Richard Gaskin
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199239450
- eISBN:
- 9780191716997
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239450.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is about the philosophy of language. It analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express — what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of ...
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This book is about the philosophy of language. It analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express — what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of word-meanings respectively. Since it identifies the world with all the true and false propositions, the book's account of the unity of the proposition has significant implications for our understanding of the nature of reality. The book argues that the unity of the proposition is constituted by a certain infinitistic structure known in the tradition as ‘Bradley's regress’. Usually, Bradley's regress has been regarded as vicious, but the book argues that it is the metaphysical ground of the propositional unity, and gives us an important insight into the fundamental make-up of the world.Less
This book is about the philosophy of language. It analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express — what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of word-meanings respectively. Since it identifies the world with all the true and false propositions, the book's account of the unity of the proposition has significant implications for our understanding of the nature of reality. The book argues that the unity of the proposition is constituted by a certain infinitistic structure known in the tradition as ‘Bradley's regress’. Usually, Bradley's regress has been regarded as vicious, but the book argues that it is the metaphysical ground of the propositional unity, and gives us an important insight into the fundamental make-up of the world.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252145
- eISBN:
- 9780191598487
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252149.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Contains thirteen essays published by Barry Stroud between 1965 and 2000 on central topics in the philosophy of language and epistemology. In a volume that generally deals with the philosophical ...
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Contains thirteen essays published by Barry Stroud between 1965 and 2000 on central topics in the philosophy of language and epistemology. In a volume that generally deals with the philosophical questions of meaning, understanding, necessity, and the intentionality of thought, there are some papers devoted to specific questions of Wittgenstein's philosophy, as well as papers on Quine, Searle, Davidson, and David Pears.The tenor of the essays on meaning is critical of reductive attempts to elucidate meaning and understanding ‘from outside’—i.e. without summoning intentional vocabulary referring to what speakers mean and understand in relation to each other. In view of considerations regarding the indispensably semantical nature of explanatory accounts of meaning, an appeal to speakers’ conformity to linguistic practice must satisfy the requirements of a thick, semantical description of the meaning of words in a community. There will be no satisfactory theories of meaning solely in terms of non‐semantic, non‐intentional regularities. In the author's estimation, this idea runs close to Wittgenstein's treatment of ‘inner’ or ‘private’ objects. The first essay in this collection addresses the attribution of a ‘conventionalist’ position to Wittgenstein in summation of his thought on necessity and logical truth. The author looks askance at Michael Dummett's conventionalist reading of Wittgenstein and takes it to task accordingly. ‘Inference, Belief and Understanding’ (essay 2) re‐examines the question of being ‘forced’ to a conclusion in the context of Lewis Carroll's ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. It is argued, here and throughout, that it is important to grasp the implications of the kind of regress besetting Achilles for a theory of understanding and the mind. The threat of regress is a key constraint on philosophical accounts of understanding viewed as a capacity possessed by the speaker. In his third essay ‘Evolution and the Necessity of Thought’, the author asks whether we can hold steadfast to a notion of necessity and an evolutionary or historical story of the acquisition of human knowledge. Wittgenstein's arguments against the existence of a private language are treated in the fifth and again, in more detail, in the final essay in this volume— the author notes his intention to look at the question relatively unencumbered by existing scholarship in the hope of drawing out the very idea of what Wittgenstein was doing in his philosophy. The collection of essays on Wittgenstein includes a study of Wittgenstein on meaning, understanding, and community (essay 6), which partly overlaps with an essay on translation that additionally revisits the problem of regress and its implications for semantic competence (essay 8). It is argued that the indeterminacy of meaning with respect to a certain class of facts has the consequence that meaning is indeterminate tout court only if those facts are the only available facts; but a ‘community practice’ view of meaning has no such consequence. A fuller treatment of some of these topics is given in ‘Mind, Meaning and Practice’ (essay 11), which examines the idea of meaning as use, and ostensive teaching in relation to Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning and distorted conception of the mental.The essays on Quine (essay 7 and 10) consider the doctrine of physicalism and the question of conceptual schemes respectively. Searle's theory of intentionality (‘background’) supposes that there are attitudes that are mental, though pre‐intentional and non‐representational; considerations are brought against Searle in essay 9. The work on Davidson provides the renewed occasion for attacking the idea that linguistic competence or understanding is a matter of applying general rules or conventions to particular utterances (essay 12). A central theme of this book—the threat of regress and the pressure it exerts on semantic theory—is brought out with reference to the theory of understanding, which locates linguistic competence in the application of general knowledge to particular utterances. It is argued that such theories invariably fall foul of regress. A profitable semantic theory should combine the insight that explaining understanding and meaning is aptly fulfilled by invoking speakers’ abilities and knowledge, yet without positing additional mental entities, with a recognition that the abilities and knowledge in question go beyond mere relations between expressions.Less
Contains thirteen essays published by Barry Stroud between 1965 and 2000 on central topics in the philosophy of language and epistemology. In a volume that generally deals with the philosophical questions of meaning, understanding, necessity, and the intentionality of thought, there are some papers devoted to specific questions of Wittgenstein's philosophy, as well as papers on Quine, Searle, Davidson, and David Pears.
The tenor of the essays on meaning is critical of reductive attempts to elucidate meaning and understanding ‘from outside’—i.e. without summoning intentional vocabulary referring to what speakers mean and understand in relation to each other. In view of considerations regarding the indispensably semantical nature of explanatory accounts of meaning, an appeal to speakers’ conformity to linguistic practice must satisfy the requirements of a thick, semantical description of the meaning of words in a community. There will be no satisfactory theories of meaning solely in terms of non‐semantic, non‐intentional regularities. In the author's estimation, this idea runs close to Wittgenstein's treatment of ‘inner’ or ‘private’ objects. The first essay in this collection addresses the attribution of a ‘conventionalist’ position to Wittgenstein in summation of his thought on necessity and logical truth. The author looks askance at Michael Dummett's conventionalist reading of Wittgenstein and takes it to task accordingly. ‘Inference, Belief and Understanding’ (essay 2) re‐examines the question of being ‘forced’ to a conclusion in the context of Lewis Carroll's ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. It is argued, here and throughout, that it is important to grasp the implications of the kind of regress besetting Achilles for a theory of understanding and the mind. The threat of regress is a key constraint on philosophical accounts of understanding viewed as a capacity possessed by the speaker. In his third essay ‘Evolution and the Necessity of Thought’, the author asks whether we can hold steadfast to a notion of necessity and an evolutionary or historical story of the acquisition of human knowledge. Wittgenstein's arguments against the existence of a private language are treated in the fifth and again, in more detail, in the final essay in this volume— the author notes his intention to look at the question relatively unencumbered by existing scholarship in the hope of drawing out the very idea of what Wittgenstein was doing in his philosophy. The collection of essays on Wittgenstein includes a study of Wittgenstein on meaning, understanding, and community (essay 6), which partly overlaps with an essay on translation that additionally revisits the problem of regress and its implications for semantic competence (essay 8). It is argued that the indeterminacy of meaning with respect to a certain class of facts has the consequence that meaning is indeterminate tout court only if those facts are the only available facts; but a ‘community practice’ view of meaning has no such consequence. A fuller treatment of some of these topics is given in ‘Mind, Meaning and Practice’ (essay 11), which examines the idea of meaning as use, and ostensive teaching in relation to Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning and distorted conception of the mental.
The essays on Quine (essay 7 and 10) consider the doctrine of physicalism and the question of conceptual schemes respectively. Searle's theory of intentionality (‘background’) supposes that there are attitudes that are mental, though pre‐intentional and non‐representational; considerations are brought against Searle in essay 9. The work on Davidson provides the renewed occasion for attacking the idea that linguistic competence or understanding is a matter of applying general rules or conventions to particular utterances (essay 12). A central theme of this book—the threat of regress and the pressure it exerts on semantic theory—is brought out with reference to the theory of understanding, which locates linguistic competence in the application of general knowledge to particular utterances. It is argued that such theories invariably fall foul of regress. A profitable semantic theory should combine the insight that explaining understanding and meaning is aptly fulfilled by invoking speakers’ abilities and knowledge, yet without positing additional mental entities, with a recognition that the abilities and knowledge in question go beyond mere relations between expressions.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, ...
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The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.Less
The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.
Janet Broughton
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay contrasts Descartes with three skeptical figures: the Doubting Pyrrhonist, the Agrippan Pyrrhonist, and the Cartesian Skeptic. It argues that the meditator in Descartes’s Meditations is ...
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This essay contrasts Descartes with three skeptical figures: the Doubting Pyrrhonist, the Agrippan Pyrrhonist, and the Cartesian Skeptic. It argues that the meditator in Descartes’s Meditations is different from all three of these skeptics. Seeing the distinctive character of the meditator helps us understand how Descartes could have hoped to meet the challenge of skepticism.Less
This essay contrasts Descartes with three skeptical figures: the Doubting Pyrrhonist, the Agrippan Pyrrhonist, and the Cartesian Skeptic. It argues that the meditator in Descartes’s Meditations is different from all three of these skeptics. Seeing the distinctive character of the meditator helps us understand how Descartes could have hoped to meet the challenge of skepticism.
Michael Williams
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a ...
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This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a contextualist picture of justification. Contextualism is said to incorporate the best features of its traditionalist rivals — foundationalism and coherentism — and also to avoid skepticism. It is argued that we should not ask which conception is really true, but instead give up epistemological realism.Less
This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a contextualist picture of justification. Contextualism is said to incorporate the best features of its traditionalist rivals — foundationalism and coherentism — and also to avoid skepticism. It is argued that we should not ask which conception is really true, but instead give up epistemological realism.
Richard Gaskin
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199239450
- eISBN:
- 9780191716997
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239450.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the generation of a regress consequent on the specification of the logical copula's reference or referent is the solution to the unity problem. Bradley's regress is not ...
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This chapter argues that the generation of a regress consequent on the specification of the logical copula's reference or referent is the solution to the unity problem. Bradley's regress is not vicious, as many have supposed, but it is an innocent, constituting regress. This solution is a semantic, not a pragmatic one. There is no ontological midpoint between a fully unified proposition, on the one hand, and sheer disunity, on the other: the referents of complex names turn out, upon analysis, to be propositionally unified, and the ‘mere aggregates’ that have been serving, from the beginning of the investigation, as the point of contrast with propositions, turn out to consist of sheer objects, with no principle of cohesion. In the general case, we may think of the reference or referent of the logical copula as a unifying function applied to the proposition's other components as its arguments. The analysis of that operation of functional application draws down a regress that is in all relevant respects the same as Bradley's regress. It is its generation of the functional application regress which is what the unity of a proposition, in the general case, consists in.Less
This chapter argues that the generation of a regress consequent on the specification of the logical copula's reference or referent is the solution to the unity problem. Bradley's regress is not vicious, as many have supposed, but it is an innocent, constituting regress. This solution is a semantic, not a pragmatic one. There is no ontological midpoint between a fully unified proposition, on the one hand, and sheer disunity, on the other: the referents of complex names turn out, upon analysis, to be propositionally unified, and the ‘mere aggregates’ that have been serving, from the beginning of the investigation, as the point of contrast with propositions, turn out to consist of sheer objects, with no principle of cohesion. In the general case, we may think of the reference or referent of the logical copula as a unifying function applied to the proposition's other components as its arguments. The analysis of that operation of functional application draws down a regress that is in all relevant respects the same as Bradley's regress. It is its generation of the functional application regress which is what the unity of a proposition, in the general case, consists in.
Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter responds to some further arguments against analyticity, including the Regress Argument, arguments based on the widespread phenomenon of vagueness, arguments from semantic externalism and ...
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This chapter responds to some further arguments against analyticity, including the Regress Argument, arguments based on the widespread phenomenon of vagueness, arguments from semantic externalism and scepticism about meaning and arguments based on individual sentences, such as ‘all cats are animals’ and ‘gold is yellow’.Less
This chapter responds to some further arguments against analyticity, including the Regress Argument, arguments based on the widespread phenomenon of vagueness, arguments from semantic externalism and scepticism about meaning and arguments based on individual sentences, such as ‘all cats are animals’ and ‘gold is yellow’.
José L. Zalabardo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199656073
- eISBN:
- 9780191742132
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter introduces the problem of scepticism, discussing the connection between scepticism and knowledge, the bearing of reliabilist epistemologies on the sceptical problem, and the view that ...
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This chapter introduces the problem of scepticism, discussing the connection between scepticism and knowledge, the bearing of reliabilist epistemologies on the sceptical problem, and the view that sceptical arguments should be seen as putting pressure on realism. It then provides a preliminary overview of the resources that reliabilism can deploy against the three main lines of sceptical reasoning: the regress argument, arguments based on sceptical hypotheses, and the problem of the criterion. It contends that all these arguments rest on the assumption that knowledge requires adequate evidence, but this assumption would be false if reliabilism were correct.Less
This chapter introduces the problem of scepticism, discussing the connection between scepticism and knowledge, the bearing of reliabilist epistemologies on the sceptical problem, and the view that sceptical arguments should be seen as putting pressure on realism. It then provides a preliminary overview of the resources that reliabilism can deploy against the three main lines of sceptical reasoning: the regress argument, arguments based on sceptical hypotheses, and the problem of the criterion. It contends that all these arguments rest on the assumption that knowledge requires adequate evidence, but this assumption would be false if reliabilism were correct.
José L. Zalabardo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199656073
- eISBN:
- 9780191742132
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter applies the theory of knowledge developed in Chapters 4–6 to the assessment of sceptical arguments. It shows how the theory deals with the regress argument, arguments based on sceptical ...
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This chapter applies the theory of knowledge developed in Chapters 4–6 to the assessment of sceptical arguments. It shows how the theory deals with the regress argument, arguments based on sceptical possibilities, and the problem of the criterion. It then presents a form of sceptical reasoning that this theory of knowledge can’t block. It concerns the epistemic status of our reflective beliefs about the truth value of our first-order beliefs. It is argued that if the account of knowledge defended in the book is correct, these reflective beliefs can’t be knowledge.Less
This chapter applies the theory of knowledge developed in Chapters 4–6 to the assessment of sceptical arguments. It shows how the theory deals with the regress argument, arguments based on sceptical possibilities, and the problem of the criterion. It then presents a form of sceptical reasoning that this theory of knowledge can’t block. It concerns the epistemic status of our reflective beliefs about the truth value of our first-order beliefs. It is argued that if the account of knowledge defended in the book is correct, these reflective beliefs can’t be knowledge.
Adrian Haddock
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199586264
- eISBN:
- 9780191723360
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter sketches an account of visual knowledge according to which the justification involved in knowledge not merely guarantees the truth of the belief which knowledge involves, but guarantees ...
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This chapter sketches an account of visual knowledge according to which the justification involved in knowledge not merely guarantees the truth of the belief which knowledge involves, but guarantees that this belief is knowledgeable. It is argued that unlike the dominant alternatives, this account stays in tune with our pre-theoretical conception of knowledge and enables us to make sense of its value. Two potential problems for the account are presented: first, that it is vulnerable to the Argument from Illusion; secondly, that it generates a devastating regress. The first problem is despatched, but the second — more serious — problem is postponed until the next chapter.Less
This chapter sketches an account of visual knowledge according to which the justification involved in knowledge not merely guarantees the truth of the belief which knowledge involves, but guarantees that this belief is knowledgeable. It is argued that unlike the dominant alternatives, this account stays in tune with our pre-theoretical conception of knowledge and enables us to make sense of its value. Two potential problems for the account are presented: first, that it is vulnerable to the Argument from Illusion; secondly, that it generates a devastating regress. The first problem is despatched, but the second — more serious — problem is postponed until the next chapter.
Markus K. Brunnermeier
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296980
- eISBN:
- 9780191596025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296983.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
Focuses on dynamic models. The emphasis is on explaining technical analysis. These models show that past prices still carry valuable information. Some of these models also explain why it is rational ...
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Focuses on dynamic models. The emphasis is on explaining technical analysis. These models show that past prices still carry valuable information. Some of these models also explain why it is rational for some investors to ‘chase the trend’. Other models are devoted to the informational role of trading volume. The insiders’ optimal dynamic trading strategy over different trading periods is derived in a strategic model setting.Less
Focuses on dynamic models. The emphasis is on explaining technical analysis. These models show that past prices still carry valuable information. Some of these models also explain why it is rational for some investors to ‘chase the trend’. Other models are devoted to the informational role of trading volume. The insiders’ optimal dynamic trading strategy over different trading periods is derived in a strategic model setting.
Christopher Yeomans
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199794522
- eISBN:
- 9780199919253
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794522.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter applies the results of chapter 4 to the problem raised in chapter 3. That is, it shows how the conception of explanation Hegel articulates in his Logic eliminates the infinite regresses ...
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This chapter applies the results of chapter 4 to the problem raised in chapter 3. That is, it shows how the conception of explanation Hegel articulates in his Logic eliminates the infinite regresses that had seemed to plague the notion of self-determination or substantive free will. It focuses on the versions of the regress argument presented, in different ways, by Galen Strawson and G.E.M. Anscombe. The similarities between Hegel's view and Robert Nozick's conception of self-subsumption are then investigated in the light of arguments in the contemporary philosophy of action and Kant's Third Antinomy.Less
This chapter applies the results of chapter 4 to the problem raised in chapter 3. That is, it shows how the conception of explanation Hegel articulates in his Logic eliminates the infinite regresses that had seemed to plague the notion of self-determination or substantive free will. It focuses on the versions of the regress argument presented, in different ways, by Galen Strawson and G.E.M. Anscombe. The similarities between Hegel's view and Robert Nozick's conception of self-subsumption are then investigated in the light of arguments in the contemporary philosophy of action and Kant's Third Antinomy.
Donald H. Regan
- Published in print:
- 1980
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246091
- eISBN:
- 9780191680922
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246091.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses a development of the decision procedure P that models CU and which establishes the logical possibility of a theory with the properties that have been claimed for CU. The ...
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This chapter discusses a development of the decision procedure P that models CU and which establishes the logical possibility of a theory with the properties that have been claimed for CU. The central problem discussed is that of producing a P which is adaptable without involving either circularity or infinite regress.Less
This chapter discusses a development of the decision procedure P that models CU and which establishes the logical possibility of a theory with the properties that have been claimed for CU. The central problem discussed is that of producing a P which is adaptable without involving either circularity or infinite regress.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187724
- eISBN:
- 9780199786121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187725.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter distinguishes different ways for moral beliefs and believers to be justified: instrumentally or epistemically, permissively or positively, slightly or adequately, and personally or ...
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This chapter distinguishes different ways for moral beliefs and believers to be justified: instrumentally or epistemically, permissively or positively, slightly or adequately, and personally or impersonally. It explains the two main arguments against justified moral belief: the skeptical regress argument and the skeptical hypothesis or scenario argument. It concludes that these arguments pose a dilemma because their flaws are hard to detect, and their conclusions are hard to believe.Less
This chapter distinguishes different ways for moral beliefs and believers to be justified: instrumentally or epistemically, permissively or positively, slightly or adequately, and personally or impersonally. It explains the two main arguments against justified moral belief: the skeptical regress argument and the skeptical hypothesis or scenario argument. It concludes that these arguments pose a dilemma because their flaws are hard to detect, and their conclusions are hard to believe.
Ross P. Cameron
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199565818
- eISBN:
- 9780191722004
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Simon Blackburn posed a dilemma for any realist attempt to identify the source of necessity. Either the facts appealed to ground modal truth are themselves necessary, or they are contingent. If ...
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Simon Blackburn posed a dilemma for any realist attempt to identify the source of necessity. Either the facts appealed to ground modal truth are themselves necessary, or they are contingent. If necessary, we begin the process towards regress; but if contingent, we undermine the necessity whose source we wanted to explain. Bob Hale attempts to blunt both horns of this dilemma and this chapter defends Hale's conclusion that the dilemma can be resisted. The chapter ends by defending an account of the source of necessity, and showing why it does not fall victim to Blackburn's problem.Less
Simon Blackburn posed a dilemma for any realist attempt to identify the source of necessity. Either the facts appealed to ground modal truth are themselves necessary, or they are contingent. If necessary, we begin the process towards regress; but if contingent, we undermine the necessity whose source we wanted to explain. Bob Hale attempts to blunt both horns of this dilemma and this chapter defends Hale's conclusion that the dilemma can be resisted. The chapter ends by defending an account of the source of necessity, and showing why it does not fall victim to Blackburn's problem.
George Molnar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199204175
- eISBN:
- 9780191695537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199204175.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the major objections encountered in developing the theory of powers. One argument is that ontological seriousness about irreducible powers empties the world of something that it ...
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This chapter examines the major objections encountered in developing the theory of powers. One argument is that ontological seriousness about irreducible powers empties the world of something that it contains; another is that it imports into the world something that does not exist. The chapter discusses vicious regress in relation to space occupancy, conditionals, and lack of qualities. It evaluates dispositionalism and states that the ‘always-packing’ argument is ineffective. It also examines the position of Hume's distinctness where only contingent connections exist between distinct objects, properties, and relations in a world.Less
This chapter examines the major objections encountered in developing the theory of powers. One argument is that ontological seriousness about irreducible powers empties the world of something that it contains; another is that it imports into the world something that does not exist. The chapter discusses vicious regress in relation to space occupancy, conditionals, and lack of qualities. It evaluates dispositionalism and states that the ‘always-packing’ argument is ineffective. It also examines the position of Hume's distinctness where only contingent connections exist between distinct objects, properties, and relations in a world.
Michael V. Wedin
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253081
- eISBN:
- 9780191598647
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253080.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Wedin discusses Aristotle's claims in Metaphysics Zeta 6 that the essence of a thing is to be sought among its per se attributes, and that each thing that is primary and spoken of per se, e.g. ...
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Wedin discusses Aristotle's claims in Metaphysics Zeta 6 that the essence of a thing is to be sought among its per se attributes, and that each thing that is primary and spoken of per se, e.g. primary substance, is the same as its essence. Wedin argues that the Zeta 6 Thesis, i.e. that the essence of a thing is the thing's immediate essence, is a crucial requirement of the explanatory role of essence as the substance of c‐substances. According to Wedin, Aristotle introduces this requirement in order to establish that a thing's essence cannot depend on another essence. Form must be the essence; if form cannot explain the nature of the thing of which it is the form, there would be the threat of a regress of explanatory forms. At the end of the chapter, Wedin considers the problem that the identity of a thing and its essence is a requirement that can be met by non‐substance items, but he denies that this leads to a dilution of the conception of substance.Less
Wedin discusses Aristotle's claims in Metaphysics Zeta 6 that the essence of a thing is to be sought among its per se attributes, and that each thing that is primary and spoken of per se, e.g. primary substance, is the same as its essence. Wedin argues that the Zeta 6 Thesis, i.e. that the essence of a thing is the thing's immediate essence, is a crucial requirement of the explanatory role of essence as the substance of c‐substances. According to Wedin, Aristotle introduces this requirement in order to establish that a thing's essence cannot depend on another essence. Form must be the essence; if form cannot explain the nature of the thing of which it is the form, there would be the threat of a regress of explanatory forms. At the end of the chapter, Wedin considers the problem that the identity of a thing and its essence is a requirement that can be met by non‐substance items, but he denies that this leads to a dilution of the conception of substance.
Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247293.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Presents and tries to defuse some classic arguments for moral scepticism, and against the possibility of moral knowledge. Considers the regress argument, an argument from relevant alternatives, and a ...
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Presents and tries to defuse some classic arguments for moral scepticism, and against the possibility of moral knowledge. Considers the regress argument, an argument from relevant alternatives, and a vicious circle argument, and tries to show why we can continue to justifiably believe moral claims even in the absence of a decisive means of undermining these sceptical arguments.Less
Presents and tries to defuse some classic arguments for moral scepticism, and against the possibility of moral knowledge. Considers the regress argument, an argument from relevant alternatives, and a vicious circle argument, and tries to show why we can continue to justifiably believe moral claims even in the absence of a decisive means of undermining these sceptical arguments.
Gail Fine
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235491
- eISBN:
- 9780191597398
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235496.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The Third Man Argument is a regress argument that purports to show that if there is even one form of F, then there are infinitely many forms of F. That a regress can be identified is in itself an ...
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The Third Man Argument is a regress argument that purports to show that if there is even one form of F, then there are infinitely many forms of F. That a regress can be identified is in itself an objection to the theory of forms because forms ought to be unique; and a regress would destroy the possibility of knowledge. Apart from the one in the Peri Idēon, there are at least three other versions of the Third Man Argument; two in Plato's Parmenides, and one recorded by Eudemus. In this chapter, Fine explores the logic of and interconnections between the four regress arguments; she argues that the four arguments share the same premises (i.e. self‐predication, the one over many assumption, and a non‐identity assumption), and draw the same inference from these premises, i.e. that if there is one form of F, then there are infinitely many forms of F. Furthermore, each argument conceives the forms as properties (in particular Aristotle's and Eudemus’ versions); hence Fine argues that, logically, they are the same argument.Less
The Third Man Argument is a regress argument that purports to show that if there is even one form of F, then there are infinitely many forms of F. That a regress can be identified is in itself an objection to the theory of forms because forms ought to be unique; and a regress would destroy the possibility of knowledge. Apart from the one in the Peri Idēon, there are at least three other versions of the Third Man Argument; two in Plato's Parmenides, and one recorded by Eudemus. In this chapter, Fine explores the logic of and interconnections between the four regress arguments; she argues that the four arguments share the same premises (i.e. self‐predication, the one over many assumption, and a non‐identity assumption), and draw the same inference from these premises, i.e. that if there is one form of F, then there are infinitely many forms of F. Furthermore, each argument conceives the forms as properties (in particular Aristotle's and Eudemus’ versions); hence Fine argues that, logically, they are the same argument.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195089875
- eISBN:
- 9780199833238
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195089871.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter lays out Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief as they are found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism. The five modes are discrepancy (differences of opinion), ...
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This chapter lays out Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief as they are found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism. The five modes are discrepancy (differences of opinion), regress ad infinitum, relativity, hypothesis (mere assumption), and circular reasoning. In the Pyrrhonist's hands, these five modes are used (either singly or in concert) to show that any effort at justifying philosophical beliefs is bound to fail. On the contemporary scene, three of these modes, arbitrary assumption, infinite regress, and circular reasoning are set up as a challenge to be met by a theory of justification. We get various kinds of theories of justification depending on how this challenge is met.Less
This chapter lays out Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief as they are found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism. The five modes are discrepancy (differences of opinion), regress ad infinitum, relativity, hypothesis (mere assumption), and circular reasoning. In the Pyrrhonist's hands, these five modes are used (either singly or in concert) to show that any effort at justifying philosophical beliefs is bound to fail. On the contemporary scene, three of these modes, arbitrary assumption, infinite regress, and circular reasoning are set up as a challenge to be met by a theory of justification. We get various kinds of theories of justification depending on how this challenge is met.
