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Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility

Dana Kay Nelkin

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608560
eISBN:
9780191729638
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608560.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This book presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately ... More


A Rational Abilities View of Responsibility

Dana Kay Nelkin

in Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608560
eISBN:
9780191729638
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608560.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

In this chapter, the rational abilities view is introduced. Stated most simply, the view is that one is responsible for an action if and only if one acts with the ability to recognize and act for ... More


Abilities

Dana Kay Nelkin

in Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608560
eISBN:
9780191729638
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608560.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

It has been argued that the ability to do otherwise is required for both praiseworthy and blameworthy actions, because so-called Frankfurt-cases can be constructed for each kind of action. If this ... More


Concluding Thoughts

Dana Kay Nelkin

in Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608560
eISBN:
9780191729638
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608560.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter shows how our commitments as rational agents fit with the rational abilities view developed earlier in the book. On the one hand, in showing that we are not committed to our being ... More


A Rationale for the Rational Abilities View: Praise, Blame, and the Ought-Implies-Can Principle

Dana Kay Nelkin

in Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608560
eISBN:
9780191729638
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608560.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter offers a novel rationale for the rational abilities view that appeals to a moral principle often taken to be axiomatic, and referred to as the “Ought-Implies-Can Principle”. The basic ... More


Deliberation and Alternatives

Dana Kay Nelkin

in Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608560
eISBN:
9780191729638
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608560.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter takes up the question of whether the rational abilities view developed thus far fits with, or is in tension with, our commitments as rational agents. It addresses a conclusion that can ... More


The Epistemology of Thought-Experiment Judgments

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis

in The Rules of Thought

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199661800
eISBN:
9780191748325
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter applies the framework developed in Part I in order to explain how thought-experiment judgments can qualify as a priori knowledge. It is suggested that because the contents of ... More


The Nature and Functions of the Agentic Self

Patrick McNamara

in The Cognitive Neuropsychiatry of Parkinson's Disease

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262016087
eISBN:
9780262298360
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262016087.003.0003
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience

This chapter defines the term ”agentic self” and discusses its nature and functions. The agentic self is defined as the aspect of human personality that is determined by future assessments of one’s ... More


The Neurology of the Agentic Self

Patrick McNamara

in The Cognitive Neuropsychiatry of Parkinson's Disease

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262016087
eISBN:
9780262298360
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262016087.003.0004
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience

This chapter deals with the neurological aspect of the agentic self. It states that the agentic self needs to control immediate impulses to achieve better results and fulfil future objectives, and to ... More


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