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The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory

Richard Dean

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199285723
eISBN:
9780191603938
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199285721.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and ... More


The Argument for the Humanity Formula

Richard Dean

in The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199285723
eISBN:
9780191603938
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199285721.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

It is no easy task to decipher Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a fundamental principle of morality (often called his ‘derivation’ of the humanity formulation). The argument ... More


The Textual Dispute, and Arguments in Favour of Minimal Readings

Richard Dean

in The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199285723
eISBN:
9780191603938
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199285721.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Commentators more or less universally agree that the ‘humanity’ that must be treated as an end in itself is not literally membership in the human species, but rather some minimal form of ‘rational ... More


What Should we Treat as an End in Itself?

Richard Dean

in The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199285723
eISBN:
9780191603938
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199285721.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter first explains that Kant defines a good will as the will of a being who is committed to moral principles, or committed to regulating her power of choice (Willkür) with the principles ... More


Kantian Egoism

Alison Hills

in The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199213306
eISBN:
9780191594212
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Kant believes that moral reasons for action are catEgorical imperatives which override all other reasons for action, including reasons based on happiness. In the first half of the chapter, some ... More


The Formula of Humanity (FH)

Henry E. Allison

in Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199691531
eISBN:
9780191731808
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691531.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter deals with Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative: the formula of humanity as an end in itself (FH). It examines Kant’s claims that a categorical imperative presupposes ... More


The Basis for Being a Subject of Rights: the Natural Law Position

Patrick Lee

in Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199675500
eISBN:
9780191757228
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675500.003.0016
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

What is the basis of full moral worth? On what basis are some entities bearers of fundamental rights while other entities are not? This chapter defends the position that this basis is being a ... More


Objectivism III: The Fundamentality Theory

Thaddeus Metz

in Meaning in Life

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199599318
eISBN:
9780191747632
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599318.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

Chapter 12 develops a novel non-consequentialist theory that, it is argued, is major improvement on rivals from the previous chapters. According to this favoured principle, one's life is more ... More


Kant’s Argument

Julia Markovits

in Moral Reason

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199567171
eISBN:
9780191758966
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567171.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter offers an internalist reading of Kant’s argument for the “formula of humanity,” according to which we must always respect the value of humanity as an end in itself, regardless of what ... More


The Value of Life and the Dignity of Persons

William J. FitzPatrick

in Human Dignity and Assisted Death

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780190675967
eISBN:
9780190675998
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190675967.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Ethical discourse about end-of-life issues tends to be framed in terms of both the value or “sanctity” of human life and the importance of human dignity. This chapter argues that the notion of human ... More


The Lives of Others: Spinoza on Benevolence as a Rational Virtue

Steven Nadler

in Essays on Spinoza's Ethical Theory

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199657537
eISBN:
9780191773822
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657537.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This essay addresses the question whether and to what extent Spinoza’s psychological and ethical egoism are able to accommodate the other-regarding concern that is ordinarily understood as definitive ... More


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