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This chapter sets out a radical sceptical argument: (S1) I am unable to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses. (S2) If I am unable to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, then I am unable to possess much of the everyday knowledge which I typically attribute to myself. (SC) I am unable to possess much of the everyday knowledge which I typically attribute to myself. The motivation for (S1) is meant to come from reflecting on the nature of radical sceptical hypotheses. The motivation for (S2) is meant to come from the highly plausible closure principle. And since (S1) and (S2) entail (SC), we have thus motivated radical scepticism.

This chapter argues that what is missing from the simpleminded version of epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism is an account of why the extent to which one needs to cite an independent rational basis in order to dismiss an error-possibility can be dependent on whether the error-possibility has been epistemically motivated. In cases — whether sceptical or non-sceptical — where an agent has factive rational support available to her, she needs an independent rational basis to dismiss the target error-possibility (which is inconsistent with this rational basis) only where that error-possibility has been epistemically motivated. However, that radical sceptical error-possibilities are in their nature lacking in epistemic motivation. The net result is that epistemological disjunctivists are able to appeal to the factive reflectively accessible that is available to them in the good+ case in order to motivate a form of neo-Mooreanism after all, so long as they supply this additional account of why independent grounds for dismissing the target error-possibility are not required in this case.

This chapter presents a three-part response to radical scepticism, a response which mirrors in key respects the ‘commonsense’ proposal often ascribed to G. E. Moore (and which is regarded with almost wholesale derision). Here this chapter calls this anti-sceptical proposal, Mooreanism. The first part of this anti-sceptical response is to focus on an everyday proposition which we paradigmatically take ourselves to know, such as that one has two hands, and to insist that we do indeed know this proposition. The second part of the response is to note that since this everyday proposition is manifestly inconsistent with the target radical sceptical hypothesis, it follows that if one knows the everyday proposition, then one must know the denial of the radical sceptical hypothesis as well. Finally, the third part of the response is the extraction of the antisceptical conclusion that one knows the denial of the target radical sceptical hypothesis, in this case that one is not a brain-in-a-vat.

This chapter summarizes the discussions in Part 3 of the book. It has been shown that epistemological disjunctivism can be successfully applied to the problem of radical scepticism, at least provided one embeds the view within some key wider claims. The anti-sceptical position that results is a form of neo-Mooreanism, albeit one that has important advantages over other neo-Moorean views that are cast along epistemic externalist or standard epistemic internalist lines. A crucial move in arguing for this position was to show that radical sceptical challenges are by their nature unmotivated, where this has a significant effect on the dialectical obligations incurred by the antisceptic. In particular, this means that the epistemological disjunctivist neo-Moorean is spared the impossible task of trying to demonstrate that agents have an independent reflectively accessible rational basis for excluding radical sceptical hypotheses. As a result, the path is cleared for this proposal to show how our knowledge of the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses could be supported by reflectively accessible factive reasons.

This chapter focuses on neo-Moorean views, positions which mirror the Moorean anti-sceptical view while differing on crucial details. Like Mooreanism, neo-Mooreanism confronts the radical sceptical problem head-on by allowing that we can know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses. Accordingly, again like Mooreanism, the view avoids radical scepticism while retaining the closure principle by denying the first premise in the radical sceptic's argument, (S1). Furthermore, neo-Mooreanism achieves this in a Moorean spirit by avoiding, as much as possible, epistemological revisionism. Unlike Mooreanism, however, neo-Moorean views aim to offer the wider theoretical motivation for the proposal, thereby avoiding the kinds of problems facing Mooreanism just outlined. In this sense they are theoretical rather than pre-theoretical responses to the radical sceptical problem.

When the Jews were allowed to return to central and western Europe, the trends which were prevalent across the west of Poland from the 1570s were to experience a crucial shift. Such represented a historical phenomenon, since these events entailed a transformation in the relations between the Jews and western Christendom. In the latter part of the sixteenth century, the influence of both the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation lost its effect and the initially universal foundations in Christianity were beginning to falter. This chapter looks into the major turning point for the situation of the Jews, since this period involved the rise of radical scepticism, and the fall of various Christian teachings due to difficulties developing regarding the acceptance of certain ‘truths’ and what others thought of as ‘good and sound knowledge’.

The construction of various models of society and the state that veered away from the concepts of traditional theology were mainly rooted in radical scepticism. Bodin played no small part in this transformation, as Bodin was the first to express a societal framework not encompassed by the Christian doctrine. Also, Bodin discovered how sovereignty was to be treated as a political reality that excluded religious undertones, aside from how economic policies should be based on the state's general social and material interests. Along with such shifts in thinking, it is important to note that the natural law and raison dʼÉtat was gradually being separated from church teachings, which started to consider the state's various responsibilities and duties to society.

This chapter shows that if we accept the view that knowledge of the facts may never be possible, then we cannot immunize knowledge of the content of ‘appearances’ against radical sceptical doubt either, which leaves it impossible to explain, without appealing to incoherent notions such as the Myth of the Given and private ostensive definition, how our putative ‘external world’ propositions can have the conceptual content that they do at all. Given that we are able to formulate such propositions, however, it must be false that we can never have knowledge of how things are (only of how they appear).

It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments, and hence to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In this chapter I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the sceptical conclusion, this is not due to closure’s holding it in place, but because we’ve already been persuaded to accept a certain conception of perceptual reasons, which both issues a standing invitation to radical scepticism and is endemic in the contemporary literature. Once the real villain of the piece is exposed, it will become clear that the closure principle has been cast in the role of scapegoat in this debate.