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Contemporary political science assumes that ‘institutions matter’. But the governing institutions of the European Union are widely presumed to matter more than most. A commonplace assumption about the EU is that those working within European institutions are subject to a pervasive tendency to become socialised into progressively more pro-integration attitudes and behaviours. This assumption has been integral to many accounts of European integration, and is also central to how scholars study individual EU institutions. However, the theoretical and empirical adequacy of this assumption has never been properly investigated. This study examines this question in the context of an increasingly important EU institution, the European Parliament. The book integrates new theoretical arguments with a substantial amount of original empirical research. It develops a coherent understanding, based on simple rationalist principles, of when and why institutional socialisation is effective. This theoretical argument explains the main empirical findings of the book. Drawing on several sources of evidence on MEPs’ attitudes and behaviour, and deploying advanced empirical techniques, the empirical analysis shows the commonplace assumption about EU institutions to be false. European Parliamentarians do not become more pro-integration as they are socialised into the institution. The findings of the study generate some highly important conclusions. They indicate that institutional socialisation of political elites should be given a much more limited and conditional role in understanding European integration than it is accorded in many accounts. They suggest that MEPs remain largely national politicians in their attitudes, loyalties and much of their activities, and that traditional classifications of the European Parliament as a ‘supra-national’ institution are misleading. Finally, the study offers broader lessons about the circumstances in which institutions effectively socialise those working within them.

This book elucidates the complex cross-cultural genealogy of themes, ideas, and practices crucial to the creation of a new hybrid form of Buddhism that has emerged within the last 150 years. Buddhism modernism is not just Buddhism that happens to exist in the modern world but a distinct form of Buddhism constituted by cross-fertilization with western ideas and practices. Using primarily examples that have shaped western articulations of Buddhism, the book shows how modern representations of Buddhism have not only changed the way the tradition is understood, but have also generated new forms of demythologized, detraditionalized, and deinstitutionalized Buddhism. The book creates a lineage of Buddhist modernism that includes liberal borrowing from scientific vocabulary in reformulations of Buddhist concepts of causality, interdependence, and meditation. It also draws upon Romantic and Transcendentalist conceptions of cosmology, creativity, spontaneity, and the interior depths of the human being. Additionally, Buddhist modernism reconfigures Buddhism as a kind of psychology or interior science, drawing both upon analytic psychology and current trends in neurobiology. In its novel approaches to meditation and mindfulness, as well as political activism, it draws heavily from western individualism, distinctively modern modes of world-affirmation, liberal political sensibilities, and modernist literary sources. The book also examines this uniquely modern Buddhism as it moves into postmodern iterations and enters the currents of global communication, media, and commerce.

This is a study of the key features of the moral psychology and metaethics of three important medieval Jewish philosophers, Saadia Gaon, Bahya ibn Pakuda, and Moses Maimonides. They are selected because of the depth and subtlety of their thought and because of their relevance to central, enduring issues in moral philosophy. The book examines their views of freedom of the will, the virtues, the rationality of moral requirements, and the relation between rational justification and revelation. Their appropriations of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian thought are explicated, showing how their theistic commitments make crucial differences to moral psychology and moral epistemology. All three thinkers developed rationalistic philosophies and sought to show how Judaism does not include doctrines in conflict with reason. Maimonides receives the fullest attention, given that he articulated the most systematic and influential accounts of the main issues. While explicating the main claims and arguments of these thinkers, the book also shows the respects in which their thought remains relevant to several important issues and debates in moral philosophy. These thinkers' views of ‘the reasons of the commandments’ (in Torah) include resources for a sophisticated moral epistemology of tradition. The points of contact and contrast between medieval Jewish moral thought and the practical wisdom approach to moral theory and also natural law approaches are examined in detail.

This book introduces generative grammar as an area of study, asking what it tells us about the human mind. It lays the foundation for the unification of modern generative linguistics with the philosophies of mind and language. It introduces Chomsky's program of a ‘minimalist’ syntax as a novel explanatory vision of the human mind. It explains how the Minimalist Program originated from work in cognitive science, biology, linguistics, and philosophy, and examines its implications for work in these fields. It also considers the way the human mind is designed when seen as an arrangement of structural patterns in nature, and argues that its design is the product not so much of adaptive evolutionary history as of principles and processes that are historical and internalist in character. The book suggests that linguistic meaning arises in the mind as a consequence of structures emerging on formal rather than functional grounds. From this, the book substantiates an unexpected and deeply unfashionable notion of human nature. It also provides an insight into the nature and aims of Chomsky's Minimalist Program.

This book argues that the Dialogues on the Miracles of the Italian Fathers, Pope Gregory the Great's (590–604) most controversial work, should be considered from the perspective of a wide-ranging debate about the saints which took place in early Byzantine society. Like other contemporary works in Greek and Syriac, Gregory's Latin text debated the nature and plausibility of the saints' miracles and the propriety of the saints' cult. Rather than viewing the early Byzantine world as overwhelmingly pious or credulous, the book argues that many contemporaries questioned and challenged the claims of hagiographers and other promoters of the saints' miracles. From Italy to the heart of the Persian Empire at Ctesiphon, a healthy, sceptical, rationalism remained alive and well. The book's conclusion argues that doubt towards the saints reflected a current of political dissent in the East Roman or early Byzantine Empire, where patronage of Christian saints' shrines was used to sanction imperial autocracy. These far-reaching debates about religion and authority also help re-contextualize the emergence of Islam in the late ancient Near East.

According to some Muslim theologians, God is not free to act; He is bound by human ethics. To be just, He must create an individual of perfect intellect and infallible morality. People are obligated to submit to this person; otherwise eternal damnation awaits them. While these claims may be interpreted as an affront to God’s power, an insult to human judgment and a justification for despotism, Shiʿi Muslims in the eleventh century eagerly adopted them in their attempts to forge a ‘rational’ religious discourse. They utilized everything from literary studies and political theory to natural philosophy and metaphysical speculation in support of this project. This book presents the contribution of al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍān (d. 1044), the thinker most responsible for this irreversible change, which remains central to Imami Shiʿi sectarian identity and conception of history. His debates with Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 1024), al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 1022) and al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 1067) are the best expression of his intellectual project. The book analyses this project and establishes the dynamic context which prompted him to pour the old wine of Shiʿi doctrine into the new wineskin of systematic Muʿtazili theology.

The book argues that the contemporary theological practice of describing Christian doctrines or beliefs as ‘narratives’ or ‘stories’ leads to a non-realistic idea of God, that is, to conceiving God as a story or narrative invented by ourselves. The idea that doctrines are narratives derives from an emphasis on the method of theology, that is, the substitution of a self-reflective description of how we know about God for saying what God is. The aspect of how we know about God upon which descriptive or narrative theologies focus is visual, and hence we characterize such theologies as cinematic or ‘movieish’. The book considers four ways in which narrative theologies replace content with method. Within ecclesiology, Barthian narrative theologians stress our grasp of the resurrected Christ at the expense of the resurrection witnesses. In the context of arguing for God's existence, Thomistic narrativists discuss the rationality of our questioning rather than the evidence for God's existence. Since, therefore, neither Barthian nor Thomistic narrative theologies can assume that the Creator God is metaphysically known, they visualize the problem of evil, presenting it like a melodramatic conflict. Fourthly, the attempt to elucidate the Trinity by means of narration or description tends toward modalism or Sabellianism. The focus of narrative theologies on methodological or epistemic issues entails that they reflect either the faith of the believer (rather than the object of belief) or the reason of the reasoner (rather than its target). This book proposes that theology can bypass this fideism/rationalism axis by making love the basis of theology, and that in four ways: the source of the Church and its scriptures is an act of love; the evidential image on which proofs for the existence of God can be based is the love of mother for child; the appearance of the Trinity in our history is the expression of the love of God; and hence, since its principal object is God's active love, theology refers, not to a melodrama, but to a real drama.

Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.

This is a study of the reasons behind Spinoza's excommunication from the Portuguese–Jewish community of Amsterdam in 1656. The central question in the book is how and why did the issue of the immortality of the soul play a role in the decision to excommunicate Spinoza. The work begins with a discussion of the nature of cherem or banning within Judaism, and in the Amsterdam community, in particular, as well as of a number of possible explanations for Spinoza's ban. It then turns to the variety of traditions in Jewish religious and philosophical thought on the post‐mortem fate of the soul and the after life. This is followed by an examination of Spinoza's own views on the eternity of the mind in the Ethics and the role that the denial of personal immortality plays in his overall philosophical and political project. Part of the book's argument is that Spinoza's views were not only an outgrowth of his own metaphysical principles, but also a culmination of an intellectualist trend in medieval Jewish rationalism (especially Maimonides and Gersonides).

This book presents and analyses the most important parts of the philosophical works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Volume 1: the shift from Aristotelian to Cartesian physics; Descartes on matter and space, on causation, and on certainty; Descartes and Spinoza on matter and mind, and on desire; Leibniz's metaphysics (monads) and physics, his theory of animals. Volume 2: Locke on ideas, on necessity, on essences, on substance, on secondary qualities, on personal identity; Descartes on modality; Berkeley's epistemology and metaphysics; Hume on ideas, on belief, on causation, on bodies, on reason; Hume and Leibniz on personal identity.

This book presents and analyses the most important parts of the philosophical works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Volume 1: the shift from Aristotelian to Cartesian physics; Descartes on matter and space, on causation, and on certainty; Descartes and Spinoza on matter and mind, and on desire; Leibniz's metaphysics (monads) and physics, his theory of animals. Volume 2: Locke on ideas, on necessity, on essences, on substance, on secondary qualities, on personal identity; Descartes on modality; Berkeley's epistemology and metaphysics; Hume on ideas, on belief, on causation, on bodies, on reason; Hume and Leibniz on personal identity.

Wight saw the philosophy of International Politics—his ‘International Theory’—as the interaction and interweaving of three traditions—Realism, Rationalism, and Revolutionism. Here, he takes the archetypal thinkers of these traditions—Machiavelli, Grotius, and Kant—to whom he adds Mazzini, the father of all revolutionary nationalism, and subjects their writings and careers to a masterly analysis and commentary. Wight thus not only throws further light upon his magisterial earlier study, International Theory: The Three Traditions, but explores the thought of four key figures in the history of Western philosophy. In useful appendices he places these figures in a ‘philosophical genealogy’ of political theorists and practitioners, shows Christian thought in terms of these traditions, and indicates where to find in De Jure Belli ac Pacis what Grotius had to say on a variety of issues. Throughout, Wight is sensitive to the moral subtleties and dilemmas to be found in International Relations, a dimension he considered of supreme importance. Both the Foreword by Sir Michael Howard, and the Introduction by Professor David Yost, stress the value and uniqueness of Wight’s approach. The work concludes with a lecture in which the author, in considering the nature of international society, summarized his leading ideas.

This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is devoted to an extended discussion of moral reasons. It argues that externalism about reasons is true, that moral rationalism is true, and that moral realism has an adequate account of moral disagreement. Part V is devoted to moral epistemology. It argues for the self‐evidence of pro tanto moral principles, and for a version of reliabilism about ethical knowledge.

Are people rational? This question was central to Greek thought and has been at the heart of psychology and philosophy for millennia. This book provides a radical and controversial reappraisal of conventional wisdom in the psychology of reasoning, proposing that the Western conception of the mind as a logical system is flawed at the very outset. It argues that cognition should be understood in terms of probability theory, the calculus of uncertain reasoning, rather than in terms of logic, the calculus of certain reasoning.

This book addresses a striking puzzle in contemporary world politics: Why have European states responded in varying ways to unilateralist tendencies in US foreign policy? The United States played a hegemonic leadership role in building the post‐war multilateral order, but has been reluctant to embrace many recent multilateral treaty initiatives championed by its traditional European allies, such as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the International Criminal Court, or the verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. European responses to US objections, however, have varied across these different transatlantic controversies. In some cases, European decision‐makers watered down or abandoned contested treaties, whereas in others, they opted for regime‐building excluding the US, that is, for a strategy of non‐hegemonic cooperation. How Europeans choose to deal with the ‘reluctant hegemon’ has critical implications for how key global challenges are addressed—yet, the variation of their responses has been largely overlooked in a scholarly debate fixated on understanding US policy. This book fills this important gap by studying European strategic choices in five recent transatlantic conflicts over multilateral agreements. It argues that neither realist accounts of global power dynamics nor rational institutionalist models of cooperation can fully explain why Europeans opt for non‐hegemonic cooperation in some cases but not others. To resolve this puzzle, we need to combine rationalist propositions with constructivist insights about normative constraints on states’ institutional choices. By developing such an integrated model, the book sheds new light on the long‐standing theoretical debate about the relationship between hegemony and international cooperation.