Henry Laycock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281718
- eISBN:
- 9780191603594
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281718.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate ...
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The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate assertions of the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable to the semantically distinctive status of non-count nouns — nouns which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a non-singular noun, that there can be no such single thing or object as the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them as singular expressions — expressions which, in the case of non-count nouns, are true of ‘parcels’ or ‘quantities’ of stuff, and in the case of plural nouns, are true of ‘plural entities’ or ‘sets’. It is argued that both approaches are equally misguided, that there are no distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the corresponding singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also large amounts of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded in the realities to which it is non-ideally or intransparently correlated.Less
The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate assertions of the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable to the semantically distinctive status of non-count nouns — nouns which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a non-singular noun, that there can be no such single thing or object as the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them as singular expressions — expressions which, in the case of non-count nouns, are true of ‘parcels’ or ‘quantities’ of stuff, and in the case of plural nouns, are true of ‘plural entities’ or ‘sets’. It is argued that both approaches are equally misguided, that there are no distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the corresponding singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also large amounts of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded in the realities to which it is non-ideally or intransparently correlated.
Maximilian de Gaynesford
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287826
- eISBN:
- 9780191603570
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287821.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, ...
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The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, expressive use, and communicative role of all and only expressions used to formulate first-personal reference in any language. The first part of the book shows why the standard account of I as a ‘pure indexical’ (‘purism’) should be rejected. Purism requires three mutually supportive doctrines which turn out to be myths: a) that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I (‘rule theory’); b) that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to (‘independence’); and c) that as a matter of the meaning of I, any use of the term is logically guaranteed against failure to refer (‘the guarantee’). The second part of the book shows why the radically new account of I should be endorsed as a deictic term. Substitution instances and the behaviour of I in inference reveal that it has an obligatorily deictic logical character and inferential role. I fulfils its referential function in the deictic way, providing determinacy of reference by making an individual referentially salient in the extra-sentential context. The discriminability of the referent of an I-use depends on recognizing the referentially salient individual. This is true of its discriminability both to the reference-maker and to the audience. So I has the expressive use and communicative role of a deictic term. The conclusion of the book directs research towards the next step, showing how the meaning of I may be used to elucidate the thoughts expressed by the term, and from there questions relating to self-knowledge, practical reasoning, belief-acquisition, and belief-ascription.Less
The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, expressive use, and communicative role of all and only expressions used to formulate first-personal reference in any language. The first part of the book shows why the standard account of I as a ‘pure indexical’ (‘purism’) should be rejected. Purism requires three mutually supportive doctrines which turn out to be myths: a) that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I (‘rule theory’); b) that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to (‘independence’); and c) that as a matter of the meaning of I, any use of the term is logically guaranteed against failure to refer (‘the guarantee’). The second part of the book shows why the radically new account of I should be endorsed as a deictic term. Substitution instances and the behaviour of I in inference reveal that it has an obligatorily deictic logical character and inferential role. I fulfils its referential function in the deictic way, providing determinacy of reference by making an individual referentially salient in the extra-sentential context. The discriminability of the referent of an I-use depends on recognizing the referentially salient individual. This is true of its discriminability both to the reference-maker and to the audience. So I has the expressive use and communicative role of a deictic term. The conclusion of the book directs research towards the next step, showing how the meaning of I may be used to elucidate the thoughts expressed by the term, and from there questions relating to self-knowledge, practical reasoning, belief-acquisition, and belief-ascription.
Richard Gaskin
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287253
- eISBN:
- 9780191603969
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287252.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
John McDowell’s attempt to revive the doctrine of empiricism in a ‘minimal’ or ‘transcendental’ form is seriously undermined by inadequacies in the way he conceives what he styles the ‘order of ...
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John McDowell’s attempt to revive the doctrine of empiricism in a ‘minimal’ or ‘transcendental’ form is seriously undermined by inadequacies in the way he conceives what he styles the ‘order of justification’ connecting world, experience, and judgement. For example, his conception of the roles played by causation and nature in this order is threatened with vacuity. The requirements of self-consciousness and verbal articulacy which he places on subjects participating in the justificatory relation between experience and judgement are unwarranted, and have the implausible consequence that infants and non-human animals are excluded from the ‘order of justification’, and thus deprived of experience of the world. Above all, McDowell’s position is vitiated by a substantial error he commits in the philosophy of language: following ancient tradition rather than Frege’s radical departure from that tradition, he locates concepts at the level of sense rather than at the level of reference in the semantical hierarchy. This error generates an unwanted Kantian transcendental idealism which in effect delivers a reductio ad absurdum of McDowell’s metaphysical economy. To correct this mistake, Frege must first be followed in his location of concepts at the level of reference. Second, one must move beyond Frege to locate not only concepts but also propositions at that level. This, in turn, requires the serious consideration of an idea which McDowell mentions only to reject, that of objects as speaking to us ‘in the world’s own language’. Despite the correction recommended here, if empiricism is to have any chance of success, it must be still more minimal in its pretensions than McDowell allows. In particular, it must abandon the individualistic and intellectualistic construction which McDowell places on the ‘order of justification’.Less
John McDowell’s attempt to revive the doctrine of empiricism in a ‘minimal’ or ‘transcendental’ form is seriously undermined by inadequacies in the way he conceives what he styles the ‘order of justification’ connecting world, experience, and judgement. For example, his conception of the roles played by causation and nature in this order is threatened with vacuity. The requirements of self-consciousness and verbal articulacy which he places on subjects participating in the justificatory relation between experience and judgement are unwarranted, and have the implausible consequence that infants and non-human animals are excluded from the ‘order of justification’, and thus deprived of experience of the world. Above all, McDowell’s position is vitiated by a substantial error he commits in the philosophy of language: following ancient tradition rather than Frege’s radical departure from that tradition, he locates concepts at the level of sense rather than at the level of reference in the semantical hierarchy. This error generates an unwanted Kantian transcendental idealism which in effect delivers a reductio ad absurdum of McDowell’s metaphysical economy. To correct this mistake, Frege must first be followed in his location of concepts at the level of reference. Second, one must move beyond Frege to locate not only concepts but also propositions at that level. This, in turn, requires the serious consideration of an idea which McDowell mentions only to reject, that of objects as speaking to us ‘in the world’s own language’. Despite the correction recommended here, if empiricism is to have any chance of success, it must be still more minimal in its pretensions than McDowell allows. In particular, it must abandon the individualistic and intellectualistic construction which McDowell places on the ‘order of justification’.
Lucy O'Brien
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261482
- eISBN:
- 9780191718632
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of ...
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This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions?Less
This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions?
Sam Glucksberg
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195111095
- eISBN:
- 9780199872107
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195111095.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The book presents a comprehensive account of how people understand metaphors and idioms in everyday discourse. Traditionally, figurative language has been considered to be derived from and more ...
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The book presents a comprehensive account of how people understand metaphors and idioms in everyday discourse. Traditionally, figurative language has been considered to be derived from and more complex than literal language. The book presents an alternative view, arguing that figurative language makes use of the same kinds of linguistic and pragmatic operations that are used for literal language. A new theory of metaphor comprehension integrates linguistic, philosophical, and psychological perspectives to account for figurative language use. The theory's central tenet is that everyday conversational metaphors are used spontaneously to create new concepts and categories. Metaphor is special only in the sense that metaphorical categories are salient examples of the things that they represent. These categories get their names from the best examples of those categories. Thus, the literal “shark” can be a metaphor for any vicious and predatory creature. Because the same term, “shark”, is used for both its literal referent and for the metaphorical category, as in “my lawyer is a shark”, such terms have dual-reference. In this way, metaphors simultaneously refer to the abstract metaphorical category and to the most salient literal exemplar of that category, as in the expression “boys (literal) will be boys (metaphorical)”. The book concludes with a comprehensive treatment of idiom use, and an analysis and critique (written by Matthew McGlone) of conceptual metaphor in the context of how people understand both conventional and novel figurative expressions.Less
The book presents a comprehensive account of how people understand metaphors and idioms in everyday discourse. Traditionally, figurative language has been considered to be derived from and more complex than literal language. The book presents an alternative view, arguing that figurative language makes use of the same kinds of linguistic and pragmatic operations that are used for literal language. A new theory of metaphor comprehension integrates linguistic, philosophical, and psychological perspectives to account for figurative language use. The theory's central tenet is that everyday conversational metaphors are used spontaneously to create new concepts and categories. Metaphor is special only in the sense that metaphorical categories are salient examples of the things that they represent. These categories get their names from the best examples of those categories. Thus, the literal “shark” can be a metaphor for any vicious and predatory creature. Because the same term, “shark”, is used for both its literal referent and for the metaphorical category, as in “my lawyer is a shark”, such terms have dual-reference. In this way, metaphors simultaneously refer to the abstract metaphorical category and to the most salient literal exemplar of that category, as in the expression “boys (literal) will be boys (metaphorical)”. The book concludes with a comprehensive treatment of idiom use, and an analysis and critique (written by Matthew McGlone) of conceptual metaphor in the context of how people understand both conventional and novel figurative expressions.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239443
- eISBN:
- 9780191717000
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This introduction begins with a discussion of the principal claim of the book, which is that reference and truth have an explanatory role to play in the nature of understanding and ...
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This introduction begins with a discussion of the principal claim of the book, which is that reference and truth have an explanatory role to play in the nature of understanding and concept-possession, an explanatory role that is deeper and more extensive than is commonly envisaged — either by opponents of truth-conditional theories, or even by some of their supporters. Part I of the book attempts to extract a general model of understanding from examples and defend it by its explanatory powers. Part II applies the general model outlined in Part I to various mental concepts. These include the concept of a subject of conscious states, and the concepts of perception and action, both bodily and mental. An overview of the succeeding chapters is presented.Less
This introduction begins with a discussion of the principal claim of the book, which is that reference and truth have an explanatory role to play in the nature of understanding and concept-possession, an explanatory role that is deeper and more extensive than is commonly envisaged — either by opponents of truth-conditional theories, or even by some of their supporters. Part I of the book attempts to extract a general model of understanding from examples and defend it by its explanatory powers. Part II applies the general model outlined in Part I to various mental concepts. These include the concept of a subject of conscious states, and the concepts of perception and action, both bodily and mental. An overview of the succeeding chapters is presented.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239443
- eISBN:
- 9780191717000
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. Among these are that fundamental reference rules for concepts can provide a substantive account of ...
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This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. Among these are that fundamental reference rules for concepts can provide a substantive account of understanding. They can support a realistic treatment of truth and reference, and can do so in a way that is superior to justificationist, pragmatist, and pure conceptual-role theories of content. Current issues in philosophy and its adjacent cognitive sciences that require a substantive theory of sense for its resolution are presented.Less
This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. Among these are that fundamental reference rules for concepts can provide a substantive account of understanding. They can support a realistic treatment of truth and reference, and can do so in a way that is superior to justificationist, pragmatist, and pure conceptual-role theories of content. Current issues in philosophy and its adjacent cognitive sciences that require a substantive theory of sense for its resolution are presented.
Gary Kemp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695621
- eISBN:
- 9780191738524
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most ...
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So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.Less
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.
Paul L. Nunez and Ramesh Srinivasan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195050387
- eISBN:
- 9780199865673
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195050387.001.0001
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Neuroendocrine and Autonomic, Techniques
This text is the second edition of this book. It expands the widely acclaimed 1981 book, filling more gaps between EEG and the physical sciences. EEG opens a “window on the mind” by finding new ...
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This text is the second edition of this book. It expands the widely acclaimed 1981 book, filling more gaps between EEG and the physical sciences. EEG opens a “window on the mind” by finding new connections between psychology and physiology. Topics include synaptic sources, electrode placement, choice of reference, volume conduction, power and coherence, projection of scalp potentials to dura surface, dynamic signatures of conscious experience, and neural networks immersed in global fields of synaptic action.Less
This text is the second edition of this book. It expands the widely acclaimed 1981 book, filling more gaps between EEG and the physical sciences. EEG opens a “window on the mind” by finding new connections between psychology and physiology. Topics include synaptic sources, electrode placement, choice of reference, volume conduction, power and coherence, projection of scalp potentials to dura surface, dynamic signatures of conscious experience, and neural networks immersed in global fields of synaptic action.
Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199738946
- eISBN:
- 9780199866175
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Ordinary language and scientific language enable us to speak about, in a singular way (with demonstratives and names), what we recognize not to exist: fictions, the contents of our hallucinations, ...
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Ordinary language and scientific language enable us to speak about, in a singular way (with demonstratives and names), what we recognize not to exist: fictions, the contents of our hallucinations, abstract objects, and various idealized nonexistent objects to which our scientific theories more conveniently apply. Indeed, references to such nonexistent items—especially in the case of the application of mathematics to the sciences—are indispensable. Scientific and ordinary languages allow us to say things about Pegasus or about hallucinated objects that are true (or false) such as “Pegasus was believed by the ancient Greeks to be a flying horse,” or “That elf I’m now hallucinating over there is wearing blue shoes.” Standard contemporary metaphysical views and standard contemporary philosophical semantic analyses of singular idioms have not successfully accommodated these routine practices of saying true and false things about the nonexistent while simultaneously honoring the insight that such things do not exist in any way at all (and have no properties). This book reconfigures metaphysics and semantics in a radical way to allow the accommodation of our ordinary ways of speaking of what does not exist while retaining the absolutely crucial assumption that such objects exist in no way at all, have no properties, and so are not the truth-makers for the truths and falsities that are about them.Less
Ordinary language and scientific language enable us to speak about, in a singular way (with demonstratives and names), what we recognize not to exist: fictions, the contents of our hallucinations, abstract objects, and various idealized nonexistent objects to which our scientific theories more conveniently apply. Indeed, references to such nonexistent items—especially in the case of the application of mathematics to the sciences—are indispensable. Scientific and ordinary languages allow us to say things about Pegasus or about hallucinated objects that are true (or false) such as “Pegasus was believed by the ancient Greeks to be a flying horse,” or “That elf I’m now hallucinating over there is wearing blue shoes.” Standard contemporary metaphysical views and standard contemporary philosophical semantic analyses of singular idioms have not successfully accommodated these routine practices of saying true and false things about the nonexistent while simultaneously honoring the insight that such things do not exist in any way at all (and have no properties). This book reconfigures metaphysics and semantics in a radical way to allow the accommodation of our ordinary ways of speaking of what does not exist while retaining the absolutely crucial assumption that such objects exist in no way at all, have no properties, and so are not the truth-makers for the truths and falsities that are about them.
Roger W. Shuy
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391329
- eISBN:
- 9780199866274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391329.003.0015
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter reviews the progress made from the days in which language conflicts were settled by duels to their replacement by present day defamation law suits, concluding that although much progress ...
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This chapter reviews the progress made from the days in which language conflicts were settled by duels to their replacement by present day defamation law suits, concluding that although much progress has been made, there is still more to be added if lawyers would make use of the linguistic expertise that was illustrated in the preceding chapters.Less
This chapter reviews the progress made from the days in which language conflicts were settled by duels to their replacement by present day defamation law suits, concluding that although much progress has been made, there is still more to be added if lawyers would make use of the linguistic expertise that was illustrated in the preceding chapters.
Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198280736
- eISBN:
- 9780191598746
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198280734.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Looks at diplomacy and debate at the UN Security Council, and the role of procedural rules and practice in these activities. The first four sections of the chapter describe the rules for: the order ...
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Looks at diplomacy and debate at the UN Security Council, and the role of procedural rules and practice in these activities. The first four sections of the chapter describe the rules for: the order of speakers; interrupting the speaker; the right of reply; and motions, proposals and suggestions — the various types of these are all defined. The next section discusses precedence motions (Rule 33), which are techniques available to the Council by which debate can be suspended or terminated, either to facilitate positive purposes, or to frustrate negative ones (such as filibustering); these include: suspension of the meeting; adjournment of the meeting either sine die or to a certain day or hour; reference of any matter to a committee, the Secretary‐General of the UN, or a rapporteur; postponement of the discussion to a certain day, or indefinitely; and introduction of an amendment; all of these are described separately. The remaining sections of the chapter discuss amendments, and statements before or after the vote.Less
Looks at diplomacy and debate at the UN Security Council, and the role of procedural rules and practice in these activities. The first four sections of the chapter describe the rules for: the order of speakers; interrupting the speaker; the right of reply; and motions, proposals and suggestions — the various types of these are all defined. The next section discusses precedence motions (Rule 33), which are techniques available to the Council by which debate can be suspended or terminated, either to facilitate positive purposes, or to frustrate negative ones (such as filibustering); these include: suspension of the meeting; adjournment of the meeting either sine die or to a certain day or hour; reference of any matter to a committee, the Secretary‐General of the UN, or a rapporteur; postponement of the discussion to a certain day, or indefinitely; and introduction of an amendment; all of these are described separately. The remaining sections of the chapter discuss amendments, and statements before or after the vote.
John Hawthorne and David Manley
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693672
- eISBN:
- 9780191739002
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693672.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins by denying that either is tied to a special ...
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This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins by denying that either is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. It goes on to challenge the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other—a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work in semantics, a more unified account of all four types of expression is explored, according to which none of them paradigmatically fits the profile of a referential term. The authors argue that all four involve existential quantification but admit of uses that exhibit many of the traits associated with reference—a phenomenon that is due to the presence of what we call a ‘singular restriction’ on the existentially quantified domain. The Afterword draws out some implications of the proposed semantic picture for the traditional categories of reference and singular thought.Less
This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins by denying that either is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. It goes on to challenge the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other—a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work in semantics, a more unified account of all four types of expression is explored, according to which none of them paradigmatically fits the profile of a referential term. The authors argue that all four involve existential quantification but admit of uses that exhibit many of the traits associated with reference—a phenomenon that is due to the presence of what we call a ‘singular restriction’ on the existentially quantified domain. The Afterword draws out some implications of the proposed semantic picture for the traditional categories of reference and singular thought.
Barry Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286690
- eISBN:
- 9780191604065
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286698.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter sets out the relevant core of Putnam’s case. Section 3.1 extracts three arguments from Putnam’s writings: the Arguments from Cardinality, Completeness, and Permutation. Of these, section ...
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This chapter sets out the relevant core of Putnam’s case. Section 3.1 extracts three arguments from Putnam’s writings: the Arguments from Cardinality, Completeness, and Permutation. Of these, section 3.2 argues that only the second is of direct relevance. Section 3.3 examines attempts to frame constraints based on causal and psycho-behavioural reductions of reference. Section 3.4 investigates the Translational Reference Constraint (TRC), a constraint on reference which does not rely on a reduction of reference but makes essential use of translation (from object language to metalanguage) to sort out the models which get reference right. The claims made in this section, however, require foundation in a theory of translation, sufficient to sustain the assumptions it makes about that controversial and opaque notion. This foundation is supplied in section 3.5, whose general tenor is Davidsonian, its key notion being that of a ‘hermeneutic theory’, i.e., a Davidsonian theory of interpretation cast into model-theoretic terms. With Translational Truth Constraint (TTC) now identified as the most fundamental constraint on intendedness, it remains to see if it will suffice to rule out as unintended all the models of ideal theory whose existence the Completeness Theorem guarantees. The issue is examined in section 3.6.Less
This chapter sets out the relevant core of Putnam’s case. Section 3.1 extracts three arguments from Putnam’s writings: the Arguments from Cardinality, Completeness, and Permutation. Of these, section 3.2 argues that only the second is of direct relevance. Section 3.3 examines attempts to frame constraints based on causal and psycho-behavioural reductions of reference. Section 3.4 investigates the Translational Reference Constraint (TRC), a constraint on reference which does not rely on a reduction of reference but makes essential use of translation (from object language to metalanguage) to sort out the models which get reference right. The claims made in this section, however, require foundation in a theory of translation, sufficient to sustain the assumptions it makes about that controversial and opaque notion. This foundation is supplied in section 3.5, whose general tenor is Davidsonian, its key notion being that of a ‘hermeneutic theory’, i.e., a Davidsonian theory of interpretation cast into model-theoretic terms. With Translational Truth Constraint (TTC) now identified as the most fundamental constraint on intendedness, it remains to see if it will suffice to rule out as unintended all the models of ideal theory whose existence the Completeness Theorem guarantees. The issue is examined in section 3.6.
Anthony Brueckner
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585861
- eISBN:
- 9780191595332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter raises a problem for the Davidsonian anti-sceptical strategy that mirrors a problem raised for Putnam in Chapter 7.
This chapter raises a problem for the Davidsonian anti-sceptical strategy that mirrors a problem raised for Putnam in Chapter 7.
Kent Bach
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240778
- eISBN:
- 9780191680267
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240778.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This book presents a view of the problems of reference and singular terms, including an account of singular thought, a systematic application of recent work in the theory of speech acts, and a ...
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This book presents a view of the problems of reference and singular terms, including an account of singular thought, a systematic application of recent work in the theory of speech acts, and a partial revival of Russell's analysis of singular terms.Less
This book presents a view of the problems of reference and singular terms, including an account of singular thought, a systematic application of recent work in the theory of speech acts, and a partial revival of Russell's analysis of singular terms.
R. M. Sainsbury
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199241804
- eISBN:
- 9780191602696
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241805.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book concerns the nature of reference, and the theory it develops is intermediate between direct reference theories and descriptivist theories. A guiding thought is that just as truth conditions ...
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This book concerns the nature of reference, and the theory it develops is intermediate between direct reference theories and descriptivist theories. A guiding thought is that just as truth conditions (rather than truth values) can throw light on the meaning of sentences so can reference conditions (rather than referents) throw light on the meaning of referring expressions. A reference condition need not be a descriptive condition, and it need not be satisfied. The first of these points marks the divergence from descriptivist theories, and the second, from direct reference theories. This idea is applied to proper names, pronouns, and definite descriptions (singular, plural and mass); problems of existential and fictional sentences are addressed; and, in the final chapter, an analogue of the main idea is applied to mental content.Less
This book concerns the nature of reference, and the theory it develops is intermediate between direct reference theories and descriptivist theories. A guiding thought is that just as truth conditions (rather than truth values) can throw light on the meaning of sentences so can reference conditions (rather than referents) throw light on the meaning of referring expressions. A reference condition need not be a descriptive condition, and it need not be satisfied. The first of these points marks the divergence from descriptivist theories, and the second, from direct reference theories. This idea is applied to proper names, pronouns, and definite descriptions (singular, plural and mass); problems of existential and fictional sentences are addressed; and, in the final chapter, an analogue of the main idea is applied to mental content.
Timothy McCarthy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145069
- eISBN:
- 9780199833436
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145062.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising ...
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Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.Less
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242894
- eISBN:
- 9780191597381
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242895.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and ...
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This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and truth‐conditions, and their role in a theory of meaning and of the content of our mental states. The next five deal with what I call ‘factually defective discourse’—discourse that gives rise to issues about which, it is tempting to say that, there is no fact of the matter as to the right answer; one particular kind of factually defective discourse is called ‘indeterminacy’, and it gets the bulk of the attention. The final bunch of papers deal with issues about objectivity, closely related to issues about factual defectiveness; two deal with the question of whether the axioms of mathematics are as objective as is often assumed, and one deals with the question of whether our epistemological methods are as objective as they are usually assumed to be.Less
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and truth‐conditions, and their role in a theory of meaning and of the content of our mental states. The next five deal with what I call ‘factually defective discourse’—discourse that gives rise to issues about which, it is tempting to say that, there is no fact of the matter as to the right answer; one particular kind of factually defective discourse is called ‘indeterminacy’, and it gets the bulk of the attention. The final bunch of papers deal with issues about objectivity, closely related to issues about factual defectiveness; two deal with the question of whether the axioms of mathematics are as objective as is often assumed, and one deals with the question of whether our epistemological methods are as objective as they are usually assumed to be.
Stewart Shapiro
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139303
- eISBN:
- 9780199833658
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195139305.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The philosophy of mathematics articulated and defended in this book goes by the name of “structuralism”, and its slogan is that mathematics is the science of structure. The subject matter of ...
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The philosophy of mathematics articulated and defended in this book goes by the name of “structuralism”, and its slogan is that mathematics is the science of structure. The subject matter of arithmetic, for example, is the natural number structure, the pattern common to any countably infinite system of objects with a distinguished initial object and a successor relation that satisfies the induction principle. The essence of each natural number is its relation to the other natural numbers. One way to understand structuralism is to reify structures as ante rem universals. This would be a platonism concerning mathematical objects, which are the places within such structures. Alternatively, one can take an eliminative, in re approach, and understand talk of structures as shorthand for talk of systems of objects or, invoking modality, talk of possible systems of objects. Shapiro argues that although the realist, ante rem approach is the most perspicuous, in a sense, the various accounts are equivalent. Along the way, the ontological and epistemological aspects of the structuralist philosophies are assessed. One key aspect is to show how each philosophy deals with reference to mathematical objects. The view is tentatively extended to objects generally: to science and ordinary discourse.Less
The philosophy of mathematics articulated and defended in this book goes by the name of “structuralism”, and its slogan is that mathematics is the science of structure. The subject matter of arithmetic, for example, is the natural number structure, the pattern common to any countably infinite system of objects with a distinguished initial object and a successor relation that satisfies the induction principle. The essence of each natural number is its relation to the other natural numbers. One way to understand structuralism is to reify structures as ante rem universals. This would be a platonism concerning mathematical objects, which are the places within such structures. Alternatively, one can take an eliminative, in re approach, and understand talk of structures as shorthand for talk of systems of objects or, invoking modality, talk of possible systems of objects. Shapiro argues that although the realist, ante rem approach is the most perspicuous, in a sense, the various accounts are equivalent. Along the way, the ontological and epistemological aspects of the structuralist philosophies are assessed. One key aspect is to show how each philosophy deals with reference to mathematical objects. The view is tentatively extended to objects generally: to science and ordinary discourse.
