W. Patrick McCray
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780691176291
- eISBN:
- 9781400844685
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691176291.001.0001
- Subject:
- Physics, History of Physics
In 1969, Princeton physicist Gerard O'Neill began looking outward to space colonies as the new frontier for humanity's expansion. A decade later, Eric Drexler turned his attention to the molecular ...
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In 1969, Princeton physicist Gerard O'Neill began looking outward to space colonies as the new frontier for humanity's expansion. A decade later, Eric Drexler turned his attention to the molecular world as the place where society's future needs could be met using self-replicating nanoscale machines. These modern utopians predicted that their technologies could transform society as humans mastered the ability to create new worlds, undertook atomic-scale engineering, and, if truly successful, overcame their own biological limits. This book tells the story of how these scientists and the communities they fostered imagined, designed, and popularized speculative technologies such as space colonies and nanotechnologies. The book traces how these visioneers blended countercultural ideals with hard science, entrepreneurship, libertarianism, and unbridled optimism about the future. It shows how they built networks that communicated their ideas to writers, politicians, and corporate leaders. But the visioneers were not immune to failure. O'Neill and Drexler faced difficulty funding their work and overcoming colleagues' skepticism, and saw their ideas co-opted and transformed. Ultimately, both men struggled to overcome stigma and ostracism as they tried to unshackle their visioneering from pejorative labels like “fringe” and “pseudoscience”? This book provides a balanced look at the successes and pitfalls they encountered. It exposes the dangers of promotion that can plague exploratory science. But above all, it highlights the importance of radical new ideas that inspire us to support cutting-edge research into tomorrow's technologies.Less
In 1969, Princeton physicist Gerard O'Neill began looking outward to space colonies as the new frontier for humanity's expansion. A decade later, Eric Drexler turned his attention to the molecular world as the place where society's future needs could be met using self-replicating nanoscale machines. These modern utopians predicted that their technologies could transform society as humans mastered the ability to create new worlds, undertook atomic-scale engineering, and, if truly successful, overcame their own biological limits. This book tells the story of how these scientists and the communities they fostered imagined, designed, and popularized speculative technologies such as space colonies and nanotechnologies. The book traces how these visioneers blended countercultural ideals with hard science, entrepreneurship, libertarianism, and unbridled optimism about the future. It shows how they built networks that communicated their ideas to writers, politicians, and corporate leaders. But the visioneers were not immune to failure. O'Neill and Drexler faced difficulty funding their work and overcoming colleagues' skepticism, and saw their ideas co-opted and transformed. Ultimately, both men struggled to overcome stigma and ostracism as they tried to unshackle their visioneering from pejorative labels like “fringe” and “pseudoscience”? This book provides a balanced look at the successes and pitfalls they encountered. It exposes the dangers of promotion that can plague exploratory science. But above all, it highlights the importance of radical new ideas that inspire us to support cutting-edge research into tomorrow's technologies.
Philip A. Sullivan
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195172256
- eISBN:
- 9780199835546
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195172256.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues that the encroachment of advocacy in certain disciplines has undermined their credibility, and that this trend is largely due to uncritical acceptance of relativist epistemologies ...
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This chapter argues that the encroachment of advocacy in certain disciplines has undermined their credibility, and that this trend is largely due to uncritical acceptance of relativist epistemologies such as social constructivism. Examples are cited from anthropology, educational theory, law, the sociology of science, and women’s studies. It is suggested that practices in the natural and historical sciences, as contrasted to the attributes of pseudoscience, provide guidelines for both university scholarship and the public debate essential to democracy.Less
This chapter argues that the encroachment of advocacy in certain disciplines has undermined their credibility, and that this trend is largely due to uncritical acceptance of relativist epistemologies such as social constructivism. Examples are cited from anthropology, educational theory, law, the sociology of science, and women’s studies. It is suggested that practices in the natural and historical sciences, as contrasted to the attributes of pseudoscience, provide guidelines for both university scholarship and the public debate essential to democracy.
Allison B. Kaufman and James C. Kaufman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262037426
- eISBN:
- 9780262344814
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037426.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
In a post-truth, fake news world, we are particularly susceptible to the claims of pseudoscience. When emotions and opinions are more widely disseminated than scientific findings, and self-proclaimed ...
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In a post-truth, fake news world, we are particularly susceptible to the claims of pseudoscience. When emotions and opinions are more widely disseminated than scientific findings, and self-proclaimed experts get their expertise from Google, how can the average person distinguish real science from fake? This book examines pseudoscience from a variety of perspectives, through case studies, analysis, and personal accounts that show how to recognize pseudoscience, why it is so widely accepted, and how to advocate for real science. Contributors examine the basics of pseudoscience, including issues of cognitive bias; the costs of pseudoscience, with accounts of naturopathy and logical fallacies in the anti-vaccination movement; perceptions of scientific soundness; the mainstream presence of “integrative medicine,” hypnosis, and parapsychology; and the use of case studies and new media in science advocacy.Less
In a post-truth, fake news world, we are particularly susceptible to the claims of pseudoscience. When emotions and opinions are more widely disseminated than scientific findings, and self-proclaimed experts get their expertise from Google, how can the average person distinguish real science from fake? This book examines pseudoscience from a variety of perspectives, through case studies, analysis, and personal accounts that show how to recognize pseudoscience, why it is so widely accepted, and how to advocate for real science. Contributors examine the basics of pseudoscience, including issues of cognitive bias; the costs of pseudoscience, with accounts of naturopathy and logical fallacies in the anti-vaccination movement; perceptions of scientific soundness; the mainstream presence of “integrative medicine,” hypnosis, and parapsychology; and the use of case studies and new media in science advocacy.
George Slusser
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252038228
- eISBN:
- 9780252096037
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252038228.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 20th-century and Contemporary Literature
Gregory Benford is perhaps best known as the author of Benford's law of controversy: “Passion is inversely proportional to the amount of real information available.” That maxim is a quotation from ...
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Gregory Benford is perhaps best known as the author of Benford's law of controversy: “Passion is inversely proportional to the amount of real information available.” That maxim is a quotation from Timescape, Benford's Nebula and Campbell Award-winning 1980 novel, which established his work as an exemplar of “hard science fiction,” dedicated to working out the consequences of modern science rather than substituting pseudoscience for fantasy. An astrophysicist by training and profession, Benford has published more than twenty novels, over 100 short stories, some fifty essays, and myriad articles that display both his scientific rigor as well as a recognition of literary traditions. This book explores the extraordinary, seemingly inexhaustible display of creative energy in Gregory Benford's life and work. By identifying direct sources and making parallels with other works and writers, the book reveals the vast scope of Benford's knowledge, both of literature and of the major scientific and philosophical issues of our time. The book also discusses Benford's numerous scientific articles and nonfiction books and includes a new interview with him.Less
Gregory Benford is perhaps best known as the author of Benford's law of controversy: “Passion is inversely proportional to the amount of real information available.” That maxim is a quotation from Timescape, Benford's Nebula and Campbell Award-winning 1980 novel, which established his work as an exemplar of “hard science fiction,” dedicated to working out the consequences of modern science rather than substituting pseudoscience for fantasy. An astrophysicist by training and profession, Benford has published more than twenty novels, over 100 short stories, some fifty essays, and myriad articles that display both his scientific rigor as well as a recognition of literary traditions. This book explores the extraordinary, seemingly inexhaustible display of creative energy in Gregory Benford's life and work. By identifying direct sources and making parallels with other works and writers, the book reveals the vast scope of Benford's knowledge, both of literature and of the major scientific and philosophical issues of our time. The book also discusses Benford's numerous scientific articles and nonfiction books and includes a new interview with him.
N. David Mermin
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226467221
- eISBN:
- 9780226467245
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226467245.003.0030
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Years of public attacks on astrology by eminent scientists seem to have created the presumption that no scientist can address the subject in any context without deploring and condemning. This chapter ...
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Years of public attacks on astrology by eminent scientists seem to have created the presumption that no scientist can address the subject in any context without deploring and condemning. This chapter criticizes that astrology provided a bad textbook illustration of an area that might shift across the boundary scientists draw between science and pseudoscience, because far too much scientific knowledge would have to be thrown out to accommodate astrology with any plausibility. This same disposition appeared in David Bloor's reply to a review of Scientific Knowledge. In criticizing their choice of astrology as an example the review emphasized that there was a difference between drawing sharp, precisely defined boundaries between science and nonscience and distinguishing between extreme cases.Less
Years of public attacks on astrology by eminent scientists seem to have created the presumption that no scientist can address the subject in any context without deploring and condemning. This chapter criticizes that astrology provided a bad textbook illustration of an area that might shift across the boundary scientists draw between science and pseudoscience, because far too much scientific knowledge would have to be thrown out to accommodate astrology with any plausibility. This same disposition appeared in David Bloor's reply to a review of Scientific Knowledge. In criticizing their choice of astrology as an example the review emphasized that there was a difference between drawing sharp, precisely defined boundaries between science and nonscience and distinguishing between extreme cases.
Clyde Freeman Herreid
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262037426
- eISBN:
- 9780262344814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037426.003.0018
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
To combat pseudoscience, students must first understand that science is not just a collection of facts but it is a way of discovering the nature of the physical world. The way that scientists go ...
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To combat pseudoscience, students must first understand that science is not just a collection of facts but it is a way of discovering the nature of the physical world. The way that scientists go about their business is best learned by active learning strategies such as studying case studies of famous discoveries, rather than hearing about them via lecture as revealed wisdom. Equally, the follies of pseudoscience are best exposed when students discuss how extraordinary claims fail to live up to the canons of science where evidence is the final arbiter of truth.Less
To combat pseudoscience, students must first understand that science is not just a collection of facts but it is a way of discovering the nature of the physical world. The way that scientists go about their business is best learned by active learning strategies such as studying case studies of famous discoveries, rather than hearing about them via lecture as revealed wisdom. Equally, the follies of pseudoscience are best exposed when students discuss how extraordinary claims fail to live up to the canons of science where evidence is the final arbiter of truth.
Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226051796
- eISBN:
- 9780226051826
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226051826.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
What sets the practice of rigorously tested, sound science apart from pseudoscience? This book seeks to answer this question, known to philosophers of science as “the demarcation problem.” This issue ...
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What sets the practice of rigorously tested, sound science apart from pseudoscience? This book seeks to answer this question, known to philosophers of science as “the demarcation problem.” This issue has a long history in philosophy, stretching as far back as the early twentieth century and the work of Karl Popper. But by the late 1980s, scholars in the field began to treat the demarcation problem as impossible to solve and futile to ponder. However, the chapters here make a case for the unequivocal importance of reflecting on the separation between pseudoscience and sound science. Moreover, the demarcation problem is not a purely theoretical dilemma of mere academic interest: it affects parents' decisions to vaccinate children and governments' willingness to adopt policies that prevent climate change. Pseudoscience often mimics science, using the superficial language and trappings of actual scientific research to seem more respectable. Even a well-informed public can be taken in by such questionable theories dressed up as science. Pseudoscientific beliefs compete with sound science on the health pages of newspapers for media coverage and in laboratories for research funding. Now more than ever the ability to separate genuine scientific findings from spurious ones is vital, and this book provides ground for philosophers, sociologists, historians, and laypeople to make decisions about what science is or isn't.Less
What sets the practice of rigorously tested, sound science apart from pseudoscience? This book seeks to answer this question, known to philosophers of science as “the demarcation problem.” This issue has a long history in philosophy, stretching as far back as the early twentieth century and the work of Karl Popper. But by the late 1980s, scholars in the field began to treat the demarcation problem as impossible to solve and futile to ponder. However, the chapters here make a case for the unequivocal importance of reflecting on the separation between pseudoscience and sound science. Moreover, the demarcation problem is not a purely theoretical dilemma of mere academic interest: it affects parents' decisions to vaccinate children and governments' willingness to adopt policies that prevent climate change. Pseudoscience often mimics science, using the superficial language and trappings of actual scientific research to seem more respectable. Even a well-informed public can be taken in by such questionable theories dressed up as science. Pseudoscientific beliefs compete with sound science on the health pages of newspapers for media coverage and in laboratories for research funding. Now more than ever the ability to separate genuine scientific findings from spurious ones is vital, and this book provides ground for philosophers, sociologists, historians, and laypeople to make decisions about what science is or isn't.
Emilio J. C. Lobato and Corinne Zimmerman
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262037426
- eISBN:
- 9780262344814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037426.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
We review findings from the psychology of science that are relevant to understanding or explaining peoples’ tendencies to believe both scientific and pseudoscientific claims. We discuss relevant ...
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We review findings from the psychology of science that are relevant to understanding or explaining peoples’ tendencies to believe both scientific and pseudoscientific claims. We discuss relevant theoretical frameworks and empirical findings to support the proposal that pseudoscientific beliefs arise in much the same way as other scientific and non-scientific beliefs do. In particular, we focus on (a) cognitive and metacognitive factors at the individual level; (b) trust in testimony and judgments of expertise at the social level; and (c) personal identity and the public’s relationship with the scientific community at a cultural level.Less
We review findings from the psychology of science that are relevant to understanding or explaining peoples’ tendencies to believe both scientific and pseudoscientific claims. We discuss relevant theoretical frameworks and empirical findings to support the proposal that pseudoscientific beliefs arise in much the same way as other scientific and non-scientific beliefs do. In particular, we focus on (a) cognitive and metacognitive factors at the individual level; (b) trust in testimony and judgments of expertise at the social level; and (c) personal identity and the public’s relationship with the scientific community at a cultural level.
Arnold Kozak
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262037426
- eISBN:
- 9780262344814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037426.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The American public is vulnerable to pseudoscience due to 1) a general lack of science literacy (e.g., not knowing how to distinguish science from pseudoscience 2) pedagogy that emphasizes ...
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The American public is vulnerable to pseudoscience due to 1) a general lack of science literacy (e.g., not knowing how to distinguish science from pseudoscience 2) pedagogy that emphasizes memorization of facts over critical thinking (e.g., knowing how to ask questions), 3) insufficient epistemological development (e.g., not knowing how to evaluate truth claims), and 4) media distortions of science. This chapter will review these causes and explore a case example of the science claims made by the mindfulness movement that is currently popular in America.Less
The American public is vulnerable to pseudoscience due to 1) a general lack of science literacy (e.g., not knowing how to distinguish science from pseudoscience 2) pedagogy that emphasizes memorization of facts over critical thinking (e.g., knowing how to ask questions), 3) insufficient epistemological development (e.g., not knowing how to evaluate truth claims), and 4) media distortions of science. This chapter will review these causes and explore a case example of the science claims made by the mindfulness movement that is currently popular in America.
Chad Orzel
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262037426
- eISBN:
- 9780262344814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037426.003.0010
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Scientists and science communicators often lament high-profile public failures as "hurting science" by sowing doubt that can be exploited by purveyors of pseudo-science. I will argue that, on the ...
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Scientists and science communicators often lament high-profile public failures as "hurting science" by sowing doubt that can be exploited by purveyors of pseudo-science. I will argue that, on the contrary, these public failures can play a useful role in public discourse, by illustrating the proper process of science. Failures of genuine science are characterized by engagement with the research community, debate conducted via appropriate professional channels, and self-correction by the original researchers. Pseudoscience, on the other hand, is generally produced by individuals from outside the community, is promoted via mass-media channels, and involves stubborn refusal to shift conclusions in the face of criticism from the mainstream scientific community. I illustrate this contrast with three examples: the 2011 superluminal neutrino anomaly reported by the OPERA collaboration, the 2014 claim of primordial gravitational waves by the BICEP2 collaboration, and the pseudoscientific field of “hydrino” physics. The stark contrast between the process of genuine science and the behavior of pseudoscientists provides an educational opportunity that public advocates of science can use to bolster public confidence in the integrity of science.Less
Scientists and science communicators often lament high-profile public failures as "hurting science" by sowing doubt that can be exploited by purveyors of pseudo-science. I will argue that, on the contrary, these public failures can play a useful role in public discourse, by illustrating the proper process of science. Failures of genuine science are characterized by engagement with the research community, debate conducted via appropriate professional channels, and self-correction by the original researchers. Pseudoscience, on the other hand, is generally produced by individuals from outside the community, is promoted via mass-media channels, and involves stubborn refusal to shift conclusions in the face of criticism from the mainstream scientific community. I illustrate this contrast with three examples: the 2011 superluminal neutrino anomaly reported by the OPERA collaboration, the 2014 claim of primordial gravitational waves by the BICEP2 collaboration, and the pseudoscientific field of “hydrino” physics. The stark contrast between the process of genuine science and the behavior of pseudoscientists provides an educational opportunity that public advocates of science can use to bolster public confidence in the integrity of science.
Dennis M. Gorman
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262037426
- eISBN:
- 9780262344814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037426.003.0011
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Many of the subject matters discussed under the topic of pseudoscience can be readily distinguished from science proper, and there are few individuals with any serious scientific training who would ...
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Many of the subject matters discussed under the topic of pseudoscience can be readily distinguished from science proper, and there are few individuals with any serious scientific training who would mistake these for science-based disciplines. Harder to identify and distinguish are those disciplines that may have begun as a genuine science but have transformed into pseudosciences primarily through their pursuit of positive results. This chapter discusses one such example, drug prevention research, and contends that the adoption of so-called “evidence-based practice” by this field of study has been a key driver of its decent into pseudoscience. It discusses this process using a systems approach and focusses specifically on two negative feedback loops, one entailing flexible data analysis and selective reporting and one entailing minimal adherence to study design criteria. These lops are illustrated using examples of prevention and treatment programs that have been deemed “model” intervention by the National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (NREPP).Less
Many of the subject matters discussed under the topic of pseudoscience can be readily distinguished from science proper, and there are few individuals with any serious scientific training who would mistake these for science-based disciplines. Harder to identify and distinguish are those disciplines that may have begun as a genuine science but have transformed into pseudosciences primarily through their pursuit of positive results. This chapter discusses one such example, drug prevention research, and contends that the adoption of so-called “evidence-based practice” by this field of study has been a key driver of its decent into pseudoscience. It discusses this process using a systems approach and focusses specifically on two negative feedback loops, one entailing flexible data analysis and selective reporting and one entailing minimal adherence to study design criteria. These lops are illustrated using examples of prevention and treatment programs that have been deemed “model” intervention by the National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (NREPP).
Mark Benisz, John O. Willis, and Ron Dumont
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262037426
- eISBN:
- 9780262344814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037426.003.0016
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Although the term IQ is widely used in popular culture, the true definition of intelligence and how it is measured is misunderstood. We provide an overview of how the construct of intelligence and ...
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Although the term IQ is widely used in popular culture, the true definition of intelligence and how it is measured is misunderstood. We provide an overview of how the construct of intelligence and its measurement have evolved over the past century. Several of the most popular theories of intelligence as well as the controversy over the genetic basis of intelligence are reviewed. We also discuss some of the historical and contemporary misuses of intelligence test scores including some pseudoscientific applications of those scores. Some of the claims of brain training companies are debunked as are the validity of online IQ tests.Less
Although the term IQ is widely used in popular culture, the true definition of intelligence and how it is measured is misunderstood. We provide an overview of how the construct of intelligence and its measurement have evolved over the past century. Several of the most popular theories of intelligence as well as the controversy over the genetic basis of intelligence are reviewed. We also discuss some of the historical and contemporary misuses of intelligence test scores including some pseudoscientific applications of those scores. Some of the claims of brain training companies are debunked as are the validity of online IQ tests.
Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226051796
- eISBN:
- 9780226051826
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226051826.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This introductory chapter sets out the book's purpose, which is to offer a lively and constructive discussion about demarcationism among philosophers, sociologists, historians, and professional ...
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This introductory chapter sets out the book's purpose, which is to offer a lively and constructive discussion about demarcationism among philosophers, sociologists, historians, and professional skeptics. By proposing something of a new philosophical subdiscipline, the Philosophy of Pseudoscience, it attempts to convince those following in Larry Laudan's footsteps that the term “pseudoscience” does single out something real that merits attention. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.Less
This introductory chapter sets out the book's purpose, which is to offer a lively and constructive discussion about demarcationism among philosophers, sociologists, historians, and professional skeptics. By proposing something of a new philosophical subdiscipline, the Philosophy of Pseudoscience, it attempts to convince those following in Larry Laudan's footsteps that the term “pseudoscience” does single out something real that merits attention. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.
Martin Mahner
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226051796
- eISBN:
- 9780226051826
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226051826.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter explores a cluster approach to demarcation. The first step toward a feasible demarcation is choosing the most comprehensive unit of analysis: entire fields of knowledge, or epistemic ...
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This chapter explores a cluster approach to demarcation. The first step toward a feasible demarcation is choosing the most comprehensive unit of analysis: entire fields of knowledge, or epistemic fields. Choosing fields of knowledge as a starting point allows us to consider the many facets of science, namely that it is at the same time a body of knowledge and a social system of people including their collective activities. It allows us to consider not just the philosophy of science, but also the history, sociology, and psychology of science. However, one consequence of a cluster approach is that we must do with a reasonable profile of any given field rather than with a clear-cut assessment. A cluster demarcation also entails that the reasons we give for classifying a given field as a pseudoscience may vary from field to field.Less
This chapter explores a cluster approach to demarcation. The first step toward a feasible demarcation is choosing the most comprehensive unit of analysis: entire fields of knowledge, or epistemic fields. Choosing fields of knowledge as a starting point allows us to consider the many facets of science, namely that it is at the same time a body of knowledge and a social system of people including their collective activities. It allows us to consider not just the philosophy of science, but also the history, sociology, and psychology of science. However, one consequence of a cluster approach is that we must do with a reasonable profile of any given field rather than with a clear-cut assessment. A cluster demarcation also entails that the reasons we give for classifying a given field as a pseudoscience may vary from field to field.
James Ladyman
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226051796
- eISBN:
- 9780226051826
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226051826.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter first distinguishes between the concepts of pseudoscience, nonscience, bad science, and science fraud. It then considers why we need the concept of pseudoscience. Next, it deploys Harry ...
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This chapter first distinguishes between the concepts of pseudoscience, nonscience, bad science, and science fraud. It then considers why we need the concept of pseudoscience. Next, it deploys Harry Frankfurt's famous analysis of “bullshit” to highlight the difference between pseudoscience and straightforward scientific fraud.Less
This chapter first distinguishes between the concepts of pseudoscience, nonscience, bad science, and science fraud. It then considers why we need the concept of pseudoscience. Next, it deploys Harry Frankfurt's famous analysis of “bullshit” to highlight the difference between pseudoscience and straightforward scientific fraud.
Sven Ove Hansson
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226051796
- eISBN:
- 9780226051826
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226051826.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter recasts the demarcation problem in terms of epistemic warrant. It proposes a definition of pseudoscience that differs from most previous proposals by operating on a higher level of ...
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This chapter recasts the demarcation problem in terms of epistemic warrant. It proposes a definition of pseudoscience that differs from most previous proposals by operating on a higher level of epistemic generality. It defends that feature of the definition and explains how it contributes to avoiding some of the problems besetting previously proposed definitions.Less
This chapter recasts the demarcation problem in terms of epistemic warrant. It proposes a definition of pseudoscience that differs from most previous proposals by operating on a higher level of epistemic generality. It defends that feature of the definition and explains how it contributes to avoiding some of the problems besetting previously proposed definitions.
Maarten Boudry
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226051796
- eISBN:
- 9780226051826
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226051826.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter attempts to clarify the confusion between genuine demarcation (the science/pseudoscience boundaries) and the “territorial” demarcation between science and other epistemic fields ...
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This chapter attempts to clarify the confusion between genuine demarcation (the science/pseudoscience boundaries) and the “territorial” demarcation between science and other epistemic fields (philosophy, mathematics). It argues that only the former is pressing and worth pursuing. The territorial problem has little epistemic import, suffers from additional categorization problems, and consequently neither calls nor allows for anything more than a pragmatic and rough-and-ready solution. The normative demarcation project, by contrast is eminently worthy of philosophical attention, not only because it carries real epistemic import and practical urgency, but also because it happens to be a tractable problem.Less
This chapter attempts to clarify the confusion between genuine demarcation (the science/pseudoscience boundaries) and the “territorial” demarcation between science and other epistemic fields (philosophy, mathematics). It argues that only the former is pressing and worth pursuing. The territorial problem has little epistemic import, suffers from additional categorization problems, and consequently neither calls nor allows for anything more than a pragmatic and rough-and-ready solution. The normative demarcation project, by contrast is eminently worthy of philosophical attention, not only because it carries real epistemic import and practical urgency, but also because it happens to be a tractable problem.
Daniel P. Thurs and Ronald L. Numbers
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226051796
- eISBN:
- 9780226051826
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226051826.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter presents a historical analysis of pseudoscience, tracking down the coinage and currency of the term and explaining its shifting meaning in tandem with the emerging historical identity of ...
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This chapter presents a historical analysis of pseudoscience, tracking down the coinage and currency of the term and explaining its shifting meaning in tandem with the emerging historical identity of science. The discussions cover the invention of pseudoscience; science and pseudoscience in the late nineteenth century; pseudoscience in the new century; and pseudoscience and its critics in the late twentieth century.Less
This chapter presents a historical analysis of pseudoscience, tracking down the coinage and currency of the term and explaining its shifting meaning in tandem with the emerging historical identity of science. The discussions cover the invention of pseudoscience; science and pseudoscience in the late nineteenth century; pseudoscience in the new century; and pseudoscience and its critics in the late twentieth century.
Erich Goode
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226051796
- eISBN:
- 9780226051826
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226051826.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter analyzes paranormalism as a “deviant discipline” violating the consensus of established science. It discusses the five types of pseudoscientific belief systems: beliefs that depend on a ...
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This chapter analyzes paranormalism as a “deviant discipline” violating the consensus of established science. It discusses the five types of pseudoscientific belief systems: beliefs that depend on a client–practitioner relationship; paranormal belief systems that begin within a religious tradition and are sustained by a religious institution; a form of pseudoscience that is kept alive by a core of researchers who practice what seems to be the form but not the content of science; paranormal belief systems that can be characterized as grassroots in nature; and paranormal beliefs originating from the mind of a social isolate, a single person with an unusual, implausible, scientifically unworkable vision of how nature works. The chapter then presents case studies on astrology and parapsychology.Less
This chapter analyzes paranormalism as a “deviant discipline” violating the consensus of established science. It discusses the five types of pseudoscientific belief systems: beliefs that depend on a client–practitioner relationship; paranormal belief systems that begin within a religious tradition and are sustained by a religious institution; a form of pseudoscience that is kept alive by a core of researchers who practice what seems to be the form but not the content of science; paranormal belief systems that can be characterized as grassroots in nature; and paranormal beliefs originating from the mind of a social isolate, a single person with an unusual, implausible, scientifically unworkable vision of how nature works. The chapter then presents case studies on astrology and parapsychology.
Gary Westfahl
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252037801
- eISBN:
- 9780252095085
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252037801.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, 20th-century and Contemporary Literature
This chapter discusses William Gibson's contributions to science fiction fanzines in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with particular emphasis on his cartoons and articles. When he was fifteen, Gibson ...
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This chapter discusses William Gibson's contributions to science fiction fanzines in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with particular emphasis on his cartoons and articles. When he was fifteen, Gibson began publishing cartoons in Fanac and his own fanzines, which reflect an adolescent sense of humor. Two cartoons in Wormfarm indicate that Gibson, like many science fiction fans, detested John W. Campbell Jr.'s enthusiasms for dubious pseudoscience like psychic powers (“psionics”) and the Dean Drive, a purported engine that violated Newton's Third Law of Motion. Gibson's prose in early fanzines is generally unmemorable, suggesting that he channeled his creative energies into poetry at the time. During his stay in Arizona, Gibson devoted his time to doing normal things, but he never really stopped reading science fiction. This chapter also considers Gibson's published reviews and articles, including “Stoned,” which appeared in the 1976 issue of the BCSFA Newsletter.Less
This chapter discusses William Gibson's contributions to science fiction fanzines in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with particular emphasis on his cartoons and articles. When he was fifteen, Gibson began publishing cartoons in Fanac and his own fanzines, which reflect an adolescent sense of humor. Two cartoons in Wormfarm indicate that Gibson, like many science fiction fans, detested John W. Campbell Jr.'s enthusiasms for dubious pseudoscience like psychic powers (“psionics”) and the Dean Drive, a purported engine that violated Newton's Third Law of Motion. Gibson's prose in early fanzines is generally unmemorable, suggesting that he channeled his creative energies into poetry at the time. During his stay in Arizona, Gibson devoted his time to doing normal things, but he never really stopped reading science fiction. This chapter also considers Gibson's published reviews and articles, including “Stoned,” which appeared in the 1976 issue of the BCSFA Newsletter.
