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This book examines the post-crisis international derivatives regulation by bringing together the international relations literature on regime complexity and the international political economy literature on financial regulation. Specifically, it addresses three interconnected questions. What factors drove international standard-setting on derivatives post-crisis? Why did international regime complexity emerge? How was it managed and with what outcomes? Theoretically, this research innovatively combines a state-centric, a transgovernmental and a business-led explanations. Empirically, it examines all the main sets of standards (or elemental regimes) concerning derivatives, namely: trading, clearing, and reporting derivatives; resilience, recovery, and resolution of central counterparties; bank capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties and derivatives; margins for derivatives non-centrally cleared. Regime complexity in derivatives ensued from the multi-dimensionality and the interlinkages of the problems to tackle, especially because it was a new policy area without a focal international standard-setter. Overall, the international cooperation that took place in order to promote regulatory precision, stringency, and consistency in the regime complex on derivatives was remarkable, especially considering the large number of policy actors involved (states, private actors, regulators). The main jurisdictions played an important role in managing regime complexity, but their effectiveness was constrained by limited domestic coordination. Networks of regulators facilitated international standard-setting and contributed to managing regime complexity through formal and informal tools. The financial industry, at times, lobbied in favour of less precise and stringent rules, engaging in international ‘venue shopping’; other times, it promoted regulatory harmonization and consistency.

This book addresses the institutions that were deployed to fight the euro crisis, re-establish financial stability, and prevent contagion beyond Europe. It addresses why European leaders chose to include the International Monetary Fund and provides a detailed account of the decisions of the institutions that make up the “troika” (the European Commission, European Central Bank, and IMF). The study explains the institutions’ negotiating strategies, the outcomes of their interaction, and the effectiveness of their cooperation. It also explores the strategies of the member states, including Germany and the United States, with respect to the institutions and the advantages they sought in directing them to work together. The book locates the analysis within the framework of regime complexity, clusters of overlapping and intersecting regional and multilateral institutions. It tests conjectures spawned by that literature against the seven cases of financial rescues of euro-area countries that were stricken by crisis during 2010–15. The book concludes that regime complexity is the consequence of a strategy by key states to control “agency drift.” States mediate conflicts among institutions, through informal as well as formal mechanisms, and thereby limit fragmentation of the regime complex and underpin substantive efficacy. In so doing, the book answers several key puzzles, including why (a) Germany and other northern European countries supported IMF inclusion despite substantive positions opposed to their economic preferences, (b) crisis-fighting arrangements endured intense conflicts among the institutions, and (c) the United States and the IMF promoted further steps to “complete” the monetary union.

Something remarkable has occurred in Asia with little fanfare over the past twenty-five years. Considered severely underinstitutionalized at the end of the Cold War, Asia’s regional architecture is now characterized by a complex patchwork of overlapping alliances and multilateral institutions. How did this happen? Why should we care? And what does this mean for the future of regional order and Asian security? Adopting a new framework grounded in historical institutionalism, this book examines the transformation of Asia’s regional architecture from 1945 to the present. The book traces institutional and political developments in Asia beginning with the emergence of the postwar US bilateral alliance system and covers the debate and contention behind the rise of several post–Cold War multilateral initiatives. These include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asian Summit, Trans-Pacific Partnership, China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Summit, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative, among others. Asian policy makers have endeavored to create a set of rules, norms, and institutions to build confidence, facilitate cooperation, improve governance, and ultimately bring peace and order to a region fraught with underlying historical and political tensions. Although Asia’s complex patchwork of institutions may exacerbate regional rivalries, the book demonstrates how overlapping institutions may ultimately bring greater stability to the region.