Aurora Szentagotai and Jason Jones
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195182231
- eISBN:
- 9780199870684
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195182231.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Clinical Psychology
This chapter examines the relation between rational/irrational thinking and behavior. It reviews studies assessing the irrational beliefs-dysfunctional/maladaptive behavior relationship, and focused ...
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This chapter examines the relation between rational/irrational thinking and behavior. It reviews studies assessing the irrational beliefs-dysfunctional/maladaptive behavior relationship, and focused mainly on research that evaluates the four types of beliefs separately, rather than global irrationality. Despite an obvious degree of specificity in the behavioral consequences of individual irrational beliefs, there is also an overlap in their effects (e.g., the aggressive expression of anger is related to high levels of low frustration tolerance, self-downing, and demandingness). This is not surprising considering the hypothesized mutual interdependence among diverse irrational beliefs.Less
This chapter examines the relation between rational/irrational thinking and behavior. It reviews studies assessing the irrational beliefs-dysfunctional/maladaptive behavior relationship, and focused mainly on research that evaluates the four types of beliefs separately, rather than global irrationality. Despite an obvious degree of specificity in the behavioral consequences of individual irrational beliefs, there is also an overlap in their effects (e.g., the aggressive expression of anger is related to high levels of low frustration tolerance, self-downing, and demandingness). This is not surprising considering the hypothesized mutual interdependence among diverse irrational beliefs.
José Luis Bermúdez
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199548026
- eISBN:
- 9780191720246
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548026.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences — from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, from management science to decision analysis. ...
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The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences — from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, from management science to decision analysis. But what counts as rational action and rational behavior? This book explores decision theory as a theory of rationality. Decision theory is the mathematical theory of choice and for many social scientists it makes the concept of rationality mathematically tractable and scientifically legitimate. Yet rationality is a concept with several dimensions and the theory of rationality has different roles to play. It plays an action-guiding role (prescribing what counts as a rational solution of a given decision problem). It plays a normative role (giving us the tools to pass judgment not just on how a decision problem was solved, but also on how it was set up in the first place). And it plays a predictive/explanatory role (telling us how rational agents will behave, or why they did what they did). This book shows, first, that decision theory cannot play all of these roles simultaneously and, second, that no theory of rationality can play one role without playing the other two. The conclusion is that there is no hope of taking decision theory as a theory of rationality.Less
The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences — from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, from management science to decision analysis. But what counts as rational action and rational behavior? This book explores decision theory as a theory of rationality. Decision theory is the mathematical theory of choice and for many social scientists it makes the concept of rationality mathematically tractable and scientifically legitimate. Yet rationality is a concept with several dimensions and the theory of rationality has different roles to play. It plays an action-guiding role (prescribing what counts as a rational solution of a given decision problem). It plays a normative role (giving us the tools to pass judgment not just on how a decision problem was solved, but also on how it was set up in the first place). And it plays a predictive/explanatory role (telling us how rational agents will behave, or why they did what they did). This book shows, first, that decision theory cannot play all of these roles simultaneously and, second, that no theory of rationality can play one role without playing the other two. The conclusion is that there is no hope of taking decision theory as a theory of rationality.
Arthur Still
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195182231
- eISBN:
- 9780199870684
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195182231.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Clinical Psychology
In 1958 Albert Ellis published “Rational Psychotherapy,” a brief paper marking the beginning of cognitive therapies. As the therapy developed and he gained followers, he changed the name to ...
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In 1958 Albert Ellis published “Rational Psychotherapy,” a brief paper marking the beginning of cognitive therapies. As the therapy developed and he gained followers, he changed the name to “rational-emotive therapy,” and then to “rational-emotive behavior therapy” (REBT). This chapter looks at the logical and historical background to Ellis's use of rational, and why this use is so relevant in understanding the distinctive importance of REBT. It starts by exploring the different uses of the word that give rise to its different meanings. It then brings out two fundamental and apparently contrasting usages, referred to here as disciplinary and emancipatory rationality. Finally, it draws on the tension between these usages to display the full complexity of Ellis's use of the word rational, and to put some of the philosophical criticisms of Ellis and REBT into perspective.Less
In 1958 Albert Ellis published “Rational Psychotherapy,” a brief paper marking the beginning of cognitive therapies. As the therapy developed and he gained followers, he changed the name to “rational-emotive therapy,” and then to “rational-emotive behavior therapy” (REBT). This chapter looks at the logical and historical background to Ellis's use of rational, and why this use is so relevant in understanding the distinctive importance of REBT. It starts by exploring the different uses of the word that give rise to its different meanings. It then brings out two fundamental and apparently contrasting usages, referred to here as disciplinary and emancipatory rationality. Finally, it draws on the tension between these usages to display the full complexity of Ellis's use of the word rational, and to put some of the philosophical criticisms of Ellis and REBT into perspective.
Paul W. Glimcher
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262195805
- eISBN:
- 9780262272353
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262195805.003.0016
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
There has been an increasing interest in neurobiological analyses of the causes of behavior among many practitioners of criminal law. In some institutional circles this has crystallized as an ...
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There has been an increasing interest in neurobiological analyses of the causes of behavior among many practitioners of criminal law. In some institutional circles this has crystallized as an interest in providing a physical method for classifying the actions of human agents according to preexisting social–legal categories. The impetus driving this search for neurobiological classification tools stems from both the longstanding Western legal requirement that actors be held accountable only for those voluntary actions which are preceded by what is termed a culpable mental state and the longstanding legal difficulty in establishing culpable mental state at trial. Thus a pressing question for many legal practitioners is whether existing neurobiological techniques or data can be used to identify the socially defined categories that guide law and punishment. Based on modern epistemological views of natural scientists and neurobiological evidence, this chapter suggests that there is no meaningful sense in which the possible states of the brain can be reduced to a standard psycho–legal state. Current understanding suggests that at an empirical neurobiological level, the distinctions employed by the criminal justice system may be nearly meaningless.Less
There has been an increasing interest in neurobiological analyses of the causes of behavior among many practitioners of criminal law. In some institutional circles this has crystallized as an interest in providing a physical method for classifying the actions of human agents according to preexisting social–legal categories. The impetus driving this search for neurobiological classification tools stems from both the longstanding Western legal requirement that actors be held accountable only for those voluntary actions which are preceded by what is termed a culpable mental state and the longstanding legal difficulty in establishing culpable mental state at trial. Thus a pressing question for many legal practitioners is whether existing neurobiological techniques or data can be used to identify the socially defined categories that guide law and punishment. Based on modern epistemological views of natural scientists and neurobiological evidence, this chapter suggests that there is no meaningful sense in which the possible states of the brain can be reduced to a standard psycho–legal state. Current understanding suggests that at an empirical neurobiological level, the distinctions employed by the criminal justice system may be nearly meaningless.
Julie B. Schnur, Guy H. Montgomery, and Daniel David
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195182231
- eISBN:
- 9780199870684
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195182231.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Clinical Psychology
This chapter proposes a theoretical model that could potentially increase our understanding of the effects of irrational beliefs on health outcomes. It has been written that REBT “is perhaps the only ...
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This chapter proposes a theoretical model that could potentially increase our understanding of the effects of irrational beliefs on health outcomes. It has been written that REBT “is perhaps the only therapeutic system that directly tackles our confrontation with reality.” Also as humans cannot help but be all too aware, physical suffering is an inextricable part of reality. REBT arms us in our struggle with this aspect of reality by providing us with two weapons: a willingness to accept reality, combined with an unwillingness to accept our irrational interpretations of that reality.Less
This chapter proposes a theoretical model that could potentially increase our understanding of the effects of irrational beliefs on health outcomes. It has been written that REBT “is perhaps the only therapeutic system that directly tackles our confrontation with reality.” Also as humans cannot help but be all too aware, physical suffering is an inextricable part of reality. REBT arms us in our struggle with this aspect of reality by providing us with two weapons: a willingness to accept reality, combined with an unwillingness to accept our irrational interpretations of that reality.
Lael J. Schooler
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262195805
- eISBN:
- 9780262272353
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262195805.003.0010
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Michael Watkins has said that a cognitive theory “is a bit like someone else’s toothbrush—it is fine for the individual’s use, but for the rest of us…well, we would just rather not, thank you.” To ...
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Michael Watkins has said that a cognitive theory “is a bit like someone else’s toothbrush—it is fine for the individual’s use, but for the rest of us…well, we would just rather not, thank you.” To say whether people are behaving rationally requires a definition of what it means to behave rationally, and like a toothbrush everyone has their own. This chapter, defines rational behavior as follows: To behave rationally in some context is to display behavior that corresponds to a normative standard of behavior for that context. The choice of the standard determines what constitutes rational behavior. This chapter explores the roots of the idea that behavior that is rational in natural environments may not necessarily be rational in the peculiar environments that experimental psychologists concoct.Less
Michael Watkins has said that a cognitive theory “is a bit like someone else’s toothbrush—it is fine for the individual’s use, but for the rest of us…well, we would just rather not, thank you.” To say whether people are behaving rationally requires a definition of what it means to behave rationally, and like a toothbrush everyone has their own. This chapter, defines rational behavior as follows: To behave rationally in some context is to display behavior that corresponds to a normative standard of behavior for that context. The choice of the standard determines what constitutes rational behavior. This chapter explores the roots of the idea that behavior that is rational in natural environments may not necessarily be rational in the peculiar environments that experimental psychologists concoct.
Louis M. Herman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198528272
- eISBN:
- 9780191689529
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.003.0020
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter examines the intelligence and rational behaviour in four bottlenose dolphins evidenced by their cognitive accomplishments. It ...
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This chapter examines the intelligence and rational behaviour in four bottlenose dolphins evidenced by their cognitive accomplishments. It describes the dolphins' trained facility in understanding symbolic gestures and evaluates whether this capacity to understand symbolic gestures is related to the rational responses dolphins display. It explains that intelligence is manifested in behavioural flexibility and intelligently flexible behaviour provides the foundation for rational behaviour.Less
This chapter examines the intelligence and rational behaviour in four bottlenose dolphins evidenced by their cognitive accomplishments. It describes the dolphins' trained facility in understanding symbolic gestures and evaluates whether this capacity to understand symbolic gestures is related to the rational responses dolphins display. It explains that intelligence is manifested in behavioural flexibility and intelligently flexible behaviour provides the foundation for rational behaviour.
Duane Rumbaugh and David Washburn
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300099836
- eISBN:
- 9780300129359
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300099836.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology
What is animal intelligence? In what ways is it similar to human intelligence? Many behavioral scientists have realized that animals can be rational, can think in abstract symbols, can understand and ...
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What is animal intelligence? In what ways is it similar to human intelligence? Many behavioral scientists have realized that animals can be rational, can think in abstract symbols, can understand and react to human speech, and can learn through observation as well as conditioning many of the more complicated skills of life. This book explores the mysteries of the animal mind even further, identifying an advanced level of animal behavior—emergents—that reflects animals' natural and active inclination to make sense of the world. The authors unify all behavior into a framework they call Rational Behaviorism and present it as a new way to understand learning, intelligence, and rational behavior in both animals and humans. Drawing on years of research on issues of complex learning and intelligence in primates (notably rhesus monkeys, chimpanzees, and bonobos), the authors provide examples of animal ingenuity and persistence, showing that animals are capable of very creative solutions to novel challenges. They analyze learning processes and research methods, discuss the meaningful differences across the primate order, and point the way to further advances, enlivening theoretical material about primates with stories about their behavior and achievements.Less
What is animal intelligence? In what ways is it similar to human intelligence? Many behavioral scientists have realized that animals can be rational, can think in abstract symbols, can understand and react to human speech, and can learn through observation as well as conditioning many of the more complicated skills of life. This book explores the mysteries of the animal mind even further, identifying an advanced level of animal behavior—emergents—that reflects animals' natural and active inclination to make sense of the world. The authors unify all behavior into a framework they call Rational Behaviorism and present it as a new way to understand learning, intelligence, and rational behavior in both animals and humans. Drawing on years of research on issues of complex learning and intelligence in primates (notably rhesus monkeys, chimpanzees, and bonobos), the authors provide examples of animal ingenuity and persistence, showing that animals are capable of very creative solutions to novel challenges. They analyze learning processes and research methods, discuss the meaningful differences across the primate order, and point the way to further advances, enlivening theoretical material about primates with stories about their behavior and achievements.
Gerd Gigerenzer
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195153729
- eISBN:
- 9780199849222
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195153729.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Social rationality is a specific form of ecological rationality, one in which the environment consists of other humans. The program of social rationality explains human judgment and decision making ...
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Social rationality is a specific form of ecological rationality, one in which the environment consists of other humans. The program of social rationality explains human judgment and decision making in terms of the structure of social environments. This chapter illustrates how behaviors that look irrational from an individualistic point of view can turn out to be well adapted to a specific social environment. Social environments foster different strategies than physical environments, such as imitation instead of deliberation, and demand attention to information that is unique to social interaction, such as cues that could reveal that one is being cheated or bluffed. The examples demonstrate that only by referring to something external to the rules or axioms, such as social objectives, values, and norms, can one decide whether an axiom or choice rule entails rational behavior.Less
Social rationality is a specific form of ecological rationality, one in which the environment consists of other humans. The program of social rationality explains human judgment and decision making in terms of the structure of social environments. This chapter illustrates how behaviors that look irrational from an individualistic point of view can turn out to be well adapted to a specific social environment. Social environments foster different strategies than physical environments, such as imitation instead of deliberation, and demand attention to information that is unique to social interaction, such as cues that could reveal that one is being cheated or bluffed. The examples demonstrate that only by referring to something external to the rules or axioms, such as social objectives, values, and norms, can one decide whether an axiom or choice rule entails rational behavior.
DAVID J. BARTHOLOMEW
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198270140
- eISBN:
- 9780191683923
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198270140.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter takes on how these supernatural or religious beliefs are reasonable enough for people to allow this supernaturalism to affect their behaviour, especially in terms of commitment. It ...
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This chapter takes on how these supernatural or religious beliefs are reasonable enough for people to allow this supernaturalism to affect their behaviour, especially in terms of commitment. It points out how we must first recognize the limitations of the scientific method before we use it as a basis of knowledge for rational behaviour. This chapter discusses the elements of decision making to further explain how some Christians take their religious beliefs into account when making ordinary everyday decisions. Because decisions are possibly based on whatever values that are instilled with beliefs, the chapter also introduces a ‘game’ theory to emphasize conflicts that decision makers face.Less
This chapter takes on how these supernatural or religious beliefs are reasonable enough for people to allow this supernaturalism to affect their behaviour, especially in terms of commitment. It points out how we must first recognize the limitations of the scientific method before we use it as a basis of knowledge for rational behaviour. This chapter discusses the elements of decision making to further explain how some Christians take their religious beliefs into account when making ordinary everyday decisions. Because decisions are possibly based on whatever values that are instilled with beliefs, the chapter also introduces a ‘game’ theory to emphasize conflicts that decision makers face.
David Papineau and Cecilia Heyes
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198528272
- eISBN:
- 9780191689529
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter examines the heuristic and theoretical importance of a distinction between rational and associative behaviour in animals in the ...
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This chapter examines the heuristic and theoretical importance of a distinction between rational and associative behaviour in animals in the case of imitation in the Japanese quail. It suggests that there is no Rubicon between associative and rational processes to be crossed and that evolution adds specific new cognitive capacities by tinkering with previous mechanisms. It proposes that research should refocus on specific explanations of how animals do specific things, rather than on the presence or absence of some general or ideal form of rationality that contrasts with associative mechanisms.Less
This chapter examines the heuristic and theoretical importance of a distinction between rational and associative behaviour in animals in the case of imitation in the Japanese quail. It suggests that there is no Rubicon between associative and rational processes to be crossed and that evolution adds specific new cognitive capacities by tinkering with previous mechanisms. It proposes that research should refocus on specific explanations of how animals do specific things, rather than on the presence or absence of some general or ideal form of rationality that contrasts with associative mechanisms.
Joëlle Proust
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198528272
- eISBN:
- 9780191689529
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter examines the evolution of rationality and metacognition in non-human animals. It charts the adaptive steps that lead from merely ...
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This chapter examines the evolution of rationality and metacognition in non-human animals. It charts the adaptive steps that lead from merely biologically rational behaviour to human reasoning processes, and clarifies the critical functions of metacognitive processes in this genesis. It argues that variable, complex environments exert strong selective pressure for flexible behaviour and adaptive control structures evolve in response to this pressure.Less
This chapter examines the evolution of rationality and metacognition in non-human animals. It charts the adaptive steps that lead from merely biologically rational behaviour to human reasoning processes, and clarifies the critical functions of metacognitive processes in this genesis. It argues that variable, complex environments exert strong selective pressure for flexible behaviour and adaptive control structures evolve in response to this pressure.
JOANNA BOURKE
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203858
- eISBN:
- 9780191676024
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203858.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Social History
The market is a model of human relations. The price of commodities is an indicator of their relative worth. The ‘factors of production’, including human labour, receive their economic value in the ...
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The market is a model of human relations. The price of commodities is an indicator of their relative worth. The ‘factors of production’, including human labour, receive their economic value in the process of exchange. People choose on the basis of ‘rational’ analysis of economic conditions and prospects. In a growing economy, ‘rational’ behaviour is followed by increased well-being. The economic approach poses problems for the historian trying to understand the decisions that women in Ireland made in the period prior to World War I. Clearly, people make decisions based on notions of what they perceive to be ‘best’ for them. This book investigates the interaction of female well-being, agricultural production, and labour. A model of well-being needs to consider three aspects: material production and private consumption, non-economic factors, and distributional factors.Less
The market is a model of human relations. The price of commodities is an indicator of their relative worth. The ‘factors of production’, including human labour, receive their economic value in the process of exchange. People choose on the basis of ‘rational’ analysis of economic conditions and prospects. In a growing economy, ‘rational’ behaviour is followed by increased well-being. The economic approach poses problems for the historian trying to understand the decisions that women in Ireland made in the period prior to World War I. Clearly, people make decisions based on notions of what they perceive to be ‘best’ for them. This book investigates the interaction of female well-being, agricultural production, and labour. A model of well-being needs to consider three aspects: material production and private consumption, non-economic factors, and distributional factors.
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, and Thomas R. Palfrey
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780691124230
- eISBN:
- 9781400880928
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691124230.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
This chapter lays out the general theory of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) for normal-form games. It starts with the reduced-form approach to QR, based on the direct specification of “regular” ...
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This chapter lays out the general theory of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) for normal-form games. It starts with the reduced-form approach to QR, based on the direct specification of “regular” quantal or smoothed best-response functions required to satisfy four intuitive axioms of stochastic choice. A simple asymmetric matching pennies game is used to illustrate these ideas and show that QRE imposes strong restrictions on the data, even without parametric assumptions on the quantal response functions. Particular attention is given to the logit QRE, since it is the most commonly used approach taken when QRE is applied to experimental or other data. The discussion includes the topological and limiting properties of logit QRE and connections with refinement concepts. QRE is also related to several other equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior in games, including a game-theoretic equilibrium version of Luce's (1959) model of individual choice, Rosenthal's (1989) linear response model, and Van Damme's (1987) control cost model; these connections are explained in the chapter.Less
This chapter lays out the general theory of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) for normal-form games. It starts with the reduced-form approach to QR, based on the direct specification of “regular” quantal or smoothed best-response functions required to satisfy four intuitive axioms of stochastic choice. A simple asymmetric matching pennies game is used to illustrate these ideas and show that QRE imposes strong restrictions on the data, even without parametric assumptions on the quantal response functions. Particular attention is given to the logit QRE, since it is the most commonly used approach taken when QRE is applied to experimental or other data. The discussion includes the topological and limiting properties of logit QRE and connections with refinement concepts. QRE is also related to several other equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior in games, including a game-theoretic equilibrium version of Luce's (1959) model of individual choice, Rosenthal's (1989) linear response model, and Van Damme's (1987) control cost model; these connections are explained in the chapter.
Edmund T. Rolls
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- July 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198845997
- eISBN:
- 9780191881237
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198845997.003.0006
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience, Molecular and Cellular Systems
Emotions can be defined as states elicited by instrumental reinforcers, that is, by rewards and punishers. Because of its roles in processing rewards and punishers, the orbitofrontal cortex is ...
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Emotions can be defined as states elicited by instrumental reinforcers, that is, by rewards and punishers. Because of its roles in processing rewards and punishers, the orbitofrontal cortex is therefore the key brain region in emotion. Cognition can have a top-down biasing effect on the emotion-related systems in the orbitofrontal cortex. In addition to the emotional route to behavior, there is also a rational route to behavior involving reasoning, which involves systems outside the orbitofrontal cortex. Individual differences in sensitivity to rewards and punishers also provide a foundation for understanding many aspects of personality. The functions of the orbitofrontal cortex in emotion are compared with those of the amygdala, which it is argued becomes overshadowed by the orbitofrontal cortex in humans. Indeed, a current topic of interest is that the orbitofrontal cortex appears to be involved much more in subjective aspects of emotion in humans than the amygdala.Less
Emotions can be defined as states elicited by instrumental reinforcers, that is, by rewards and punishers. Because of its roles in processing rewards and punishers, the orbitofrontal cortex is therefore the key brain region in emotion. Cognition can have a top-down biasing effect on the emotion-related systems in the orbitofrontal cortex. In addition to the emotional route to behavior, there is also a rational route to behavior involving reasoning, which involves systems outside the orbitofrontal cortex. Individual differences in sensitivity to rewards and punishers also provide a foundation for understanding many aspects of personality. The functions of the orbitofrontal cortex in emotion are compared with those of the amygdala, which it is argued becomes overshadowed by the orbitofrontal cortex in humans. Indeed, a current topic of interest is that the orbitofrontal cortex appears to be involved much more in subjective aspects of emotion in humans than the amygdala.
Shlomo Zilberstein
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262014809
- eISBN:
- 9780262295284
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014809.003.0003
- Subject:
- Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence
This chapter explores the relationship between computational models of rational behavior and metareasoning. It examines several approaches to bounded rationality, dividing them into four broad ...
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This chapter explores the relationship between computational models of rational behavior and metareasoning. It examines several approaches to bounded rationality, dividing them into four broad classes: heuristic search, approximate modeling, optimal metareasoning, and bounded optimality. The approach based on optimal metareasoning seems particularly attractive because it is both relatively easy to implement and provides some formal guarantees about the behavior of the agent. The chapter considers several instantiations of this approach using anytime algorithms and provides a characterization of the relationship between the object-level and metareasoning components. These examples show that metareasoning plays an important role in this particular approach to bounded rationality.Less
This chapter explores the relationship between computational models of rational behavior and metareasoning. It examines several approaches to bounded rationality, dividing them into four broad classes: heuristic search, approximate modeling, optimal metareasoning, and bounded optimality. The approach based on optimal metareasoning seems particularly attractive because it is both relatively easy to implement and provides some formal guarantees about the behavior of the agent. The chapter considers several instantiations of this approach using anytime algorithms and provides a characterization of the relationship between the object-level and metareasoning components. These examples show that metareasoning plays an important role in this particular approach to bounded rationality.
