Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198778608
- eISBN:
- 9780191853487
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explains how, for quasi-realism to be a distinctive meta-ethical view, quasi-realists must use the word ‘true’ in some stronger, more-than-minimal sense. It demonstrates this sense ...
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This chapter explains how, for quasi-realism to be a distinctive meta-ethical view, quasi-realists must use the word ‘true’ in some stronger, more-than-minimal sense. It demonstrates this sense through an assumption that, when we make some claims which seem to be meta-ethical, we are really making first-order, normative claims. In addition, the chapter argues that, when we believe that some act is wrong, most of us assume that our belief is, or at least might be, true. If expressivists deny that such beliefs might be true, they should become error theorists. Quasi-realist expressivists could instead claim that, when we say that some act is wrong, we both express an attitude of being against such acts, and claim that, in having this attitude, we are getting things right. If we are getting things right, such claims would be true. This wider version of quasi-realism would be one form of cognitivism.Less
This chapter explains how, for quasi-realism to be a distinctive meta-ethical view, quasi-realists must use the word ‘true’ in some stronger, more-than-minimal sense. It demonstrates this sense through an assumption that, when we make some claims which seem to be meta-ethical, we are really making first-order, normative claims. In addition, the chapter argues that, when we believe that some act is wrong, most of us assume that our belief is, or at least might be, true. If expressivists deny that such beliefs might be true, they should become error theorists. Quasi-realist expressivists could instead claim that, when we say that some act is wrong, we both express an attitude of being against such acts, and claim that, in having this attitude, we are getting things right. If we are getting things right, such claims would be true. This wider version of quasi-realism would be one form of cognitivism.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198778608
- eISBN:
- 9780191853487
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198778608.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This third volume of this series develops further previous treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. It engages with critics, and shows the way to ...
More
This third volume of this series develops further previous treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. It engages with critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences. This volume is partly about what it is for things to matter, in the sense that we all have reasons to care about these things. Much of the book discusses three of the main kinds of meta-ethical theory: normative naturalism, quasi-realist expressivism, and non-metaphysical non-naturalism, which this book refers to as non-realist cognitivism. This third theory claims that, if we use the word ‘reality’ in an ontologically weighty sense, irreducibly normative truths have no mysterious or incredible ontological implications. If instead we use ‘reality’ in a wide sense, according to which all truths are truths about reality, this theory claims that some non-empirically discoverable truths — such as logical, mathematical, modal, and some normative truths — raise no difficult ontological questions. This book discusses these theories partly by commenting on the views of some of the contributors to Peter Singer's collection Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity.Less
This third volume of this series develops further previous treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. It engages with critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences. This volume is partly about what it is for things to matter, in the sense that we all have reasons to care about these things. Much of the book discusses three of the main kinds of meta-ethical theory: normative naturalism, quasi-realist expressivism, and non-metaphysical non-naturalism, which this book refers to as non-realist cognitivism. This third theory claims that, if we use the word ‘reality’ in an ontologically weighty sense, irreducibly normative truths have no mysterious or incredible ontological implications. If instead we use ‘reality’ in a wide sense, according to which all truths are truths about reality, this theory claims that some non-empirically discoverable truths — such as logical, mathematical, modal, and some normative truths — raise no difficult ontological questions. This book discusses these theories partly by commenting on the views of some of the contributors to Peter Singer's collection Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198778608
- eISBN:
- 9780191853487
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter investigates a wider, non-realist cognitivist form. In this view, our normative concepts and claims cannot be defined or restated in naturalistic terms. As non-naturalists believe, these ...
More
This chapter investigates a wider, non-realist cognitivist form. In this view, our normative concepts and claims cannot be defined or restated in naturalistic terms. As non-naturalists believe, these concepts and claims are irreducibly normative. According to metaphysical non-naturalists, these claims imply that there exist some ontologically weighty non-natural entities or properties. But if non-naturalists gave up their ontological beliefs in these mysterious non-natural properties, the best version of non-naturalism would coincide with the best version of the quasi-realist expressivism discussed in this chapter. Some non-naturalists, however, do not have such ontological beliefs, as there are some non-empirical truths which have no weighty ontological implications.Less
This chapter investigates a wider, non-realist cognitivist form. In this view, our normative concepts and claims cannot be defined or restated in naturalistic terms. As non-naturalists believe, these concepts and claims are irreducibly normative. According to metaphysical non-naturalists, these claims imply that there exist some ontologically weighty non-natural entities or properties. But if non-naturalists gave up their ontological beliefs in these mysterious non-natural properties, the best version of non-naturalism would coincide with the best version of the quasi-realist expressivism discussed in this chapter. Some non-naturalists, however, do not have such ontological beliefs, as there are some non-empirical truths which have no weighty ontological implications.