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The Nuclear Revolution

Michael Quinlan

in Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199563944
eISBN:
9780191721274
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563944.003.0002
Subject:
Political Science, International Relations and Politics

This chapter starts with the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by nuclear weapons in 1945, to terminate World War II. It considers what people at the time thought about the significance of this, ... More


Replies to Hasker and Zimmerman

Trenton Merricks

in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199590629
eISBN:
9780191731280
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology

William Hasker and Dean Zimmerman raise objections to Hasker's paper ‘Truth and Molinism’. This chapter responds to those objections.


Externalism and Armchair Knowledge

Martin Davies

in New Essays on the A Priori

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199241279
eISBN:
9780191597107
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199241279.003.0016
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Martin Davies explores a solution to a reductio ad absurdum argument template, one instance of which has the conclusion that we can know the proposition ‘someone has interacted with water’ a priori. ... More


Conditional Reasoning Part I: Three Kinds of Conditionals and the Psychology of the Material Conditional

Peter Langland-Hassan

in Explaining Imagination

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
September 2020
ISBN:
9780198815068
eISBN:
9780191852886
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198815068.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Three types of conditional are distinguished: the material conditional, indicative conditional, and subjunctive/counterfactual conditional. The apparent difference in truth conditions of each is ... More


The Logical Syntax of Inductive Support-gradings

L. Jonathan Cohen

in The Probable and The Provable

Published in print:
1977
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198244127
eISBN:
9780191680748
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244127.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

According to Karl von Frisch's method of reasoning, the conjunction of two generalizations must have the same grade of support as has the less well supported of the two or as both have if they are ... More


Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of Empricial Facts

Bill Brewer

in New Essays on the A Priori

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199241279
eISBN:
9780191597107
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199241279.003.0017
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Bill Brewer explores a solution to a reductio ad absurdum argument template, one instance of which has the conclusion that we can know the proposition ‘someone has interacted with water’ a priori. ... More


Rhetoric in Life

Carlo Michelstaedter

in Persuasion and Rhetoric

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
October 2013
ISBN:
9780300104349
eISBN:
9780300130126
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Yale University Press
DOI:
10.12987/yale/9780300104349.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter begins with Michelstaedter's satire of the self-satisfaction of the “man of the world,” who takes himself to be learned, tasteful, and attentive to duties; who relies on the perks of ... More


The Quest for Perpetually Acting Machines

Jennifer Coopersmith

in Energy, the Subtle Concept: The discovery of Feynman's blocks from Leibniz to Einstein

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
August 2015
ISBN:
9780198716747
eISBN:
9780191800955
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716747.003.0002
Subject:
Physics, Particle Physics / Astrophysics / Cosmology, History of Physics

Perpetual motion—a perpetually acting machine— had been attempted for so many years, and in so many ways, but was never successful (the French Royal Academy of Sciences said ‘Non’, no more ... More


Must Anselm be Interpreted as a Meinongian?

Lynne Rudder Baker

in Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
January 2017
ISBN:
9780198715702
eISBN:
9780191783401
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion

Peter van Inwagen recently published an essay entitled “Three Versions of the Ontological Argument” (Van Inwagen 2012). The three versions he labeled “The Meinongian Version,” “The Conceptual ... More


Mathematics and Reality

Roger Penrose and Martin Gardner

in The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and The Laws of Physics

Published in print:
1989
Published Online:
November 2020
ISBN:
9780198519737
eISBN:
9780191917080
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198519737.003.0011
Subject:
Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning

Let us imagine that we have been travelling on a great journey to some far-off world. We shall call this world Tor’Bled-Nam. Our remote sensing device has picked up a signal which is now displayed ... More


Conclusion

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The hangman/surprise-examination/prediction paradox is solved. It is not solved by denying knowledge closure (although knowledge closure is false). It is not solved by denying KK or denying that ... More


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