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Chapter 6 explores developments in Asia’s regional architecture under the Trump government and the rising influence of China under Xi Jinping. The chapter draws explicit connections between Asia’s current regional architecture and the future of Asian order. It makes the case that institutions in Asia, particularly US bilateral alliances, are more resilient than presumed. It then draws on the historical institutionalism and regime complexity literatures to describe how the complex patchwork both complicates and advances institutional cooperation. The chapter concludes by offering a more optimistic outlook regarding the complex patchwork and its potential for improving regional governance.

Chapter 7 recaps the book’s finding that processes of continuity and change have occurred simultaneously, transforming an under-institutionalized region into a complex patchwork of overlapping institutions. The chapter then draws lessons from historical institutionalism for international relations theory and its significance for Asia policy and strategy. The book concludes with recommendations for US policy makers given rising tensions in US-Sino relations and potential institutional competition between Beijing and Washington. In particular, it advocates policy makers to adopt a zero-sum framework and continue building and supporting the regional architecture in ways which reinforce, but also look beyond its bilateral alliances.

In the post-crisis period the ability of the Asia Pacific region to sustain its growth rates has become uncertain given the subdued growth prospects of the advanced economies. Asia-Pacific will have to rely more on investment and consumption within the region for sustaining its growth rates. Closing the wide infrastructure and development gaps could help generate additional aggregate demand and help to foster inclusive growth. However the huge financing required for these investments cannot be done through the existing global institutional arrangements. The 6 trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves of Asia-Pacific cannot be utilized in the region because of lack of a well-developed regional financial architecture. Developing such a regional financial framework could help in efficient intermediation between the region’s vast savings and the unmet investment needs. It could also help in bringing about development friendly reform of the international financial system.

Despite the continuation of pan-Mediterranean commerce through the fifth century and contacts brought about by imperial patronage and pilgrimage, distinctive styles quickly emerged in the different regions of the empire. This chapter contrasts architectural and urban developments at the heart of the Byzantine Empire with those in Italy (Rome, Milan, and Ravenna) and in the eastern provinces: Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Asia Minor.

In this final chapter, we contend that despite the fact that differing constructions of the Indo-Pacific occur across matrices of space, time, and selected world-view methodologies, it is important to conclude that not all constructions and geopolitical imaginations are equal. Consequently, we prioritize the ongoing relationships between the US and China: these will largely determine the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region in the twenty-first century and beyond. Also, we end the book on a constructive note, exploring a regional institutional model which is the closest we have yet experienced in terms of being representative of Indo-Pacific nation-states, from the western Indian Ocean, to the western periphery of the Pacific. The case of the Indian Ocean Rim Association, now over twenty years since its inception, is an exemplar (however imperfect) of the maritime regional organization wrestling with the daily realities of what it is to operate in a new Indo-Pacific world.

The convergence of interests between India and the United States extend to most major regional issues. Both countries intend to pursue regional cooperation and develop an inclusive regional security architecture. Yet significant perception gaps persist between the two countries linked to their asymmetry of power as well as geographical locations. India does not want to be caught in a zero-sum game between China and the United States and remains uncertain about the willingness of the United States to act as a security provider. The relationship is ultimately based on a quid pro quo that takes into account US interests and India’s own constraints. A strong but autonomous India contributes to United States interests in the region.