Leif Lewin
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198277255
- eISBN:
- 9780191599774
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198277253.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Is it self‐interest or public interest that dominates in public life? Rational‐choice theory, political philosophy, and electoral research were all used to answer this question. Analysing existing ...
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Is it self‐interest or public interest that dominates in public life? Rational‐choice theory, political philosophy, and electoral research were all used to answer this question. Analysing existing literature, Professor Leif Lewin shows that predominant consensus emerged on this issue by the 1980s. This consensus states that people in politics are driven mostly by their self‐interest and not by common good and society values. Although Professor Lewin is not testing existing views that ‘egoism rules’ on deep theoretical grounds, he strongly argues that empirical facts do not support such views and thus opens a new chapter in the debate on individuals’ rationality.Combining research results and achievements of different research fields, mentioned above, the author adopts methodology never used before. Extensive literature review on studies of Western democracy provides a basis for analysis for many countries. Separate chapters of the book are devoted to the attitudes and actions of the electoral voters, politicians, and bureaucrats in power.This allows the author to make broad conclusions, which challenges predominant views. He concludes that in most cases people in politics are driven by broader social interests rather than their own short‐term interests.Less
Is it self‐interest or public interest that dominates in public life? Rational‐choice theory, political philosophy, and electoral research were all used to answer this question. Analysing existing literature, Professor Leif Lewin shows that predominant consensus emerged on this issue by the 1980s. This consensus states that people in politics are driven mostly by their self‐interest and not by common good and society values. Although Professor Lewin is not testing existing views that ‘egoism rules’ on deep theoretical grounds, he strongly argues that empirical facts do not support such views and thus opens a new chapter in the debate on individuals’ rationality.
Combining research results and achievements of different research fields, mentioned above, the author adopts methodology never used before. Extensive literature review on studies of Western democracy provides a basis for analysis for many countries. Separate chapters of the book are devoted to the attitudes and actions of the electoral voters, politicians, and bureaucrats in power.
This allows the author to make broad conclusions, which challenges predominant views. He concludes that in most cases people in politics are driven by broader social interests rather than their own short‐term interests.
Hugh Ward
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292371
- eISBN:
- 9780191600159
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292376.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Reference
A summary explanation of rational choice theory, and its development in game theory, as a challenge to conventional social science theories. The example, demonstrating its application to the campaign ...
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A summary explanation of rational choice theory, and its development in game theory, as a challenge to conventional social science theories. The example, demonstrating its application to the campaign strategies of political parties, highlights the particular strength of rational choice approaches in throwing up non‐intuitive but empirically testable propositions.Less
A summary explanation of rational choice theory, and its development in game theory, as a challenge to conventional social science theories. The example, demonstrating its application to the campaign strategies of political parties, highlights the particular strength of rational choice approaches in throwing up non‐intuitive but empirically testable propositions.
Michael J. Gerhardt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195150506
- eISBN:
- 9780199871131
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195150506.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter critically examines the most prominent theories which social scientists and legal scholars have developed to explain the role of precedent in constitutional law. It shows that legal ...
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This chapter critically examines the most prominent theories which social scientists and legal scholars have developed to explain the role of precedent in constitutional law. It shows that legal variables matter more to the outcomes of cases than social scientists typically acknowledge, but less than many legal scholars claim. Nor, for that matter, have legal scholars been able to dismiss altogether the relevance of external factors to constitutional decision making, including the justices' personal attitudes about constitutional law and policy preferences.Less
This chapter critically examines the most prominent theories which social scientists and legal scholars have developed to explain the role of precedent in constitutional law. It shows that legal variables matter more to the outcomes of cases than social scientists typically acknowledge, but less than many legal scholars claim. Nor, for that matter, have legal scholars been able to dismiss altogether the relevance of external factors to constitutional decision making, including the justices' personal attitudes about constitutional law and policy preferences.
HeeMin Kim
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813129945
- eISBN:
- 9780813135748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813129945.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter discusses rational choice theory and the aims and purposes of this book. Rational choice theory has been applied in many subfields of political science, such as international relations ...
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This chapter discusses rational choice theory and the aims and purposes of this book. Rational choice theory has been applied in many subfields of political science, such as international relations and American politics. This theory assumes methodological individualism and purposeful action. The main focus of this book is the democratic transition in Korea, which this chapter treats as a succession of events.Less
This chapter discusses rational choice theory and the aims and purposes of this book. Rational choice theory has been applied in many subfields of political science, such as international relations and American politics. This theory assumes methodological individualism and purposeful action. The main focus of this book is the democratic transition in Korea, which this chapter treats as a succession of events.
Robert Wuthnow
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159898
- eISBN:
- 9781400852116
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159898.003.0014
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the two standard approaches to religion often regarded as the most widely discussed alternative perspectives on the relationship between religion and society: ...
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This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the two standard approaches to religion often regarded as the most widely discussed alternative perspectives on the relationship between religion and society: secularization theory and rational choice theory. It then discusses how practice theory and an emphasis on lived religion have focused attention on the intricacies of religious practice both outside and inside of religious institutions at the micro level of individual and small-group behavior and yet have failed to provide strong linkages with the macrolevel social structures and processes that interested scholars in earlier studies. The third section draws on studies of race and ethnicity to emphasize how the concept of symbolic boundaries serves as a useful way of thinking about religious categories and identities. The fourth section outlines the processes through which the identities defined by symbolic boundaries change over time and suggests how to bring in consideration of the influences on these processes of political arrangements, demographic factors, and social institutions. Finally, it suggests applications of this multilevel perspective to the analysis of religious actors' strategies of institution building, the dynamics of church and state relations, connections of religion to racial and ethnic politics, and the restructuring of religion.Less
This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the two standard approaches to religion often regarded as the most widely discussed alternative perspectives on the relationship between religion and society: secularization theory and rational choice theory. It then discusses how practice theory and an emphasis on lived religion have focused attention on the intricacies of religious practice both outside and inside of religious institutions at the micro level of individual and small-group behavior and yet have failed to provide strong linkages with the macrolevel social structures and processes that interested scholars in earlier studies. The third section draws on studies of race and ethnicity to emphasize how the concept of symbolic boundaries serves as a useful way of thinking about religious categories and identities. The fourth section outlines the processes through which the identities defined by symbolic boundaries change over time and suggests how to bring in consideration of the influences on these processes of political arrangements, demographic factors, and social institutions. Finally, it suggests applications of this multilevel perspective to the analysis of religious actors' strategies of institution building, the dynamics of church and state relations, connections of religion to racial and ethnic politics, and the restructuring of religion.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to ...
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Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to such agents; the conditions under which member‐state principals delegate greater or lesser discretion to their agents; and the conditions under which supranational organizations such as the Commission are able to pursue their distinct preferences, within the limits of their statutory discretion. Such principal‐agent analyses, drawn from rational choice theory and transaction‐costs approaches, represent a parsimonious and internally consistent approach to the study of delegation; however, a competing approach, derived from sociological institutionalism, generates strikingly different predictions. This book examines both the delegation stage (at which member‐state principals create supranational organizations, delegate powers to them and establish control mechanisms to limit their discretion) and the subsequent behaviour of supranational agents in the day‐to‐day conduct of their executive, judicial and legislative powers. Although causally related, these two stages raise very different methodological challenges, and thus the two parts of the book utilize distinct research designs and methods to answer the questions posed in each.Less
Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to such agents; the conditions under which member‐state principals delegate greater or lesser discretion to their agents; and the conditions under which supranational organizations such as the Commission are able to pursue their distinct preferences, within the limits of their statutory discretion. Such principal‐agent analyses, drawn from rational choice theory and transaction‐costs approaches, represent a parsimonious and internally consistent approach to the study of delegation; however, a competing approach, derived from sociological institutionalism, generates strikingly different predictions. This book examines both the delegation stage (at which member‐state principals create supranational organizations, delegate powers to them and establish control mechanisms to limit their discretion) and the subsequent behaviour of supranational agents in the day‐to‐day conduct of their executive, judicial and legislative powers. Although causally related, these two stages raise very different methodological challenges, and thus the two parts of the book utilize distinct research designs and methods to answer the questions posed in each.
Elinor Scarbrough and Eric Tanenbaum (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292371
- eISBN:
- 9780191600159
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292376.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Reference
This volume is a collection of commissioned articles by 16 experts in social science methodology, each contribution introducing experienced social scientists to more advanced analytic techniques. The ...
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This volume is a collection of commissioned articles by 16 experts in social science methodology, each contribution introducing experienced social scientists to more advanced analytic techniques. The contributions explain the theoretical underpinnings of a particular technique, and illustrate the approach with a worked example. The techniques covered are the basic regression model and its extensions, linear structural equation modelling, log‐linear and latent class models, multi‐level modelling, and three extensions to modelling time series data. In these contributions, statistical notation is kept to a minimum; where necessary, it is consigned to footnotes or an appendix. Three final contributions introduce new developments in rational choice theory and discourse analysis.Less
This volume is a collection of commissioned articles by 16 experts in social science methodology, each contribution introducing experienced social scientists to more advanced analytic techniques. The contributions explain the theoretical underpinnings of a particular technique, and illustrate the approach with a worked example. The techniques covered are the basic regression model and its extensions, linear structural equation modelling, log‐linear and latent class models, multi‐level modelling, and three extensions to modelling time series data. In these contributions, statistical notation is kept to a minimum; where necessary, it is consigned to footnotes or an appendix. Three final contributions introduce new developments in rational choice theory and discourse analysis.
Michael Suk-Young Chwe
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691162447
- eISBN:
- 9781400851331
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691162447.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter explains game theory from the ground up. It first considers the concepts of choice and preferences before discussing strategic thinking as a combination of several skills. Game theory is ...
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This chapter explains game theory from the ground up. It first considers the concepts of choice and preferences before discussing strategic thinking as a combination of several skills. Game theory is built upon rational choice theory, and the chapter uses an example from Jane Austen's Mansfield Park to illustrate first rational choice theory and then game theory. To demonstrate the usefulness of game theory, it uses a simple game-theoretic model to show how Beatrice and Benedick in William Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing, Richard and Harrison in Richard Wright's Black Boy, and people revolting against an oppressive regime all face the same situation. Finally, it reviews previous work trying to bring game theory, as well as related concepts such as “theory of mind,” together with the study of literature.Less
This chapter explains game theory from the ground up. It first considers the concepts of choice and preferences before discussing strategic thinking as a combination of several skills. Game theory is built upon rational choice theory, and the chapter uses an example from Jane Austen's Mansfield Park to illustrate first rational choice theory and then game theory. To demonstrate the usefulness of game theory, it uses a simple game-theoretic model to show how Beatrice and Benedick in William Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing, Richard and Harrison in Richard Wright's Black Boy, and people revolting against an oppressive regime all face the same situation. Finally, it reviews previous work trying to bring game theory, as well as related concepts such as “theory of mind,” together with the study of literature.
Leif Lewin
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198277255
- eISBN:
- 9780191599774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198277253.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Provides some theoretical approaches to the subsequent chapters. In particular, it reflects on the ways in which different sub‐disciplines approach the question of whether any grounds exist for the ...
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Provides some theoretical approaches to the subsequent chapters. In particular, it reflects on the ways in which different sub‐disciplines approach the question of whether any grounds exist for the predominance of self‐interest in Western politics.Problems of ‘rational‐choice’ theory, of the philosophical method, and of the electoral research are then analysed. The discourse of each of these three scientific fields is presented on the basis of the analysis of corresponding literature.Less
Provides some theoretical approaches to the subsequent chapters. In particular, it reflects on the ways in which different sub‐disciplines approach the question of whether any grounds exist for the predominance of self‐interest in Western politics.
Problems of ‘rational‐choice’ theory, of the philosophical method, and of the electoral research are then analysed. The discourse of each of these three scientific fields is presented on the basis of the analysis of corresponding literature.
HeeMin Kim
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813129945
- eISBN:
- 9780813135748
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813129945.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
As Asian countries emerge as global economic powers, many undergo fundamental political transformations. This book evaluates the past thirty years of political change in South Korea, including the ...
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As Asian countries emerge as global economic powers, many undergo fundamental political transformations. This book evaluates the past thirty years of political change in South Korea, including the decision of the authoritarian government to open up the political process in 1987 and the presidential impeachment of 2004. The book uses rational choice theory—which holds that individuals choose to act in ways that they think will give them the most benefit for the least cost—to explain events central to South Korea's democratization process. The book's theoretical and quantitative analysis provides a context for South Korea's remarkable transformation and offers predictions of what the future may hold for developing nations undergoing similar transitions. Combining theoretical perspectives with a policy-relevant discussion, this study sheds new light on the Korean model of democratization and makes a significant contribution to the field of comparative politics.Less
As Asian countries emerge as global economic powers, many undergo fundamental political transformations. This book evaluates the past thirty years of political change in South Korea, including the decision of the authoritarian government to open up the political process in 1987 and the presidential impeachment of 2004. The book uses rational choice theory—which holds that individuals choose to act in ways that they think will give them the most benefit for the least cost—to explain events central to South Korea's democratization process. The book's theoretical and quantitative analysis provides a context for South Korea's remarkable transformation and offers predictions of what the future may hold for developing nations undergoing similar transitions. Combining theoretical perspectives with a policy-relevant discussion, this study sheds new light on the Korean model of democratization and makes a significant contribution to the field of comparative politics.
Andrew Guzman
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195305562
- eISBN:
- 9780199867004
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305562.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Applying rational-choice theory to international law and international relations, this book offers a comprehensive theory of the subject, how it operates, and why it works. Taking as a starting point ...
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Applying rational-choice theory to international law and international relations, this book offers a comprehensive theory of the subject, how it operates, and why it works. Taking as a starting point that states comply only when it is in their self‐interest to do so, the book demonstrates that international law nevertheless supports cooperation among states. This book develops a theory of international law to explain how concerns about reciprocal non‐compliance, retaliation, and reputation discourage states from violating their international legal commitments. By building a theory from the ground up, this book is able to address international law in all its forms, including treaties, customary international law, and “soft law.” It explains that contrary to conventional views on the subject, there is no stark difference between these different types of international law. Rather, each represents a position on a spectrum of commitment and is distinguished by the strength of the obligation it imposes. Once the various legal forms are recognized as different in degree rather than kind, other features of the system are easier to understand. The book discusses how the substantive content of an international agreement relates to its form, including whether the agreement provides for dispute resolution, monitoring, exit, escape, and reservations. With respect to customary international law, this book explains how and why such rules of law work, and how existing notions of custom must be adapted to accommodate the rational choice approach.Less
Applying rational-choice theory to international law and international relations, this book offers a comprehensive theory of the subject, how it operates, and why it works. Taking as a starting point that states comply only when it is in their self‐interest to do so, the book demonstrates that international law nevertheless supports cooperation among states. This book develops a theory of international law to explain how concerns about reciprocal non‐compliance, retaliation, and reputation discourage states from violating their international legal commitments. By building a theory from the ground up, this book is able to address international law in all its forms, including treaties, customary international law, and “soft law.” It explains that contrary to conventional views on the subject, there is no stark difference between these different types of international law. Rather, each represents a position on a spectrum of commitment and is distinguished by the strength of the obligation it imposes. Once the various legal forms are recognized as different in degree rather than kind, other features of the system are easier to understand. The book discusses how the substantive content of an international agreement relates to its form, including whether the agreement provides for dispute resolution, monitoring, exit, escape, and reservations. With respect to customary international law, this book explains how and why such rules of law work, and how existing notions of custom must be adapted to accommodate the rational choice approach.
Joseph Heath
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195370294
- eISBN:
- 9780199871230
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370294.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book attempts to show how rule-following can be understood as an essential element of rational action. The first step involves showing how rational choice theory can be modified to incorporate ...
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This book attempts to show how rule-following can be understood as an essential element of rational action. The first step involves showing how rational choice theory can be modified to incorporate deontic constraint as a feature of rational deliberation. The second involves disarming the suspicion that there is something mysterious or irrational about the psychological states underlying rule-following. Human rationality is interpreted as a by-product of the so-called “language upgrade” that we receive as a consequence of the development of specific social practices. As a result, certain constitutive features of our social environment — such as the rule-governed structure of social life — migrate inwards, and become constitutive features of our psychological faculties. This in turn explains why there is an indissoluble bond between practical rationality and deontic constraint. In the end, the book offers a naturalistic, evolutionary argument in favor of the traditional Kantian view that there is an internal connection between being a rational agent and feeling the force of one's moral obligations.Less
This book attempts to show how rule-following can be understood as an essential element of rational action. The first step involves showing how rational choice theory can be modified to incorporate deontic constraint as a feature of rational deliberation. The second involves disarming the suspicion that there is something mysterious or irrational about the psychological states underlying rule-following. Human rationality is interpreted as a by-product of the so-called “language upgrade” that we receive as a consequence of the development of specific social practices. As a result, certain constitutive features of our social environment — such as the rule-governed structure of social life — migrate inwards, and become constitutive features of our psychological faculties. This in turn explains why there is an indissoluble bond between practical rationality and deontic constraint. In the end, the book offers a naturalistic, evolutionary argument in favor of the traditional Kantian view that there is an internal connection between being a rational agent and feeling the force of one's moral obligations.
Patrick Jagoda
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780226629834
- eISBN:
- 9780226630038
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226630038.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, Film, Media, and Cultural Studies
This chapter takes up the concept of choice that is central to contemporary economics and the medium of video games. Rational choice theory bases all economic activity on decision-making undertaken ...
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This chapter takes up the concept of choice that is central to contemporary economics and the medium of video games. Rational choice theory bases all economic activity on decision-making undertaken by a rational subject. However, nonconscious decision-making informs everything from relations on social media to trades across financial markets. Video games serve as an ideal medium for exploring decision-making. This chapter delves into the limits and possibilities of choice in a digital era, exploring the first-person interactive metafictional game The Stanley Parable (2013), the networked game Moirai (2013), and the role-playing game Undertale (2015). My reading of these games moves from a model of rational decision-making to one of experimental construction of freedom.Less
This chapter takes up the concept of choice that is central to contemporary economics and the medium of video games. Rational choice theory bases all economic activity on decision-making undertaken by a rational subject. However, nonconscious decision-making informs everything from relations on social media to trades across financial markets. Video games serve as an ideal medium for exploring decision-making. This chapter delves into the limits and possibilities of choice in a digital era, exploring the first-person interactive metafictional game The Stanley Parable (2013), the networked game Moirai (2013), and the role-playing game Undertale (2015). My reading of these games moves from a model of rational decision-making to one of experimental construction of freedom.
Daniel Béland and Robert Henry Cox (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199736430
- eISBN:
- 9780199866106
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199736430.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Writing about ideas, John Maynard Keynes noted that they are “more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.” One would expect, therefore, that political ...
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Writing about ideas, John Maynard Keynes noted that they are “more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.” One would expect, therefore, that political science—a discipline that focuses specifically on the nature of power—would have a healthy respect for the role of ideas. However, for a variety of reasons—not least of which is the influence of rational choice theory, which presumes that individuals are self-maximizing rational actors—this is not the case, and the literature on the topic is fairly thin. As this book shows, ideas are in fact powerful shapers of political and social life. The book provides a general overview of the theoretical, empirical, and methodological issues raised by social science research on ideas and politics. Throughout, it hones in on three central questions. What is the theoretical basis for studying ideas in politics? What are the best methods? What sort of empirical puzzles can be solved by examining ideas and related phenomena such as discourse, policy paradigms, and framing processes?Less
Writing about ideas, John Maynard Keynes noted that they are “more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.” One would expect, therefore, that political science—a discipline that focuses specifically on the nature of power—would have a healthy respect for the role of ideas. However, for a variety of reasons—not least of which is the influence of rational choice theory, which presumes that individuals are self-maximizing rational actors—this is not the case, and the literature on the topic is fairly thin. As this book shows, ideas are in fact powerful shapers of political and social life. The book provides a general overview of the theoretical, empirical, and methodological issues raised by social science research on ideas and politics. Throughout, it hones in on three central questions. What is the theoretical basis for studying ideas in politics? What are the best methods? What sort of empirical puzzles can be solved by examining ideas and related phenomena such as discourse, policy paradigms, and framing processes?
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300574
- eISBN:
- 9780199783748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter explains the meaning of the payoffs that are used to quantify the outcomes of games. The theory of revealed preference assumes only that players are consistent. With appropriate ...
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This chapter explains the meaning of the payoffs that are used to quantify the outcomes of games. The theory of revealed preference assumes only that players are consistent. With appropriate consistency assumptions, it is shown that players act as though maximizing a utility function. The game of Russian Roulette is introduced to show that the players need to reveal preferences over lotteries so that risky situations can be accommodated. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's consistency postulates are shown to imply that an agent acts as though maximizing the expected value of a utility function in risky situations. Risk aversion is identified with having a concave Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function. The properties of such functions are then explored. Russian Roulette is then analyzed to show that the outcome depends on the level of risk aversion of the players. Finally, Allais' paradox and Zeckhauser's paradox are used to comment on the difference between rational behavior in the presence of risk and actual behavior.Less
This chapter explains the meaning of the payoffs that are used to quantify the outcomes of games. The theory of revealed preference assumes only that players are consistent. With appropriate consistency assumptions, it is shown that players act as though maximizing a utility function. The game of Russian Roulette is introduced to show that the players need to reveal preferences over lotteries so that risky situations can be accommodated. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's consistency postulates are shown to imply that an agent acts as though maximizing the expected value of a utility function in risky situations. Risk aversion is identified with having a concave Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function. The properties of such functions are then explored. Russian Roulette is then analyzed to show that the outcome depends on the level of risk aversion of the players. Finally, Allais' paradox and Zeckhauser's paradox are used to comment on the difference between rational behavior in the presence of risk and actual behavior.
Stephen Welch
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199553334
- eISBN:
- 9780191756009
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199553334.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Chapters 3 and 4 turn to approaches to political analysis which seek to displace political culture from the centre of attention, and show how they fail to do so. Chapter 3 examines ‘materialist’ ...
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Chapters 3 and 4 turn to approaches to political analysis which seek to displace political culture from the centre of attention, and show how they fail to do so. Chapter 3 examines ‘materialist’ displacements, in particular rational choice theory and Marxism. Rational choice theory has been recognized as the chief rival to cultural explanation in political science, but it actually has much in common with it, since both rely on unexamined assumptions about the nature of human motivation. Marxism originated in a critique of ‘idealist’ cultural explanations, and sought to deal with culture by displacing it onto the class structure. Yet the deterministic implications of this displacement have led to recurrent attempts to develop a more sophisticated theory of the political role of culture, notably under the heading of ‘hegemony’ by Gramsci and his successors in social history and cultural studies. The failure of these attempts is demonstrated.Less
Chapters 3 and 4 turn to approaches to political analysis which seek to displace political culture from the centre of attention, and show how they fail to do so. Chapter 3 examines ‘materialist’ displacements, in particular rational choice theory and Marxism. Rational choice theory has been recognized as the chief rival to cultural explanation in political science, but it actually has much in common with it, since both rely on unexamined assumptions about the nature of human motivation. Marxism originated in a critique of ‘idealist’ cultural explanations, and sought to deal with culture by displacing it onto the class structure. Yet the deterministic implications of this displacement have led to recurrent attempts to develop a more sophisticated theory of the political role of culture, notably under the heading of ‘hegemony’ by Gramsci and his successors in social history and cultural studies. The failure of these attempts is demonstrated.
Daniel Read
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199290420
- eISBN:
- 9780191710506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0009
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Rational choice theory assumes that agents have a set of basic preferences, and specifies “rationality conditions” that must be met to satisfy those preferences optimally. Most experimental studies ...
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Rational choice theory assumes that agents have a set of basic preferences, and specifies “rationality conditions” that must be met to satisfy those preferences optimally. Most experimental studies in behavioural economics are either explicit tests of whether actual behaviour conforms to these rationality conditions or else developments of theories that began that way. This chapter is a selective review of these experimental studies. It focuses on differences between the conditions of choice that are normatively irrelevant according to the rationality conditions, yet which nonetheless have, a profound influence on preference. These include framing of consequences, adding irrelevant items to the choice set, and changing the way preferences are expressed. The chapter discusses how preferences are not pre‐computed, but rather produced at the moment of choice from information that is made salient by the choice context.Less
Rational choice theory assumes that agents have a set of basic preferences, and specifies “rationality conditions” that must be met to satisfy those preferences optimally. Most experimental studies in behavioural economics are either explicit tests of whether actual behaviour conforms to these rationality conditions or else developments of theories that began that way. This chapter is a selective review of these experimental studies. It focuses on differences between the conditions of choice that are normatively irrelevant according to the rationality conditions, yet which nonetheless have, a profound influence on preference. These include framing of consequences, adding irrelevant items to the choice set, and changing the way preferences are expressed. The chapter discusses how preferences are not pre‐computed, but rather produced at the moment of choice from information that is made salient by the choice context.
Leif Lewin
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198277255
- eISBN:
- 9780191599774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198277253.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Political choices of voters are examined by discussing a large number of empirical studies. The aim is to test the pocketbook hypothesis that states that voters are following their economic rational ...
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Political choices of voters are examined by discussing a large number of empirical studies. The aim is to test the pocketbook hypothesis that states that voters are following their economic rational self‐interest.The author presents and discusses analysed cases of voters choices in the US, Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. He concludes that results of electoral research disapprove the pocketbook hypothesis.Less
Political choices of voters are examined by discussing a large number of empirical studies. The aim is to test the pocketbook hypothesis that states that voters are following their economic rational self‐interest.
The author presents and discusses analysed cases of voters choices in the US, Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. He concludes that results of electoral research disapprove the pocketbook hypothesis.
Jules L. Coleman
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199253609
- eISBN:
- 9780191719783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253609.003.0013
- Subject:
- Law, Competition Law
This chapter considers the possibility of analysing morality as a solution to the problem of market failure. Here, morality is viewed as the outcome of a rational bargain nested in a prisoners' ...
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This chapter considers the possibility of analysing morality as a solution to the problem of market failure. Here, morality is viewed as the outcome of a rational bargain nested in a prisoners' dilemma. In his book Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier argues that morality can be the outcome of a rational bargain. The chapter takes up the possibility of deriving morality from rationality. Whatever the specific shortcomings of Gauthier's argument, its great power is in seeing the deeply instrumental nature of morality. Morality is a social construct devised to solve problems that arise from the logical structure of human interaction. Like much of our normative life, a defensible morality is tied up with mutual advantage in ways the market failure-prisoners' dilemma paradigm enables us to see — to which other ways of modelling the problem blind us.Less
This chapter considers the possibility of analysing morality as a solution to the problem of market failure. Here, morality is viewed as the outcome of a rational bargain nested in a prisoners' dilemma. In his book Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier argues that morality can be the outcome of a rational bargain. The chapter takes up the possibility of deriving morality from rationality. Whatever the specific shortcomings of Gauthier's argument, its great power is in seeing the deeply instrumental nature of morality. Morality is a social construct devised to solve problems that arise from the logical structure of human interaction. Like much of our normative life, a defensible morality is tied up with mutual advantage in ways the market failure-prisoners' dilemma paradigm enables us to see — to which other ways of modelling the problem blind us.
Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, David A. Siegel, and Michael M. Ting
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691135076
- eISBN:
- 9781400836802
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691135076.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter focuses on voter participation, perhaps the most well-known anomaly for rational choice theory. The problem goes like this: in large electorates, the chance that any single voter will be ...
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This chapter focuses on voter participation, perhaps the most well-known anomaly for rational choice theory. The problem goes like this: in large electorates, the chance that any single voter will be pivotal is very small. Consequently, the cost of voting will outweigh the expected gains from turning out and few citizens will vote. This prediction is not consistent with some of the most easily observed facts about elections. The chapter introduces a basic model of electoral participation that focuses on voters’ turnout decisions under fixed candidate platforms. Contrary to the “paradox of turnout” raised by game-theoretic models of turnout, the model consistently generates realistically high levels of turnout. It also produces comparative statics, including those for voting cost, population size, and faction size, that are intuitive and empirically supported.Less
This chapter focuses on voter participation, perhaps the most well-known anomaly for rational choice theory. The problem goes like this: in large electorates, the chance that any single voter will be pivotal is very small. Consequently, the cost of voting will outweigh the expected gains from turning out and few citizens will vote. This prediction is not consistent with some of the most easily observed facts about elections. The chapter introduces a basic model of electoral participation that focuses on voters’ turnout decisions under fixed candidate platforms. Contrary to the “paradox of turnout” raised by game-theoretic models of turnout, the model consistently generates realistically high levels of turnout. It also produces comparative statics, including those for voting cost, population size, and faction size, that are intuitive and empirically supported.
