Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237075
- eISBN:
- 9780191598456
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237073.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Aims to reconcile a unified semantic account of conditional statements with an apparent contrast between the logics of indicative and ”subjunctive” conditionals. The difference between the two kinds ...
More
Aims to reconcile a unified semantic account of conditional statements with an apparent contrast between the logics of indicative and ”subjunctive” conditionals. The difference between the two kinds of conditionals is explained in terms of different constraints imposed on the contexts relative to which the different forms of conditionals are interpreted. A pragmatic concept of reasonable inference is defined and contrasted with semantic entailment. This concept is then used to explain why certain inferences involving indicative conditionals are compelling, and to diagnose a fallacy in a familiar argument for fatalism.Less
Aims to reconcile a unified semantic account of conditional statements with an apparent contrast between the logics of indicative and ”subjunctive” conditionals. The difference between the two kinds of conditionals is explained in terms of different constraints imposed on the contexts relative to which the different forms of conditionals are interpreted. A pragmatic concept of reasonable inference is defined and contrasted with semantic entailment. This concept is then used to explain why certain inferences involving indicative conditionals are compelling, and to diagnose a fallacy in a familiar argument for fatalism.
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226470405
- eISBN:
- 9780226470429
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226470429.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Company and Commercial Law
This chapter proposes a constructive corporate liability doctrine. Constructive fault permits fact finders to move beyond the strictures of subjective evidence of culpability in order to find ...
More
This chapter proposes a constructive corporate liability doctrine. Constructive fault permits fact finders to move beyond the strictures of subjective evidence of culpability in order to find corporate states of mind that may be more reasonably deduced or inferred with or without the assistance of subjective evidence of the defendant. The search is for the best possible estimation of a corporate mental state through actual knowledge, as well as through reasonable inferences. Did the actions of the corporation, given the circumstances, objectively manifest intention or purpose, awareness or knowledge, indifference or recklessness? Did the corporation, given its size, structure, and complexity, know of the risks of injury? Notwithstanding any evidence of actual knowledge, these are the central questions of constructive fault.Less
This chapter proposes a constructive corporate liability doctrine. Constructive fault permits fact finders to move beyond the strictures of subjective evidence of culpability in order to find corporate states of mind that may be more reasonably deduced or inferred with or without the assistance of subjective evidence of the defendant. The search is for the best possible estimation of a corporate mental state through actual knowledge, as well as through reasonable inferences. Did the actions of the corporation, given the circumstances, objectively manifest intention or purpose, awareness or knowledge, indifference or recklessness? Did the corporation, given its size, structure, and complexity, know of the risks of injury? Notwithstanding any evidence of actual knowledge, these are the central questions of constructive fault.
