Nicholas Wolterstorff and Terence Cuneo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199558957
- eISBN:
- 9780191744808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199558957.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The project of this essay is to stand back from all particular versions of public reason theories, describe their general structure, and assess their prospects. The prospects of this theory, this ...
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The project of this essay is to stand back from all particular versions of public reason theories, describe their general structure, and assess their prospects. The prospects of this theory, this essay contends, are not bright. The arguments offered for it by its main proponents, such as Rawls and Gaus, are not satisfactory. Moreover, the view is subject to a series of objections – objections regarding the fairness of the view and the feasibility of its application to actual political life – which indicate that we need to look elsewhere when developing a satisfactory account of liberal democracy.Less
The project of this essay is to stand back from all particular versions of public reason theories, describe their general structure, and assess their prospects. The prospects of this theory, this essay contends, are not bright. The arguments offered for it by its main proponents, such as Rawls and Gaus, are not satisfactory. Moreover, the view is subject to a series of objections – objections regarding the fairness of the view and the feasibility of its application to actual political life – which indicate that we need to look elsewhere when developing a satisfactory account of liberal democracy.
Nicholas Wolterstorff
Terence Cuneo (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199558957
- eISBN:
- 9780191744808
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199558957.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book collects Nicholas Wolterstorff's papers in political philosophy. While this collection includes some of Wolterstorff's earlier and influential work on the intersection between liberal ...
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This book collects Nicholas Wolterstorff's papers in political philosophy. While this collection includes some of Wolterstorff's earlier and influential work on the intersection between liberal democracy and religion, it also contains nine new essays in which Wolterstorff stakes out novel positions regarding the nature of liberal democracy, human rights, and political authority. The overall position is one that is intended to be an attractive alternative to so-called public reason liberalism defended by thinkers such as John Rawls. Of interest to philosophers, political theorists, and theologians, the book should engage a wide audience of those interested in how best to understand the nature of liberal democracy and its relation to religion.Less
This book collects Nicholas Wolterstorff's papers in political philosophy. While this collection includes some of Wolterstorff's earlier and influential work on the intersection between liberal democracy and religion, it also contains nine new essays in which Wolterstorff stakes out novel positions regarding the nature of liberal democracy, human rights, and political authority. The overall position is one that is intended to be an attractive alternative to so-called public reason liberalism defended by thinkers such as John Rawls. Of interest to philosophers, political theorists, and theologians, the book should engage a wide audience of those interested in how best to understand the nature of liberal democracy and its relation to religion.
Nicholas Wolterstorff and Terence Cuneo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199558957
- eISBN:
- 9780191744808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199558957.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The central thesis in this essay is that the discussions by public reason liberals of the ethic of citizen suffer from a strange kind of myopia; their attention is focused exclusively on just one ...
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The central thesis in this essay is that the discussions by public reason liberals of the ethic of citizen suffer from a strange kind of myopia; their attention is focused exclusively on just one form of morally-based democratic political activity: policy deliberation and decision. More narrowly yet, they focus exclusively on the sorts of reasons one ought to employ when engaging in that activity, and on what one should do in case one’s reasons fail to persuade all one’s fellow citizens of one’s position. The aim of this essay is to break the grip of this myopia by describing examples of two other forms of morally-committed democratic political activity, not unusual and obscure ways but ways that we all know about, ways that many of us have personally engaged in: broad-based organizing and movement organizing.Less
The central thesis in this essay is that the discussions by public reason liberals of the ethic of citizen suffer from a strange kind of myopia; their attention is focused exclusively on just one form of morally-based democratic political activity: policy deliberation and decision. More narrowly yet, they focus exclusively on the sorts of reasons one ought to employ when engaging in that activity, and on what one should do in case one’s reasons fail to persuade all one’s fellow citizens of one’s position. The aim of this essay is to break the grip of this myopia by describing examples of two other forms of morally-committed democratic political activity, not unusual and obscure ways but ways that we all know about, ways that many of us have personally engaged in: broad-based organizing and movement organizing.
Nicholas Wolterstorff and Terence Cuneo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199558957
- eISBN:
- 9780191744808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199558957.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Gerald Gaus has developed a distinct version of public reason liberalism and has done so with a great deal of philosophical sophistication. There are two respects in which Gaus’ version of public ...
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Gerald Gaus has developed a distinct version of public reason liberalism and has done so with a great deal of philosophical sophistication. There are two respects in which Gaus’ version of public reason liberalism is significantly distinct. He develops and employs the moral demand argument far more carefully and thoroughly than any other public reason liberal does. And whereas most versions of public reason liberalism are consensus theories, his is a convergence theory. This chapter examines Gaus' view in detail, explores the main arguments Gaus offers for it, and concludes that Gaus' position is unsatisfactory.Less
Gerald Gaus has developed a distinct version of public reason liberalism and has done so with a great deal of philosophical sophistication. There are two respects in which Gaus’ version of public reason liberalism is significantly distinct. He develops and employs the moral demand argument far more carefully and thoroughly than any other public reason liberal does. And whereas most versions of public reason liberalism are consensus theories, his is a convergence theory. This chapter examines Gaus' view in detail, explores the main arguments Gaus offers for it, and concludes that Gaus' position is unsatisfactory.
Nicholas Wolterstorff and Terence Cuneo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199558957
- eISBN:
- 9780191744808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199558957.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This essay moves beyond critique of public reason liberalism to propose an alternative interpretation of the governing idea of liberal democracy. At the heart of that idea is a commitment to not ...
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This essay moves beyond critique of public reason liberalism to propose an alternative interpretation of the governing idea of liberal democracy. At the heart of that idea is a commitment to not public reason, as Rawls understands that, but to the equal right of citizens to full political voice – this voice to be exercised within an explicit or implicit constitution that imposes limits and guarantees on government, and within a legal order that protects citizens against impairment of their right to full political voice by their fellow citizens. The resulting position is the equal political voice interpretation of liberal democracy. Less
This essay moves beyond critique of public reason liberalism to propose an alternative interpretation of the governing idea of liberal democracy. At the heart of that idea is a commitment to not public reason, as Rawls understands that, but to the equal right of citizens to full political voice – this voice to be exercised within an explicit or implicit constitution that imposes limits and guarantees on government, and within a legal order that protects citizens against impairment of their right to full political voice by their fellow citizens. The resulting position is the equal political voice interpretation of liberal democracy.
Nicholas Wolterstorff and Terence Cuneo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199558957
- eISBN:
- 9780191744808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199558957.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter describes the transition in the West from a perfectionist view of the state, which states that the task of the state is to “perfect” its citizens, to a protectionist view of the state, ...
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This chapter describes the transition in the West from a perfectionist view of the state, which states that the task of the state is to “perfect” its citizens, to a protectionist view of the state, which states that the fundamental task of the state is not to cultivate virtue in citizens but to protect them from serious violations of their natural rights by their fellow citizens or by foreigners. This introduction then summarizes the chapters contained in this book.Less
This chapter describes the transition in the West from a perfectionist view of the state, which states that the task of the state is to “perfect” its citizens, to a protectionist view of the state, which states that the fundamental task of the state is not to cultivate virtue in citizens but to protect them from serious violations of their natural rights by their fellow citizens or by foreigners. This introduction then summarizes the chapters contained in this book.
Kevin Vallier
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198794394
- eISBN:
- 9780191835896
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198794394.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter develops a principle that determines when governmental activity constitutes an objectionable form of establishment, either religious or secular. Situated within the theory of public ...
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This chapter develops a principle that determines when governmental activity constitutes an objectionable form of establishment, either religious or secular. Situated within the theory of public reason liberalism, the principle holds that non-coercive forms of establishment, such as the use of religious symbols in government, are governed by a publicly justified purpose requirement. To be permissible, the relevant governmental act must have a purpose that can be publicly justified to multiple qualified points of view. Given that few acts of establishment, religious or secular, have that purpose, this chapter concludes that public reason liberalism is generally unfriendly to non-coercive establishment.Less
This chapter develops a principle that determines when governmental activity constitutes an objectionable form of establishment, either religious or secular. Situated within the theory of public reason liberalism, the principle holds that non-coercive forms of establishment, such as the use of religious symbols in government, are governed by a publicly justified purpose requirement. To be permissible, the relevant governmental act must have a purpose that can be publicly justified to multiple qualified points of view. Given that few acts of establishment, religious or secular, have that purpose, this chapter concludes that public reason liberalism is generally unfriendly to non-coercive establishment.
Kevin Vallier
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- November 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190887223
- eISBN:
- 9780190887254
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190887223.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
As argued in Must Politics Be War?, it is feasible for some societies to avoid a warlike politics through the appropriate cultivation of social and political trust. This involves establishing ...
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As argued in Must Politics Be War?, it is feasible for some societies to avoid a warlike politics through the appropriate cultivation of social and political trust. This involves establishing societal rules that are mutually acceptable, that is, publicly justified, for each group. These rules prod diverse people to act in ways that signal their fundamental trustworthiness to one another, creating trust between different persons otherwise inclined to tribalism and conflict. These rules, however, must also create trust in the real world with real people, increasing trust for the right reasons. In this way, the aim of this book is to show that some liberal institutions create trust for the right reasons between diverse persons. It is, in this way, also a defense of a form of public reason liberalism.Less
As argued in Must Politics Be War?, it is feasible for some societies to avoid a warlike politics through the appropriate cultivation of social and political trust. This involves establishing societal rules that are mutually acceptable, that is, publicly justified, for each group. These rules prod diverse people to act in ways that signal their fundamental trustworthiness to one another, creating trust between different persons otherwise inclined to tribalism and conflict. These rules, however, must also create trust in the real world with real people, increasing trust for the right reasons. In this way, the aim of this book is to show that some liberal institutions create trust for the right reasons between diverse persons. It is, in this way, also a defense of a form of public reason liberalism.
Kevin Vallier and Michael Weber
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190666187
- eISBN:
- 9780190666217
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190666187.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The law of religious liberty in the United States tends to treat religion as special in two ways. It does first by offering religious citizens certain exemptions and accommodations based on their ...
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The law of religious liberty in the United States tends to treat religion as special in two ways. It does first by offering religious citizens certain exemptions and accommodations based on their religious objections to otherwise generally applicable law. Second, it enforces certain exclusions of public expressions of religious doctrines or values. But this special treatment is unwarranted since states should recognize religious principles of action as legally equivalent to a variety of sectarian secular doctrines that people affirm as a matter of conscience. This essay argues for the coherence and relative attractiveness of (i) robust protections for both religious and secular conscience, and (ii) weak restrictions on noncoercive establishment of both religious and secular doctrines.Less
The law of religious liberty in the United States tends to treat religion as special in two ways. It does first by offering religious citizens certain exemptions and accommodations based on their religious objections to otherwise generally applicable law. Second, it enforces certain exclusions of public expressions of religious doctrines or values. But this special treatment is unwarranted since states should recognize religious principles of action as legally equivalent to a variety of sectarian secular doctrines that people affirm as a matter of conscience. This essay argues for the coherence and relative attractiveness of (i) robust protections for both religious and secular conscience, and (ii) weak restrictions on noncoercive establishment of both religious and secular doctrines.
Kevin Vallier
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190632830
- eISBN:
- 9780190632861
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190632830.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Americans are far less likely to trust their institutions, and one another, than in decades past. This collapse in social and political trust arguably inspires our increasingly ferocious ideological ...
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Americans are far less likely to trust their institutions, and one another, than in decades past. This collapse in social and political trust arguably inspires our increasingly ferocious ideological conflicts and hardened partisanship. Many believe that our previously high levels of trust and bipartisanship were a pleasant anomaly and that today we live under the historic norm. For politics itself is nothing more than a struggle for power between groups with irreconcilable aims. Contemporary American politics is war because political life as such is war. This book argues that our shared liberal democratic institutions have the unique capacity to sustain social and political trust between diverse persons. Constitutional rights and democratic governance prevent any one faith or ideology from dominating the rest, and so protect each person’s freedom to live according to her values and principles. Illiberal arrangements, where one group’s faith or ideology reigns, turn those who disagree into unwilling subversives, persons with little reason to trust their regime or to be trustworthy in obeying it. Liberal arrangements, in contrast, incentivize trust and trustworthiness because they protect the conscience of all, and so allow people with diverse and divergent ends to act from conviction. Diverse people become trustworthy because they can all obey the rules of their society without acting against their ideals. A liberal society is thereby one at moral peace with a politics that is not war.Less
Americans are far less likely to trust their institutions, and one another, than in decades past. This collapse in social and political trust arguably inspires our increasingly ferocious ideological conflicts and hardened partisanship. Many believe that our previously high levels of trust and bipartisanship were a pleasant anomaly and that today we live under the historic norm. For politics itself is nothing more than a struggle for power between groups with irreconcilable aims. Contemporary American politics is war because political life as such is war. This book argues that our shared liberal democratic institutions have the unique capacity to sustain social and political trust between diverse persons. Constitutional rights and democratic governance prevent any one faith or ideology from dominating the rest, and so protect each person’s freedom to live according to her values and principles. Illiberal arrangements, where one group’s faith or ideology reigns, turn those who disagree into unwilling subversives, persons with little reason to trust their regime or to be trustworthy in obeying it. Liberal arrangements, in contrast, incentivize trust and trustworthiness because they protect the conscience of all, and so allow people with diverse and divergent ends to act from conviction. Diverse people become trustworthy because they can all obey the rules of their society without acting against their ideals. A liberal society is thereby one at moral peace with a politics that is not war.