosophical literature that turn on perceptual variation phenomena and in which relationalism provides an elegant and unified resolution is presented in the latter part of this chapter.
JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Addressing a series of challenges to the color relationalist's ontology is the main goal of this chapter. The first objection concerns the large plurality of color properties recognized by color ...
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Addressing a series of challenges to the color relationalist's ontology is the main goal of this chapter. The first objection concerns the large plurality of color properties recognized by color relationalism. The second objection focuses on the accusation that relationalism is committed to irrealism about color. Lastly, the charge that relationalism is an error theory is examined. As it is argued in this chapter, standard motivations for parsimony in counting properties are unpersuasive when applied to relational properties. In addition, while there are some construals of the real/unreal distinction according to which that relationalism is committed to irrealism, there is no compelling and philosophically substantive reason to reject those kinds of irrealism. Further, the accusation that relationalism is an error theory is considered insufficient by the author.Less
Addressing a series of challenges to the color relationalist's ontology is the main goal of this chapter. The first objection concerns the large plurality of color properties recognized by color relationalism. The second objection focuses on the accusation that relationalism is committed to irrealism about color. Lastly, the charge that relationalism is an error theory is examined. As it is argued in this chapter, standard motivations for parsimony in counting properties are unpersuasive when applied to relational properties. In addition, while there are some construals of the real/unreal distinction according to which that relationalism is committed to irrealism, there is no compelling and philosophically substantive reason to reject those kinds of irrealism. Further, the accusation that relationalism is an error theory is considered insufficient by the author.
JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
A relationalist treatment of the phenomenology of color is offered in this chapter. It explores the accusation that color relationalism is inconsistent with the ordinary color phenomenology, and that ...
More
A relationalist treatment of the phenomenology of color is offered in this chapter. It explores the accusation that color relationalism is inconsistent with the ordinary color phenomenology, and that it cannot be coherently combined with plausible theories of the nature of color phenomenology. To defend relationalism against both types of phenomenological objections, the aim of this chapter is to illustrate that color relationalism is not in conflict with the phenomenological evidence about color once one understands just how phenomenology can be useful in addressing questions of color ontology and that it presents no special difficulties regarding the metaphysics of color experience. Furthermore, the threat of regress dissolves when it is seen that it depends crucially on substitution instances that one has reason to reject, and that relationalism is not ungrounded in any sense that would prevent understanding of the theory.Less
A relationalist treatment of the phenomenology of color is offered in this chapter. It explores the accusation that color relationalism is inconsistent with the ordinary color phenomenology, and that it cannot be coherently combined with plausible theories of the nature of color phenomenology. To defend relationalism against both types of phenomenological objections, the aim of this chapter is to illustrate that color relationalism is not in conflict with the phenomenological evidence about color once one understands just how phenomenology can be useful in addressing questions of color ontology and that it presents no special difficulties regarding the metaphysics of color experience. Furthermore, the threat of regress dissolves when it is seen that it depends crucially on substitution instances that one has reason to reject, and that relationalism is not ungrounded in any sense that would prevent understanding of the theory.
JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter compares role functionalism with other forms of color relationalism that have attracted philosophical adherents and argues that these alternative forms of relationalism all have serious ...
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This chapter compares role functionalism with other forms of color relationalism that have attracted philosophical adherents and argues that these alternative forms of relationalism all have serious drawbacks. Specifically, these forms include color dispositionalism, ecological relationalism, and sensory classificationalism. The author argues that dispositionalism either collapses onto role functionalism or rests on an implausible account of the relationship between dispositions and their bases. Ecological relationalism, on the other hand, falls prey to worries about multiple realization and is committed either to an unacceptable form of idealism or mislocates colors. Lastly, sensory classficationism links too tightly the perceptual classificatory responses of organisms and their subsequent epistemic or non-epistemic actions. With these contentions at hand, this chapter asserts that the role functionalism is the most promising species of relationalist color ontology.Less
This chapter compares role functionalism with other forms of color relationalism that have attracted philosophical adherents and argues that these alternative forms of relationalism all have serious drawbacks. Specifically, these forms include color dispositionalism, ecological relationalism, and sensory classificationalism. The author argues that dispositionalism either collapses onto role functionalism or rests on an implausible account of the relationship between dispositions and their bases. Ecological relationalism, on the other hand, falls prey to worries about multiple realization and is committed either to an unacceptable form of idealism or mislocates colors. Lastly, sensory classficationism links too tightly the perceptual classificatory responses of organisms and their subsequent epistemic or non-epistemic actions. With these contentions at hand, this chapter asserts that the role functionalism is the most promising species of relationalist color ontology.
Heidi Rolland Unruh and Ronald J. Sider
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195161557
- eISBN:
- 9780199835836
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195161556.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
The current conversation about faith-based initiatives calls for closer attention to socially active conversionist churches—those that serve society alongside, or motivated by, a desire to save ...
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The current conversation about faith-based initiatives calls for closer attention to socially active conversionist churches—those that serve society alongside, or motivated by, a desire to save souls. Five main dialectical qualities depict these churches' public mission: engaged orthodoxy that balances this-worldly engagement with anticipation of other-worldly salvation; a whole-person anthropology, concerned with meeting both spiritual and social needs; invitational voluntarism that recruits others to Christian faith while respecting their free will; expressive relationalism that promotes caring relationships as a channel for communicating the gospel; and expanded individualism that values personal regeneration and structural reform as mutually reinforcing objectives. These attributes help to explain how conversionist churches are able to adapt and diversify their outreach strategies to expand their access to secular resources. The impact of socially engaged conversionist churches is likely disproportionate to their number, particularly among evangelical, inner-city and ethnic minority congregations.Less
The current conversation about faith-based initiatives calls for closer attention to socially active conversionist churches—those that serve society alongside, or motivated by, a desire to save souls. Five main dialectical qualities depict these churches' public mission: engaged orthodoxy that balances this-worldly engagement with anticipation of other-worldly salvation; a whole-person anthropology, concerned with meeting both spiritual and social needs; invitational voluntarism that recruits others to Christian faith while respecting their free will; expressive relationalism that promotes caring relationships as a channel for communicating the gospel; and expanded individualism that values personal regeneration and structural reform as mutually reinforcing objectives. These attributes help to explain how conversionist churches are able to adapt and diversify their outreach strategies to expand their access to secular resources. The impact of socially engaged conversionist churches is likely disproportionate to their number, particularly among evangelical, inner-city and ethnic minority congregations.
Heidi Rolland Unruh and Ronald J. Sider
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195161557
- eISBN:
- 9780199835836
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195161556.003.0011
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Congregations represent a significant source of energy for social action because of their unique capacity to mobilize a constituent network for collective ends. Congregations translate their social ...
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Congregations represent a significant source of energy for social action because of their unique capacity to mobilize a constituent network for collective ends. Congregations translate their social capital into public good by sponsoring organized action, by empowering the civic involvement of members, by sharing resources within the congregation's relational network, and by harnessing religious cultural capital to social concerns. An evangelistic mission may strengthen a church's social capital, particularly if the church adopts a relational, holistic mission orientation, sharing its faith both in word and deed. This potential may be limited, however, by the challenges of connecting with people across racial, cultural or socioeconomic class lines, and by the lack of a social vision.Less
Congregations represent a significant source of energy for social action because of their unique capacity to mobilize a constituent network for collective ends. Congregations translate their social capital into public good by sponsoring organized action, by empowering the civic involvement of members, by sharing resources within the congregation's relational network, and by harnessing religious cultural capital to social concerns. An evangelistic mission may strengthen a church's social capital, particularly if the church adopts a relational, holistic mission orientation, sharing its faith both in word and deed. This potential may be limited, however, by the challenges of connecting with people across racial, cultural or socioeconomic class lines, and by the lack of a social vision.
Bence Nanay (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195386196
- eISBN:
- 9780199866748
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195386196.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Philosophy of perception has recently become one of the most important and most central subfields of philosophical research.This book aims to give a representative sample of the new approaches in ...
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Philosophy of perception has recently become one of the most important and most central subfields of philosophical research.This book aims to give a representative sample of the new approaches in philosophy of perception that are responsible for this explosion of philosophical interest. This book contains twelve chapters, written by some of the leading contemporary philosophers of perception. The book covers topics such as color relationalism, color phenomenology, the feeling of presence as it relats to perceptual recognition, the texture of conscious experience, inner experience, and visual experience.Less
Philosophy of perception has recently become one of the most important and most central subfields of philosophical research.This book aims to give a representative sample of the new approaches in philosophy of perception that are responsible for this explosion of philosophical interest. This book contains twelve chapters, written by some of the leading contemporary philosophers of perception. The book covers topics such as color relationalism, color phenomenology, the feeling of presence as it relats to perceptual recognition, the texture of conscious experience, inner experience, and visual experience.
Jonathan Cohen
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195386196
- eISBN:
- 9780199866748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195386196.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations between subjects and objects. Despite its other merits, many have been convinced that relationalism conflicts ...
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Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations between subjects and objects. Despite its other merits, many have been convinced that relationalism conflicts unacceptably with the manifest evidence of color phenomenology, and that this clash between theory and data should be resolved by giving up the theory. In this paper I’ll defend color relationalism from several versions of this worry. I’ll urge that, once we make clear just what and how color phenomenology can and cannot tell us about the nature of color properties, the data of phenomenology will be seen to support, rather than detract from, the case for relationalism. This chapter defends color relationalism from several versions of this worry. It urgese that, once we make clear just what and how color phenomenology can and cannot tell us about the nature of color properties, the data of phenomenology will be seen to support, rather than detract from, the case for relationalism. It concludes that color phenomenology is not the stumbling block for color relationalism that many have held it to be.Less
Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations between subjects and objects. Despite its other merits, many have been convinced that relationalism conflicts unacceptably with the manifest evidence of color phenomenology, and that this clash between theory and data should be resolved by giving up the theory. In this paper I’ll defend color relationalism from several versions of this worry. I’ll urge that, once we make clear just what and how color phenomenology can and cannot tell us about the nature of color properties, the data of phenomenology will be seen to support, rather than detract from, the case for relationalism. This chapter defends color relationalism from several versions of this worry. It urgese that, once we make clear just what and how color phenomenology can and cannot tell us about the nature of color properties, the data of phenomenology will be seen to support, rather than detract from, the case for relationalism. It concludes that color phenomenology is not the stumbling block for color relationalism that many have held it to be.
Feng Zhang
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780804793896
- eISBN:
- 9780804795043
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804793896.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book explores the strategic and institutional dynamics of international relations in East Asian history when imperial China was the undisputed regional hegemon. It draws on both Chinese and ...
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This book explores the strategic and institutional dynamics of international relations in East Asian history when imperial China was the undisputed regional hegemon. It draws on both Chinese and Western intellectual traditions to develop a relational theory of grand strategy and fundamental institutions in regional relations. The theory is evaluated with three case studies of Sino-Korean, Sino-Japanese, and Sino-Mongol relations during China’s early Ming dynasty (1368-1424). The book argues that early Ming China and its neighbors adopted a variety of grand strategies in their interactions, including both instrumental strategies and strategies with a distinct Confucian expressive rationality. The strategic patterns showed that expressive rationality embodying Confucian relational affection and obligation was an essential, though not dominant, feature of regional relations. This finding challenges the Eurocentric International Relations literature that has little conception of expressive rationality. Providing an institutional analysis of the early-Ming East Asian international society of Chinese hegemony, the book also challenges the venerable tribute system paradigm in the traditional historical as well as the more recent International Relations literatures. Contemporary policy implications are suggested by outlining ethical relationalism as a critical and normative theory to critique contemporary Chinese foreign policy and assess the strategic impact of China’s rise.Less
This book explores the strategic and institutional dynamics of international relations in East Asian history when imperial China was the undisputed regional hegemon. It draws on both Chinese and Western intellectual traditions to develop a relational theory of grand strategy and fundamental institutions in regional relations. The theory is evaluated with three case studies of Sino-Korean, Sino-Japanese, and Sino-Mongol relations during China’s early Ming dynasty (1368-1424). The book argues that early Ming China and its neighbors adopted a variety of grand strategies in their interactions, including both instrumental strategies and strategies with a distinct Confucian expressive rationality. The strategic patterns showed that expressive rationality embodying Confucian relational affection and obligation was an essential, though not dominant, feature of regional relations. This finding challenges the Eurocentric International Relations literature that has little conception of expressive rationality. Providing an institutional analysis of the early-Ming East Asian international society of Chinese hegemony, the book also challenges the venerable tribute system paradigm in the traditional historical as well as the more recent International Relations literatures. Contemporary policy implications are suggested by outlining ethical relationalism as a critical and normative theory to critique contemporary Chinese foreign policy and assess the strategic impact of China’s rise.
Lee Smolin
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199269693
- eISBN:
- 9780191699436
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269693.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter explains the arguments behind the assertion that the correct quantum theory of gravity must be background independent. It begins by recounting how the debate over whether quantum gravity ...
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This chapter explains the arguments behind the assertion that the correct quantum theory of gravity must be background independent. It begins by recounting how the debate over whether quantum gravity must be background independent is a continuation of a long-standing argument in the history of physics and philosophy over whether space and time are relational or absolute. This leads to a careful statement of what physicists mean when we speak of background independence. Given this we can characterize the precise sense in which general relativity is a background-independent theory. The leading background-independent approaches to quantum gravity are then discussed, including causal set models, loop quantum gravity, and dynamical triangulations, and their main achievements are summarized along with the problems that remain open. The relational/absolute debate has implications also for other issues such as unification and how the parameters of the standard models of physics and cosmology are to be explained. The chapter reviews recent issues concerning the string theory landscape and argues that they can only be resolved within the context of a background-independent formulation. Finally, it reviews some recent proposals to make quantum theory more relational.Less
This chapter explains the arguments behind the assertion that the correct quantum theory of gravity must be background independent. It begins by recounting how the debate over whether quantum gravity must be background independent is a continuation of a long-standing argument in the history of physics and philosophy over whether space and time are relational or absolute. This leads to a careful statement of what physicists mean when we speak of background independence. Given this we can characterize the precise sense in which general relativity is a background-independent theory. The leading background-independent approaches to quantum gravity are then discussed, including causal set models, loop quantum gravity, and dynamical triangulations, and their main achievements are summarized along with the problems that remain open. The relational/absolute debate has implications also for other issues such as unification and how the parameters of the standard models of physics and cosmology are to be explained. The chapter reviews recent issues concerning the string theory landscape and argues that they can only be resolved within the context of a background-independent formulation. Finally, it reviews some recent proposals to make quantum theory more relational.
John Hawthorne
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199291236
- eISBN:
- 9780191710612
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291236.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines modal considerations on reifying locations. Denying the existence of spatiotemporal locations excludes certain possibilities for spatiotemporal reality. Denying the existence of ...
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This chapter examines modal considerations on reifying locations. Denying the existence of spatiotemporal locations excludes certain possibilities for spatiotemporal reality. Denying the existence of qualitative locations excludes certain possibilities for qualitative reality. In each case the excluded possibilities are pre-analytically possible. Some of the possibilities can be reinstated by modifying the locationless theories, but at the cost of an unattractive holism.Less
This chapter examines modal considerations on reifying locations. Denying the existence of spatiotemporal locations excludes certain possibilities for spatiotemporal reality. Denying the existence of qualitative locations excludes certain possibilities for qualitative reality. In each case the excluded possibilities are pre-analytically possible. Some of the possibilities can be reinstated by modifying the locationless theories, but at the cost of an unattractive holism.
John Hawthorne
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199291236
- eISBN:
- 9780191710612
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291236.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Let us say that a thing is gunky just in case every part of that thing has proper parts (i.e., parts that are not identical to it). The idea that all physical objects are gunky seems sufficiently ...
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Let us say that a thing is gunky just in case every part of that thing has proper parts (i.e., parts that are not identical to it). The idea that all physical objects are gunky seems sufficiently sweeping, interesting, and plausible that it is worth examining. However, there is a difficulty. The features of an extended object can surely vary continuously (in time and/or space). If an object is gunky then it cannot have point-sized parts which have no further parts. But how can one conceive of a continuous variation in features other than as the obtaining of different features at different point-sized locations? This chapter shows that addressing this matter will require us to get clear about which distinctions the gunk lover will wish to respect, and which to abolish. Section 2 makes some preliminary remarks about gunky conceptions of the natural world. Section 3 introduces the focal problem, paying special attention to its history. Section 4 sketches four strategies for handling this problem that we do not find satisfactory. Section 5 develops a pair of rather more promising strategies. The chapter concludes by noting some interesting analogies between our development of gunk theory and relationalism about space and time.Less
Let us say that a thing is gunky just in case every part of that thing has proper parts (i.e., parts that are not identical to it). The idea that all physical objects are gunky seems sufficiently sweeping, interesting, and plausible that it is worth examining. However, there is a difficulty. The features of an extended object can surely vary continuously (in time and/or space). If an object is gunky then it cannot have point-sized parts which have no further parts. But how can one conceive of a continuous variation in features other than as the obtaining of different features at different point-sized locations? This chapter shows that addressing this matter will require us to get clear about which distinctions the gunk lover will wish to respect, and which to abolish. Section 2 makes some preliminary remarks about gunky conceptions of the natural world. Section 3 introduces the focal problem, paying special attention to its history. Section 4 sketches four strategies for handling this problem that we do not find satisfactory. Section 5 develops a pair of rather more promising strategies. The chapter concludes by noting some interesting analogies between our development of gunk theory and relationalism about space and time.
JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
In this chapter, the author first presents a standard taxonomy of the major alternative positions about color ontology. The distinction between color realism and color irrealism is explored. Several ...
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In this chapter, the author first presents a standard taxonomy of the major alternative positions about color ontology. The distinction between color realism and color irrealism is explored. Several difficulties with the Standard Taxonomy are discussed including some directions in which one might proceed to refine the characterization of the options. The distinction between relationalist and non-relationalist accounts of color is then illustrated. The author argues that this distinction is useful in understanding the space of alternative views on color ontology because it crystallizes a central set of issues that divides the accounts, and does so while sidestepping problems that plague the Standard Taxonomy. Further, an alternative Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology is then provided as a useful way to clarify the relationship of color relationalism to other views.Less
In this chapter, the author first presents a standard taxonomy of the major alternative positions about color ontology. The distinction between color realism and color irrealism is explored. Several difficulties with the Standard Taxonomy are discussed including some directions in which one might proceed to refine the characterization of the options. The distinction between relationalist and non-relationalist accounts of color is then illustrated. The author argues that this distinction is useful in understanding the space of alternative views on color ontology because it crystallizes a central set of issues that divides the accounts, and does so while sidestepping problems that plague the Standard Taxonomy. Further, an alternative Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology is then provided as a useful way to clarify the relationship of color relationalism to other views.
JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter attempts to consider and respond to a series of challenges against the argument from perceptual variation. Three classes of objections are illustrated. The first concerns suggestions to ...
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This chapter attempts to consider and respond to a series of challenges against the argument from perceptual variation. Three classes of objections are illustrated. The first concerns suggestions to treat one's inability to single out a distinguished variant as a mere epistemic shortcoming with no ontological import. The second revolves on accepting irrealism about color. The third focuses on some that suggest non-relationalist ways of accepting ecumenicism with respect to multiple perceptual variants. The aim of this chapter is to respond to the objections of these three classes, thus strengthening the case for relationalism. Further, by discussing these objections, the goal is to throw into greater relief the connections between relationalism and other views that have shown up in the literature.Less
This chapter attempts to consider and respond to a series of challenges against the argument from perceptual variation. Three classes of objections are illustrated. The first concerns suggestions to treat one's inability to single out a distinguished variant as a mere epistemic shortcoming with no ontological import. The second revolves on accepting irrealism about color. The third focuses on some that suggest non-relationalist ways of accepting ecumenicism with respect to multiple perceptual variants. The aim of this chapter is to respond to the objections of these three classes, thus strengthening the case for relationalism. Further, by discussing these objections, the goal is to throw into greater relief the connections between relationalism and other views that have shown up in the literature.
