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This chapter looks at Wittgenstein's iconoclastic account of the structure of rational evaluation, such that all rational evaluation takes place relative to essentially groundless hinge commitments and hence is inherently local. On the face of it Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation seems to come into conflict with the kind of reasoning at issue in closure-style inferences, in that such inferences seem to license knowledge, perhaps even rationally grounded knowledge, of hinge propositions, in conflict with Wittgenstein's proposal. With this in mind, this chapter examines three ways of spelling out the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation.

This chapter explores a fourth way of casting the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation. Like the nonpropositional reading used to tackle the account's “closure problem” in the previous chapter, this fourth method is a nonepistemic proposal in that it does not treat our hinge commitments as being in the market for rationally grounded knowledge. Unlike the nonpropositional reading, however, it is not allied to additional philosophical theses that are independently controversial. With this construal of our hinge commitments in place, the chapter further explores the anti-skeptical ramifications of this proposal, including in contrast to superficially similar anti-skeptical stances.

This introductory chapter argues that integrating epistemological disjunctivism with Wittgenstein's radical account of the structure of rational evaluation can solve the problem of radical skepticism. On the face of it, these proposals look very different; indeed, they look antithetical and competing. Whereas the one proposal emphasizes the locality of rational evaluation, and hence rational support, the other emphasizes the strength of the rational support available to us in paradigm conditions, in that it is factive. But these differences are superficial, the chapter asserts. In fact, these proposals work very well with each other, in that they are not only compatible, but also mutually supporting and philosophically in the same spirit.

This chapter presents that the maximizing requirement requires a lover to constantly compare the object of her love with others and ask whether she really has managed to focus her love on the best possible object. It expresses a view of rational evaluative thought that places such thought in the context of an impartial, neutral point of view from which various values are assessed and objectively ranked against one another. The chapter attempts to undermine the assumption that all rational evaluation must take place from such a point of view. It argues that there are ways of responding to value that have little or nothing to do with this sort of neutral comparison, and they are not rationally deficient for that. Although there are contexts in which attempting to take the perspective of an objective evaluator by performing a comprehensive survey of the available options is reasonable, recommended, or even rationally mandatory, we make a mistake if we assume that all contexts are of this sort.

In cases of uncertainty, choosing a maximin strategy typically minimizes public risk (to citizens) and maximizes industry risk (to those responsible for dangerous technology). But this raises the question of whether, in a situation of uncertainty where we must do one of the other, we ought to minimize industry risk or public risk. This chapter argues that rational risk evaluation and management often requires us to minimize public risk.