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Regulation Inside Government analyses the army of inspectors, auditors, grievance‐chasers, standard‐setters, and other bodies overseeing contemporary public organizations. On the basis of a pioneering two‐year inside study of British Government by a team of leading scholars, this book provides an original analytical perspective on regulation within government. Given the limitations of orthodox constitutional checks on executive government, the courts, and elected politicians, regulation inside government deserves more attention than it has hitherto received. As one of the first comprehensive accounts of regulation inside government, this book begins to fill the gap. The empirical data for the study sets out the full range of modes of control applied to the public sector. The authors examine the relationship between formal oversight, of the traditional regulatory sort, with other forms of control based on competition, mutuality, and contrived randomness. They conclude that there is a failure in contemporary public management to deploy each of these modes of control to their full potential.

Why does public management—the art of the state—so often go wrong, producing failure and fiasco instead of public service, and what are the different ways in which control or regulation can be applied to government? Why do we find contradictory recipes for the improvement of public services, and are the forces of modernity set to produce worldwide convergence in ways of organizing government? This study aims to explore such questions, which are central to debates over public management. It combines contemporary and historical experience, and employs grid/group cultural theory as an organizing frame and method of exploration. Using examples from different places and eras, the study seeks to identify the recurring variety of ideas about how to organize public services—and contrary to widespread claims that modernization will bring a new global uniformity, it argues that variety is unlikely to disappear from doctrine and practice in public management. The book has three parts. Part I, Introductory, has three chapters that discuss various aspects of public management. Part II, Classic and Recurring Ideas in Public Management, has four chapters that discuss various ways of doing public management. Part III, Rhetoric, Modernity, and Science in Public Management, has three chapters that discuss the rhetoric, and culture of public management, contemporary public management, and the state of the art of the state.

Why does the regulation of risks to human health and safety vary so dramatically from one policy domain to another? Why are some risks regulated aggressively and others responded to only modestly? Is there any logic to the techniques we use in risk regulation? This book addresses these important questions by systematically examining variety amongst risk regulation regimes across policy domains, analysing the significant driving forces shaping those regimes, and identifying the causes of regulatory failure and success. In order to do so, the book develops a systems‐based concept of a ‘risk regulation regime’, which enables comparative description and analysis of the rules, institutional arrangements, and cultures that are bound up with the handling of risk within and between regimes. Using that framework, the book analyses how regimes and their constituent components are differentially shaped by three major driving forces—namely, the pressures exerted by market failure, by public opinion, and by organized interests inside and outside the state apparatus—and blame‐avoidance responses of regimes in the face of pressures for greater openness. The book applies the method to analyse a range of risk regulation regimes that cross the divide between ‘natural’ and ‘socially created’, state‐created and market‐created, ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’, high‐tech and low‐tech, individually, and corporately produced risks. Those regimes include the release of paedophiles into the community, air pollution, local road safety, radon, pesticides, and dangerous dogs. The analysis reveals both variations and paradoxes that can neither be identified by single case studies, nor be easily explained by macro‐oriented approaches to understanding risk regulation. The Government of Risk shows how such an approach is of high policy relevance as well as of considerable theoretical importance.

The era of economic liberalization, spanning 1978 to 2008, is often regarded as a period in which government was simply dismantled. In fact, government was reconstructed to meet the needs of a globalized economy. Central banking, fiscal control, tax collection, regulation, port and airport management, infrastructure development—in all of these areas, radical reforms were made to the architecture of government. A common philosophy shaped all of these reforms: the logic of discipline. It was premised on deep skepticism about the ability of democratic processes to make sensible policy choices. It sought to impose constraints on elected officials and citizens, often by shifting power to technocrat-guardians who were shielded from political influence. It placed great faith in the power of legal changes—new laws, treaties, and contracts—to produce significant alterations in the performance of governmental systems. Even before the global economic crisis of 2007-2009, the logic of discipline was under assault. Faced with many failed reform projects, advocates of discipline realized that they had underestimated the complexity of governmental change. Opponents of discipline emphasized the damage to democratic values that followed from the empowerment of new groups of technocrat-guardians. The financial crisis did further damage to the logic of discipline, as governments modified their attitudes about central bank independence and fiscal control, and global financial and trade flows declined. It was the market that now appeared to behave myopically and erratically, and which now insisted that governments should abandon precepts about the role of government that it had once insisted were inviolable. An account of neoliberal governmental restructuring across the world, The Logic of Discipline offers an analysis of how this undemocratic model is unravelling in the face of a monumental and ongoing failure of the market.

Access Points develops a new theory about how democratic institutions influence policy outcomes. Access Point Theory argues that the more points of access that institutions provide to interest groups, the cheaper lobbying will be, and, thus, the more lobbying will occur. This will lead to more complex policy, as policymakers insert specific provisions to benefit special interests, and, if one side of the debate has a lobbying advantage, to more biased policy, as the advantaged side is able to better take advantage of the cheaper lobbying. This book then uses Access Point Theory to explain why some countries have more protectionist and more complex trade policies than others; why some countries have stronger environmental and banking regulations than others; and why some countries have more complicated tax codes than others. In policy area after policy area, this book finds that more access points lead to more biased and more complex policy. Access Points provides scholars a powerful tool to explain how political institutions matter and why countries implement the policies they do.

Ecologists, epidemiologists, and evolutionary biologists are increasingly aware of the significance of parasites in the study of ecosystems. This book provides a summary of the issues involved as well as an overview of the possibilities offered by this research topic, using well-documented case-studies to illustrate the main trends and prospects in this area. This is the first book devoted to the comprehension of both the roles and consequences of pathogens in ecosystems.

The last sixty years witnessed an unprecedented expansion of international trade. The system created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and later by the World Trade Organization (WTO) has proved to be an efficient tool for the elimination of trade tariff barriers. This process also coincided with the increased national risk regulatory controls. Governments, responding to the demands of their domestic constituencies, have adopted a wide range of regulatory measures aimed at protecting the environment and human health. Although for the most part, these new regulatory initiatives served legitimate objectives, it has also turned out that internal measures might become an attractive vehicle for protectionism, taking the place that was traditionally occupied by tariff barriers. The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) is an attempt by the international community to limit possible abuses while accepting a considerable margin of regulatory discretion of WTO Members. Does it optimally strike a balance between competing objectives of international free trade and regulatory freedom in the field of risk regulation? In answering this question, the book engages in a comprehensive and critical examination of the substantive provisions of the SPS Agreement and the corresponding case law. Special attention is paid to three specific issues: the appropriateness of the disciplines established by the SPS Agreement, the consistency of their interpretation by the WTO case law, and the normative content of those requirements that have not yet been addressed by SPS jurisprudence. The book concludes that despite some failures of the SPS system, the Agreement provides an operable and efficient mechanism for the supervision of domestic SPS measures.

This book sets forth the economic rationale for international financial regulation and what role, if any, international regulation can play in effectively managing systemic risk while providing accountability to all affected nations. The book suggests that a particular type of global governance structure is necessary to have more efficient regulation of the international financial systems. The book defines global governance of financial systems to involve three main principles: effectiveness in devising efficient regulatory standards and rules; accountability in decision-making structure and chain of command; and legitimacy, meaning that those subject to international regulatory standards have participated in some meaningful way in their development.

The regulation of financial markets and companies in Europe has undergone significant changes over the last decade. The Commission, Member States, and Parliament constructed regimes that facilitate new legislation, sanction delegation to the Commission for financial market law, and structure the cross‐border regulation of companies within the single market. The substance of this book is about that regime development. In creating the regimes discussed in this book, European Union (EU) leaders contributed to the ongoing constitutionalization of Europe by contesting and constructing norms. Each of the regimes required an explicit definition of the vertical relationship between the EU and the member states, and of the horizontal relationship among the member states. It defined the kind of regulatory state that would be required, the mix of European and national bodies involved, and the procedures they were to follow in carrying out their functions. It also defined what kinds of national variation in related economic and social policy would be regarded as legitimate. As they made these agreements, European leaders simultaneously articulated what it meant to be a member state in the single market, and what it meant to delegate responsibilities to the EU. This constitutionalized these ideals by sorting out the issues of EU and national responsibilities in a powerfully authoritative way. The theory of this book is about demonstrating the normative foundations of these constitutional agreements and showing how they had to be built on the shoulders of national ones.

Using an institutional and empirical approach, this book analyses the role of formal rules (law and regulations) and informal rules (norms, practices, and shared beliefs) in the Japanese economy. Through in‐depth studies of corporate governance and finance, mergers and acquisitions, financial regulation, organized crime, and markets for everything from venture capital to legal talent, Professors Milhaupt and West show that institutions play a crucial and heretofore overlooked role in the structure of the Japanese economy, which often is portrayed as being governed exclusively by interpersonal relations and bureaucratic fiat. As these rules change, Japanese actors are responding, reshaping corporate governance and financial markets, while eroding the bureaucracy's power.

Water is fundamental to life and to the maintenance of an appropriate environment for physiological functions at the molecular, cellular, and organismal level. Water balance is also the principal mechanism of volume regulation in animals. The physical properties of water have profound effects on all biological structures and their function. Animal Osmoregulation has three main themes. The first deals with the physical properties of water, and its interactions with proteins, lipids, and biological membranes. Solutes affect the activity of water and thus the magnitude of the gradients driving water movement through osmosis. The distribution and transport of water in biological systems depends therefore on the properties of solutes, their distribution, and their transport. The second theme involves a detailed physical description of osmosis. This is followed by an explanation of the significance of osmotic regulation in animals inhabiting a wide variety of environments. Examples are explored for marine, freshwater, and terrestrial animals. A broad phylogenetic array of animals is discussed. Thirdly, the book deals with membranes as compartmental barriers. By definition, osmosis occurs through semi-permeable membranes. Membranes also, however, play a fundamental role in energy storage, energy transduction, solute transport, and sensory physiology. This volume approaches animal osmoregulation from the perspective of the physical laws that influence the structure of biological systems. It extends these concepts to explore the diversity of adaptations in the animal kingdom that deal with osmotic challenges in a variety of environments.

Ideally, individual risk‐taking decisions and government risk policies should be based on a rational balancing of risk and cost. Unfortunately, private decisions are subject to a number of biases including overestimation of small probabilities and alarmist responses to ambiguous risks. Hazard warnings can potentially be effective, but are not always ideal, as the people now overestimate the risks of smoking. Labour market estimates of the value of life can provide a rational reference point for benefit‐cost tests of risk regulations. The pressures exerted by irrational public responses to risk often lead to regulations that impose inordinately high costs per life saved. Excessive regulation potentially makes society worse off from a health and safety standpoint as shown by the risk–risk analysis methodology developed in this book. Similarly, liability rules and social insurance systems also should be structured to reflect an efficient balancing of risk and cost.

This book presents eight essays on financial regulation, focusing on the European context. Essay one examines the concept of market-friendly regulation. Essay two discusses the need for stronger bank licensing principles. Essay three explores the changing attitude towards banking competition. Essay four discusses self-regulation by financial institutions. Essay five explores the increasing links between banking and securities activities. Essay six examines the organisational structure of financial regulatory and supervisory functions. Essays seven and eight discuss the abandonment of the coincidence between the jurisdiction of monetary policy and the jurisdiction of banking supervision, and the important role of central banks in financial stability, respectively.