Doris Penka
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199567263
- eISBN:
- 9780191723261
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567263.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Syntax and Morphology
This exploration of the syntax-semantics interface is concerned with negative indefinites like English ‘nobody’, ‘nothing’, etc. and their counterparts in other languages. A cross-linguistically ...
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This exploration of the syntax-semantics interface is concerned with negative indefinites like English ‘nobody’, ‘nothing’, etc. and their counterparts in other languages. A cross-linguistically unified analysis is proposed and applied to several languages. While negative indefinites are standardly assumed to be semantically negative quantifiers, this work argues for a different analysis. It is motivated by three phenomena, which negative indefinites give rise to in different languages and which are unexpected under the negative quantifier analysis. The first, negative concord, has been widely discussed in both semantic and syntactic literature. The fact that in many languages negative indefinites can co-occur with other seemingly negative elements without contributing a negation to the semantics motivates the assumption that these expressions are not inherently negative. Following recent work on negative concord, an analysis is elaborated that is based on the assumption that negative indefinites are semantically non-negative and must be licensed by a — possibly covert — negation. This analysis explains the behaviour of negative indefinites in a number of languages. In a next step, this analysis is extended to languages that do not exhibit negative concord. Motivation for this comes from the fact that even in non-negative concord languages, the negative quantifier analysis cannot account for the semantics of negative indefinites. Crucial evidence comes from the existence of split readings, in which another operator takes scope in between the negative and the indefinite meaning component. Moreover, in many languages the distribution of negative indefinites is subject to syntactic restrictions. It is shown how this follows from the proposed analysis and independently motivated syntactic properties.Less
This exploration of the syntax-semantics interface is concerned with negative indefinites like English ‘nobody’, ‘nothing’, etc. and their counterparts in other languages. A cross-linguistically unified analysis is proposed and applied to several languages. While negative indefinites are standardly assumed to be semantically negative quantifiers, this work argues for a different analysis. It is motivated by three phenomena, which negative indefinites give rise to in different languages and which are unexpected under the negative quantifier analysis. The first, negative concord, has been widely discussed in both semantic and syntactic literature. The fact that in many languages negative indefinites can co-occur with other seemingly negative elements without contributing a negation to the semantics motivates the assumption that these expressions are not inherently negative. Following recent work on negative concord, an analysis is elaborated that is based on the assumption that negative indefinites are semantically non-negative and must be licensed by a — possibly covert — negation. This analysis explains the behaviour of negative indefinites in a number of languages. In a next step, this analysis is extended to languages that do not exhibit negative concord. Motivation for this comes from the fact that even in non-negative concord languages, the negative quantifier analysis cannot account for the semantics of negative indefinites. Crucial evidence comes from the existence of split readings, in which another operator takes scope in between the negative and the indefinite meaning component. Moreover, in many languages the distribution of negative indefinites is subject to syntactic restrictions. It is shown how this follows from the proposed analysis and independently motivated syntactic properties.
Stanley Peters and Dag Westerståhl
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199291267
- eISBN:
- 9780191700590
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291267.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Quantification is a topic which brings together linguistics, logic, and philosophy. Quantifiers are the essential tools with which, in language or logic, we refer to quantity of things or amount of ...
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Quantification is a topic which brings together linguistics, logic, and philosophy. Quantifiers are the essential tools with which, in language or logic, we refer to quantity of things or amount of stuff. In English they include such expressions as no, some, all, both, or many. This book presents the definitive interdisciplinary exploration of how they work — their syntax, semantics, and inferential role.Less
Quantification is a topic which brings together linguistics, logic, and philosophy. Quantifiers are the essential tools with which, in language or logic, we refer to quantity of things or amount of stuff. In English they include such expressions as no, some, all, both, or many. This book presents the definitive interdisciplinary exploration of how they work — their syntax, semantics, and inferential role.
Nino B. Cocchiarella and Max A. Freund
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195366587
- eISBN:
- 9780199851898
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195366587.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
In this text, a variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels are developed with clarity, precision, and philosophical insight. All of the S1-S5 modal logics of ...
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In this text, a variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels are developed with clarity, precision, and philosophical insight. All of the S1-S5 modal logics of Lewis and Langford, among others, are constructed. A matrix, or many-valued semantics, for sentential modal logic is formalized, and an important result that no finite matrix can characterize any of the standard modal logics is proven. Exercises, some of which show independence results, help to develop logical skills. A separate sentential modal logic of logical necessity in logical atomism is also constructed and shown to be complete and decidable. On the first-order level of the logic of logical necessity, the modal thesis of anti-essentialism is valid and every de re sentence is provably equivalent to a de dicto sentence. An elegant extension of the standard sentential modal logics into several first-order modal logics is developed. Both a first-order modal logic for possibilism containing actualism as a proper part as well as a separate modal logic for actualism alone are constructed for a variety of modal systems. Exercises on this level show the connections between modal laws and quantifier logic regarding generalization into, or out of, modal contexts and the conditions required for the necessity of identity and non-identity. Two types of second-order modal logics, one possibilist and the other actualist, are developed based on a distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general. The result is a deeper second-order analysis of possibilism and actualism as ontological frameworks. Exercises regarding second-order predicate quantifiers clarify the distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general.Less
In this text, a variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels are developed with clarity, precision, and philosophical insight. All of the S1-S5 modal logics of Lewis and Langford, among others, are constructed. A matrix, or many-valued semantics, for sentential modal logic is formalized, and an important result that no finite matrix can characterize any of the standard modal logics is proven. Exercises, some of which show independence results, help to develop logical skills. A separate sentential modal logic of logical necessity in logical atomism is also constructed and shown to be complete and decidable. On the first-order level of the logic of logical necessity, the modal thesis of anti-essentialism is valid and every de re sentence is provably equivalent to a de dicto sentence. An elegant extension of the standard sentential modal logics into several first-order modal logics is developed. Both a first-order modal logic for possibilism containing actualism as a proper part as well as a separate modal logic for actualism alone are constructed for a variety of modal systems. Exercises on this level show the connections between modal laws and quantifier logic regarding generalization into, or out of, modal contexts and the conditions required for the necessity of identity and non-identity. Two types of second-order modal logics, one possibilist and the other actualist, are developed based on a distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general. The result is a deeper second-order analysis of possibilism and actualism as ontological frameworks. Exercises regarding second-order predicate quantifiers clarify the distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general.
Robert J. Stainton
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199250387
- eISBN:
- 9780191719523
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199250387.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter lays out five different ways of reading the context principle: methodological, metasemantic, pragmatic, semantic, and psychological. It notes several rationales for embracing the ...
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This chapter lays out five different ways of reading the context principle: methodological, metasemantic, pragmatic, semantic, and psychological. It notes several rationales for embracing the principle. It then objects to the principle, on several of its readings, from non-sentence use. The suggested result, in the face of this objection, was three parts consistency and two parts inconsistency: (a) the first reading of the principle would be largely untouched; (b) the second would be left unsupported; but (c) the other readings would be outright falsified.Less
This chapter lays out five different ways of reading the context principle: methodological, metasemantic, pragmatic, semantic, and psychological. It notes several rationales for embracing the principle. It then objects to the principle, on several of its readings, from non-sentence use. The suggested result, in the face of this objection, was three parts consistency and two parts inconsistency: (a) the first reading of the principle would be largely untouched; (b) the second would be left unsupported; but (c) the other readings would be outright falsified.
Jason Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288038
- eISBN:
- 9780191603679
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288038.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers a range of context-dependent constructions, and concludes that there are sufficiently significant disanalogies between all of them and the behavior of epistemic predicates such ...
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This chapter considers a range of context-dependent constructions, and concludes that there are sufficiently significant disanalogies between all of them and the behavior of epistemic predicates such as ‘know that the bank is open’ to cast doubt upon contextualism in epistemology. It is argued that even if knowledge ascriptions were context-sensitive, this fact about them would not have the explanatory value accorded to it by the contextualist.Less
This chapter considers a range of context-dependent constructions, and concludes that there are sufficiently significant disanalogies between all of them and the behavior of epistemic predicates such as ‘know that the bank is open’ to cast doubt upon contextualism in epistemology. It is argued that even if knowledge ascriptions were context-sensitive, this fact about them would not have the explanatory value accorded to it by the contextualist.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter connects formal language more explicitly with some problems in formal representation of English sentences. This provides a better understanding of the formal apparatus, and it also ...
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This chapter connects formal language more explicitly with some problems in formal representation of English sentences. This provides a better understanding of the formal apparatus, and it also indicates the direction of some applications in the semantics of natural language. A major development is the use of quantifiers as the basis for representing distributive predication.Less
This chapter connects formal language more explicitly with some problems in formal representation of English sentences. This provides a better understanding of the formal apparatus, and it also indicates the direction of some applications in the semantics of natural language. A major development is the use of quantifiers as the basis for representing distributive predication.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter presents the development of the semantics within a set-theoretic context. It also provides a base for reconsidering limitations of the set-theoretic approach.
This chapter presents the development of the semantics within a set-theoretic context. It also provides a base for reconsidering limitations of the set-theoretic approach.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter considers the significance of the context sensitivity of definite descriptions (singular and plural) and suggests some ways of understanding it. It argues that many uses of definite ...
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This chapter considers the significance of the context sensitivity of definite descriptions (singular and plural) and suggests some ways of understanding it. It argues that many uses of definite descriptions are ‘incomplete’. That is, the explicit definite description does not uniquely specify an individual or, in the plural case, some maximally inclusive individuals; we rely on context to provide the additional resources that make the description uniquely applicable. Two processes of contextual supplementation are important here. One is predicate supplementation: a brief definite description stands proxy for a longer definite description that can be constructed by adding predicates that are explicit in the discourse context. The other is domain restriction: the context restricts the domain for the definite description, with uniqueness achieved within that smaller domain.Less
This chapter considers the significance of the context sensitivity of definite descriptions (singular and plural) and suggests some ways of understanding it. It argues that many uses of definite descriptions are ‘incomplete’. That is, the explicit definite description does not uniquely specify an individual or, in the plural case, some maximally inclusive individuals; we rely on context to provide the additional resources that make the description uniquely applicable. Two processes of contextual supplementation are important here. One is predicate supplementation: a brief definite description stands proxy for a longer definite description that can be constructed by adding predicates that are explicit in the discourse context. The other is domain restriction: the context restricts the domain for the definite description, with uniqueness achieved within that smaller domain.
Stanley Peters
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199291267
- eISBN:
- 9780191700590
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291267.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter considers how the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé (EF) technique can be made to work for arbitrary quantifiers and structures. First, two-person games are described, followed by some relatively ...
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This chapter considers how the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé (EF) technique can be made to work for arbitrary quantifiers and structures. First, two-person games are described, followed by some relatively simple illustrations and a rather detailed outline of the application to branching quantifiers. The result is that branching of many familiar quantirelation denotations is not definable from any finite number of monadic quantifiers. There is a similar result for Ramsey quantifiers, which is relevant for the interpretation of certain reciprocal sentences in natural language. For resumptions, there are slightly weaker results; in this case the monadic EF-tools can be used. The inverse question of under what circumstances a quantifier is definable from its k-ary resumption is also considered. In each case, the conclusions about natural languages that may be drawn from these logical results are stated via formalisation.Less
This chapter considers how the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé (EF) technique can be made to work for arbitrary quantifiers and structures. First, two-person games are described, followed by some relatively simple illustrations and a rather detailed outline of the application to branching quantifiers. The result is that branching of many familiar quantirelation denotations is not definable from any finite number of monadic quantifiers. There is a similar result for Ramsey quantifiers, which is relevant for the interpretation of certain reciprocal sentences in natural language. For resumptions, there are slightly weaker results; in this case the monadic EF-tools can be used. The inverse question of under what circumstances a quantifier is definable from its k-ary resumption is also considered. In each case, the conclusions about natural languages that may be drawn from these logical results are stated via formalisation.
Nathan Salmon
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284726
- eISBN:
- 9780191713774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter draws a sharp distinction between the classical semantics of expressions, in the tradition of Tarski, and the non-classical semantics of expression-occurrences in the tradition of Frege. ...
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This chapter draws a sharp distinction between the classical semantics of expressions, in the tradition of Tarski, and the non-classical semantics of expression-occurrences in the tradition of Frege. An occurrence-semantic theory of variable-binding is developed by assigning non-standard semantic values to expression-occurrences standing within the scope of a variable-binding operator, shedding light on a number of philosophically significant issues. The theory is applied to two seemingly unrelated controversies: whether or not genuine singular terms can be quantified into; and whether so-called E-type pronouns are closed descriptive terms (as with Evans and some of his critics) or bound variables (as with Geach).Less
This chapter draws a sharp distinction between the classical semantics of expressions, in the tradition of Tarski, and the non-classical semantics of expression-occurrences in the tradition of Frege. An occurrence-semantic theory of variable-binding is developed by assigning non-standard semantic values to expression-occurrences standing within the scope of a variable-binding operator, shedding light on a number of philosophically significant issues. The theory is applied to two seemingly unrelated controversies: whether or not genuine singular terms can be quantified into; and whether so-called E-type pronouns are closed descriptive terms (as with Evans and some of his critics) or bound variables (as with Geach).
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter investigates what is involved in asking general ontological questions such as: “what exists?” and “how many things are there?” It is argued that well-formed existence and counting ...
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This chapter investigates what is involved in asking general ontological questions such as: “what exists?” and “how many things are there?” It is argued that well-formed existence and counting questions are “specific” existence questions that specify a certain category or sort of entity enquired about. Purely “generic” existence and counting questions (asking about “anything whatsoever”, where “thing” is not used sortally) are ill-formed unanswerable questions. This gives us reason to think that quantificational claims likewise presuppose certain categories of entity quantified over. It also suggests that many of the questions driving ontological debates are based on pseudo-questions, and does so without subscribing to anti-realism or quantifier variance. The chapter closes by considering whether we can revive a form of universal quantification by way of a “covering” use of “thing” that generalizes over a range of category-specific terms.Less
This chapter investigates what is involved in asking general ontological questions such as: “what exists?” and “how many things are there?” It is argued that well-formed existence and counting questions are “specific” existence questions that specify a certain category or sort of entity enquired about. Purely “generic” existence and counting questions (asking about “anything whatsoever”, where “thing” is not used sortally) are ill-formed unanswerable questions. This gives us reason to think that quantificational claims likewise presuppose certain categories of entity quantified over. It also suggests that many of the questions driving ontological debates are based on pseudo-questions, and does so without subscribing to anti-realism or quantifier variance. The chapter closes by considering whether we can revive a form of universal quantification by way of a “covering” use of “thing” that generalizes over a range of category-specific terms.
Nathan Salmon
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284726
- eISBN:
- 9780191713774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter investigates the arguments and proposals made by Quine in ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’. Quine's proposal to distinguish two kinds of believing is criticized. It is shown ...
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This chapter investigates the arguments and proposals made by Quine in ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’. Quine's proposal to distinguish two kinds of believing is criticized. It is shown using minimal assumptions that Quine's proposal to replace one sort of attribution of belief with another fails to preserve truth value, let alone content. A curious inconsistency is derived from Quine's response to Alonzo Church.Less
This chapter investigates the arguments and proposals made by Quine in ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’. Quine's proposal to distinguish two kinds of believing is criticized. It is shown using minimal assumptions that Quine's proposal to replace one sort of attribution of belief with another fails to preserve truth value, let alone content. A curious inconsistency is derived from Quine's response to Alonzo Church.
Steve Awodey
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198568612
- eISBN:
- 9780191717567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198568612.003.0009
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Algebra
This chapter focuses on notion of adjoint functor, which applies everything that has been learned so far to unify and subsume all the different universal mapping properties encountered, from free ...
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This chapter focuses on notion of adjoint functor, which applies everything that has been learned so far to unify and subsume all the different universal mapping properties encountered, from free groups to limits to exponentials. It also captures an important mathematical phenomenon that is invisible without the use of the lens of category theory. It is argued that adjointness is a concept of fundamental logical and mathematical importance not captured elsewhere in mathematics. Topics discussed include hom-set definition, examples of adjoints, order adjoints, quantifiers as adjoints, RAPL 197, locally cartesian closed categories, and the adjoint functor theorem.Less
This chapter focuses on notion of adjoint functor, which applies everything that has been learned so far to unify and subsume all the different universal mapping properties encountered, from free groups to limits to exponentials. It also captures an important mathematical phenomenon that is invisible without the use of the lens of category theory. It is argued that adjointness is a concept of fundamental logical and mathematical importance not captured elsewhere in mathematics. Topics discussed include hom-set definition, examples of adjoints, order adjoints, quantifiers as adjoints, RAPL 197, locally cartesian closed categories, and the adjoint functor theorem.
Roman Kossak and James H. Schmerl
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198568278
- eISBN:
- 9780191718199
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198568278.003.0010
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
This chapter presents several constructions of ω1-like models with interesting second order properties. The list includes: recursively saturated rather classless models, rigid recursively saturated ...
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This chapter presents several constructions of ω1-like models with interesting second order properties. The list includes: recursively saturated rather classless models, rigid recursively saturated models, models whose additive reducts are isomorphic but whose multiplicative reducts are not, and very similar but nonisomorphic models. The chapter also presents two constructions used in completeness theorems for Peano Arithmetic with the Ramsey quantifier and the stationary quantifier.Less
This chapter presents several constructions of ω1-like models with interesting second order properties. The list includes: recursively saturated rather classless models, rigid recursively saturated models, models whose additive reducts are isomorphic but whose multiplicative reducts are not, and very similar but nonisomorphic models. The chapter also presents two constructions used in completeness theorems for Peano Arithmetic with the Ramsey quantifier and the stationary quantifier.
D.M. Gabbay and L. Maksimova
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198511748
- eISBN:
- 9780191705779
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198511748.003.0014
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
This chapter proposes some uniform algorithmic methodology for finding interpolants in various logic. It operates with translations of non-classical logics into classical first-order theories and ...
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This chapter proposes some uniform algorithmic methodology for finding interpolants in various logic. It operates with translations of non-classical logics into classical first-order theories and introduces so-called expansion interpolation. This leads us to find interpolants in the classical theories using the existing algorithms, which can then be translated back into non-classical theories. Two examples from modal logic are considered: quantified S5 and propositional S4.3. These logic lack ordinary interpolation but have expansion interpolation.Less
This chapter proposes some uniform algorithmic methodology for finding interpolants in various logic. It operates with translations of non-classical logics into classical first-order theories and introduces so-called expansion interpolation. This leads us to find interpolants in the classical theories using the existing algorithms, which can then be translated back into non-classical theories. Two examples from modal logic are considered: quantified S5 and propositional S4.3. These logic lack ordinary interpolation but have expansion interpolation.
Katalin É. Kiss
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199556861
- eISBN:
- 9780191722271
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556861.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology, Phonetics / Phonology
The paper argues that the free postverbal order of the Hungarian sentence cannot be either the result of random base‐generation, or the result of syntactic Scrambling or flattening. It is a PF ...
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The paper argues that the free postverbal order of the Hungarian sentence cannot be either the result of random base‐generation, or the result of syntactic Scrambling or flattening. It is a PF operation, because it also affects postverbal adverbials and quantifiers c‐commanding their scope at the interfaces. The units of reordering are the phonological phrases.Less
The paper argues that the free postverbal order of the Hungarian sentence cannot be either the result of random base‐generation, or the result of syntactic Scrambling or flattening. It is a PF operation, because it also affects postverbal adverbials and quantifiers c‐commanding their scope at the interfaces. The units of reordering are the phonological phrases.
Lisa Rochman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199556861
- eISBN:
- 9780191722271
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556861.003.0005
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology, Phonetics / Phonology
This paper explores the connection between floating quantifiers (FQs) and information structure arguing that there is a connection between the use of an FQ and the presence of a focused element ...
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This paper explores the connection between floating quantifiers (FQs) and information structure arguing that there is a connection between the use of an FQ and the presence of a focused element following the FQ. Evidence from analysis of FQ behavior with particle verbs, FQs acceptability with different types of predicates, and the relationship between FQs and the nuclear accent.Less
This paper explores the connection between floating quantifiers (FQs) and information structure arguing that there is a connection between the use of an FQ and the presence of a focused element following the FQ. Evidence from analysis of FQ behavior with particle verbs, FQs acceptability with different types of predicates, and the relationship between FQs and the nuclear accent.
George Bealer
- Published in print:
- 1982
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198244288
- eISBN:
- 9780191680762
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244288.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
First-order quantifier logic is complete; higher-order quantifier logic is not. A few formally minded philosophers of logic — such as Quine and some of his followers — appear to believe that this is ...
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First-order quantifier logic is complete; higher-order quantifier logic is not. A few formally minded philosophers of logic — such as Quine and some of his followers — appear to believe that this is sufficient grounds for concluding that the only legitimate quantifier logic is first-order, not higher-order. However, most leading formally minded philosophers of logic over the past hundred years — Frege, Russell, Church, Carnap, Henkin, Montague, Kaplan — believe that the higher-order approach is a natural generalization of the first-order approach and therefore that quantifier logic is properly identified with higher-order quantifier logic. This chapter departs from this majority opinion. It discusses the underlying philosophical differences between the two approaches to quantifier logic, and attempts to illustrate the greater naturalness and generality of the first-order approach.Less
First-order quantifier logic is complete; higher-order quantifier logic is not. A few formally minded philosophers of logic — such as Quine and some of his followers — appear to believe that this is sufficient grounds for concluding that the only legitimate quantifier logic is first-order, not higher-order. However, most leading formally minded philosophers of logic over the past hundred years — Frege, Russell, Church, Carnap, Henkin, Montague, Kaplan — believe that the higher-order approach is a natural generalization of the first-order approach and therefore that quantifier logic is properly identified with higher-order quantifier logic. This chapter departs from this majority opinion. It discusses the underlying philosophical differences between the two approaches to quantifier logic, and attempts to illustrate the greater naturalness and generality of the first-order approach.
Ronald W. Langacker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331967
- eISBN:
- 9780199868209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.003.0010
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
Personal pronouns and proper names are inherently grounded. The structure of other nominals tends to reflect semantic function, with the head noun as core, grounding as the outermost layer, and ...
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Personal pronouns and proper names are inherently grounded. The structure of other nominals tends to reflect semantic function, with the head noun as core, grounding as the outermost layer, and modifiers in between. Noun modification is varied both semantically and in its structural implementation. When nominal and relational expressions combine grammatically, there is often a discrepancy between the nominal expression's profile and the entity which participates most directly in the relationship—its active zone with respect to that relationship. Noun classes have varying degrees of semantic motivation. Distributional classes, defined by participation in particular patterns, may be semantically arbitrary. While gender-type classes have semantic prototypes, the class as a whole is defined by a consistent set of grammatical behaviors. In a usage based approach, such classes are characterized by families of constructional schemas. Noun classifiers likewise have prototypical values semantically extended to a range of other cases. They represent a distinct kind of nominal structure in which the classifier functions as a schematic head noun. Classifiers are related to quantifier constructions allowing the unitization of a mass. Nouns bear various kinds of grammatical markings. Most intrinsic to nouns are elements deriving them from other classes. There is no sharp distinction between such derivation and noun inflection. Markings of gender and number are intermediate. More extrinsic are markings indicating a nominal's role in higher-level grammatical constructions. These are meaningful in a symbolic account of grammar. Such an account accommodates both agreement—the multiple realization of semantic specifications—and cases where multiple specifications are realized by a single, unanalyzable form. Analyzability is a matter of degree.Less
Personal pronouns and proper names are inherently grounded. The structure of other nominals tends to reflect semantic function, with the head noun as core, grounding as the outermost layer, and modifiers in between. Noun modification is varied both semantically and in its structural implementation. When nominal and relational expressions combine grammatically, there is often a discrepancy between the nominal expression's profile and the entity which participates most directly in the relationship—its active zone with respect to that relationship. Noun classes have varying degrees of semantic motivation. Distributional classes, defined by participation in particular patterns, may be semantically arbitrary. While gender-type classes have semantic prototypes, the class as a whole is defined by a consistent set of grammatical behaviors. In a usage based approach, such classes are characterized by families of constructional schemas. Noun classifiers likewise have prototypical values semantically extended to a range of other cases. They represent a distinct kind of nominal structure in which the classifier functions as a schematic head noun. Classifiers are related to quantifier constructions allowing the unitization of a mass. Nouns bear various kinds of grammatical markings. Most intrinsic to nouns are elements deriving them from other classes. There is no sharp distinction between such derivation and noun inflection. Markings of gender and number are intermediate. More extrinsic are markings indicating a nominal's role in higher-level grammatical constructions. These are meaningful in a symbolic account of grammar. Such an account accommodates both agreement—the multiple realization of semantic specifications—and cases where multiple specifications are realized by a single, unanalyzable form. Analyzability is a matter of degree.
Ronald W. Langacker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331967
- eISBN:
- 9780199868209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
Grounding is the grammaticized means of relating the thing profiled by a nominal, or the process profiled by a finite clause, to the ground (the speech event and its participants). As narrowly ...
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Grounding is the grammaticized means of relating the thing profiled by a nominal, or the process profiled by a finite clause, to the ground (the speech event and its participants). As narrowly defined, grounding elements make very fundamental specifications of a basically epistemic nature. Moreover, they construe the ground subjectively—leaving it implicit as the offstage locus of conception—with the profiled entity being the focused, onstage object of conception. Whereas a lexical noun or verb merely names a type of thing or process, a full nominal or finite clause designates and grounds an instance of the type. An instance differs from a type by being thought of as having a particular location in the domain of instantiation, one that distinguishes it from other instances. The profiled instance is not necessarily an actual individual, but may also be a virtual (or fictive) entity confined to a special mental space. A nominal referent is generally identified through a combination of description, which selects a set of eligible candidates, and grounding, which directs attention to a member of this set. Two basic grounding strategies are deixis (abstract pointing) and quantification. The deictic grounding elements—demonstratives and the definite article—are definite: they single out the intended referent independently of the content of the clause containing the nominal. By contrast, with indefinite grounding elements the referent is initially virtual, pending its identification by means of the clausal content (in the case of indefinite articles), or is necessarily virtual (in the case of quantifiers). Clausal grounding is less concerned with identification than with existence, i.e. whether or not an event occurs. For English the basic grounding elements are tense and the modals. The tense opposition present vs. past is a special case of the more schematic value of immediate vs. non-immediate (with respect to the ground). The absence of a modal indicates that the speaker accepts the profiled occurrence as part of the speaker's conception of reality. The presence of a modal indicates that it does not yet have this status, but is still a target for realization. The choice of modal registers the impetus for speaker control, which occurs on either of two levels: effective vs. epistemic control (corresponding to root vs. epistemic modals).Less
Grounding is the grammaticized means of relating the thing profiled by a nominal, or the process profiled by a finite clause, to the ground (the speech event and its participants). As narrowly defined, grounding elements make very fundamental specifications of a basically epistemic nature. Moreover, they construe the ground subjectively—leaving it implicit as the offstage locus of conception—with the profiled entity being the focused, onstage object of conception. Whereas a lexical noun or verb merely names a type of thing or process, a full nominal or finite clause designates and grounds an instance of the type. An instance differs from a type by being thought of as having a particular location in the domain of instantiation, one that distinguishes it from other instances. The profiled instance is not necessarily an actual individual, but may also be a virtual (or fictive) entity confined to a special mental space. A nominal referent is generally identified through a combination of description, which selects a set of eligible candidates, and grounding, which directs attention to a member of this set. Two basic grounding strategies are deixis (abstract pointing) and quantification. The deictic grounding elements—demonstratives and the definite article—are definite: they single out the intended referent independently of the content of the clause containing the nominal. By contrast, with indefinite grounding elements the referent is initially virtual, pending its identification by means of the clausal content (in the case of indefinite articles), or is necessarily virtual (in the case of quantifiers). Clausal grounding is less concerned with identification than with existence, i.e. whether or not an event occurs. For English the basic grounding elements are tense and the modals. The tense opposition present vs. past is a special case of the more schematic value of immediate vs. non-immediate (with respect to the ground). The absence of a modal indicates that the speaker accepts the profiled occurrence as part of the speaker's conception of reality. The presence of a modal indicates that it does not yet have this status, but is still a target for realization. The choice of modal registers the impetus for speaker control, which occurs on either of two levels: effective vs. epistemic control (corresponding to root vs. epistemic modals).
