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It is no easy task to decipher Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a fundamental principle of morality (often called his ‘derivation’ of the humanity formulation). The argument may be viewed as having two steps. The first step, establishing that each rational agent has reason to treat her own rational nature in certain ways, is justified because one’s own rational nature is the necessary condition of the value of any other ends one has. The second step, establishing that each rational agent also must treat others’ rational nature in certain ways, depends on Kant’s idea that any formulation of the Categorical Imperative must embody basic everyday assumptions about the nature of morality. A principle of morality must give people common ends to work toward, rather than spurring them toward inevitable conflict. Thus, a moral principle based on the importance of rational nature must emphasize the importance of everyone’s rational nature, instead of telling each person to care only about her own.

Commentators more or less universally agree that the ‘humanity’ that must be treated as an end in itself is not literally membership in the human species, but rather some minimal form of ‘rational nature’ possessed by all typical adult humans. But there is more disagreement than is generally recognized about exactly what aspect of rational nature qualifies someone as an end in herself. Although Kant’s texts are not perfectly consistent, the most justified overall reading is that Kant means the end in itself to be the will of a being committed to morality, rather than the end in itself being just the power to set ends (Willkür), the self-legislation of moral principles through Wille, or the overall capacity to act morally. Many of the texts offered in favor of one of the minimal readings of ‘humanity’ actually favour the good will reading if taken within their larger context, and some key passages favouring the good will reading have been overlooked or minimized.

This chapter first explains that Kant defines a good will as the will of a being who is committed to moral principles, or committed to regulating her power of choice (Willkür) with the principles legislated by her Wille. It then surveys the divergent views that prominent commentators have offered of what should be treated as an end in itself. Other commentators have generally identified the end in itself as some more minimal form of rational nature, such as just Willkür itself, just the power to legislate moral principles, or just the capacity for morality. Even if one does not accept the claim that good will is the end in itself, it is still important to distinguish between the different readings that others have offered of ‘humanity’ in the humanity formulation.

Kant believes that moral reasons for action are catEgorical imperatives which override all other reasons for action, including reasons based on happiness. In the first half of the chapter, some interesting variations on standard Egoism are set out, and it is explained why Kant thought that Egoism could not be a genuine rival to the moral law. The second half of the chapter takes a different approach, however, developing an entirely new, distinctively Kantian version of Egoism that is not based on happiness. Kantian Egoism parallels the moral law: it is a theory of self-regarding catEgorical imperatives. In discussing this theory, some fundamental issues in Kant's practical philosophy are addressed; in particular, a new ‘realist’ account is given of the importance of rational nature and the way in which it is the source of other kinds of value, which is an improvement on the more familiar constructivist interpretations of Kant.

This chapter deals with Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative: the formula of humanity as an end in itself (FH). It examines Kant’s claims that a categorical imperative presupposes something of absolute value; that this must have the status of an end in itself, and that humanity or rational nature is the only thing that could meet this condition. It argues that this end must be understood in the negative sense as something not to be acted against, rather than in the positive sense as something to be attained. In light of this, it examines FH, which maintains that humanity (whether in one’s own person or that of others) is always to be respected as an end in itself and never treated merely as a means, and considers Kant’s application of this principle to the four examples that considered under FLN.

What is the basis of full moral worth? On what basis are some entities bearers of fundamental rights while other entities are not? This chapter defends the position that this basis is being a substance with a rational nature. It defends both parts of this criterion, namely, that it is a type of substance — not an accidental attribute — and it is a substance that has a rational nature.

Chapter 12 develops a novel non-consequentialist theory that, it is argued, is major improvement on rivals from the previous chapters. According to this favoured principle, one's life is more meaningful, the more one contours intelligence or rational nature (in a way that does not violate certain moral constraints) toward fundamental objects, conditions of human life that are largely responsible for many of its other conditions. The chapter demonstrates how this ‘fundamentality theory’ plausibly accounts for the meaningfulness of the good (beneficence, morality), the true (knowledge, enquiry), and the beautiful (art, creativity), and not only avoids the objections to competing theories, but also incorporates their kernels of truth. For examples of the latter, the chapter explains how the appeal to depth accommodates the ideas that meaning in life could be enhanced by, but does not require: relating to God, exhibiting subjective attraction to one’s projects and improving others' lives.

This chapter offers an internalist reading of Kant’s argument for the “formula of humanity,” according to which we must always respect the value of humanity as an end in itself, regardless of what else we care about, on pain of procedural irrationality. Our ends are not valuable in themselves, Kant says, but have as the source of their value the value of the rational natures that set them. So our commitment to the value of our contingent ends also commits us to the intrinsic value of humanity. But Kant’s argument is full of gaps, and faces serious objections: why think we’re rationally committed to seeing ourselves as the source of value for our ends? Even if we are the source of their value, why conclude that we ourselves must have value, much less intrinsic value? And does Kant’s argument entail, troublingly, that people who don’t value anything don’t have value?

Ethical discourse about end-of-life issues tends to be framed in terms of both the value or “sanctity” of human life and the importance of human dignity. This chapter argues that the notion of human dignity is more fundamental than that of sanctity of life and defends a person-centered conception of both. Such an approach contrasts sharply with views focused primarily on respecting the sanctity of the life manifested in a person, or the value of her rational capacity, or the value of the continuation of the human organism associated with her against her wishes or even after she (as an embodied human subject) is gone. Such approaches all misidentify the locus and nature of the ethical value at issue.

This essay addresses the question whether and to what extent Spinoza’s psychological and ethical egoism are able to accommodate the other-regarding concern that is ordinarily understood as definitive of morality. According to Nadler, even though Spinoza’s theory of virtue is egoistic in the sense that virtuous action is self-interested, it is not, he argues, narrowly egoistic, for Spinoza holds that we ought to live according to a nature that we share with others. On Nadler’s reading, given that reason is our nature and, equally important, given the nature of reason, there is no meaningful difference between a concern for one’s own true advantage and a non-mercenary, benevolent concern for the real well-being of others.