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Needs, Facts, Goodness, and Truth

E. J. Lowe

in Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199217144
eISBN:
9780191712418
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines the important distinction between practical and theoretical reason and rationality. As a consequence, a modification is made to the version of externalism regarding reasons for ... More


Evidence, High Probability, and Belief

Peter Achinstein

in The Book of Evidence

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195143898
eISBN:
9780199833023
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195143892.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

It is argued that evidence must supply a good reason for belief, and that the latter requires that the objective epistemic probability of the hypothesis on the evidence be greater than half. ... More


Peirce and Scepticism

Christopher Hookway

in The Pragmatic Maxim: Essays on Peirce and pragmatism

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199588381
eISBN:
9780191745089
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588381.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Although Peirce endorsed fallibilism, he had no sympathy for philosophical concerns with scepticism. This was because ‘real doubt’ required a reason and the fact that we have no positive reason for ... More


Leaps of Knowledge

Andrew Reisner

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Direct doxastic voluntarism is commonly thought to be conceptually impossible owing to the way in which belief aims at truth. In this chapter, Reisner argues that the view that belief aims at truth ... More


Against Internalism-Parity: A Supplementary Argument

Christopher Cowie

in Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
December 2019
ISBN:
9780198842736
eISBN:
9780191878664
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

An alternative argument is provided for rejecting internalism-parity. It is claimed that, from the perspective of internalism-based moral error theorists, categorical reasons for action are more ... More


The Error Theory

Bart Streumer

in Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198785897
eISBN:
9780191848070
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198785897.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter asks to which judgements the error theory applies, what the error theory entails, and whether what the error theory entails can be true. It argues that the error theory does not apply to ... More


Empiricism and Normative Constraint

Hannah Ginsborg

in In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Perception and Reasons

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198809630
eISBN:
9780191846908
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198809630.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

McDowell holds that our thinking, in order to have intentional content, must stand in a normative relation to empirical reality. He thinks that this condition can be satisfied only if we adopt ... More


Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief

Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen

in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780198758709
eISBN:
9780191818622
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Epistemic instrumentalists seek to understand the normativity of epistemic norms on the model of practical instrumental norms governing the relation between aims and means. Non-instrumentalists often ... More


Are Perceptual Reasons the Objects of Perception?

J.J. Cunningham

in In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Perception and Reasons

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198809630
eISBN:
9780191846908
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198809630.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This paper begins with a Davidsonian puzzle in the epistemology of perception and introduces two solutions to that puzzle: the Truth-Maker View (TMV) and the Content Model. The paper goes on to ... More


Moral and Epistemic Error Theory: The Parity Premise Reconsidered

Jonas Olson

in Metaepistemology

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
December 2018
ISBN:
9780198805366
eISBN:
9780191843433
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198805366.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Many moral error theorists hold that moral facts are irreducibly normative. They also hold that irreducible normativity is metaphysically queer and conclude that there are no irreducibly normative ... More


Reason to Believe the Error Theory

Bart Streumer

in Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198785897
eISBN:
9780191848070
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198785897.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter gives three arguments for the claim that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action only if this person can perform this action: the argument from crazy reasons, the ... More


Against Internalism-Parity

Christopher Cowie

in Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
December 2019
ISBN:
9780198842736
eISBN:
9780191878664
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

It is argued that the first version of the parity premise—internalism-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements are committed to the existence of ‘merely institutional’ reasons. Moral ... More


Knowledge versus Truth

John Gibbons

in Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
May 2014
ISBN:
9780199660025
eISBN:
9780191772672
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Does belief aim at knowledge or merely at the truth? And what does it mean for belief to aim at something? One account of what it is for belief to aim at something is provided. If you believe that p, ... More


Philosophy, Science, and Common Sense

Hilary Kornblith

in Scientism: Prospects and Problems

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
August 2018
ISBN:
9780190462758
eISBN:
9780190462772
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General

Wilfrid Sellars recognized a conflict between what he called “the scientific image” of our place in the world, and “the manifest image.” Sellars sought, somehow, to join these views together in spite ... More


The Dual-Aspect Norms of Belief and Assertion: A Virtue Approach to Epistemic Norms

Sarah Wright

in Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
May 2014
ISBN:
9780199660025
eISBN:
9780191772672
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter suggesteds that rather than a single univocal norm of belief, there is instead a dual-aspect norm of belief, each aspect taking a different form and focusing on a different epistemic ... More


Reasoning about Means

Ingmar Persson

in Reasons in Action: A Reductionist Account of Intentional Action

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780198845034
eISBN:
9780191880391
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198845034.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, General

An advantage of using conditionals as the standard formula for reasons for action is that the conditional form can also be used to bring out the structure of reasons for belief—thus making possible a ... More


Epistemic Normativity

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

in Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
May 2014
ISBN:
9780199660025
eISBN:
9780191772672
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Human beings are rational animals, not in the sense of never being irrational, but in the sense of having a capacity at least occasionally displayed in thought and behavior. The display of this ... More


Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements

Bart Streumer

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198785897
eISBN:
9780191848070
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198785897.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental ... More


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