Michelle P. Egan
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244058
- eISBN:
- 9780191599132
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199244057.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Provides the central theoretical and analytical framework of the book. It includes an extensive review of the regulatory literature, which largely casts the European Union as analogous to a ...
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Provides the central theoretical and analytical framework of the book. It includes an extensive review of the regulatory literature, which largely casts the European Union as analogous to a ‘regulatory state’ since it engages in widespread social and economic regulation to promote economic integration. Different theories of regulation—interest group, public interest, and public choice—are examined in order to understand current developments in European political economy. Although most accounts of regulation, often cited in the American context, have highlighted the impact of industry influence or ‘regulatory capture’, such a static view of the public–private relationship diverts attention away from other types of organizational relations. Private organizations assuming governmental functions are well known in Europe, whether it is self‐regulation, corporatism, or private interest government. Applying insights from both the European and American literature, this chapter highlights the importance of understanding the origins, practice, and consequences of regulation for broader issues of democratic governance, legitimacy, and accountability.Less
Provides the central theoretical and analytical framework of the book. It includes an extensive review of the regulatory literature, which largely casts the European Union as analogous to a ‘regulatory state’ since it engages in widespread social and economic regulation to promote economic integration. Different theories of regulation—interest group, public interest, and public choice—are examined in order to understand current developments in European political economy. Although most accounts of regulation, often cited in the American context, have highlighted the impact of industry influence or ‘regulatory capture’, such a static view of the public–private relationship diverts attention away from other types of organizational relations. Private organizations assuming governmental functions are well known in Europe, whether it is self‐regulation, corporatism, or private interest government. Applying insights from both the European and American literature, this chapter highlights the importance of understanding the origins, practice, and consequences of regulation for broader issues of democratic governance, legitimacy, and accountability.
Leif Lewin
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198277255
- eISBN:
- 9780191599774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198277253.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Even if bureaucrats carry out the wishes of the voters and the decisions of the politicians by performing various sorts of tasks, it is, according to the assumption of the public‐choice theory, their ...
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Even if bureaucrats carry out the wishes of the voters and the decisions of the politicians by performing various sorts of tasks, it is, according to the assumption of the public‐choice theory, their self‐interest that best accounts for their actions.Critical analysis of budget‐maximizing hypothesis, formulated by the leading‐members of the public‐choice school such as Tullock, Dawns, and Niskanen, shows serious shortcomings of this model. Although Leif Lewin agrees that certain amount of contradiction exists in the empirical evidence on this issue, as ‘one came across bureaucrats, who out of self‐interest try to maximize the budget for their agencies’, he argues that budget‐maximization hypothesis explains too little about essential features of Western bureaucracy and other circumstances appear to be more important for its description.Less
Even if bureaucrats carry out the wishes of the voters and the decisions of the politicians by performing various sorts of tasks, it is, according to the assumption of the public‐choice theory, their self‐interest that best accounts for their actions.
Critical analysis of budget‐maximizing hypothesis, formulated by the leading‐members of the public‐choice school such as Tullock, Dawns, and Niskanen, shows serious shortcomings of this model. Although Leif Lewin agrees that certain amount of contradiction exists in the empirical evidence on this issue, as ‘one came across bureaucrats, who out of self‐interest try to maximize the budget for their agencies’, he argues that budget‐maximization hypothesis explains too little about essential features of Western bureaucracy and other circumstances appear to be more important for its description.
A. B. Atkinson
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294719
- eISBN:
- 9780191599361
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294719.003.0031
- Subject:
- Political Science, Reference
Considers what was old about political economy and questions the new. The transition from old to new represents a move from economics to political economy, in which the latter includes the approach ...
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Considers what was old about political economy and questions the new. The transition from old to new represents a move from economics to political economy, in which the latter includes the approach of public choice, a new interaction between economists and political scientists, and a rapid growth of interest in the political economy approach. Three areas of contribution in new political economy: the role of institutions, rational choice analysis, and the deployment of empirical evidence are questioned, respectively, for their exogeneity, application, and demonstrability.Less
Considers what was old about political economy and questions the new. The transition from old to new represents a move from economics to political economy, in which the latter includes the approach of public choice, a new interaction between economists and political scientists, and a rapid growth of interest in the political economy approach. Three areas of contribution in new political economy: the role of institutions, rational choice analysis, and the deployment of empirical evidence are questioned, respectively, for their exogeneity, application, and demonstrability.
Raymond Plant
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199281756
- eISBN:
- 9780191713040
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281756.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
One of the central themes of this chapter is the neo‐liberal critique of the ‘public service ethic’ which it has been thought by Social Democratic thinkers as the main way in which the ...
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One of the central themes of this chapter is the neo‐liberal critique of the ‘public service ethic’ which it has been thought by Social Democratic thinkers as the main way in which the self‐interested behaviour of welfare bureaucracies can be constrained. The chapter looks at the close links between the neo‐liberal approach to this and the Public Choice School of public policy analysts who argue that the role and expansion of welfare bureaucracy is best explained by the utility maximizing behaviour at work in such bureaucracies when they are exempt from market disciplines and the possibility of bankruptcy. The role of interest groups in a welfare state is taken up again with reference to the work of Macur Olson in terms of his account of the rigidities caused to the economy by long lasting interest groups. The neo‐liberal approach to trades unions is also considered in this chapter.Less
One of the central themes of this chapter is the neo‐liberal critique of the ‘public service ethic’ which it has been thought by Social Democratic thinkers as the main way in which the self‐interested behaviour of welfare bureaucracies can be constrained. The chapter looks at the close links between the neo‐liberal approach to this and the Public Choice School of public policy analysts who argue that the role and expansion of welfare bureaucracy is best explained by the utility maximizing behaviour at work in such bureaucracies when they are exempt from market disciplines and the possibility of bankruptcy. The role of interest groups in a welfare state is taken up again with reference to the work of Macur Olson in terms of his account of the rigidities caused to the economy by long lasting interest groups. The neo‐liberal approach to trades unions is also considered in this chapter.
Kathleen M. McGraw
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294719
- eISBN:
- 9780191599361
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294719.003.0034
- Subject:
- Political Science, Reference
Provides a discussion of issues relating to research design and experimental methods in political science. Issues are elaborated relating to control and random case selection, internal and external ...
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Provides a discussion of issues relating to research design and experimental methods in political science. Issues are elaborated relating to control and random case selection, internal and external validity, identification of mediating variables, and replication. Examples of experimental contributions in political science are outlined in the fields of public opinion research, decision‐making and information processing, collective action, public choice, and public policy. Experimentation represents a burgeoning cutting‐edge approach in the future of political science research.Less
Provides a discussion of issues relating to research design and experimental methods in political science. Issues are elaborated relating to control and random case selection, internal and external validity, identification of mediating variables, and replication. Examples of experimental contributions in political science are outlined in the fields of public opinion research, decision‐making and information processing, collective action, public choice, and public policy. Experimentation represents a burgeoning cutting‐edge approach in the future of political science research.
Erin A. O'Hara and Larry E. Ribstein
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195312898
- eISBN:
- 9780199871025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195312898.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
As background for explaining the costs and benefits of the law market, this chapter uses public choice theory to explain the political dynamic that causes states sometimes to adopt inferior laws. ...
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As background for explaining the costs and benefits of the law market, this chapter uses public choice theory to explain the political dynamic that causes states sometimes to adopt inferior laws. This chapter also explains why party choice of law can help to economize on the costs of those laws and reminds the reader that unbridled party choice can, in certain circumstances, impose harmful effects on society, making limits appropriate. In some cases, limits to party choice are necessary in order to prevent other harmful influences on the lawmaking process.Less
As background for explaining the costs and benefits of the law market, this chapter uses public choice theory to explain the political dynamic that causes states sometimes to adopt inferior laws. This chapter also explains why party choice of law can help to economize on the costs of those laws and reminds the reader that unbridled party choice can, in certain circumstances, impose harmful effects on society, making limits appropriate. In some cases, limits to party choice are necessary in order to prevent other harmful influences on the lawmaking process.
Leif Lewin
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198277255
- eISBN:
- 9780191599774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198277253.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
According to the assumption of the public‐choice theory, politicians are guided by their self‐interest and vote maximization. By analysing studies based on theories of the political business cycle, ...
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According to the assumption of the public‐choice theory, politicians are guided by their self‐interest and vote maximization. By analysing studies based on theories of the political business cycle, Leif Lewin provides evidence of predominance of public interest over self‐interest in politics.The author then proceeds to analyse the electoral strategies of European socialists supporting this argument. The facts presented clearly indicate that the image of the politicians as primarily vote‐maximizers has little empirical support.Less
According to the assumption of the public‐choice theory, politicians are guided by their self‐interest and vote maximization. By analysing studies based on theories of the political business cycle, Leif Lewin provides evidence of predominance of public interest over self‐interest in politics.
The author then proceeds to analyse the electoral strategies of European socialists supporting this argument. The facts presented clearly indicate that the image of the politicians as primarily vote‐maximizers has little empirical support.
Raymond Plant
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199281756
- eISBN:
- 9780191713040
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281756.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
This book has two central aims. The first is to give a fair, comprehensive, and analytical account of the central features of the neo‐liberal view about the role and limits of the state in the modern ...
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This book has two central aims. The first is to give a fair, comprehensive, and analytical account of the central features of the neo‐liberal view about the role and limits of the state in the modern world. It considers important ideas such as the contrast between a state based on rules and the one based on outcomes, the implications of this contrast for the rule of law, for the ideas of freedom, social justice, and rights. It provides a full account of the neo‐liberal view of the relationship between the state and the economy and to civil society and voluntary organizations. It draws upon a wide range of works by neo‐liberal thinkers to build up the theoretical case for this conception of the role of government and politics. The thinkers at the heart of this part of the study are Hayek, Buchanan, Mises, Menger, as well as others who while not regarding themselves as neo‐liberals nevertheless have contributed to neo‐liberal ideas. These include Oakeshott, Nozick, and Rothbard. The study also looks at the public policy implications of neo‐liberal ideas in relation to the role of the welfare state and other forms of public sector provision. The second part of the book provides a detailed critical appraisal of some of the central neo‐liberal doctrines particularly in relation to the core ideas of freedom, justice, rights, the role of collective organizations in civil society, and the provision of welfare. The book argues that contrary to neo‐liberal arguments there is no coherent way of providing a sharp and categorical distinction between neo‐liberalism and Social Democracy on the one hand and libertarianism on the other.Less
This book has two central aims. The first is to give a fair, comprehensive, and analytical account of the central features of the neo‐liberal view about the role and limits of the state in the modern world. It considers important ideas such as the contrast between a state based on rules and the one based on outcomes, the implications of this contrast for the rule of law, for the ideas of freedom, social justice, and rights. It provides a full account of the neo‐liberal view of the relationship between the state and the economy and to civil society and voluntary organizations. It draws upon a wide range of works by neo‐liberal thinkers to build up the theoretical case for this conception of the role of government and politics. The thinkers at the heart of this part of the study are Hayek, Buchanan, Mises, Menger, as well as others who while not regarding themselves as neo‐liberals nevertheless have contributed to neo‐liberal ideas. These include Oakeshott, Nozick, and Rothbard. The study also looks at the public policy implications of neo‐liberal ideas in relation to the role of the welfare state and other forms of public sector provision. The second part of the book provides a detailed critical appraisal of some of the central neo‐liberal doctrines particularly in relation to the core ideas of freedom, justice, rights, the role of collective organizations in civil society, and the provision of welfare. The book argues that contrary to neo‐liberal arguments there is no coherent way of providing a sharp and categorical distinction between neo‐liberalism and Social Democracy on the one hand and libertarianism on the other.
Jones Philip
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195179972
- eISBN:
- 9780199850709
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179972.003.0012
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, International
This chapter discusses the result of a public choice analysis of international cooperation. It explains that public choice analysis yields predictions with reference to the interests of those who ...
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This chapter discusses the result of a public choice analysis of international cooperation. It explains that public choice analysis yields predictions with reference to the interests of those who participate in democratic processes and compares it with normative analysis. The result of public choice analysis identifies the possible reasons for underfinancing international cooperation and that voter respondents in the analysis are preoccupied with the more immediate benefits of domestic programs which are less costly when supported by intergovernmental grants. This chapter concludes that policy must take into account individuals' perceptions and responses.Less
This chapter discusses the result of a public choice analysis of international cooperation. It explains that public choice analysis yields predictions with reference to the interests of those who participate in democratic processes and compares it with normative analysis. The result of public choice analysis identifies the possible reasons for underfinancing international cooperation and that voter respondents in the analysis are preoccupied with the more immediate benefits of domestic programs which are less costly when supported by intergovernmental grants. This chapter concludes that policy must take into account individuals' perceptions and responses.
Stephen D. Cohen
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195179354
- eISBN:
- 9780199783779
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179354.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, International
This chapter expounds on another core argument of this book: given the paucity of universally accepted or empirically demonstrable truths, perceptions usually determine whether an individual views ...
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This chapter expounds on another core argument of this book: given the paucity of universally accepted or empirically demonstrable truths, perceptions usually determine whether an individual views MNCs and FDI as being positive and desirable or negative and harmful phenomena. The first section is an overview analysis of economic ideology. It focuses on the important role that individual beliefs concerning the larger question of the virtues of free, unfettered markets versus government intervention in the economy shape attitudes towards multinational enterprises. In keeping with the eclectic, non-judgmental approach of this study, the second and third sections summarize valid intellectual arguments that can be made on behalf of, respectively, the wealth and efficiency-creating virtues of private enterprise and the need for government to protect the majority from the income-distorting avarice of big corporations. After a discussion of the roles of MNCs and FDI in the debate about the merits of globalization, a final section introduces yet another integrating theme of this study: the virtues of a middle-ground synthesis as opposed to an extreme government versus markets model of managing national economies and the international economic order.Less
This chapter expounds on another core argument of this book: given the paucity of universally accepted or empirically demonstrable truths, perceptions usually determine whether an individual views MNCs and FDI as being positive and desirable or negative and harmful phenomena. The first section is an overview analysis of economic ideology. It focuses on the important role that individual beliefs concerning the larger question of the virtues of free, unfettered markets versus government intervention in the economy shape attitudes towards multinational enterprises. In keeping with the eclectic, non-judgmental approach of this study, the second and third sections summarize valid intellectual arguments that can be made on behalf of, respectively, the wealth and efficiency-creating virtues of private enterprise and the need for government to protect the majority from the income-distorting avarice of big corporations. After a discussion of the roles of MNCs and FDI in the debate about the merits of globalization, a final section introduces yet another integrating theme of this study: the virtues of a middle-ground synthesis as opposed to an extreme government versus markets model of managing national economies and the international economic order.
Francesco Parisi and Vincy Fon
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195374155
- eISBN:
- 9780199871834
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374155.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This book explores the relative advantages and limits of alternative sources of law. It views the sources of law through a law and economics lens, and considers the important issue of institutional ...
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This book explores the relative advantages and limits of alternative sources of law. It views the sources of law through a law and economics lens, and considers the important issue of institutional design in lawmaking. It considers the respective advantages and proper scope of application of four fundamental sources of law: legislation, judge-made law, customary law, and international law. The defining features of these four sources of law are examined using the formal methods of public choice theory: lawmaking through legislation; lawmaking through adjudication; lawmaking through practice; and lawmaking through agreement. The book begins by examining the sources of law dependent on collective political decision-making, such as legislation. Multiple issues are considered, such as optimal specificity of law, optimal timing of legal intervention and optimal territorial scope of law, and include a thorough discussion on the sources of law derived from judges' decisions, such as common law. It provides an extensive study on the roles of litigation and judicial path-dependence on judge-made law, biases in the evolution of legal remedies through litigation, and the effect of alternative doctrines of legal precedent, such as stare decisis and jurisprudence constante. It also considers the customary sources of law, with special attention on the mechanisms that determine their emergence and evolution, and explores sources of law derived from international treaties and conventions. The Economics of Lawmaking is the first systematic law and economics treatment of this field and will shed new light on the process of lawmaking.Less
This book explores the relative advantages and limits of alternative sources of law. It views the sources of law through a law and economics lens, and considers the important issue of institutional design in lawmaking. It considers the respective advantages and proper scope of application of four fundamental sources of law: legislation, judge-made law, customary law, and international law. The defining features of these four sources of law are examined using the formal methods of public choice theory: lawmaking through legislation; lawmaking through adjudication; lawmaking through practice; and lawmaking through agreement. The book begins by examining the sources of law dependent on collective political decision-making, such as legislation. Multiple issues are considered, such as optimal specificity of law, optimal timing of legal intervention and optimal territorial scope of law, and include a thorough discussion on the sources of law derived from judges' decisions, such as common law. It provides an extensive study on the roles of litigation and judicial path-dependence on judge-made law, biases in the evolution of legal remedies through litigation, and the effect of alternative doctrines of legal precedent, such as stare decisis and jurisprudence constante. It also considers the customary sources of law, with special attention on the mechanisms that determine their emergence and evolution, and explores sources of law derived from international treaties and conventions. The Economics of Lawmaking is the first systematic law and economics treatment of this field and will shed new light on the process of lawmaking.
Jonathan R. Macey
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198298922
- eISBN:
- 9780191685545
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198298922.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter decisively adopts a ‘public-choice’ perspective, holding that what matters most in determining which international regulatory processes will emerge and prove effective is not some ...
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This chapter decisively adopts a ‘public-choice’ perspective, holding that what matters most in determining which international regulatory processes will emerge and prove effective is not some neutral institutional assessment, but rather the political motivations of regulators, bureaucrats, and other public officials. According to this view, regulators enter into international arrangements if and to the extent they determine that it is in their interest to do so. Under some circumstances, regulators may eschew commitments because the latter entail sacrifices in autonomy; increasingly, under contemporary technological and globalized conditions, regulators find that international arrangements enhance rather than weaken their authority within a national regulatory environment in which they may otherwise find their authority sharply challenged.Less
This chapter decisively adopts a ‘public-choice’ perspective, holding that what matters most in determining which international regulatory processes will emerge and prove effective is not some neutral institutional assessment, but rather the political motivations of regulators, bureaucrats, and other public officials. According to this view, regulators enter into international arrangements if and to the extent they determine that it is in their interest to do so. Under some circumstances, regulators may eschew commitments because the latter entail sacrifices in autonomy; increasingly, under contemporary technological and globalized conditions, regulators find that international arrangements enhance rather than weaken their authority within a national regulatory environment in which they may otherwise find their authority sharply challenged.
P. P. CRAIG
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198256373
- eISBN:
- 9780191681646
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198256373.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter considers the significant differences of opinion which exist within pluralism. The choice between these competing visions reflects important value judgements, and the preferred option ...
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This chapter considers the significant differences of opinion which exist within pluralism. The choice between these competing visions reflects important value judgements, and the preferred option has significant repercussions for the shape and content of constitutional review. Three visions are considered: the public-choice model, modified pluralism, and the process model. It also examines John Hart Ely’s theory of judicial review because of its connection with the pluralist model of democratic society.Less
This chapter considers the significant differences of opinion which exist within pluralism. The choice between these competing visions reflects important value judgements, and the preferred option has significant repercussions for the shape and content of constitutional review. Three visions are considered: the public-choice model, modified pluralism, and the process model. It also examines John Hart Ely’s theory of judicial review because of its connection with the pluralist model of democratic society.
Paul Dragos Aligica, Peter J. Boettke, and Vlad Tarko
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190267032
- eISBN:
- 9780190267063
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190267032.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Chapter 5 illuminates the specific nature of the synthesis attempted by the Ostroms’ and their associates and discusses the successes as well as the failures of their endeavors. Their effort to ...
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Chapter 5 illuminates the specific nature of the synthesis attempted by the Ostroms’ and their associates and discusses the successes as well as the failures of their endeavors. Their effort to promote the public choice perspective in public administration, and the public administration perspective in public choice and to advance on that basis a paradigm change (from “bureaucratic public administration” to “democratic public administration”) is presented as a reference point, a model and case study entailing several lessons about the nature and limits of such endeavors. The chapter also builds upon the work of Michael Spicer, a remarkable author who has kept alive this type of approach in the field of public administration by combining public choice and knowledge process theory, long after the initial effect of the Ostroms’ efforts faded.Less
Chapter 5 illuminates the specific nature of the synthesis attempted by the Ostroms’ and their associates and discusses the successes as well as the failures of their endeavors. Their effort to promote the public choice perspective in public administration, and the public administration perspective in public choice and to advance on that basis a paradigm change (from “bureaucratic public administration” to “democratic public administration”) is presented as a reference point, a model and case study entailing several lessons about the nature and limits of such endeavors. The chapter also builds upon the work of Michael Spicer, a remarkable author who has kept alive this type of approach in the field of public administration by combining public choice and knowledge process theory, long after the initial effect of the Ostroms’ efforts faded.
Richard S. Markovits
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300114591
- eISBN:
- 9780300145229
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300114591.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
Is economic efficiency a sound basis upon which to make public policy or legal decisions? This book considers the way in which scholars and public decision-makers define, predict, and assess the ...
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Is economic efficiency a sound basis upon which to make public policy or legal decisions? This book considers the way in which scholars and public decision-makers define, predict, and assess the moral and legal relevance of economic efficiency. The book begins by identifying imperfections in the traditional definition of economic efficiency. Further, the book develops and illustrates an appropriate response to Second-Best Theory and investigates the moral and legal relevance of economic-efficiency analyses. Not only do virtually all economic, legal, and public policy thinkers misdefine economic efficiency, but also the book concludes, that they ignore or respond inadequately to Second-Best Theory when analyzing the economic efficiency of public choices and mis-assess the relevance of economic-efficiency conclusions both for moral evaluations and for the answer to legal-rights questions that is correct as a matter of law.Less
Is economic efficiency a sound basis upon which to make public policy or legal decisions? This book considers the way in which scholars and public decision-makers define, predict, and assess the moral and legal relevance of economic efficiency. The book begins by identifying imperfections in the traditional definition of economic efficiency. Further, the book develops and illustrates an appropriate response to Second-Best Theory and investigates the moral and legal relevance of economic-efficiency analyses. Not only do virtually all economic, legal, and public policy thinkers misdefine economic efficiency, but also the book concludes, that they ignore or respond inadequately to Second-Best Theory when analyzing the economic efficiency of public choices and mis-assess the relevance of economic-efficiency conclusions both for moral evaluations and for the answer to legal-rights questions that is correct as a matter of law.
Ernesto Screpanti and Stefano Zamagni
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199279142
- eISBN:
- 9780191602887
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279144.003.0012
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
Deals with three specific areas of research developed in the last quarter of a century. The first one is game-theoretic approach to economics and endogenous growth theory. The second area covers the ...
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Deals with three specific areas of research developed in the last quarter of a century. The first one is game-theoretic approach to economics and endogenous growth theory. The second area covers the neo-Ricardian paradigm and Sraffa's economics. Finally, the chapter surveys the programme known as radical political economy, both in the USA and in Europe.Less
Deals with three specific areas of research developed in the last quarter of a century. The first one is game-theoretic approach to economics and endogenous growth theory. The second area covers the neo-Ricardian paradigm and Sraffa's economics. Finally, the chapter surveys the programme known as radical political economy, both in the USA and in Europe.
Sidney A. Shapiro and Joseph P. Tomain
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199965540
- eISBN:
- 9780199360833
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199965540.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Chapter 6 introduces Part III and begins with a discussion of the importance of pragmatism in formulating sound regulatory policies. In any complex society, policies must be formulated and ...
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Chapter 6 introduces Part III and begins with a discussion of the importance of pragmatism in formulating sound regulatory policies. In any complex society, policies must be formulated and implemented. Ideally, policies should be adopted that address identified problems. Chapter 6 discusses how social and economic problems fall into identifiable patterns. In some instances, market failures generate inefficiencies that can be corrected by government action. In other instances, social problems, such as suboptimal political and economic participation, can be enhanced by government when market behavior inhibits full participation. Pragmatism provides a method for determining which public policies and which government interventions into economic and social arenas can benefit society. Chapter 6 argues that pragmatism is a superior method for understanding government than economic analyses. Pragmatism looks to objective institutions, multiple disciplines, and positive and normative values to develop a policy process and a method of policy analysis that is superior to the rational choice approach.Less
Chapter 6 introduces Part III and begins with a discussion of the importance of pragmatism in formulating sound regulatory policies. In any complex society, policies must be formulated and implemented. Ideally, policies should be adopted that address identified problems. Chapter 6 discusses how social and economic problems fall into identifiable patterns. In some instances, market failures generate inefficiencies that can be corrected by government action. In other instances, social problems, such as suboptimal political and economic participation, can be enhanced by government when market behavior inhibits full participation. Pragmatism provides a method for determining which public policies and which government interventions into economic and social arenas can benefit society. Chapter 6 argues that pragmatism is a superior method for understanding government than economic analyses. Pragmatism looks to objective institutions, multiple disciplines, and positive and normative values to develop a policy process and a method of policy analysis that is superior to the rational choice approach.
Megan Mullin
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262013130
- eISBN:
- 9780262259088
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262013130.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter describes two competing theories of special districts, emphasizing the features that differentiate them from other local public entities. The metropolitan reform theory emphasizes the ...
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This chapter describes two competing theories of special districts, emphasizing the features that differentiate them from other local public entities. The metropolitan reform theory emphasizes the importance of consolidating special districts with local governments to avoid wasteful duplication of costly services and to counter the problem of uncoordinated actions. Public choice theory, however, states the importance of special districts and claims that the districts create a competitive environment for local governments. This helps them perform more effectively and efficiently. Public choice theory offers the hope that districts will be more responsive toward water management for local needs. The chapter discusses the responsiveness of special districts to drinking water problems and their role in inter-local cooperation. Furthermore, it makes some assumptions about how developers may influence the governance of special districts.Less
This chapter describes two competing theories of special districts, emphasizing the features that differentiate them from other local public entities. The metropolitan reform theory emphasizes the importance of consolidating special districts with local governments to avoid wasteful duplication of costly services and to counter the problem of uncoordinated actions. Public choice theory, however, states the importance of special districts and claims that the districts create a competitive environment for local governments. This helps them perform more effectively and efficiently. Public choice theory offers the hope that districts will be more responsive toward water management for local needs. The chapter discusses the responsiveness of special districts to drinking water problems and their role in inter-local cooperation. Furthermore, it makes some assumptions about how developers may influence the governance of special districts.
Ioannis Lianos
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804789394
- eISBN:
- 9780804791625
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804789394.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Competition Law
Current accounts of the interaction between competition law and state activities are based on a clear-cut old liberalism style distinction between “state”/“government” and “market” that does not take ...
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Current accounts of the interaction between competition law and state activities are based on a clear-cut old liberalism style distinction between “state”/“government” and “market” that does not take into account the emergence of the neoliberal state. By advancing a “bureaucratic-centered theory” of the competition law and state interaction, this chapter offers an alternative interdisciplinary theoretical framework that can be successfully transposed into different institutional and cultural settings.Less
Current accounts of the interaction between competition law and state activities are based on a clear-cut old liberalism style distinction between “state”/“government” and “market” that does not take into account the emergence of the neoliberal state. By advancing a “bureaucratic-centered theory” of the competition law and state interaction, this chapter offers an alternative interdisciplinary theoretical framework that can be successfully transposed into different institutional and cultural settings.
Albert Weale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- July 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198853541
- eISBN:
- 9780191887963
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198853541.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The Calculus of Consent by Buchanan and Tullock was the first book to apply the contract method to questions of public choice, particularly in respect of voting, in the modern era. Their contractual ...
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The Calculus of Consent by Buchanan and Tullock was the first book to apply the contract method to questions of public choice, particularly in respect of voting, in the modern era. Their contractual construction imagines individuals in an original position of a laissez-faire economy, where the individuals have to determine rules for the making of collective choices in respect of the reduction of economic externalities and the provision of public goods. Those individuals calculate the costs and benefits of different decision rules. Faced with proposals with which they disagree, individuals would prefer a high threshold of agreement; faced with proposals with which they agree, individuals would prefer a low threshold of agreement. The constitutional question such individuals confront is to determine a general decision rule when they are uncertain about the future stream of choices the members of their community will face. Buchanan and Tullock are defended against the criticism that their original position lacks justification and that it presupposes a requirement of unanimity to secure change. However, they are less convincing in their attack on the simple majority principle, and in their attempt to show that supermajority decision-making does not give too much power to minorities. Indeed, sometimes the supermajority devices they support should be used to protect minorities, as shown in the literature on consociational democracy.Less
The Calculus of Consent by Buchanan and Tullock was the first book to apply the contract method to questions of public choice, particularly in respect of voting, in the modern era. Their contractual construction imagines individuals in an original position of a laissez-faire economy, where the individuals have to determine rules for the making of collective choices in respect of the reduction of economic externalities and the provision of public goods. Those individuals calculate the costs and benefits of different decision rules. Faced with proposals with which they disagree, individuals would prefer a high threshold of agreement; faced with proposals with which they agree, individuals would prefer a low threshold of agreement. The constitutional question such individuals confront is to determine a general decision rule when they are uncertain about the future stream of choices the members of their community will face. Buchanan and Tullock are defended against the criticism that their original position lacks justification and that it presupposes a requirement of unanimity to secure change. However, they are less convincing in their attack on the simple majority principle, and in their attempt to show that supermajority decision-making does not give too much power to minorities. Indeed, sometimes the supermajority devices they support should be used to protect minorities, as shown in the literature on consociational democracy.
