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This chapter examines how the Department of Justice's (DOJ) lawyers adapted the civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) law for use against entrenched corruption and racketeering in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). It begins with an overview of RICO and its provisions that are relevant to the US v. IBT civil RICO complaint. It then looks at the defendants in US v. IBT, which include Cosa Nostra in addition to IBT and goes on to discuss various reactions to the case. It also considers the pretrial motions, discovery, and depositions related to the case and concludes with an assessment of settlement signed by the IBT with the DOJ providing for three court-appointed officers to enforce a consent decree imposing strong disciplinary and election remedies.

This chapter examines how the Department of Justice's (DOJ) lawyers adapted the civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) law for use against entrenched corruption and racketeering in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). It begins with an overview of RICO and its provisions that are relevant to the US v. IBT civil RICO complaint. It then looks at the defendants in US v. IBT, which include Cosa Nostra in addition to IBT and goes on to discuss various reactions to the case. It also considers the pretrial motions, discovery, and depositions related to the case and concludes with an assessment of settlement signed by the IBT with the DOJ providing for three court-appointed officers to enforce a consent decree imposing strong disciplinary and election remedies.

This chapter reflects on the lessons that can be learned from US v. IBT and speculates about how the case will conclude. It places US v. IBT, a government lawsuit that charged the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) with racketeering and being associated with organized crime through Cosa Nostra, in political context. It also examines the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), enacted by Congress in 1970 to combat Cosa Nostra's infiltration of the legitimate economy, including labor unions, as well as the US v. IBT consent decree. Finally, it outlines the US v. IBT lessons for union democracy and for court-supervised institutional reform, along with the issue of who should bear the case's remediation costs.

This chapter reflects on the lessons that can be learned from US v. IBT and speculates about how the case will conclude. It places US v. IBT, a government lawsuit that charged the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) with racketeering and being associated with organized crime through Cosa Nostra, in political context. It also examines the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), enacted by Congress in 1970 to combat Cosa Nostra's infiltration of the legitimate economy, including labor unions, as well as the US v. IBT consent decree. Finally, it outlines the US v. IBT lessons for union democracy and for court-supervised institutional reform, along with the issue of who should bear the case's remediation costs.

This chapter examines health care fraud and abuse as well as the crimes that facilitate it. It first considers the definition of fraud, how fraud differs from abuses such as price gouging or mistakes such as billing errors, and the conditions required to prove fraud. It then discusses the so-called “object crimes” such as filing phony insurance claims, making false diagnoses and unnecessary treatments, organizing a rent-a-patient scheme, or promoting the illegal off-label use of a drug. The crimes that support or enable the object crimes are known as auxiliary or facilitative crimes; examples are conspiracy, money laundering, tax evasion, mail and wire fraud, lying to federal authorities, perjury, and obstruction of justice. The chapter also explains how the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, enacted primarily to combat organized crime, can be used not only to pursue the mob's entrance into the health care arena but also against health care institutions, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and health insurers.

This chapter traces the waning of Patrick’s career and that of the Outfit as law enforcement was closing in. It discusses the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statutes, which was part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. RICO expressly spelled out the capacity to target individuals for being part of a criminal organization. It expanded the existing power to bring conspiracy charges against criminal organizations. Under conspiracy, everyone involved had to be aware of the shared goal of the operation, and the group was defined by its participation in a particular crime. Under RICO, it became possible to convict someone who was part of an organization engaged in a pattern of illegal activity even if some members of the organization were unaware of specific actions or even of the ultimate goal of those actions.

This chapter provides the ‘bottom up’ story of material survival during Ireland’s wartime experience. It reveals a comprehensive social geography of price differentiation, black market hotspots, and travel and retail disparities. While recounting stories of hardship has become somewhat hackneyed post-Angela’s Ashes, this chapter employs new oral evidence to convey the harshness of life in Ireland at the time, particularly in her western peripheries where the threat of starvation – one hundred years old – returned once more. Contrasting life in urban and rural contexts, it takes the novel approach of exploring the interaction of ordinary people with the state’s system of supply and distribution and reveals how an alternative system, or ‘moral economy’, operated in defiance of legal and institutional checks intended to ensure equitable distribution and fair price. It provides a case study of the operation of Irish co-operatives at the time and reveals large-scale black market activity across sections of society.

This chapter on Graham Greene's The Third Man examines the imperiled body of an underground racketeer. The novella concludes with a chase through the sewers of Vienna. Fantasies of dread and pursuit concern culpability and the desire to be caught, whether those fantasies are rooted in political guilt or personal terror. Although chases embody the flight towards or flight from commitment, not all spy fiction treats commitment as a physical event.

This chapters covers the federal government’s “War on Crime” as initiated by the Johnson and continued by the Nixon Administration. The chapter also introduces the Nixon-Ford appointments to the court. Suspensions of the executions in Florida are discussed under Furman v. Georgia, (1972). U.S. Attorney John Briggs who replaced Edward Boardman is introduced. Extensive coverage of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 and how it was used in the district to fight organized crime is explained and introduced. Prosecutions of Florida organized crime figures such as Santo Trafficante and Harlan Blackburn are covered. The chapter also covers the activity of the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP), and especially the activities of its operatives in the Democratic Primary in Florida (1972) and their subsequent capture and arraignment. The last part of the chapter deals with the prosecution of Senator Ed Gurney, Finally, the prosecution of Sen. Ed Gurney for ethics violations is covered.

This chapter focuses on the watershed 1991 election of International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) international officers, the first election supervised by the court-appointed election officer. In negotiating the US v. IBT consent decree, US Attorney Rudolph Giuliani accepted the suggestion that, given free and fair elections, the IBT would elect candidates who opposed corruption and racketeering. The consent decree thus mandated election procedures that were more democratic than those of any other labor union in the United States. This chapter first provides an overview of the 1991 election rules before looking at the candidates for general president and their slates. It then considers the election campaigns, the preballoting election protests, and balloting and results, which saw insurgent candidate Ron Carey winning in the one-man-one-vote, secret mail-ballot election.

This chapter focuses on the watershed 1991 election of International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) international officers, the first election supervised by the court-appointed election officer. In negotiating the US v. IBT consent decree, US Attorney Rudolph Giuliani accepted the suggestion that, given free and fair elections, the IBT would elect candidates who opposed corruption and racketeering. The consent decree thus mandated election procedures that were more democratic than those of any other labor union in the United States. This chapter first provides an overview of the 1991 election rules before looking at the candidates for general president and their slates. It then considers the election campaigns, the preballoting election protests, and balloting and results, which saw insurgent candidate Ron Carey winning in the one-man-one-vote, secret mail-ballot election.

This chapter examines the aftermath of the “night of horrors” wherein several innocent Chinese in the slum neighborhood of the Calle de los Negros in Los Angeles's Chinatown were massacred by a mob of white Angelenos on October 24, 1871. It first considers the memorial service held for the massacre victims in August 1872 that culminated in a procession to the City Cemetery. It then looks at the attitudes of non-Asian Angelenos and the local press toward Chinese rituals before turning to the resumption of normalcy in Chinatown, particularly the Chinese racketeers' continued abduction and selling of women in cahoots with American policemen. It also discusses the end of mob justice in Los Angeles, the intensification of anti-Chinese sentiment in the city during the decade that followed the tragedy, the discrimination and exclusion suffered by Chinese immigrants, and the fates of the main protagonists in the massacre. The chapter concludes by evaluating the lessons to be drawn from the so-called “Black Tuesday”.