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Is economics like car building or car repair? Are we working toward a finished product, or are we attempting to answer pertinent questions that arise and change from time to time? These questions are entertained in this chapter in order to explore the nature of the methods economists employ. The subjective nature of data and the relevance of predicting from past trendsis explored. The proof that rational choice analysis predicts better than any alternative process is seen to be less than definitive by typical standards of proof. Welfare economics comes closest to philosophy when it optimizes social welfare with a social welfare function, but the ramifications of that model are rarely explored. Finally, it is suggested that key questions change and economic thinking then adapts to deal with the new challenges. The vignette for this chapter looks at John Maynard Keynes and his rethinking of mainstream macroeconomics.

This chapter presents theories of institutional change. It begins with a discussion of the definition of institutions. It then discusses the concepts of institutional change, rational choice institutionalism, and distributional rational choice institutionalism.

Provides an overview of rational choice perspectives in the discipline of political science. Reviews rational choice models and provides examples of their application, in both their broad and narrow forms, in which this relates to the level of preference specification. Considers the relationship of rational choice analysis to institutions and institutional change. Predicts future boundary developments in the application of rational choice perspectives, by extending the range and assumptions built into rational choice models.

This chapter outlines an explanation of how Kant grounds morality in reason. It argues that all rational choice is guided by normative considerations (reasons with normative force for the agent). In moral choice, the reasons from which the agent acts are in fact sufficient to justify the action to anyone. Such a view underlies Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative, and offers the best understanding of the connection that he draws between moral principles and the nature of practical reason. The chapter offers a reconstruction of the derivation of the Formula of Universal Law in the first two sections of the Groundwork. Section II provides an overview of the argument of Groundwork, I, which explains how Kant thinks that the concept of morality implicit in ordinary thought leads to the Formula of Universal Law (FUL). Sections III through V explain, respectively, what leads Kant to undertake another derivation of the FUL in Groundwork, II — this time one that traces it to the nature of practical reason; his conception of practical reason; and how it is most fully expressed by the Categorical Imperative.

Explores the generic foundations of political theory in the twentieth century. It sorts and analyses the overarching perceptions of the political theory, at a broad level of generality, during the bulk of the century. The five positions outlined are normative political theory, institutional theory, historical political theory, empirical political theory, and ideological theory.

New public management–the new discipline that serves as an intellectual basis for public management reform–is far from constituting a unified intellectual field. New public management theoretical–ideological orientations vary also according to the different national realities that analysts face. We have, for instance, an Anglo-Saxon, a Continental European, and a Scandinavian tradition of approaching government and the state. It is possible to discern at least three orientations in the literature on managerial public administration, which I propose to the call ‘technical’, ‘economic’, and ‘political and sociological’ approaches. The political and sociological approach is the one that I adopt in this book. This approach founds inspiration rather in political theory and in the sociology of organizations than in rational choice theory.

Defends Down's three main arguments in An Economic Theory of Democracy. These three arguments relate to the costs associated with voting and rational non‐voting, party competition costs of attempting to attract votes away from the median voter, and the costs associated with obtaining political knowledge. These arguments can be maintained if we do not overestimate what we can expect from a theory, and consequently the contribution of rational choice and of Downs should not be minimized.

Focuses on the development of justice‐based theory, predominantly after the publication of John Rawls Theory of Justice in 1971. After an overview of the concept of justice, it provides a critical discussion of desert and non‐desert theories, mutual advantage, impartiality, utilitarian, rational choice, and feminist and pluralist accounts of justice

This chapter critically examines the most prominent theories which social scientists and legal scholars have developed to explain the role of precedent in constitutional law. It shows that legal variables matter more to the outcomes of cases than social scientists typically acknowledge, but less than many legal scholars claim. Nor, for that matter, have legal scholars been able to dismiss altogether the relevance of external factors to constitutional decision making, including the justices' personal attitudes about constitutional law and policy preferences.

As paradigms conflict, so the fields of political economy and sociology conflict, yet they also cross‐fertilize. Reviews the contribution of political economy to sociology and vice versa, pointing to the social determinants and contextualization of rational utility maximizers and the contribution of sociology to political economy. While some social phenomena may be explained by rational choice, the marriage is uncomfortable, most specifically in the areas yet untouched by rational theory, and by the potential for the detrimental impact of rational utility maximizers upon the social.

What's ‘new’ about ‘new institutionalism’? New institutionalism arises through the use of new behavioural methodology, bringing with it new variables, new focus of interest, and a growth in comparativism. Varieties of new institutionalism exist, and these are reviewed in the form of normative, rational choice, historical, social, and structural applications. Theoretical issues related to new institutionalism are considered.

This chapter develops a causal model for explaining the performance of liberal democracies. The model builds on explanatory models from three theoretical strands: comparative research on democracy, comparative public policy, and the veto player approach advocated in the context of the new institutionalism. It integrates formal and informal institutional factors as well as the three most-important non-institutional factors for explaining performance: the national level of wealth, the ideological orientation of the government, and the openness of the economy. The causal relationship between these factors is conceptualized on the basis of rational choice institutionalism. Furthermore, this chapter includes a discussion of the constitutional and partisan veto-player indices for measuring institutions. It concludes with a set of specific hypotheses on the effect of formal and informal institutions on political effectiveness.

This chapter discusses rational choice theory and the aims and purposes of this book. Rational choice theory has been applied in many subfields of political science, such as international relations and American politics. This theory assumes methodological individualism and purposeful action. The main focus of this book is the democratic transition in Korea, which this chapter treats as a succession of events.

Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to such agents; the conditions under which member‐state principals delegate greater or lesser discretion to their agents; and the conditions under which supranational organizations such as the Commission are able to pursue their distinct preferences, within the limits of their statutory discretion. Such principal‐agent analyses, drawn from rational choice theory and transaction‐costs approaches, represent a parsimonious and internally consistent approach to the study of delegation; however, a competing approach, derived from sociological institutionalism, generates strikingly different predictions. This book examines both the delegation stage (at which member‐state principals create supranational organizations, delegate powers to them and establish control mechanisms to limit their discretion) and the subsequent behaviour of supranational agents in the day‐to‐day conduct of their executive, judicial and legislative powers. Although causally related, these two stages raise very different methodological challenges, and thus the two parts of the book utilize distinct research designs and methods to answer the questions posed in each.

This chapter examines the leading present-day expression of modernist-empiricism: the new institutionalism. First, it challenges the belief of new institutionalists that they have a shared new paradigm. Instead, we suggest it is varied, containing strands that can scarcely be reconciled with one another. Second, it argues that historical institutionalism exists primarily as a counter to rational choice institutionalism but its inductive, modernist-empiricist logic lacks a micro-level theory for explaining historical change and awareness grows that it is not a distinctive approach. Third, it argues that ideational or constructivist institutionalism offers a promising way forward provided it develops a micro-theory that appeals to the beliefs and desires of actors and it breaks with the ahistorical forms of explanation of modernist-empiricism.