Roger Scully
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199284320
- eISBN:
- 9780191603365
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199284326.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Contemporary political science assumes that ‘institutions matter’. But the governing institutions of the European Union are widely presumed to matter more than most. A commonplace assumption about ...
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Contemporary political science assumes that ‘institutions matter’. But the governing institutions of the European Union are widely presumed to matter more than most. A commonplace assumption about the EU is that those working within European institutions are subject to a pervasive tendency to become socialised into progressively more pro-integration attitudes and behaviours. This assumption has been integral to many accounts of European integration, and is also central to how scholars study individual EU institutions. However, the theoretical and empirical adequacy of this assumption has never been properly investigated. This study examines this question in the context of an increasingly important EU institution, the European Parliament. The book integrates new theoretical arguments with a substantial amount of original empirical research. It develops a coherent understanding, based on simple rationalist principles, of when and why institutional socialisation is effective. This theoretical argument explains the main empirical findings of the book. Drawing on several sources of evidence on MEPs’ attitudes and behaviour, and deploying advanced empirical techniques, the empirical analysis shows the commonplace assumption about EU institutions to be false. European Parliamentarians do not become more pro-integration as they are socialised into the institution. The findings of the study generate some highly important conclusions. They indicate that institutional socialisation of political elites should be given a much more limited and conditional role in understanding European integration than it is accorded in many accounts. They suggest that MEPs remain largely national politicians in their attitudes, loyalties and much of their activities, and that traditional classifications of the European Parliament as a ‘supra-national’ institution are misleading. Finally, the study offers broader lessons about the circumstances in which institutions effectively socialise those working within them.Less
Contemporary political science assumes that ‘institutions matter’. But the governing institutions of the European Union are widely presumed to matter more than most. A commonplace assumption about the EU is that those working within European institutions are subject to a pervasive tendency to become socialised into progressively more pro-integration attitudes and behaviours. This assumption has been integral to many accounts of European integration, and is also central to how scholars study individual EU institutions. However, the theoretical and empirical adequacy of this assumption has never been properly investigated. This study examines this question in the context of an increasingly important EU institution, the European Parliament. The book integrates new theoretical arguments with a substantial amount of original empirical research. It develops a coherent understanding, based on simple rationalist principles, of when and why institutional socialisation is effective. This theoretical argument explains the main empirical findings of the book. Drawing on several sources of evidence on MEPs’ attitudes and behaviour, and deploying advanced empirical techniques, the empirical analysis shows the commonplace assumption about EU institutions to be false. European Parliamentarians do not become more pro-integration as they are socialised into the institution. The findings of the study generate some highly important conclusions. They indicate that institutional socialisation of political elites should be given a much more limited and conditional role in understanding European integration than it is accorded in many accounts. They suggest that MEPs remain largely national politicians in their attitudes, loyalties and much of their activities, and that traditional classifications of the European Parliament as a ‘supra-national’ institution are misleading. Finally, the study offers broader lessons about the circumstances in which institutions effectively socialise those working within them.
David L. McMahan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195183276
- eISBN:
- 9780199870882
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183276.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
This book elucidates the complex cross-cultural genealogy of themes, ideas, and practices crucial to the creation of a new hybrid form of Buddhism that has emerged within the last 150 years. Buddhism ...
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This book elucidates the complex cross-cultural genealogy of themes, ideas, and practices crucial to the creation of a new hybrid form of Buddhism that has emerged within the last 150 years. Buddhism modernism is not just Buddhism that happens to exist in the modern world but a distinct form of Buddhism constituted by cross-fertilization with western ideas and practices. Using primarily examples that have shaped western articulations of Buddhism, the book shows how modern representations of Buddhism have not only changed the way the tradition is understood, but have also generated new forms of demythologized, detraditionalized, and deinstitutionalized Buddhism. The book creates a lineage of Buddhist modernism that includes liberal borrowing from scientific vocabulary in reformulations of Buddhist concepts of causality, interdependence, and meditation. It also draws upon Romantic and Transcendentalist conceptions of cosmology, creativity, spontaneity, and the interior depths of the human being. Additionally, Buddhist modernism reconfigures Buddhism as a kind of psychology or interior science, drawing both upon analytic psychology and current trends in neurobiology. In its novel approaches to meditation and mindfulness, as well as political activism, it draws heavily from western individualism, distinctively modern modes of world-affirmation, liberal political sensibilities, and modernist literary sources. The book also examines this uniquely modern Buddhism as it moves into postmodern iterations and enters the currents of global communication, media, and commerce.Less
This book elucidates the complex cross-cultural genealogy of themes, ideas, and practices crucial to the creation of a new hybrid form of Buddhism that has emerged within the last 150 years. Buddhism modernism is not just Buddhism that happens to exist in the modern world but a distinct form of Buddhism constituted by cross-fertilization with western ideas and practices. Using primarily examples that have shaped western articulations of Buddhism, the book shows how modern representations of Buddhism have not only changed the way the tradition is understood, but have also generated new forms of demythologized, detraditionalized, and deinstitutionalized Buddhism. The book creates a lineage of Buddhist modernism that includes liberal borrowing from scientific vocabulary in reformulations of Buddhist concepts of causality, interdependence, and meditation. It also draws upon Romantic and Transcendentalist conceptions of cosmology, creativity, spontaneity, and the interior depths of the human being. Additionally, Buddhist modernism reconfigures Buddhism as a kind of psychology or interior science, drawing both upon analytic psychology and current trends in neurobiology. In its novel approaches to meditation and mindfulness, as well as political activism, it draws heavily from western individualism, distinctively modern modes of world-affirmation, liberal political sensibilities, and modernist literary sources. The book also examines this uniquely modern Buddhism as it moves into postmodern iterations and enters the currents of global communication, media, and commerce.
Jonathan Jacobs
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199542833
- eISBN:
- 9780191594359
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542833.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
This is a study of the key features of the moral psychology and metaethics of three important medieval Jewish philosophers, Saadia Gaon, Bahya ibn Pakuda, and Moses Maimonides. They are selected ...
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This is a study of the key features of the moral psychology and metaethics of three important medieval Jewish philosophers, Saadia Gaon, Bahya ibn Pakuda, and Moses Maimonides. They are selected because of the depth and subtlety of their thought and because of their relevance to central, enduring issues in moral philosophy. The book examines their views of freedom of the will, the virtues, the rationality of moral requirements, and the relation between rational justification and revelation. Their appropriations of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian thought are explicated, showing how their theistic commitments make crucial differences to moral psychology and moral epistemology. All three thinkers developed rationalistic philosophies and sought to show how Judaism does not include doctrines in conflict with reason. Maimonides receives the fullest attention, given that he articulated the most systematic and influential accounts of the main issues. While explicating the main claims and arguments of these thinkers, the book also shows the respects in which their thought remains relevant to several important issues and debates in moral philosophy. These thinkers' views of ‘the reasons of the commandments’ (in Torah) include resources for a sophisticated moral epistemology of tradition. The points of contact and contrast between medieval Jewish moral thought and the practical wisdom approach to moral theory and also natural law approaches are examined in detail.Less
This is a study of the key features of the moral psychology and metaethics of three important medieval Jewish philosophers, Saadia Gaon, Bahya ibn Pakuda, and Moses Maimonides. They are selected because of the depth and subtlety of their thought and because of their relevance to central, enduring issues in moral philosophy. The book examines their views of freedom of the will, the virtues, the rationality of moral requirements, and the relation between rational justification and revelation. Their appropriations of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian thought are explicated, showing how their theistic commitments make crucial differences to moral psychology and moral epistemology. All three thinkers developed rationalistic philosophies and sought to show how Judaism does not include doctrines in conflict with reason. Maimonides receives the fullest attention, given that he articulated the most systematic and influential accounts of the main issues. While explicating the main claims and arguments of these thinkers, the book also shows the respects in which their thought remains relevant to several important issues and debates in moral philosophy. These thinkers' views of ‘the reasons of the commandments’ (in Torah) include resources for a sophisticated moral epistemology of tradition. The points of contact and contrast between medieval Jewish moral thought and the practical wisdom approach to moral theory and also natural law approaches are examined in detail.
Wolfram Hinzen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199289257
- eISBN:
- 9780191706424
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289257.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
This book introduces generative grammar as an area of study, asking what it tells us about the human mind. It lays the foundation for the unification of modern generative linguistics with the ...
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This book introduces generative grammar as an area of study, asking what it tells us about the human mind. It lays the foundation for the unification of modern generative linguistics with the philosophies of mind and language. It introduces Chomsky's program of a ‘minimalist’ syntax as a novel explanatory vision of the human mind. It explains how the Minimalist Program originated from work in cognitive science, biology, linguistics, and philosophy, and examines its implications for work in these fields. It also considers the way the human mind is designed when seen as an arrangement of structural patterns in nature, and argues that its design is the product not so much of adaptive evolutionary history as of principles and processes that are historical and internalist in character. The book suggests that linguistic meaning arises in the mind as a consequence of structures emerging on formal rather than functional grounds. From this, the book substantiates an unexpected and deeply unfashionable notion of human nature. It also provides an insight into the nature and aims of Chomsky's Minimalist Program.Less
This book introduces generative grammar as an area of study, asking what it tells us about the human mind. It lays the foundation for the unification of modern generative linguistics with the philosophies of mind and language. It introduces Chomsky's program of a ‘minimalist’ syntax as a novel explanatory vision of the human mind. It explains how the Minimalist Program originated from work in cognitive science, biology, linguistics, and philosophy, and examines its implications for work in these fields. It also considers the way the human mind is designed when seen as an arrangement of structural patterns in nature, and argues that its design is the product not so much of adaptive evolutionary history as of principles and processes that are historical and internalist in character. The book suggests that linguistic meaning arises in the mind as a consequence of structures emerging on formal rather than functional grounds. From this, the book substantiates an unexpected and deeply unfashionable notion of human nature. It also provides an insight into the nature and aims of Chomsky's Minimalist Program.
John Kekes
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199588886
- eISBN:
- 9780191595448
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588886.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The aim of the book is to present and defend a secular view of the human condition. This view is pluralist, not absolutist; rationalist, not relativist; fallibilist, not skeptical or dogmatic; ...
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The aim of the book is to present and defend a secular view of the human condition. This view is pluralist, not absolutist; rationalist, not relativist; fallibilist, not skeptical or dogmatic; realist, not optimist or pessimist; particular and concrete, not general and abstract. Its perspective is humanistic, neither religiously, nor scientifically oriented.Less
The aim of the book is to present and defend a secular view of the human condition. This view is pluralist, not absolutist; rationalist, not relativist; fallibilist, not skeptical or dogmatic; realist, not optimist or pessimist; particular and concrete, not general and abstract. Its perspective is humanistic, neither religiously, nor scientifically oriented.
Matthew Dal Santo (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199646791
- eISBN:
- 9780199949939
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646791.001.0001
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Religions, European History: BCE to 500CE
This book argues that the Dialogues on the Miracles of the Italian Fathers, Pope Gregory the Great's (590–604) most controversial work, should be considered from the perspective of a wide-ranging ...
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This book argues that the Dialogues on the Miracles of the Italian Fathers, Pope Gregory the Great's (590–604) most controversial work, should be considered from the perspective of a wide-ranging debate about the saints which took place in early Byzantine society. Like other contemporary works in Greek and Syriac, Gregory's Latin text debated the nature and plausibility of the saints' miracles and the propriety of the saints' cult. Rather than viewing the early Byzantine world as overwhelmingly pious or credulous, the book argues that many contemporaries questioned and challenged the claims of hagiographers and other promoters of the saints' miracles. From Italy to the heart of the Persian Empire at Ctesiphon, a healthy, sceptical, rationalism remained alive and well. The book's conclusion argues that doubt towards the saints reflected a current of political dissent in the East Roman or early Byzantine Empire, where patronage of Christian saints' shrines was used to sanction imperial autocracy. These far-reaching debates about religion and authority also help re-contextualize the emergence of Islam in the late ancient Near East.Less
This book argues that the Dialogues on the Miracles of the Italian Fathers, Pope Gregory the Great's (590–604) most controversial work, should be considered from the perspective of a wide-ranging debate about the saints which took place in early Byzantine society. Like other contemporary works in Greek and Syriac, Gregory's Latin text debated the nature and plausibility of the saints' miracles and the propriety of the saints' cult. Rather than viewing the early Byzantine world as overwhelmingly pious or credulous, the book argues that many contemporaries questioned and challenged the claims of hagiographers and other promoters of the saints' miracles. From Italy to the heart of the Persian Empire at Ctesiphon, a healthy, sceptical, rationalism remained alive and well. The book's conclusion argues that doubt towards the saints reflected a current of political dissent in the East Roman or early Byzantine Empire, where patronage of Christian saints' shrines was used to sanction imperial autocracy. These far-reaching debates about religion and authority also help re-contextualize the emergence of Islam in the late ancient Near East.
Nicholas Rescher
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236016
- eISBN:
- 9780191679162
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, General
This book presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, it rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. ...
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This book presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, it rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. On the other hand, it opposes the rationalism inherent in new-contractarian theory — both in the idealized communicative-contract version promoted in continental European political philosophy by Jürgen Habermas, and in the idealized social-contract version of the theory promoted in the Anglo-American context by John Rawls. Against such tendencies, this pluralist approach takes a more realistic and pragmatic line, eschewing the convenient recourse of idealization in cognitive and practical matters. Instead of a utopianism that looks to a uniquely perfect order that would prevail under ideal conditions, it advocates incremental improvements within the framework or arrangements that none of us will deem perfect, but that all of us ‘can live with’. Such an approach replaces the yearning for an unattainable consensus with the institution of pragmatic arrangements in which the community will acquiesce — not through agreeing on their optimality, but through a shared recognition among the dissonant parties that the available options are even worse.Less
This book presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, it rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. On the other hand, it opposes the rationalism inherent in new-contractarian theory — both in the idealized communicative-contract version promoted in continental European political philosophy by Jürgen Habermas, and in the idealized social-contract version of the theory promoted in the Anglo-American context by John Rawls. Against such tendencies, this pluralist approach takes a more realistic and pragmatic line, eschewing the convenient recourse of idealization in cognitive and practical matters. Instead of a utopianism that looks to a uniquely perfect order that would prevail under ideal conditions, it advocates incremental improvements within the framework or arrangements that none of us will deem perfect, but that all of us ‘can live with’. Such an approach replaces the yearning for an unattainable consensus with the institution of pragmatic arrangements in which the community will acquiesce — not through agreeing on their optimality, but through a shared recognition among the dissonant parties that the available options are even worse.
Wallace Matson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812691
- eISBN:
- 9780199919420
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812691.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Although participants in the scientific enterprise comply at least tacitly with the Milesian requirements of monism, naturalism, and rationalism, not all philosophers have followed suit. Many ...
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Although participants in the scientific enterprise comply at least tacitly with the Milesian requirements of monism, naturalism, and rationalism, not all philosophers have followed suit. Many metaphysicians continue to believe in the contingency of the world, thereby still stirring the pot in which simmer the traditional ‘problems’ of external-world skepticism, induction, other minds, etc. But two 17th century philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and Benedict Spinoza, produced Grand Theories satisfying the Milesian requirements. Hobbes's Monism consisted in asserting that nothing exists but bodies in motion. Sensations and all mental items are motions in the brain. Hobbesian Naturalism was his claim that bodies are not driven by forces other than those inherent in them. He was a Rationalist, holding that all true propositions are necessarily true. He did not distinguish between philosophy and science: both are the finding out of causes from effects and vice versa, by “ratiocination.”Less
Although participants in the scientific enterprise comply at least tacitly with the Milesian requirements of monism, naturalism, and rationalism, not all philosophers have followed suit. Many metaphysicians continue to believe in the contingency of the world, thereby still stirring the pot in which simmer the traditional ‘problems’ of external-world skepticism, induction, other minds, etc. But two 17th century philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and Benedict Spinoza, produced Grand Theories satisfying the Milesian requirements. Hobbes's Monism consisted in asserting that nothing exists but bodies in motion. Sensations and all mental items are motions in the brain. Hobbesian Naturalism was his claim that bodies are not driven by forces other than those inherent in them. He was a Rationalist, holding that all true propositions are necessarily true. He did not distinguish between philosophy and science: both are the finding out of causes from effects and vice versa, by “ratiocination.”
W. J. Mander
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240907
- eISBN:
- 9780191680298
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240907.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
F. H. Bradley was the greatest of the British Idealists, but for much of this century his views have been neglected, primarily as a result of the severe criticism to which they were subjected by ...
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F. H. Bradley was the greatest of the British Idealists, but for much of this century his views have been neglected, primarily as a result of the severe criticism to which they were subjected by Russell and Moore. In recent years, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in and a widespread reappraisal of his work. This book offers a general introduction to Bradley's metaphysics and its logical foundations, and shows that much of his philosophy has been seriously misunderstood. The book argues that any adequate treatment of Bradley's thought must take account of his unique dual inheritance from the traditions of British empiricism and Hegelian rationalism. The scholarship of recent years is assessed, and new interpretations are offered of Bradley's views about truth, predication, and relations, and of his arguments for idealism.Less
F. H. Bradley was the greatest of the British Idealists, but for much of this century his views have been neglected, primarily as a result of the severe criticism to which they were subjected by Russell and Moore. In recent years, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in and a widespread reappraisal of his work. This book offers a general introduction to Bradley's metaphysics and its logical foundations, and shows that much of his philosophy has been seriously misunderstood. The book argues that any adequate treatment of Bradley's thought must take account of his unique dual inheritance from the traditions of British empiricism and Hegelian rationalism. The scholarship of recent years is assessed, and new interpretations are offered of Bradley's views about truth, predication, and relations, and of his arguments for idealism.
Francesca Aran Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219285
- eISBN:
- 9780191711664
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219285.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
The book argues that the contemporary theological practice of describing Christian doctrines or beliefs as ‘narratives’ or ‘stories’ leads to a non-realistic idea of God, that is, to conceiving God ...
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The book argues that the contemporary theological practice of describing Christian doctrines or beliefs as ‘narratives’ or ‘stories’ leads to a non-realistic idea of God, that is, to conceiving God as a story or narrative invented by ourselves. The idea that doctrines are narratives derives from an emphasis on the method of theology, that is, the substitution of a self-reflective description of how we know about God for saying what God is. The aspect of how we know about God upon which descriptive or narrative theologies focus is visual, and hence we characterize such theologies as cinematic or ‘movieish’. The book considers four ways in which narrative theologies replace content with method. Within ecclesiology, Barthian narrative theologians stress our grasp of the resurrected Christ at the expense of the resurrection witnesses. In the context of arguing for God's existence, Thomistic narrativists discuss the rationality of our questioning rather than the evidence for God's existence. Since, therefore, neither Barthian nor Thomistic narrative theologies can assume that the Creator God is metaphysically known, they visualize the problem of evil, presenting it like a melodramatic conflict. Fourthly, the attempt to elucidate the Trinity by means of narration or description tends toward modalism or Sabellianism. The focus of narrative theologies on methodological or epistemic issues entails that they reflect either the faith of the believer (rather than the object of belief) or the reason of the reasoner (rather than its target). This book proposes that theology can bypass this fideism/rationalism axis by making love the basis of theology, and that in four ways: the source of the Church and its scriptures is an act of love; the evidential image on which proofs for the existence of God can be based is the love of mother for child; the appearance of the Trinity in our history is the expression of the love of God; and hence, since its principal object is God's active love, theology refers, not to a melodrama, but to a real drama.Less
The book argues that the contemporary theological practice of describing Christian doctrines or beliefs as ‘narratives’ or ‘stories’ leads to a non-realistic idea of God, that is, to conceiving God as a story or narrative invented by ourselves. The idea that doctrines are narratives derives from an emphasis on the method of theology, that is, the substitution of a self-reflective description of how we know about God for saying what God is. The aspect of how we know about God upon which descriptive or narrative theologies focus is visual, and hence we characterize such theologies as cinematic or ‘movieish’. The book considers four ways in which narrative theologies replace content with method. Within ecclesiology, Barthian narrative theologians stress our grasp of the resurrected Christ at the expense of the resurrection witnesses. In the context of arguing for God's existence, Thomistic narrativists discuss the rationality of our questioning rather than the evidence for God's existence. Since, therefore, neither Barthian nor Thomistic narrative theologies can assume that the Creator God is metaphysically known, they visualize the problem of evil, presenting it like a melodramatic conflict. Fourthly, the attempt to elucidate the Trinity by means of narration or description tends toward modalism or Sabellianism. The focus of narrative theologies on methodological or epistemic issues entails that they reflect either the faith of the believer (rather than the object of belief) or the reason of the reasoner (rather than its target). This book proposes that theology can bypass this fideism/rationalism axis by making love the basis of theology, and that in four ways: the source of the Church and its scriptures is an act of love; the evidential image on which proofs for the existence of God can be based is the love of mother for child; the appearance of the Trinity in our history is the expression of the love of God; and hence, since its principal object is God's active love, theology refers, not to a melodrama, but to a real drama.
Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195149838
- eISBN:
- 9780199872206
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195149831.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In this discussion of where justification and understanding come to an end, Nagel undertakes to refute various forms of subjectivism. Defending rationalism, he argues that there are some thoughts ...
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In this discussion of where justification and understanding come to an end, Nagel undertakes to refute various forms of subjectivism. Defending rationalism, he argues that there are some thoughts that we simply cannot get outside of; thoughts that we cannot regard as mere psychological dispositions. The last word on philosophical disputes about the objectivity of any form of thought must lie in some unqualified thoughts about how things are. In the domains of logic and mathematics, certain basic propositions are immune to doubt being central to the framework of everything we can think. In the domains of ethics, science, or history, resistance to the external or subjective viewpoint comes from within these domains themselves. First‐order thoughts about ethics, science, and history are the decisive factor in response to any second‐order thoughts about their psychological character. Any criticism of the reasoning within these domains necessarily involves reasoning carried out at the same level of inquiry. Questions about how the capacity for rational thought is possible for a species like ours generate a pernicious fear of religion that Nagel seeks to dispel.Less
In this discussion of where justification and understanding come to an end, Nagel undertakes to refute various forms of subjectivism. Defending rationalism, he argues that there are some thoughts that we simply cannot get outside of; thoughts that we cannot regard as mere psychological dispositions. The last word on philosophical disputes about the objectivity of any form of thought must lie in some unqualified thoughts about how things are. In the domains of logic and mathematics, certain basic propositions are immune to doubt being central to the framework of everything we can think. In the domains of ethics, science, or history, resistance to the external or subjective viewpoint comes from within these domains themselves. First‐order thoughts about ethics, science, and history are the decisive factor in response to any second‐order thoughts about their psychological character. Any criticism of the reasoning within these domains necessarily involves reasoning carried out at the same level of inquiry. Questions about how the capacity for rational thought is possible for a species like ours generate a pernicious fear of religion that Nagel seeks to dispel.
Jerry A. Fodor
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236368
- eISBN:
- 9780191597404
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236360.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have ...
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Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.Less
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.
Steven Nadler
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247073
- eISBN:
- 9780191598074
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247072.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This is a study of the reasons behind Spinoza's excommunication from the Portuguese–Jewish community of Amsterdam in 1656. The central question in the book is how and why did the issue of the ...
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This is a study of the reasons behind Spinoza's excommunication from the Portuguese–Jewish community of Amsterdam in 1656. The central question in the book is how and why did the issue of the immortality of the soul play a role in the decision to excommunicate Spinoza. The work begins with a discussion of the nature of cherem or banning within Judaism, and in the Amsterdam community, in particular, as well as of a number of possible explanations for Spinoza's ban. It then turns to the variety of traditions in Jewish religious and philosophical thought on the post‐mortem fate of the soul and the after life. This is followed by an examination of Spinoza's own views on the eternity of the mind in the Ethics and the role that the denial of personal immortality plays in his overall philosophical and political project. Part of the book's argument is that Spinoza's views were not only an outgrowth of his own metaphysical principles, but also a culmination of an intellectualist trend in medieval Jewish rationalism (especially Maimonides and Gersonides).Less
This is a study of the reasons behind Spinoza's excommunication from the Portuguese–Jewish community of Amsterdam in 1656. The central question in the book is how and why did the issue of the immortality of the soul play a role in the decision to excommunicate Spinoza. The work begins with a discussion of the nature of cherem or banning within Judaism, and in the Amsterdam community, in particular, as well as of a number of possible explanations for Spinoza's ban. It then turns to the variety of traditions in Jewish religious and philosophical thought on the post‐mortem fate of the soul and the after life. This is followed by an examination of Spinoza's own views on the eternity of the mind in the Ethics and the role that the denial of personal immortality plays in his overall philosophical and political project. Part of the book's argument is that Spinoza's views were not only an outgrowth of his own metaphysical principles, but also a culmination of an intellectualist trend in medieval Jewish rationalism (especially Maimonides and Gersonides).
Jonathan Bennett
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250920
- eISBN:
- 9780191597060
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250924.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book presents and analyses the most important parts of the philosophical works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Volume 1: the shift from Aristotelian to Cartesian ...
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This book presents and analyses the most important parts of the philosophical works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Volume 1: the shift from Aristotelian to Cartesian physics; Descartes on matter and space, on causation, and on certainty; Descartes and Spinoza on matter and mind, and on desire; Leibniz's metaphysics (monads) and physics, his theory of animals. Volume 2: Locke on ideas, on necessity, on essences, on substance, on secondary qualities, on personal identity; Descartes on modality; Berkeley's epistemology and metaphysics; Hume on ideas, on belief, on causation, on bodies, on reason; Hume and Leibniz on personal identity.Less
This book presents and analyses the most important parts of the philosophical works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Volume 1: the shift from Aristotelian to Cartesian physics; Descartes on matter and space, on causation, and on certainty; Descartes and Spinoza on matter and mind, and on desire; Leibniz's metaphysics (monads) and physics, his theory of animals. Volume 2: Locke on ideas, on necessity, on essences, on substance, on secondary qualities, on personal identity; Descartes on modality; Berkeley's epistemology and metaphysics; Hume on ideas, on belief, on causation, on bodies, on reason; Hume and Leibniz on personal identity.
Jonathan Bennett
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250913
- eISBN:
- 9780191597053
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250916.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book presents and analyses the most important parts of the philosophical works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Volume 1: the shift from Aristotelian to Cartesian ...
More
This book presents and analyses the most important parts of the philosophical works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Volume 1: the shift from Aristotelian to Cartesian physics; Descartes on matter and space, on causation, and on certainty; Descartes and Spinoza on matter and mind, and on desire; Leibniz's metaphysics (monads) and physics, his theory of animals. Volume 2: Locke on ideas, on necessity, on essences, on substance, on secondary qualities, on personal identity; Descartes on modality; Berkeley's epistemology and metaphysics; Hume on ideas, on belief, on causation, on bodies, on reason; Hume and Leibniz on personal identity.Less
This book presents and analyses the most important parts of the philosophical works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Volume 1: the shift from Aristotelian to Cartesian physics; Descartes on matter and space, on causation, and on certainty; Descartes and Spinoza on matter and mind, and on desire; Leibniz's metaphysics (monads) and physics, his theory of animals. Volume 2: Locke on ideas, on necessity, on essences, on substance, on secondary qualities, on personal identity; Descartes on modality; Berkeley's epistemology and metaphysics; Hume on ideas, on belief, on causation, on bodies, on reason; Hume and Leibniz on personal identity.
Martin Wight
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199273676
- eISBN:
- 9780191602771
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199273677.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Wight saw the philosophy of International Politics—his ‘International Theory’—as the interaction and interweaving of three traditions—Realism, Rationalism, and Revolutionism. Here, he takes the ...
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Wight saw the philosophy of International Politics—his ‘International Theory’—as the interaction and interweaving of three traditions—Realism, Rationalism, and Revolutionism. Here, he takes the archetypal thinkers of these traditions—Machiavelli, Grotius, and Kant—to whom he adds Mazzini, the father of all revolutionary nationalism, and subjects their writings and careers to a masterly analysis and commentary. Wight thus not only throws further light upon his magisterial earlier study, International Theory: The Three Traditions, but explores the thought of four key figures in the history of Western philosophy. In useful appendices he places these figures in a ‘philosophical genealogy’ of political theorists and practitioners, shows Christian thought in terms of these traditions, and indicates where to find in De Jure Belli ac Pacis what Grotius had to say on a variety of issues. Throughout, Wight is sensitive to the moral subtleties and dilemmas to be found in International Relations, a dimension he considered of supreme importance. Both the Foreword by Sir Michael Howard, and the Introduction by Professor David Yost, stress the value and uniqueness of Wight’s approach. The work concludes with a lecture in which the author, in considering the nature of international society, summarized his leading ideas.Less
Wight saw the philosophy of International Politics—his ‘International Theory’—as the interaction and interweaving of three traditions—Realism, Rationalism, and Revolutionism. Here, he takes the archetypal thinkers of these traditions—Machiavelli, Grotius, and Kant—to whom he adds Mazzini, the father of all revolutionary nationalism, and subjects their writings and careers to a masterly analysis and commentary. Wight thus not only throws further light upon his magisterial earlier study, International Theory: The Three Traditions, but explores the thought of four key figures in the history of Western philosophy. In useful appendices he places these figures in a ‘philosophical genealogy’ of political theorists and practitioners, shows Christian thought in terms of these traditions, and indicates where to find in De Jure Belli ac Pacis what Grotius had to say on a variety of issues. Throughout, Wight is sensitive to the moral subtleties and dilemmas to be found in International Relations, a dimension he considered of supreme importance. Both the Foreword by Sir Michael Howard, and the Introduction by Professor David Yost, stress the value and uniqueness of Wight’s approach. The work concludes with a lecture in which the author, in considering the nature of international society, summarized his leading ideas.
Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259755.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and ...
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This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is devoted to an extended discussion of moral reasons. It argues that externalism about reasons is true, that moral rationalism is true, and that moral realism has an adequate account of moral disagreement. Part V is devoted to moral epistemology. It argues for the self‐evidence of pro tanto moral principles, and for a version of reliabilism about ethical knowledge.Less
This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is devoted to an extended discussion of moral reasons. It argues that externalism about reasons is true, that moral rationalism is true, and that moral realism has an adequate account of moral disagreement. Part V is devoted to moral epistemology. It argues for the self‐evidence of pro tanto moral principles, and for a version of reliabilism about ethical knowledge.
Mike Oaksford and Nick Chater
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198524496
- eISBN:
- 9780191584923
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524496.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Are people rational? This question was central to Greek thought and has been at the heart of psychology and philosophy for millennia. This book provides a radical and controversial reappraisal of ...
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Are people rational? This question was central to Greek thought and has been at the heart of psychology and philosophy for millennia. This book provides a radical and controversial reappraisal of conventional wisdom in the psychology of reasoning, proposing that the Western conception of the mind as a logical system is flawed at the very outset. It argues that cognition should be understood in terms of probability theory, the calculus of uncertain reasoning, rather than in terms of logic, the calculus of certain reasoning.Less
Are people rational? This question was central to Greek thought and has been at the heart of psychology and philosophy for millennia. This book provides a radical and controversial reappraisal of conventional wisdom in the psychology of reasoning, proposing that the Western conception of the mind as a logical system is flawed at the very outset. It argues that cognition should be understood in terms of probability theory, the calculus of uncertain reasoning, rather than in terms of logic, the calculus of certain reasoning.
Caroline Fehl
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608621
- eISBN:
- 9780191731730
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608621.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book addresses a striking puzzle in contemporary world politics: Why have European states responded in varying ways to unilateralist tendencies in US foreign policy? The United States played a ...
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This book addresses a striking puzzle in contemporary world politics: Why have European states responded in varying ways to unilateralist tendencies in US foreign policy? The United States played a hegemonic leadership role in building the post‐war multilateral order, but has been reluctant to embrace many recent multilateral treaty initiatives championed by its traditional European allies, such as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the International Criminal Court, or the verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. European responses to US objections, however, have varied across these different transatlantic controversies. In some cases, European decision‐makers watered down or abandoned contested treaties, whereas in others, they opted for regime‐building excluding the US, that is, for a strategy of non‐hegemonic cooperation. How Europeans choose to deal with the ‘reluctant hegemon’ has critical implications for how key global challenges are addressed—yet, the variation of their responses has been largely overlooked in a scholarly debate fixated on understanding US policy. This book fills this important gap by studying European strategic choices in five recent transatlantic conflicts over multilateral agreements. It argues that neither realist accounts of global power dynamics nor rational institutionalist models of cooperation can fully explain why Europeans opt for non‐hegemonic cooperation in some cases but not others. To resolve this puzzle, we need to combine rationalist propositions with constructivist insights about normative constraints on states’ institutional choices. By developing such an integrated model, the book sheds new light on the long‐standing theoretical debate about the relationship between hegemony and international cooperation.Less
This book addresses a striking puzzle in contemporary world politics: Why have European states responded in varying ways to unilateralist tendencies in US foreign policy? The United States played a hegemonic leadership role in building the post‐war multilateral order, but has been reluctant to embrace many recent multilateral treaty initiatives championed by its traditional European allies, such as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the International Criminal Court, or the verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. European responses to US objections, however, have varied across these different transatlantic controversies. In some cases, European decision‐makers watered down or abandoned contested treaties, whereas in others, they opted for regime‐building excluding the US, that is, for a strategy of non‐hegemonic cooperation. How Europeans choose to deal with the ‘reluctant hegemon’ has critical implications for how key global challenges are addressed—yet, the variation of their responses has been largely overlooked in a scholarly debate fixated on understanding US policy. This book fills this important gap by studying European strategic choices in five recent transatlantic conflicts over multilateral agreements. It argues that neither realist accounts of global power dynamics nor rational institutionalist models of cooperation can fully explain why Europeans opt for non‐hegemonic cooperation in some cases but not others. To resolve this puzzle, we need to combine rationalist propositions with constructivist insights about normative constraints on states’ institutional choices. By developing such an integrated model, the book sheds new light on the long‐standing theoretical debate about the relationship between hegemony and international cooperation.
Albert Casullo
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195115055
- eISBN:
- 9780199786190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195115058.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The two questions have dominated traditional discussions of a priori knowledge: What is its relationship to necessary truth? What is its relationship to analytic truth? Answering them is not ...
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The two questions have dominated traditional discussions of a priori knowledge: What is its relationship to necessary truth? What is its relationship to analytic truth? Answering them is not necessary to answer the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge: What is it? Does it exist? This chapter argues that the prominence of questions about the relationship between the a priori and the necessary derives from two traditional views: the rationalist conception of a priori knowledge and Kant’s claim that necessity is a criterion of the a priori. Independent grounds for rejecting both are offered, and it is argued that the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge can be answered without resolving the disputes over its relationship to necessary truth.Less
The two questions have dominated traditional discussions of a priori knowledge: What is its relationship to necessary truth? What is its relationship to analytic truth? Answering them is not necessary to answer the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge: What is it? Does it exist? This chapter argues that the prominence of questions about the relationship between the a priori and the necessary derives from two traditional views: the rationalist conception of a priori knowledge and Kant’s claim that necessity is a criterion of the a priori. Independent grounds for rejecting both are offered, and it is argued that the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge can be answered without resolving the disputes over its relationship to necessary truth.
