Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199263288
- eISBN:
- 9780191603631
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263280.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The Law of Non-Contradiction has been high orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The so-called Law has been the subject of radical challenge in recent years by dialetheism, the view that ...
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The Law of Non-Contradiction has been high orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The so-called Law has been the subject of radical challenge in recent years by dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are indeed true. Many philosophers have taken the Law to be central to many of our most important philosophical concepts. This book mounts the case against this view. Starting with an analysis of Aristotle on the Law, it discusses the nature of truth, rationality, negation, and logic itself, and argues that the Law is inessential to all of these things. The book develops Priest’s earlier ideas in In Contradiction.Less
The Law of Non-Contradiction has been high orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The so-called Law has been the subject of radical challenge in recent years by dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are indeed true. Many philosophers have taken the Law to be central to many of our most important philosophical concepts. This book mounts the case against this view. Starting with an analysis of Aristotle on the Law, it discusses the nature of truth, rationality, negation, and logic itself, and argues that the Law is inessential to all of these things. The book develops Priest’s earlier ideas in In Contradiction.
Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, and K. Danner Clouser
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195159066
- eISBN:
- 9780199786466
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195159063.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
BIOETHICS: A Systematic Approach is an extensive revision of Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. The subtitle has changed in order to emphasize that what distinguishes the authors’ ...
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BIOETHICS: A Systematic Approach is an extensive revision of Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. The subtitle has changed in order to emphasize that what distinguishes the authors’ approach to bioethics from almost all others is that it is systematic. It applies the account of morality and rationality presented in COMMON MORALITY: Deciding What To Do (2004) and MORALITY: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition (2005) to the moral problems that arise in the practice of medicine. The concept of rationality used to justify morality is the same concept that is used to define the concept of malady or disease. The book offers an account of the concept of death, and provides an account of euthanasia that fits within the systematic account of morality and rationality that have been provided. It also shows that this systematic account explains the controversy about the morality of abortion. There are new chapters on moral disagreements, abortion, and on “what doctors must know”, and significant improvements have been made in the treatment of the concepts of consent and malady. An entire chapter is devoted to the concept of mental maladies. Arguments are also developed against principlism and shows how principlism’s authors’ misunderstanding of this view undermines their criticisms.Less
BIOETHICS: A Systematic Approach is an extensive revision of Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. The subtitle has changed in order to emphasize that what distinguishes the authors’ approach to bioethics from almost all others is that it is systematic. It applies the account of morality and rationality presented in COMMON MORALITY: Deciding What To Do (2004) and MORALITY: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition (2005) to the moral problems that arise in the practice of medicine. The concept of rationality used to justify morality is the same concept that is used to define the concept of malady or disease. The book offers an account of the concept of death, and provides an account of euthanasia that fits within the systematic account of morality and rationality that have been provided. It also shows that this systematic account explains the controversy about the morality of abortion. There are new chapters on moral disagreements, abortion, and on “what doctors must know”, and significant improvements have been made in the treatment of the concepts of consent and malady. An entire chapter is devoted to the concept of mental maladies. Arguments are also developed against principlism and shows how principlism’s authors’ misunderstanding of this view undermines their criticisms.
Ermanno Bencivenga
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195307351
- eISBN:
- 9780199867851
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307351.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Can we regard ourselves as free originators of some of our behavior? What is the place of values in a world of facts? What grounds the authority of moral imperatives, and why should we care about ...
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Can we regard ourselves as free originators of some of our behavior? What is the place of values in a world of facts? What grounds the authority of moral imperatives, and why should we care about them? Unless satisfactory answers are provided for these questions, ethics has no credible status and is likely to be swallowed by psychology, history, or rational decision theory: an outcome quite common in recent (post-Hegelian) times as well as one to be strongly regretted. Immanuel Kant's philosophy is a sustained, bold, and successful effort aiming at offering us the answers we need, and this book is a clear and thorough account of this effort that builds on the author's previous interpretation of transcendental philosophy (as articulated in his Kant'sCopernican Revolution) and draws on the entire Kantian corpus. Free choice is rational choice, hence, it is also what reason would consider a good choice; evil behavior is not free — when we behave irrationally, we lose all control on our conduct and become obtuse wheels in the hands of irresistible nature. Which does not mean, however, that we should not take responsibility for our evil actions. On the contrary, that is exactly the right thing to do, despite the absurdity of the stance it involves. This very absurdity teaches us an important Kantian lesson on how to negotiate the bounds of sense: how there is not a single line demarcating sense from nonsense, but rather a variety of shades of (non)sense, experienced in the wake of an ideal of perfect meaningfulness but forever falling short of that ideal. In pursuing this troubling suggestion, the author brings additional light on Kant's understanding of the human form of life. Specifically, on its irremediably conflictual, undecidable character, and on the primacy unrealizable norms have in it.Less
Can we regard ourselves as free originators of some of our behavior? What is the place of values in a world of facts? What grounds the authority of moral imperatives, and why should we care about them? Unless satisfactory answers are provided for these questions, ethics has no credible status and is likely to be swallowed by psychology, history, or rational decision theory: an outcome quite common in recent (post-Hegelian) times as well as one to be strongly regretted. Immanuel Kant's philosophy is a sustained, bold, and successful effort aiming at offering us the answers we need, and this book is a clear and thorough account of this effort that builds on the author's previous interpretation of transcendental philosophy (as articulated in his Kant'sCopernican Revolution) and draws on the entire Kantian corpus. Free choice is rational choice, hence, it is also what reason would consider a good choice; evil behavior is not free — when we behave irrationally, we lose all control on our conduct and become obtuse wheels in the hands of irresistible nature. Which does not mean, however, that we should not take responsibility for our evil actions. On the contrary, that is exactly the right thing to do, despite the absurdity of the stance it involves. This very absurdity teaches us an important Kantian lesson on how to negotiate the bounds of sense: how there is not a single line demarcating sense from nonsense, but rather a variety of shades of (non)sense, experienced in the wake of an ideal of perfect meaningfulness but forever falling short of that ideal. In pursuing this troubling suggestion, the author brings additional light on Kant's understanding of the human form of life. Specifically, on its irremediably conflictual, undecidable character, and on the primacy unrealizable norms have in it.
Leif Lewin
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198277255
- eISBN:
- 9780191599774
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198277253.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Is it self‐interest or public interest that dominates in public life? Rational‐choice theory, political philosophy, and electoral research were all used to answer this question. Analysing existing ...
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Is it self‐interest or public interest that dominates in public life? Rational‐choice theory, political philosophy, and electoral research were all used to answer this question. Analysing existing literature, Professor Leif Lewin shows that predominant consensus emerged on this issue by the 1980s. This consensus states that people in politics are driven mostly by their self‐interest and not by common good and society values. Although Professor Lewin is not testing existing views that ‘egoism rules’ on deep theoretical grounds, he strongly argues that empirical facts do not support such views and thus opens a new chapter in the debate on individuals’ rationality.Combining research results and achievements of different research fields, mentioned above, the author adopts methodology never used before. Extensive literature review on studies of Western democracy provides a basis for analysis for many countries. Separate chapters of the book are devoted to the attitudes and actions of the electoral voters, politicians, and bureaucrats in power.This allows the author to make broad conclusions, which challenges predominant views. He concludes that in most cases people in politics are driven by broader social interests rather than their own short‐term interests.Less
Is it self‐interest or public interest that dominates in public life? Rational‐choice theory, political philosophy, and electoral research were all used to answer this question. Analysing existing literature, Professor Leif Lewin shows that predominant consensus emerged on this issue by the 1980s. This consensus states that people in politics are driven mostly by their self‐interest and not by common good and society values. Although Professor Lewin is not testing existing views that ‘egoism rules’ on deep theoretical grounds, he strongly argues that empirical facts do not support such views and thus opens a new chapter in the debate on individuals’ rationality.
Combining research results and achievements of different research fields, mentioned above, the author adopts methodology never used before. Extensive literature review on studies of Western democracy provides a basis for analysis for many countries. Separate chapters of the book are devoted to the attitudes and actions of the electoral voters, politicians, and bureaucrats in power.
This allows the author to make broad conclusions, which challenges predominant views. He concludes that in most cases people in politics are driven by broader social interests rather than their own short‐term interests.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195158427
- eISBN:
- 9780199871407
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each ...
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The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each separately. It sets out a comprehensive theory of rationality applicable to both practical and theoretical reason. In both domains, the book explains how experience grounds rationality, delineates the structure of central elements, and attacks the egocentric conception of rationality. It establishes the rationality of altruism and thereby supports major moral principles. The concluding part describes the pluralism and relativity the book's conception of rationality accommodates and, taking the unified account of theoretical and practical rationality in that light, constructs a theory of global rationality — the overall rationality of persons.Less
The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each separately. It sets out a comprehensive theory of rationality applicable to both practical and theoretical reason. In both domains, the book explains how experience grounds rationality, delineates the structure of central elements, and attacks the egocentric conception of rationality. It establishes the rationality of altruism and thereby supports major moral principles. The concluding part describes the pluralism and relativity the book's conception of rationality accommodates and, taking the unified account of theoretical and practical rationality in that light, constructs a theory of global rationality — the overall rationality of persons.
Uwe Steinhoff
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199547807
- eISBN:
- 9780191720758
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547807.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
Jürgen Habermas seeks to defend the Enlightenment and with it an “emphatical”, “uncurtailed” conception of reason against the post-modern critique of reason on the one hand, and against so-called ...
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Jürgen Habermas seeks to defend the Enlightenment and with it an “emphatical”, “uncurtailed” conception of reason against the post-modern critique of reason on the one hand, and against so-called scientism (which would include critical rationalism and the greater part of analytical philosophy) on the other. His objection to the former is that it is self-contradictory and politically defeatist; his objection to the latter is that, thanks to a standard of rationality derived from the natural sciences or from Weber's concept of purposive rationality, it leaves normative questions to irrational decisions. Wishing to offer an alternative, Habermas tries to develop a theory of communicative action that can clarify the normative foundations of a critical theory of society as well as provide a fruitful theoretical framework for empirical social research. This study is a comprehensive and detailed analysis and a sustained critique of Habermas' philosophical system starting with his pragmatist turn in the seventies. It clearly and precisely depicts its long path from an analysis of speech acts to a discourse theory of law and the democratic constitutional state via the theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, and the attempts to apply the approach to, and support it with, empirical theories.Less
Jürgen Habermas seeks to defend the Enlightenment and with it an “emphatical”, “uncurtailed” conception of reason against the post-modern critique of reason on the one hand, and against so-called scientism (which would include critical rationalism and the greater part of analytical philosophy) on the other. His objection to the former is that it is self-contradictory and politically defeatist; his objection to the latter is that, thanks to a standard of rationality derived from the natural sciences or from Weber's concept of purposive rationality, it leaves normative questions to irrational decisions. Wishing to offer an alternative, Habermas tries to develop a theory of communicative action that can clarify the normative foundations of a critical theory of society as well as provide a fruitful theoretical framework for empirical social research. This study is a comprehensive and detailed analysis and a sustained critique of Habermas' philosophical system starting with his pragmatist turn in the seventies. It clearly and precisely depicts its long path from an analysis of speech acts to a discourse theory of law and the democratic constitutional state via the theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, and the attempts to apply the approach to, and support it with, empirical theories.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199283927
- eISBN:
- 9780191712524
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283927.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Different theologians give different accounts of the kind of faith that is necessary for the practice of a religion such as Christianity. For some it is simply belief that there is a God (and that he ...
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Different theologians give different accounts of the kind of faith that is necessary for the practice of a religion such as Christianity. For some it is simply belief that there is a God (and that he has done various actions); for others it is trust in God. This book analyses the nature of belief and trust, and considers when belief and trust are rational. It concludes that the practice of a religion requires a faith which involves both trust and belief, but a fairly weak kind of belief. The book reaches this conclusion by analysing the purposes for practising a religion — the rendering of due worship and obedience to God, and the attainment of salvation for oneself and others. Someone's religious practice is rational in so far as he or she has reason for believing that practising his or her religion is the best way to achieve these purposes, and that these purposes are greatly worthwhile.Less
Different theologians give different accounts of the kind of faith that is necessary for the practice of a religion such as Christianity. For some it is simply belief that there is a God (and that he has done various actions); for others it is trust in God. This book analyses the nature of belief and trust, and considers when belief and trust are rational. It concludes that the practice of a religion requires a faith which involves both trust and belief, but a fairly weak kind of belief. The book reaches this conclusion by analysing the purposes for practising a religion — the rendering of due worship and obedience to God, and the attainment of salvation for oneself and others. Someone's religious practice is rational in so far as he or she has reason for believing that practising his or her religion is the best way to achieve these purposes, and that these purposes are greatly worthwhile.
Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199226078
- eISBN:
- 9780191594236
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Disagreement is common. Even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing ...
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Disagreement is common. Even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This book examines the epistemology of disagreement, with a focus on disagreements involving epistemic peers. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: this book focuses on the general epistemic issues arising from informed disagreement. Ten leading philosophers offer specially written chapters which together will offer a starting-point for future work on this topic.Less
Disagreement is common. Even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This book examines the epistemology of disagreement, with a focus on disagreements involving epistemic peers. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: this book focuses on the general epistemic issues arising from informed disagreement. Ten leading philosophers offer specially written chapters which together will offer a starting-point for future work on this topic.
David E. Klein and Gregory Mitchell (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195367584
- eISBN:
- 9780199776917
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367584.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Forensic Psychology
This volume of essays examines the psychological processes that underlie judicial decision making. Chapters in the first section of the book take as their starting point the fact that judges make ...
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This volume of essays examines the psychological processes that underlie judicial decision making. Chapters in the first section of the book take as their starting point the fact that judges make many of the same judgments and decisions that ordinary people make and consider how our knowledge about judgment and decision-making in general applies to the case of legal judges. Chapters in the second section focus on the specific tasks that judges perform within a unique social setting and examine the expertise and particular modes of reasoning that judges develop to deal with their tasks in this unique setting. Chapters in the third section raise questions about whether and how we can evaluate judicial performance, with implications for the possibility of improving judging through the selection and training of judges and structuring of judicial institutions. Together the essays apply a wide range of psychological insights to help us better understand how judges make decisions and to open new avenues of inquiry into the influences on judicial behavior.Less
This volume of essays examines the psychological processes that underlie judicial decision making. Chapters in the first section of the book take as their starting point the fact that judges make many of the same judgments and decisions that ordinary people make and consider how our knowledge about judgment and decision-making in general applies to the case of legal judges. Chapters in the second section focus on the specific tasks that judges perform within a unique social setting and examine the expertise and particular modes of reasoning that judges develop to deal with their tasks in this unique setting. Chapters in the third section raise questions about whether and how we can evaluate judicial performance, with implications for the possibility of improving judging through the selection and training of judges and structuring of judicial institutions. Together the essays apply a wide range of psychological insights to help us better understand how judges make decisions and to open new avenues of inquiry into the influences on judicial behavior.
Simon J. Evnine
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239948
- eISBN:
- 9780191716898
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239948.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, ...
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This book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, and engage in agency, including the making of long‐term plans. It is argued that for any being meeting these conditions, a number of epistemic consequences obtain. First, all such beings must have certain logical concepts and be able to use them in certain ways. Secondly, there are at least two principles governing belief that it is rational for persons to satisfy and are such that nothing can be a person at all unless it satisfies them to a large extent. These principles are that one believe the conjunction of one's beliefs and that one treat one's future beliefs as, by and large, better than one's current beliefs. Thirdly, persons both occupy epistemic points of view on the world and show up within those views. This makes it impossible for them to be completely objective about their own beliefs. This ‘aspectual dualism’ is characteristic of treatments of persons in the Kantian tradition. In sum, these epistemic consequences add up to a fairly traditional view of the nature of persons, one in opposition to much recent theorizing.Less
This book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, and engage in agency, including the making of long‐term plans. It is argued that for any being meeting these conditions, a number of epistemic consequences obtain. First, all such beings must have certain logical concepts and be able to use them in certain ways. Secondly, there are at least two principles governing belief that it is rational for persons to satisfy and are such that nothing can be a person at all unless it satisfies them to a large extent. These principles are that one believe the conjunction of one's beliefs and that one treat one's future beliefs as, by and large, better than one's current beliefs. Thirdly, persons both occupy epistemic points of view on the world and show up within those views. This makes it impossible for them to be completely objective about their own beliefs. This ‘aspectual dualism’ is characteristic of treatments of persons in the Kantian tradition. In sum, these epistemic consequences add up to a fairly traditional view of the nature of persons, one in opposition to much recent theorizing.
Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199744794
- eISBN:
- 9780199933396
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What ...
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The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship between consciousness and introspective self-knowledge? Should we explain consciousness in terms of introspective self-knowledge or vice versa? Until recently, questions in epistemology and the philosophy of mind were pursued largely in isolation from one another. This book aims to integrate these two lines of research by bringing together fourteen new chapters and one reprinted piece on the relationship between introspection, self-knowledge, and consciousness.Less
The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship between consciousness and introspective self-knowledge? Should we explain consciousness in terms of introspective self-knowledge or vice versa? Until recently, questions in epistemology and the philosophy of mind were pursued largely in isolation from one another. This book aims to integrate these two lines of research by bringing together fourteen new chapters and one reprinted piece on the relationship between introspection, self-knowledge, and consciousness.
John L. Pollock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195304817
- eISBN:
- 9780199850907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195304817.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book aims to construct a theory of rational decision making for real agents—not ideal agents. Real agents have limited cognitive powers, but traditional theories of rationality have applied only ...
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This book aims to construct a theory of rational decision making for real agents—not ideal agents. Real agents have limited cognitive powers, but traditional theories of rationality have applied only to idealized agents that lack such constraints. The book argues that theories of ideal rationality are largely irrelevant to the decision making of real agents. This book aims to provide a theory of “real rationality”.Less
This book aims to construct a theory of rational decision making for real agents—not ideal agents. Real agents have limited cognitive powers, but traditional theories of rationality have applied only to idealized agents that lack such constraints. The book argues that theories of ideal rationality are largely irrelevant to the decision making of real agents. This book aims to provide a theory of “real rationality”.
David Hodgson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199845309
- eISBN:
- 9780199932269
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199845309.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
In recent years, philosophical discussions of free will have focused largely on whether or not free will is compatible with determinism. In this challenging book, David Hodgson takes a fresh approach ...
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In recent years, philosophical discussions of free will have focused largely on whether or not free will is compatible with determinism. In this challenging book, David Hodgson takes a fresh approach to the question of free will, contending that close consideration of human rationality and human consciousness shows that together they give us free will, in a robust and indeterministic sense. In particular, they give us the capacity to respond appositely to feature-rich gestalts of conscious experiences, in ways that are not wholly determined by laws of nature or computational rules. The author contends that this approach is consistent with what science tells us about the world; and he considers its implications for our responsibility for our own conduct, for the role of retribution in criminal punishment, and for the place of human beings in the wider scheme of things.Less
In recent years, philosophical discussions of free will have focused largely on whether or not free will is compatible with determinism. In this challenging book, David Hodgson takes a fresh approach to the question of free will, contending that close consideration of human rationality and human consciousness shows that together they give us free will, in a robust and indeterministic sense. In particular, they give us the capacity to respond appositely to feature-rich gestalts of conscious experiences, in ways that are not wholly determined by laws of nature or computational rules. The author contends that this approach is consistent with what science tells us about the world; and he considers its implications for our responsibility for our own conduct, for the role of retribution in criminal punishment, and for the place of human beings in the wider scheme of things.
John Parkinson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199291113
- eISBN:
- 9780191604133
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019929111X.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter argues that the definition of rationality is a major source of disagreement over the legitimacy of decision making processes. It draws attention to battles over competing problem ...
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This chapter argues that the definition of rationality is a major source of disagreement over the legitimacy of decision making processes. It draws attention to battles over competing problem definitions and agendas as a means of controlling debate, and the failure of micro-deliberative processes to handle such battles. It identifies the rhetorical devices used by deliberators to persuade their external audiences, and the impact these have on the rationality of the process. It argues that the more decisive a process is, the more it will attract publicity and the more inclusive it will be, but also the greater the incentives are to act strategically.Less
This chapter argues that the definition of rationality is a major source of disagreement over the legitimacy of decision making processes. It draws attention to battles over competing problem definitions and agendas as a means of controlling debate, and the failure of micro-deliberative processes to handle such battles. It identifies the rhetorical devices used by deliberators to persuade their external audiences, and the impact these have on the rationality of the process. It argues that the more decisive a process is, the more it will attract publicity and the more inclusive it will be, but also the greater the incentives are to act strategically.
Janet A. Kourany
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199732623
- eISBN:
- 9780199866403
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199732623.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
The goal of Philosophy of Science after Feminism is not only a (descriptively and normatively) more adequate philosophy of science than what we have now, but also a more socially engaged and socially ...
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The goal of Philosophy of Science after Feminism is not only a (descriptively and normatively) more adequate philosophy of science than what we have now, but also a more socially engaged and socially responsible philosophy of science, one that can help to promote a more socially engaged and socially responsible science. Its main message is that philosophy of science needs to locate science within its wider societal context, ceasing to analyze science as if it existed in a social/political/economic vacuum; and correlatively, that philosophy of science needs to aim for a more comprehensive understanding of scientific rationality, one that integrates the ethical with the epistemic. Since feminists—feminist scientists and historians of science as well as feminist philosophers of science—have been pursuing this kind of philosophy of science in gender-related areas for three decades now, two chapters reflect on their contributions and derive from these reflections an “ideal of socially responsible science” that is further developed and defended in other chapters. The articulation of this ideal, it is made clear, is a central project of socially responsible philosophy of science. Other projects are also spelled out.Less
The goal of Philosophy of Science after Feminism is not only a (descriptively and normatively) more adequate philosophy of science than what we have now, but also a more socially engaged and socially responsible philosophy of science, one that can help to promote a more socially engaged and socially responsible science. Its main message is that philosophy of science needs to locate science within its wider societal context, ceasing to analyze science as if it existed in a social/political/economic vacuum; and correlatively, that philosophy of science needs to aim for a more comprehensive understanding of scientific rationality, one that integrates the ethical with the epistemic. Since feminists—feminist scientists and historians of science as well as feminist philosophers of science—have been pursuing this kind of philosophy of science in gender-related areas for three decades now, two chapters reflect on their contributions and derive from these reflections an “ideal of socially responsible science” that is further developed and defended in other chapters. The articulation of this ideal, it is made clear, is a central project of socially responsible philosophy of science. Other projects are also spelled out.
Paul Boghossian
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199287185
- eISBN:
- 9780191713569
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287185.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
Relativist and constructivist conceptions of knowledge have become orthodoxy in vast stretches of the academic world in recent times. This book critically examines such views and argues that they are ...
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Relativist and constructivist conceptions of knowledge have become orthodoxy in vast stretches of the academic world in recent times. This book critically examines such views and argues that they are fundamentally flawed. The book focuses on three different ways of reading the claim that knowledge is socially constructed, one about facts and two about justification. All three are rejected. The intuitive, common sense view is that there is a way things are that is independent of human opinion, and that we are capable of arriving at belief about how things are that is objectively reasonable, and is binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence, regardless of their social or cultural perspective. Difficult as these notions may be, it is a mistake to think that recent philosophy has uncovered powerful reasons for rejecting them.Less
Relativist and constructivist conceptions of knowledge have become orthodoxy in vast stretches of the academic world in recent times. This book critically examines such views and argues that they are fundamentally flawed. The book focuses on three different ways of reading the claim that knowledge is socially constructed, one about facts and two about justification. All three are rejected. The intuitive, common sense view is that there is a way things are that is independent of human opinion, and that we are capable of arriving at belief about how things are that is objectively reasonable, and is binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence, regardless of their social or cultural perspective. Difficult as these notions may be, it is a mistake to think that recent philosophy has uncovered powerful reasons for rejecting them.
Kelly James Clark and Michael Rea (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199766864
- eISBN:
- 9780199932184
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
On May 21‐23, 2010, philosophers, family and friends gathered at the University of Notre Dame to celebrate the career and retirement of Alvin Plantinga, widely recognized as one of the world’s ...
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On May 21‐23, 2010, philosophers, family and friends gathered at the University of Notre Dame to celebrate the career and retirement of Alvin Plantinga, widely recognized as one of the world’s leading figures in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Plantinga has earned particular respect within the community of Christian philosophers for the pivotal role that he played in the recent renewal and development of philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Each of the essays in this volume engages with some particular aspect of Plantinga’s views on metaphysics, epistemology, or philosophy of religion. Contributors include Michael Bergman, Ernest Sosa, Trenton Merricks, Richard Otte, Peter VanInwagen, Thomas P. Flint, Eleonore Stump, Dean Zimmerman, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. We include responses to each essay by Bas van Fraassen, Stephen Wykstra, David VanderLaan, Robin Collins, Raymond VanArragon, E. J. Coffman, Thomas Crisp and Donald Smith.Less
On May 21‐23, 2010, philosophers, family and friends gathered at the University of Notre Dame to celebrate the career and retirement of Alvin Plantinga, widely recognized as one of the world’s leading figures in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Plantinga has earned particular respect within the community of Christian philosophers for the pivotal role that he played in the recent renewal and development of philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Each of the essays in this volume engages with some particular aspect of Plantinga’s views on metaphysics, epistemology, or philosophy of religion. Contributors include Michael Bergman, Ernest Sosa, Trenton Merricks, Richard Otte, Peter VanInwagen, Thomas P. Flint, Eleonore Stump, Dean Zimmerman, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. We include responses to each essay by Bas van Fraassen, Stephen Wykstra, David VanderLaan, Robin Collins, Raymond VanArragon, E. J. Coffman, Thomas Crisp and Donald Smith.
David M. Kreps
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198283812
- eISBN:
- 9780191596568
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198283814.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Beginning in the early to the mid‐1970s, non‐cooperative game theory became an important tool of economics. This book is based on a series of lectures given at Oxford, and comments on this use of ...
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Beginning in the early to the mid‐1970s, non‐cooperative game theory became an important tool of economics. This book is based on a series of lectures given at Oxford, and comments on this use of non‐cooperative game theory. After providing a non‐technical introduction to the basic ideas of non‐cooperative game theory, the book discusses: (1) how and why game theory has been a success—because it permits economists to model and analyse situations of dynamic competition and where private information plays an important role; (2) how and why the theory has failed—to provide an understanding of when it (and equilibrium analysis) applies, when not, and what to do when not; and (3) how its weaknesses might be addressed—by considering individuals who are imperfectly rational and learn adaptively.Less
Beginning in the early to the mid‐1970s, non‐cooperative game theory became an important tool of economics. This book is based on a series of lectures given at Oxford, and comments on this use of non‐cooperative game theory. After providing a non‐technical introduction to the basic ideas of non‐cooperative game theory, the book discusses: (1) how and why game theory has been a success—because it permits economists to model and analyse situations of dynamic competition and where private information plays an important role; (2) how and why the theory has failed—to provide an understanding of when it (and equilibrium analysis) applies, when not, and what to do when not; and (3) how its weaknesses might be addressed—by considering individuals who are imperfectly rational and learn adaptively.
Michael C. Banner
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240198
- eISBN:
- 9780191680113
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240198.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Science
Believers and non-believers often take it for granted that traditional religious faith is, in principle, incapable of the sort of justification which might be given to a scientific theory. Yet how ...
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Believers and non-believers often take it for granted that traditional religious faith is, in principle, incapable of the sort of justification which might be given to a scientific theory. Yet how are scientific theories justified and is it the case that religious belief cannot satisfy the same standards of rationality? Based on a critical examination of recent accounts of the nature of science and of its justification given by Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, Laudan, and Newton-Smith, this book contends that models of scientific rationality which are used in criticism of religious belief are in fact often inadequate as accounts of the nature of science. It is argued that a realist philosophy of science both reflects the character of science and scientific justification, and also suggests that religious belief could be given a justification of the same sort.Less
Believers and non-believers often take it for granted that traditional religious faith is, in principle, incapable of the sort of justification which might be given to a scientific theory. Yet how are scientific theories justified and is it the case that religious belief cannot satisfy the same standards of rationality? Based on a critical examination of recent accounts of the nature of science and of its justification given by Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, Laudan, and Newton-Smith, this book contends that models of scientific rationality which are used in criticism of religious belief are in fact often inadequate as accounts of the nature of science. It is argued that a realist philosophy of science both reflects the character of science and scientific justification, and also suggests that religious belief could be given a justification of the same sort.
Paul Weirich
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780195171259
- eISBN:
- 9780199834976
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019517125X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Decision theory aims at a general account of rationality covering humans but to begin makes idealizations about decision problems and agents' resources and circumstances. It treats inerrant agents ...
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Decision theory aims at a general account of rationality covering humans but to begin makes idealizations about decision problems and agents' resources and circumstances. It treats inerrant agents with unlimited cognitive power facing tractable decision problems. This book systematically rolls back idealizations and without loss of precision treats errant agents with limited cognitive abilities facing decision problems without a stable top option. It recommends choices that maximize utility using quantizations of beliefs and desires in cases where probabilities and utilities are indeterminate and using higher-order utility analysis in cases of limited access to probabilities and utilities. For agents burdened with mistakes, it advocates reasonable attempts to correct unacceptable mistakes before deciding. In decision problems without a stable top option, a topic of game theory, it proposes maximizing self-conditional utility among self-supporting options. In games of strategy, the new principles lead to solutions that are Pareto optimal among equilibria composed of jointly self-supporting strategies. Offering an account of bounded rationality, the bookmakes large strides toward realism in decision theory.Less
Decision theory aims at a general account of rationality covering humans but to begin makes idealizations about decision problems and agents' resources and circumstances. It treats inerrant agents with unlimited cognitive power facing tractable decision problems. This book systematically rolls back idealizations and without loss of precision treats errant agents with limited cognitive abilities facing decision problems without a stable top option. It recommends choices that maximize utility using quantizations of beliefs and desires in cases where probabilities and utilities are indeterminate and using higher-order utility analysis in cases of limited access to probabilities and utilities. For agents burdened with mistakes, it advocates reasonable attempts to correct unacceptable mistakes before deciding. In decision problems without a stable top option, a topic of game theory, it proposes maximizing self-conditional utility among self-supporting options. In games of strategy, the new principles lead to solutions that are Pareto optimal among equilibria composed of jointly self-supporting strategies. Offering an account of bounded rationality, the bookmakes large strides toward realism in decision theory.
