Search Results

The Myth of Post-Racial America

Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields

in The Long Southern Strategy: How Chasing White Voters in the South Changed American Politics

Beyond portraying race relations as a zero-sum economic game, GOP contenders courted southern white voters by championing “colorblindness.” The color-blind message gave white Americans and, ... More

Beyond portraying race relations as a zero-sum economic game, GOP contenders courted southern white voters by championing “colorblindness.” The color-blind message gave white Americans and, particularly, white southerners a way to move past race, while rendering federal programs to counteract institutional racism unnecessary. Replacing race-baiting with race-burying, the Long Southern Strategy catalyzed a political muteness on race that endured and gave rise to a myth of post-racialism. This myth, while attractive to white southern voters, not only misconstrues the degree and nature of racial animus still present in the hearts and minds of many white Americans, but it also fuels Racial Resentment at continued efforts to protect minority civil rights, at politically correct speech, or at efforts to address structural racial inequities.Less

Neighborhood- and Metropolitan-Level Differences in Racial Attitudes

in The Paradoxes of Integration: Race, Neighborhood, and Civic Life in Multiethnic America

With respect to race and segregation in the United States, there are two incontrovertible facts. First, the country's different racial groups—whites, Asian Americans, African Americans, and ... More

With respect to race and segregation in the United States, there are two incontrovertible facts. First, the country's different racial groups—whites, Asian Americans, African Americans, and Latinos—are highly segregated from each other. Second, feelings of racial resentment and competition are not exclusive to any one racial group, each of which tends to harbor stereotypes toward the other that are less favorable than perceptions of their own groups. In other words, regardless of one's own ethnic background, race is a key indicator of self-perception and community in the United States. However, it is not clear how these two facts are related. This chapter, which looks at differences in racial attitudes across neighborhoods and metropolitan areas, shows that racial resentment is consistently higher in metropolitan areas that are more racially diverse, particularly among whites and blacks. Racial resentment is consistently lower in more racially diverse neighborhoods, a pattern that is largely similar for all four racial groups. Together, these findings shed new light on the connection between social environments and racial attitudes.Less

New York Sybarite Conquers the South: Trump, Race, and the Southernization of American Politics

Charles S. Bullock, Susan A. MacManus, Jeremy D. Mayer, and Mark J. Rozell

in The South and the Transformation of U.S. Politics

Donald Trump, the thrice married and publicly philandering Manhattan resident who had recently been pro-choice and pro-gun control, won the Republican nomination and the presidency in 2016 in part ... More

Donald Trump, the thrice married and publicly philandering Manhattan resident who had recently been pro-choice and pro-gun control, won the Republican nomination and the presidency in 2016 in part through his very strong showing among Southern white voters. How he managed to do that is the story of this chapter. Trump appealed to Southern white racial resentment, as well as to the anti-immigration fervor particularly evident in the low growth “stagnant” Southern states such as Alabama and Mississippi. But what was really remarkable is how he won the GOP nomination by doing well in all regions. The Republican Party has become unified around a largely Southern conception of conservatism: deeply religious, pro-military, and less concerned with free trade. In the general election, by contrast, regional polarization intensified in 2016. In both elections, Trump’s path to victory required him to do well among Southern whites, which he ably did.Less

Conclusion: An Echo, Not a Choice

Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields

in The Long Southern Strategy: How Chasing White Voters in the South Changed American Politics

The Long Southern Strategy was “long” because all three components of the strategy—choosing to exploit white racial angst, fear of feminism, and evangelical righteousness—were necessary to build a ... More

The Long Southern Strategy was “long” because all three components of the strategy—choosing to exploit white racial angst, fear of feminism, and evangelical righteousness—were necessary to build a solid red base in the states of the old Confederacy. The stark polarization that resulted from these partisan choices unraveled the New Deal coalition. It also redivided white Americans not just along the Mason-Dixon line, but across the imagined fault line of southern identity. Thus, conservatism was redefined on the basis of white southern identity, and that definition became the baseline ideology of the Republican brand nationwide. A partisan sorting and realignment followed. As a result, the distribution of white Americans who harbor Racial Resentment or Modern Sexist attitudes or who identify as Christian fundamentalists is no longer even across the parties, and now, within the GOP, there is not enough opposition to fully suppress such prejudice or religiosity.Less

. Congressional Attacks on Welfare, 1980–2004

Ellen Reese

in Backlash against Welfare Mothers: Past and Present

This chapter explores the forces shaping the contemporary welfare backlash that led to the passage of 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and continues to ... More

This chapter explores the forces shaping the contemporary welfare backlash that led to the passage of 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and continues to shape Congressional debates about its reauthorization. It argues that attacks on welfare mothers resonated strongly with the public, especially white voters, because they appealed to antitax sentiments, racial resentments, traditional “family values,” and rising expectations that poor mothers work. Proposals to deny benefits to legal immigrants passed, despite the fact that most Americans opposed them. Appealing to nativist sentiments, anti-immigrant groups and right-wing think tanks urged Congress to adopt these policies. A coalition of Christian Right groups and right-wing think tanks championed “pro-family” and “pro-church” welfare policies in the 1990s. They wielded considerable influence over the contents of PRWORA. Right-wing Republicans sought more far-reaching reforms than other politicians were willing to support, stalling the passage of welfare reform for several years.Less

Polarized Parties, the 2016 Elections, and the Early Trump Presidency

Gary C. Jacobson

in Presidents and Parties in the Public Mind

This chapter argues that popular reactions to recent presidents have consistently reinforced the widening demographic, cultural, ideological, and even cognitive differences between ordinary ... More

This chapter argues that popular reactions to recent presidents have consistently reinforced the widening demographic, cultural, ideological, and even cognitive differences between ordinary Republicans and Democrats. Presidential candidates and presidents have thus been both the instruments and victims of the polarized partisanship that has emerged as the defining feature of American national politics during this century. Polarization was essential to the election of Donald Trump, whose campaign and conduct in office have so far served to magnify the demographic and cultural divisions between ordinary Democrats and Republicans. Although Trump executed a hostile takeover of the Republican Party and continues to attract vigorous criticism from many of its luminaries, his impact during his first year in office on how people view his party has been at least as large as that of previous presidents. In the intra-party struggle for the hearts and minds of ordinary Republicans, Trump has so far emerged as the consistent winner. But given his unpopularity outside core Republican circles, and especially among growing segments of the population, Trump’s dominance and prospective rebranding of the party threatens to erode its popular image, reputation, and appeal both immediately and for the long term.Less

The Not-So-New Southern Religion

Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields

in The Long Southern Strategy: How Chasing White Voters in the South Changed American Politics

In an effort to win southern white voters, the GOP embraced the old southern religion turning the church faithful into the party loyal. They did so because in many parts of the South, the church ... More

In an effort to win southern white voters, the GOP embraced the old southern religion turning the church faithful into the party loyal. They did so because in many parts of the South, the church remains the central institution defining, organizing, and politicizing its surrounding community. A “sacred canopy” drapes over the region, where there is a common cosmology that is intractable from southern white identity, including its reverence for white supremacy and patriarchy. In general, as a block, white southerners were more evangelical, Protestant, fundamentalist, and moralist than the rest of the country. The not-so-new southern religiosity satisfies an appetite for certainty, conformity, and even social status. As a means to solidify southern white support, the Long Southern Strategy framed southern white Christianity as under attack and cast the GOP as its protector, the price of which is increased cultural defensiveness, anxiety, fear, and distrust.Less