Benedetta De Alessi
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780197266953
- eISBN:
- 9780191938191
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197266953.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter focuses on the flawed transformation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A) from a rebel movement into a political organisation during the years of implementation of the ...
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This chapter focuses on the flawed transformation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A) from a rebel movement into a political organisation during the years of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan and how that contributed to delivering an unsustainable peace in Sudan and South Sudan. The chapter examines in particular how approaches to peacemaking ignited and then failed to support the war-to-peace transition, and the extent to which the drivers and factors within and outside the movement contributed to that failure. It argues that while the CPA mediators and the SPLM/A negotiators considered the SPLM to be the engine of Sudan’s democratic transition - after two decades of civil war - they did not adequately consider the movement’s structural weaknesses, namely a divisive ideology, a fractured and hierarchal military leadership and weak political institutionalisation that would affect the movement’s transformation into a national party and its ability to bring about the transformation of Sudan.Less
This chapter focuses on the flawed transformation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A) from a rebel movement into a political organisation during the years of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan and how that contributed to delivering an unsustainable peace in Sudan and South Sudan. The chapter examines in particular how approaches to peacemaking ignited and then failed to support the war-to-peace transition, and the extent to which the drivers and factors within and outside the movement contributed to that failure. It argues that while the CPA mediators and the SPLM/A negotiators considered the SPLM to be the engine of Sudan’s democratic transition - after two decades of civil war - they did not adequately consider the movement’s structural weaknesses, namely a divisive ideology, a fractured and hierarchal military leadership and weak political institutionalisation that would affect the movement’s transformation into a national party and its ability to bring about the transformation of Sudan.
David Quint
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691161914
- eISBN:
- 9781400850488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691161914.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This chapter shows how book 1 of Paradise Lost metaphorically depicts the role of the devil in raising the rebel angels out of their “bottomless perdition,” an act of poetic creation analogous to the ...
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This chapter shows how book 1 of Paradise Lost metaphorically depicts the role of the devil in raising the rebel angels out of their “bottomless perdition,” an act of poetic creation analogous to the divine creation of the universe described in the invocation—“how the heavens and earth/Rose out of chaos.” The chief devils described in the catalog that occupies the center of book 1 and organizes its poetic figures and symbolic geography—Carthage, Sodom, Egypt, Babel-Babylon, Rome—are precisely those who will come to inhabit the pagan shrines that human idolatry will build next to or even inside the Jerusalem temple, profaning God's house. This catalog—whose traditional epic function is to size up military force—instead suggests the force of spiritual falsehood, and it corresponds to the defeated devils' own reluctance to pursue another direct war against God; they would rather resort to satanic fraud.Less
This chapter shows how book 1 of Paradise Lost metaphorically depicts the role of the devil in raising the rebel angels out of their “bottomless perdition,” an act of poetic creation analogous to the divine creation of the universe described in the invocation—“how the heavens and earth/Rose out of chaos.” The chief devils described in the catalog that occupies the center of book 1 and organizes its poetic figures and symbolic geography—Carthage, Sodom, Egypt, Babel-Babylon, Rome—are precisely those who will come to inhabit the pagan shrines that human idolatry will build next to or even inside the Jerusalem temple, profaning God's house. This catalog—whose traditional epic function is to size up military force—instead suggests the force of spiritual falsehood, and it corresponds to the defeated devils' own reluctance to pursue another direct war against God; they would rather resort to satanic fraud.
Julius Ruiz
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199281831
- eISBN:
- 9780191712999
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281831.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
Madrid became one of the key symbols of Republican resistance to General Franco during the Spanish Civil War following the Nationalists' failure to take the city in the winter of 1936-7. Yet despite ...
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Madrid became one of the key symbols of Republican resistance to General Franco during the Spanish Civil War following the Nationalists' failure to take the city in the winter of 1936-7. Yet despite the defiant cries of ‘No pasarán’, they did eventually pass on 28 March 1939. This book examines the consequences in Madrid of Franco's unconditional victory in the Spanish Civil War. Using recently available archival material, this book shows how the punishment of the vanquished was based on a cruel irony — Republicans, not the military rebels of July 1936, were held responsible for the fratricidal conflict. Military tribunals handed out sentences for the crime of ‘military rebellion’; mere passivity towards the Nationalists before 1939 was not only made a civil offence under the Law of Political Responsibilities but could cause dismissal from work; and freemasons and Communists, specifically blamed for the Civil War, were criminalized by decree in March 1940. However, contrary to much that has been written on the subject, the post-war Francoist repression was not exterminatory. Genocide did not take place in post-war Madrid. While a minimum of 3,113 judicial executions took place between 1939 and 1944, death sentences were largely based on accusations of participation in ‘blood crimes’ that occurred in Madrid in 1936. Moreover, and unlike most other accounts of the Francoist political violence, this book is concerned with the question of when and why mass repression came to an end. It shows that the sheer numbers of cases opened against Republican ‘rebels’, and the use of complex pre-war bureaucratic procedures to process them, produced a crisis that was only resolved by decisions taken by the Franco regime in 1940-1 to abandon much of the repressive system. By 1944, mass repression had come to an end.Less
Madrid became one of the key symbols of Republican resistance to General Franco during the Spanish Civil War following the Nationalists' failure to take the city in the winter of 1936-7. Yet despite the defiant cries of ‘No pasarán’, they did eventually pass on 28 March 1939. This book examines the consequences in Madrid of Franco's unconditional victory in the Spanish Civil War. Using recently available archival material, this book shows how the punishment of the vanquished was based on a cruel irony — Republicans, not the military rebels of July 1936, were held responsible for the fratricidal conflict. Military tribunals handed out sentences for the crime of ‘military rebellion’; mere passivity towards the Nationalists before 1939 was not only made a civil offence under the Law of Political Responsibilities but could cause dismissal from work; and freemasons and Communists, specifically blamed for the Civil War, were criminalized by decree in March 1940. However, contrary to much that has been written on the subject, the post-war Francoist repression was not exterminatory. Genocide did not take place in post-war Madrid. While a minimum of 3,113 judicial executions took place between 1939 and 1944, death sentences were largely based on accusations of participation in ‘blood crimes’ that occurred in Madrid in 1936. Moreover, and unlike most other accounts of the Francoist political violence, this book is concerned with the question of when and why mass repression came to an end. It shows that the sheer numbers of cases opened against Republican ‘rebels’, and the use of complex pre-war bureaucratic procedures to process them, produced a crisis that was only resolved by decisions taken by the Franco regime in 1940-1 to abandon much of the repressive system. By 1944, mass repression had come to an end.
Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813035406
- eISBN:
- 9780813038377
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813035406.003.0027
- Subject:
- History, World Early Modern History
Seven ships and caravels departed Santo Domingo in July 1543 for Spain. Among them was a ship of Portugal that had come to the city with a cargo of Negroes to sell. In Santo Domingo these slaves were ...
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Seven ships and caravels departed Santo Domingo in July 1543 for Spain. Among them was a ship of Portugal that had come to the city with a cargo of Negroes to sell. In Santo Domingo these slaves were valuable and necessary for farms and services to the residents, for working the fields and gold mines, and for the sugar mills. At the time this story was recounted, there were so many of these slaves that many had rebelled and fled their masters. These rebels did much harm on the island, and worse was expected if they were not to be punished more vigorously than had been done until that point. They sailed the western route around this island and went out through the islands of the Lucayos, and from there they turned to the course for Europe. After it was out to sea and seven or eight days separated from the other ships, the ship was beset by bad weather.Less
Seven ships and caravels departed Santo Domingo in July 1543 for Spain. Among them was a ship of Portugal that had come to the city with a cargo of Negroes to sell. In Santo Domingo these slaves were valuable and necessary for farms and services to the residents, for working the fields and gold mines, and for the sugar mills. At the time this story was recounted, there were so many of these slaves that many had rebelled and fled their masters. These rebels did much harm on the island, and worse was expected if they were not to be punished more vigorously than had been done until that point. They sailed the western route around this island and went out through the islands of the Lucayos, and from there they turned to the course for Europe. After it was out to sea and seven or eight days separated from the other ships, the ship was beset by bad weather.
Christopher Bryan
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195183344
- eISBN:
- 9780199835584
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195183347.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Jesus suffered crucifixion by the Romans. Is this because he was a rebel against Rome? Not according to the evangelists, who claim that the Sanhedrin under Caiaphas initially arraigned Jesus on a ...
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Jesus suffered crucifixion by the Romans. Is this because he was a rebel against Rome? Not according to the evangelists, who claim that the Sanhedrin under Caiaphas initially arraigned Jesus on a capital charge of blasphemy. References to Jesus’ death in Jewish sources (notably Josephus and the Talmud) also claim primary responsibility for the Jerusalem authorities. Having condemned Jesus, the Sanhedrin referred the case to Pilate, as would be necessary, given Rome’s normal practice of reserving the death penalty to itself. For Pilate’s benefit, the charge was restated in terms of maiestas laesa—high treason. The gospels describe Pilate as initially unconvinced and prepared to deal with Jesus of Nazareth as Albinus would later deal with Jesus ben Hananiah. Then, perhaps because he fears a riot, Pilate is persuaded to apply the death penalty. There is no good reason to doubt the essential truth of this record.Less
Jesus suffered crucifixion by the Romans. Is this because he was a rebel against Rome? Not according to the evangelists, who claim that the Sanhedrin under Caiaphas initially arraigned Jesus on a capital charge of blasphemy. References to Jesus’ death in Jewish sources (notably Josephus and the Talmud) also claim primary responsibility for the Jerusalem authorities. Having condemned Jesus, the Sanhedrin referred the case to Pilate, as would be necessary, given Rome’s normal practice of reserving the death penalty to itself. For Pilate’s benefit, the charge was restated in terms of maiestas laesa—high treason. The gospels describe Pilate as initially unconvinced and prepared to deal with Jesus of Nazareth as Albinus would later deal with Jesus ben Hananiah. Then, perhaps because he fears a riot, Pilate is persuaded to apply the death penalty. There is no good reason to doubt the essential truth of this record.
Charles Walker
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691153599
- eISBN:
- 9781400845248
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691153599.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
This chapter examines how fear was experienced by rebels, priests, and colonial administrators in Peru during the Tupac Amaru Rebellion of 1780–1783. It first provides a historical background on the ...
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This chapter examines how fear was experienced by rebels, priests, and colonial administrators in Peru during the Tupac Amaru Rebellion of 1780–1783. It first provides a historical background on the rebellion before discussing the cases of twelve of the eighteen clerics who were prosecuted by the bishop of Cuzco, Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, to illustrate how priests experienced the uprising. It then considers what the rebellion contributed to our understanding of fear as a historical category and how the trials of the priests shed light on important questions about the Tupac Amaru Rebellion. It also explores how the Tupac Amaru uprising heightened social divisions in the Andes and notes that historians have deemed the postrebellion decades as the period of great fear. The chapter argues that Tupac Amaru as a symbol failed to foster the same broad, reactionary cohesion that the Haitian Revolution did a decade later.Less
This chapter examines how fear was experienced by rebels, priests, and colonial administrators in Peru during the Tupac Amaru Rebellion of 1780–1783. It first provides a historical background on the rebellion before discussing the cases of twelve of the eighteen clerics who were prosecuted by the bishop of Cuzco, Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, to illustrate how priests experienced the uprising. It then considers what the rebellion contributed to our understanding of fear as a historical category and how the trials of the priests shed light on important questions about the Tupac Amaru Rebellion. It also explores how the Tupac Amaru uprising heightened social divisions in the Andes and notes that historians have deemed the postrebellion decades as the period of great fear. The chapter argues that Tupac Amaru as a symbol failed to foster the same broad, reactionary cohesion that the Haitian Revolution did a decade later.
Guenael Mettraux
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199559329
- eISBN:
- 9780191705304
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559329.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology, Public International Law
This chapter deals with the scope of application ‘ratione personae’ of the doctrine of superior responsibility. In particular, it discusses and analyses the application of that doctrine to military ...
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This chapter deals with the scope of application ‘ratione personae’ of the doctrine of superior responsibility. In particular, it discusses and analyses the application of that doctrine to military as well as civilian leaders and discusses the practical and evidential distinctions relevant in both contexts. It deals with the application of that doctrine to less formal types of superiors, such as terrorist or rebel leaders and military-private contractors. The chapter is also devoted to the all important question of the distinction between de jure superiors who have been appointed or elected to command and lead, and de facto superiors whose authority to command lays, not on domestic law, but on other factors.Less
This chapter deals with the scope of application ‘ratione personae’ of the doctrine of superior responsibility. In particular, it discusses and analyses the application of that doctrine to military as well as civilian leaders and discusses the practical and evidential distinctions relevant in both contexts. It deals with the application of that doctrine to less formal types of superiors, such as terrorist or rebel leaders and military-private contractors. The chapter is also devoted to the all important question of the distinction between de jure superiors who have been appointed or elected to command and lead, and de facto superiors whose authority to command lays, not on domestic law, but on other factors.
R. R. Davies
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198205081
- eISBN:
- 9780191676499
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205081.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Medieval History
The revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr began as the conspiracy and vision of a group, or possibly two groups, of men in north Wales in the autumn of 1400; by the midsummer of 1403 it had become a movement ...
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The revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr began as the conspiracy and vision of a group, or possibly two groups, of men in north Wales in the autumn of 1400; by the midsummer of 1403 it had become a movement which took the whole of Wales for its stage and drew its support from all comers of the country. The success of the revolt, first in surviving beyond its first, very uncertain, year and then in transforming itself into what may be truly termed a national revolt, owed not a little to the incompetence and distractions of the royal government and of the English lords in Wales as well as to the difficulties of countering guerrilla warfare in mountainous terrain. The evidence is much too sparse and one-dimensional to show why some men chose, or at least agreed, to fight for Glyn Dŵr while others, at equal cost to themselves and their families, chose otherwise. But two things are fairly sure. First, in Wales as in other societies which experience revolt, choice for the majority was only made reluctantly and when it could no longer be avoided. Secondly, the success of the revolt was such that sooner or later it demanded a response; it could not be ignored.Less
The revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr began as the conspiracy and vision of a group, or possibly two groups, of men in north Wales in the autumn of 1400; by the midsummer of 1403 it had become a movement which took the whole of Wales for its stage and drew its support from all comers of the country. The success of the revolt, first in surviving beyond its first, very uncertain, year and then in transforming itself into what may be truly termed a national revolt, owed not a little to the incompetence and distractions of the royal government and of the English lords in Wales as well as to the difficulties of countering guerrilla warfare in mountainous terrain. The evidence is much too sparse and one-dimensional to show why some men chose, or at least agreed, to fight for Glyn Dŵr while others, at equal cost to themselves and their families, chose otherwise. But two things are fairly sure. First, in Wales as in other societies which experience revolt, choice for the majority was only made reluctantly and when it could no longer be avoided. Secondly, the success of the revolt was such that sooner or later it demanded a response; it could not be ignored.
Thomas G. Paterson
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195101201
- eISBN:
- 9780199854189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195101201.003.0018
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
The U.S. Embassy did not expect “ideal democratic” conditions, but the forthcoming national elections were “infinitely better than a violent overthrow of Batista and far better than no elections at ...
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The U.S. Embassy did not expect “ideal democratic” conditions, but the forthcoming national elections were “infinitely better than a violent overthrow of Batista and far better than no elections at all.” Not even Ambassador Smith anticipated the national elections to end the revolutionary war because the atmosphere for an honest election that Batista pledged could not have been more dreary. A full-blown civil upheaval was plaguing Cuba. Batista's bet, Andres Rivero Aguero, running under the ticket of the Progressive Action Party, defended the administration. Moreover, the rebels persuaded voters to boycott the elections.Less
The U.S. Embassy did not expect “ideal democratic” conditions, but the forthcoming national elections were “infinitely better than a violent overthrow of Batista and far better than no elections at all.” Not even Ambassador Smith anticipated the national elections to end the revolutionary war because the atmosphere for an honest election that Batista pledged could not have been more dreary. A full-blown civil upheaval was plaguing Cuba. Batista's bet, Andres Rivero Aguero, running under the ticket of the Progressive Action Party, defended the administration. Moreover, the rebels persuaded voters to boycott the elections.
I. M. W. Harvey
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198201601
- eISBN:
- 9780191674952
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198201601.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Medieval History
With the death of Jack Cade in the middle week of July, the central events of the rising of 1450 were over, although activities associated with it continued sporadically for years. This chapter ...
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With the death of Jack Cade in the middle week of July, the central events of the rising of 1450 were over, although activities associated with it continued sporadically for years. This chapter discusses the rebels who had followed Cade and who had shared those grievances for which he had been spokesman. Among those rebels, six stand out: Robert Est, William Isle, John Watte, John Ram, Richard Bruyn, and Katharine de la Pole.Less
With the death of Jack Cade in the middle week of July, the central events of the rising of 1450 were over, although activities associated with it continued sporadically for years. This chapter discusses the rebels who had followed Cade and who had shared those grievances for which he had been spokesman. Among those rebels, six stand out: Robert Est, William Isle, John Watte, John Ram, Richard Bruyn, and Katharine de la Pole.
Philip B. Heymann
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195335385
- eISBN:
- 9780199851690
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335385.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Senator Orrin Hatch arrived in Pakistan with his former associate from the Republican Steering Committee, Michael Pillsbury, in early June 1985 to see President Zia-ul-Haq. The group had two items on ...
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Senator Orrin Hatch arrived in Pakistan with his former associate from the Republican Steering Committee, Michael Pillsbury, in early June 1985 to see President Zia-ul-Haq. The group had two items on their agenda. The first was to learn directly from the Mujahideen what assistance would be most helpful. The second was to hear from Zia, unambiguously and without misunderstanding, whether he would sanction the delivery of stinger missiles to Afghan rebels. There was considerable confusion on this point. The Hatch trip failed to advance the aims of Pillsbury and others who wanted to secure Zia's permission to give stingers to the Mujahideen. The new Soviet leadership had raised diplomatic hopes that proximity talks in Geneva might be productive. Morton Abramowitz took every opportunity to raise the issue of giving stinger missiles to the Afghan rebels. With all parties to the decision apparently won over, a meeting was scheduled for the Planning and Coordination Group (covert actions) to approve the stinger proposal. Political accords were signed in Geneva. The last Soviet ground forces quit Afghanistan in February 1989, leaving behind a country in a state of civil war.Less
Senator Orrin Hatch arrived in Pakistan with his former associate from the Republican Steering Committee, Michael Pillsbury, in early June 1985 to see President Zia-ul-Haq. The group had two items on their agenda. The first was to learn directly from the Mujahideen what assistance would be most helpful. The second was to hear from Zia, unambiguously and without misunderstanding, whether he would sanction the delivery of stinger missiles to Afghan rebels. There was considerable confusion on this point. The Hatch trip failed to advance the aims of Pillsbury and others who wanted to secure Zia's permission to give stingers to the Mujahideen. The new Soviet leadership had raised diplomatic hopes that proximity talks in Geneva might be productive. Morton Abramowitz took every opportunity to raise the issue of giving stinger missiles to the Afghan rebels. With all parties to the decision apparently won over, a meeting was scheduled for the Planning and Coordination Group (covert actions) to approve the stinger proposal. Political accords were signed in Geneva. The last Soviet ground forces quit Afghanistan in February 1989, leaving behind a country in a state of civil war.
Andrew D. Brown
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198205210
- eISBN:
- 9780191676550
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205210.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Medieval History, History of Religion
Cathedrals of secular clergy were potentially as detached from the laity as monastic houses. The daily round of liturgical service conducted by the Salisbury canons and vicars-choral — the seven ...
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Cathedrals of secular clergy were potentially as detached from the laity as monastic houses. The daily round of liturgical service conducted by the Salisbury canons and vicars-choral — the seven canonical hours, daily mass, chantry masses, and anniversary services — tended to cut off the clerical members from lay people. The cathedral's wealth and exclusiveness meant that the institution sometimes became a focus of discontent. The rebels of the Lollard uprising in 1431 drew up plans to disendow the cathedral and raze it to the ground. Unsavoury incidents like these do not suggest that the cathedral clergy were held in high esteem. They do not even imply that the laity regarded the cathedral at best with a mixture of ‘respect and indifference’. This chapter argues, however, that lay people were neither indifferent nor hostile to the cathedral.Less
Cathedrals of secular clergy were potentially as detached from the laity as monastic houses. The daily round of liturgical service conducted by the Salisbury canons and vicars-choral — the seven canonical hours, daily mass, chantry masses, and anniversary services — tended to cut off the clerical members from lay people. The cathedral's wealth and exclusiveness meant that the institution sometimes became a focus of discontent. The rebels of the Lollard uprising in 1431 drew up plans to disendow the cathedral and raze it to the ground. Unsavoury incidents like these do not suggest that the cathedral clergy were held in high esteem. They do not even imply that the laity regarded the cathedral at best with a mixture of ‘respect and indifference’. This chapter argues, however, that lay people were neither indifferent nor hostile to the cathedral.
R. R. Davies
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198205081
- eISBN:
- 9780191676499
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205081.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Medieval History
Glyn Dŵ's revolt was primarily a guerrilla war; but during the years of success he and his fellow leaders were able to muster much larger forces. Reports regarding contemporary figures, often based ...
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Glyn Dŵ's revolt was primarily a guerrilla war; but during the years of success he and his fellow leaders were able to muster much larger forces. Reports regarding contemporary figures, often based on hysterical reports, need of course to be taken with a very large pinch of salt; but they do register clearly that by 1403, and at the height of the military season, Owain was able to command very substantial forces. There are at least two reasons which help explain why the English authorities took so long to quell the revolt. One arose out of the structure of governmental authority in Wales. The other explanation for the inadequacy of the English government's response to the Welsh revolt was not peculiar to Wales but rather was a general feature which bedevilled Henry IV's rule, especially in the first half of his reign — a desperate shortage of cash.Less
Glyn Dŵ's revolt was primarily a guerrilla war; but during the years of success he and his fellow leaders were able to muster much larger forces. Reports regarding contemporary figures, often based on hysterical reports, need of course to be taken with a very large pinch of salt; but they do register clearly that by 1403, and at the height of the military season, Owain was able to command very substantial forces. There are at least two reasons which help explain why the English authorities took so long to quell the revolt. One arose out of the structure of governmental authority in Wales. The other explanation for the inadequacy of the English government's response to the Welsh revolt was not peculiar to Wales but rather was a general feature which bedevilled Henry IV's rule, especially in the first half of his reign — a desperate shortage of cash.
Jennifer M. Hazen
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801451669
- eISBN:
- 9780801467578
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801451669.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
How easy is it for rebel groups to purchase weapons and ammunition in the middle of a war? How quickly can commodities such as diamonds and cocoa be converted into cash to buy war supplies? And why ...
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How easy is it for rebel groups to purchase weapons and ammunition in the middle of a war? How quickly can commodities such as diamonds and cocoa be converted into cash to buy war supplies? And why does answering these questions matter for understanding civil wars? This book challenges the commonly held view that rebel groups can get what they want, when they want it, and when they most need it. The book's assessments of resource availability in the wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire lead to a better understanding of rebel group capacity and options for war and war termination. Resources entail more than just cash; they include various other economic, military, and political goods, including natural resources, arms and ammunition, safe haven, and diplomatic support. However, rebel groups rarely enjoy continuous access to resources throughout a conflict. Understanding fluctuations in fortune is central to identifying the options available to rebel groups and the reasons why a rebel group chooses to pursue war or peace. The stronger the group's capacity, the more options it possesses with respect to fighting a war. The chances for successful negotiations and the implementation of a peace agreement increase as the options of the rebel group narrow. Sustainable negotiated solutions are most likely, the book finds, when a rebel group views negotiations not as one of the solutions for obtaining what it wants, but as the only solution.Less
How easy is it for rebel groups to purchase weapons and ammunition in the middle of a war? How quickly can commodities such as diamonds and cocoa be converted into cash to buy war supplies? And why does answering these questions matter for understanding civil wars? This book challenges the commonly held view that rebel groups can get what they want, when they want it, and when they most need it. The book's assessments of resource availability in the wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire lead to a better understanding of rebel group capacity and options for war and war termination. Resources entail more than just cash; they include various other economic, military, and political goods, including natural resources, arms and ammunition, safe haven, and diplomatic support. However, rebel groups rarely enjoy continuous access to resources throughout a conflict. Understanding fluctuations in fortune is central to identifying the options available to rebel groups and the reasons why a rebel group chooses to pursue war or peace. The stronger the group's capacity, the more options it possesses with respect to fighting a war. The chances for successful negotiations and the implementation of a peace agreement increase as the options of the rebel group narrow. Sustainable negotiated solutions are most likely, the book finds, when a rebel group views negotiations not as one of the solutions for obtaining what it wants, but as the only solution.
J. C. Holt
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203094
- eISBN:
- 9780191675713
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203094.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Medieval History
In many ways the northern rebels of 1215 were typical members of their class. They were great landlords and keen business men, active enclosers and improvers of their lands, owners of vast sheep ...
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In many ways the northern rebels of 1215 were typical members of their class. They were great landlords and keen business men, active enclosers and improvers of their lands, owners of vast sheep flocks, benefactors and patrons of great monasteries, founders both of religious houses and of market and municipal privileges. In certain matters, however, their relations with the King marked them out. By and large they were the ‘outs’, excluded from the spoils of office, despite a family tradition of service to the Crown in many cases, despite the earlier administrative experience that some of them enjoyed, and despite the expectancy of office that their social position gave them. In addition, many of them had personal wrongs, grievances, and problems to set right. William de Mowbray, Richard de Percy, Peter de Bros, Roger de Montbegon, Robert de Ros, John de Lacy, Gilbert de Gant, Maurice de Gant, Nicholas de Stuteville, Robert de Vaux, and Matilda de Caux were all in situations, or had been parties to transactions, which, in each case, could have become a deeply rooted grievance and ultimately a casus belli. On the whole the rebellion was not one in which an active and adventurous landowning class broke the fetters which the monarchy had placed on its development. It was a rebellion rather of the aggrieved, of the failures; a protest against the quasi-monopoly of privilege by the King and his friends; at its most significant a call, not to break bonds, but to impose them on the most active and experimental administrative force of the day, the monarchy.Less
In many ways the northern rebels of 1215 were typical members of their class. They were great landlords and keen business men, active enclosers and improvers of their lands, owners of vast sheep flocks, benefactors and patrons of great monasteries, founders both of religious houses and of market and municipal privileges. In certain matters, however, their relations with the King marked them out. By and large they were the ‘outs’, excluded from the spoils of office, despite a family tradition of service to the Crown in many cases, despite the earlier administrative experience that some of them enjoyed, and despite the expectancy of office that their social position gave them. In addition, many of them had personal wrongs, grievances, and problems to set right. William de Mowbray, Richard de Percy, Peter de Bros, Roger de Montbegon, Robert de Ros, John de Lacy, Gilbert de Gant, Maurice de Gant, Nicholas de Stuteville, Robert de Vaux, and Matilda de Caux were all in situations, or had been parties to transactions, which, in each case, could have become a deeply rooted grievance and ultimately a casus belli. On the whole the rebellion was not one in which an active and adventurous landowning class broke the fetters which the monarchy had placed on its development. It was a rebellion rather of the aggrieved, of the failures; a protest against the quasi-monopoly of privilege by the King and his friends; at its most significant a call, not to break bonds, but to impose them on the most active and experimental administrative force of the day, the monarchy.
J. C. Holt
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203094
- eISBN:
- 9780191675713
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203094.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Medieval History
The activity of the northern rebels was not confined to their own shires. Many influences cut across county and regional boundaries, blurring the distinctive characteristics of each locality and ...
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The activity of the northern rebels was not confined to their own shires. Many influences cut across county and regional boundaries, blurring the distinctive characteristics of each locality and group of rebels. The most obvious of these was the widespread distribution of the lands of many English baronies. Several of the northern rebel lords held estates outside the northern counties. In some cases these southern holdings were large. The spread of territorial interests was only one of the factors that confused the Northerners with other groups. The political inconsistency, if not inconstancy, of certain individuals, had similar effects. Although King John retained the loyalty and support of his old friends and officials to a remarkable degree in the last years of his reign, there was some leakage to the ranks of the rebels, or at least in some cases a lack of demonstrative eagerness, especially at the nadir of the King's fortunes after the landing of Prince Louis.Less
The activity of the northern rebels was not confined to their own shires. Many influences cut across county and regional boundaries, blurring the distinctive characteristics of each locality and group of rebels. The most obvious of these was the widespread distribution of the lands of many English baronies. Several of the northern rebel lords held estates outside the northern counties. In some cases these southern holdings were large. The spread of territorial interests was only one of the factors that confused the Northerners with other groups. The political inconsistency, if not inconstancy, of certain individuals, had similar effects. Although King John retained the loyalty and support of his old friends and officials to a remarkable degree in the last years of his reign, there was some leakage to the ranks of the rebels, or at least in some cases a lack of demonstrative eagerness, especially at the nadir of the King's fortunes after the landing of Prince Louis.
J. C. Holt
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203094
- eISBN:
- 9780191675713
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203094.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Medieval History
King John was unprepared for rebellion in the summer of 1212. The success of his campaigns in the last three years in Scotland, Wales, and Ireland had suppressed actual or potential opposition at ...
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King John was unprepared for rebellion in the summer of 1212. The success of his campaigns in the last three years in Scotland, Wales, and Ireland had suppressed actual or potential opposition at home, and there was nothing to connect the plot of 1212 with any earlier baronial resistance to the King. John's ignorance of baronial plans up to 16 August suggests that there was very little to arouse his sensitive suspicion earlier, and, indeed, the details of the plot could scarcely have been decided before July when John changed his plans to an expedition against the Welsh. There is perhaps no greater tribute to John's ability as a politician and administrator than the energy and skill with which he faced the situation. Throughout the winter months he made rapid preparations for the impending civil war. In addition to military measures the King was trying to adjust the political balance in the north in his own favour. During 1214 and the early months of 1215 John was working hard to retain the loyalty of those who were still probably wavering between him and his opponents.Less
King John was unprepared for rebellion in the summer of 1212. The success of his campaigns in the last three years in Scotland, Wales, and Ireland had suppressed actual or potential opposition at home, and there was nothing to connect the plot of 1212 with any earlier baronial resistance to the King. John's ignorance of baronial plans up to 16 August suggests that there was very little to arouse his sensitive suspicion earlier, and, indeed, the details of the plot could scarcely have been decided before July when John changed his plans to an expedition against the Welsh. There is perhaps no greater tribute to John's ability as a politician and administrator than the energy and skill with which he faced the situation. Throughout the winter months he made rapid preparations for the impending civil war. In addition to military measures the King was trying to adjust the political balance in the north in his own favour. During 1214 and the early months of 1215 John was working hard to retain the loyalty of those who were still probably wavering between him and his opponents.
J. C. Holt
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203094
- eISBN:
- 9780191675713
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203094.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Medieval History
In June 1215 the barons chose twenty-five of their number for the commission envisaged in cap. 60 of Magna Carta. Three members of the Twenty-Five had been guarantors of the safe-conduct given to the ...
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In June 1215 the barons chose twenty-five of their number for the commission envisaged in cap. 60 of Magna Carta. Three members of the Twenty-Five had been guarantors of the safe-conduct given to the barons in January. Two certainly, and probably a further four, had only turned against the King within the last month. Only eight of the Twenty-Five had major territorial interests in the north. Four of these, William de Fors, John de Lacy, Robert de Ros, and John fitz Robert, were recent recruits to the rebellion. The composition of the committee represents a marked dilution of the opposition to the King, a dilution in the sense that the old recalcitrant element of 1214 was now in a small minority. The period between January and June was one of repeated, almost continuous negotiation. Throughout, a vital role was played by two men who must have had a moderating influence on both parties, Archbishop Stephen Langton and William Marshal, Earl of Pembroke.Less
In June 1215 the barons chose twenty-five of their number for the commission envisaged in cap. 60 of Magna Carta. Three members of the Twenty-Five had been guarantors of the safe-conduct given to the barons in January. Two certainly, and probably a further four, had only turned against the King within the last month. Only eight of the Twenty-Five had major territorial interests in the north. Four of these, William de Fors, John de Lacy, Robert de Ros, and John fitz Robert, were recent recruits to the rebellion. The composition of the committee represents a marked dilution of the opposition to the King, a dilution in the sense that the old recalcitrant element of 1214 was now in a small minority. The period between January and June was one of repeated, almost continuous negotiation. Throughout, a vital role was played by two men who must have had a moderating influence on both parties, Archbishop Stephen Langton and William Marshal, Earl of Pembroke.
J. C. Holt
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203094
- eISBN:
- 9780191675713
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203094.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Medieval History
The first civil war in 1215 had begun with the baronial muster at Stamford, the formal defiance of the King, and the march on London. The second civil war into which the country slid in the autumn ...
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The first civil war in 1215 had begun with the baronial muster at Stamford, the formal defiance of the King, and the march on London. The second civil war into which the country slid in the autumn had no such dramatic opening. Indeed, the first move, the siege of Rochester, was the King's. At London there was some attempt to maintain the organization created by the security clause of the Charter, but the baronial effort was now much dispersed. The geography of the land, the decentralization of the King's treasure, the delegation of administrative authority to almost independent royal agents, the distribution of mercenary troops throughout the royal castles, all tended to produce, not one civil war, but many, of which the setting, strategic forces, tactical problems, and personnel varied from one region to another.Less
The first civil war in 1215 had begun with the baronial muster at Stamford, the formal defiance of the King, and the march on London. The second civil war into which the country slid in the autumn had no such dramatic opening. Indeed, the first move, the siege of Rochester, was the King's. At London there was some attempt to maintain the organization created by the security clause of the Charter, but the baronial effort was now much dispersed. The geography of the land, the decentralization of the King's treasure, the delegation of administrative authority to almost independent royal agents, the distribution of mercenary troops throughout the royal castles, all tended to produce, not one civil war, but many, of which the setting, strategic forces, tactical problems, and personnel varied from one region to another.
William Doyle
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199559855
- eISBN:
- 9780191701788
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559855.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter talks about the discontentment and rebellion of peasants during the 18th century due to the failure of the nobles and their land lords to protect their welfare and safety. Peasant rebels ...
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This chapter talks about the discontentment and rebellion of peasants during the 18th century due to the failure of the nobles and their land lords to protect their welfare and safety. Peasant rebels or urban mobs who butchered persons of condition and sacked and looted their dwellings spread terror far beyond the ranks of their lordly victims. These rebels were protesting at the failure of lords to protect their vassals against wartime marauders. There were 512 violent episodes that challenged the exactions of feudalism and lordship, three-fifths occurring after 1760.Less
This chapter talks about the discontentment and rebellion of peasants during the 18th century due to the failure of the nobles and their land lords to protect their welfare and safety. Peasant rebels or urban mobs who butchered persons of condition and sacked and looted their dwellings spread terror far beyond the ranks of their lordly victims. These rebels were protesting at the failure of lords to protect their vassals against wartime marauders. There were 512 violent episodes that challenged the exactions of feudalism and lordship, three-fifths occurring after 1760.
