Edouard Machery
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195306880
- eISBN:
- 9780199867950
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the ...
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Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. This book argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. The book shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. The book concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification.Less
Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. This book argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. The book shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. The book concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification.
Jerry A. Fodor
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236368
- eISBN:
- 9780191597404
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236360.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have ...
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Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.Less
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.
Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603617
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290652.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Morality is a practical matter that concerns choice and action, and a sound moral outlook should be capable of motivating someone to act virtuously. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that moral ...
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Morality is a practical matter that concerns choice and action, and a sound moral outlook should be capable of motivating someone to act virtuously. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that moral principles might play an important role in guiding action. This final chapter addresses this concern, and explains how moral principles can and should play an important role in guiding action. Moral principles can help us avoid the all too human failings of special pleading and rationalization. They can also help make certain features of situations more salient, and help structure thinking in ways more likely to lead to morally right action. Different philosophical models of principled guidance, contemporary empirical debates about the nature of moral cognition, and indeed of concept deployment more generally, are considered. It is argued that certain findings from cognitive science associated with so-called ‘prototype theory’ and ‘exemplar theory’ do not do much to undermine a robust role for moral principles in guiding the actions of a morally decent agent. Some empirical findings from ‘prospect theory’ about the effects of framing situations in one way rather than another are used to bolster the positive case for principled guidance.Less
Morality is a practical matter that concerns choice and action, and a sound moral outlook should be capable of motivating someone to act virtuously. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that moral principles might play an important role in guiding action. This final chapter addresses this concern, and explains how moral principles can and should play an important role in guiding action. Moral principles can help us avoid the all too human failings of special pleading and rationalization. They can also help make certain features of situations more salient, and help structure thinking in ways more likely to lead to morally right action. Different philosophical models of principled guidance, contemporary empirical debates about the nature of moral cognition, and indeed of concept deployment more generally, are considered. It is argued that certain findings from cognitive science associated with so-called ‘prototype theory’ and ‘exemplar theory’ do not do much to undermine a robust role for moral principles in guiding the actions of a morally decent agent. Some empirical findings from ‘prospect theory’ about the effects of framing situations in one way rather than another are used to bolster the positive case for principled guidance.
W. K. Estes
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195073355
- eISBN:
- 9780199867899
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195073355.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Nearly all categorization research has been concerned largely with learners' abilities to classify exemplars of categories, as in making diagnoses. However, the realization is emerging that other ...
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Nearly all categorization research has been concerned largely with learners' abilities to classify exemplars of categories, as in making diagnoses. However, the realization is emerging that other aspects of categorization may be of at least as much practical importance. This chapter examines some of these aspects. Topics covered include standard versus observational training procedures, learning based on average or configural prototypes, inducing prototypes, predicting features from categories, and pattern completion.Less
Nearly all categorization research has been concerned largely with learners' abilities to classify exemplars of categories, as in making diagnoses. However, the realization is emerging that other aspects of categorization may be of at least as much practical importance. This chapter examines some of these aspects. Topics covered include standard versus observational training procedures, learning based on average or configural prototypes, inducing prototypes, predicting features from categories, and pattern completion.
Ben Brubaker, Daniel Bump, and Solomon Friedberg
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691150659
- eISBN:
- 9781400838998
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691150659.003.0010
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Combinatorics / Graph Theory / Discrete Mathematics
This chapter deals with noncritical resonances. A short pattern is resonant at i if lsubscript i plus 1 = bᵢ. This property depends only on the associated prototype, so resonance is actually a ...
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This chapter deals with noncritical resonances. A short pattern is resonant at i if lsubscript i plus 1 = bᵢ. This property depends only on the associated prototype, so resonance is actually a property of prototypes. A first (middle) row entry is also called aᵢ critical if it is equal to one of its four neighbors, which are lᵢ, lsubscript i plus 1, bᵢ, and bsubscript i minus 1. We say that the resonance at i is critical if either aᵢ or asubscript i plus 1 is critical. The chapter introduces the relevant theorem, stating that if t is a strict pattern with no critical resonances, then t′ is also strict with no critical resonances. It also chooses a pair of canonical indexings of Γ = Γₜ and Δ′ = Δsubscript tprime.Less
This chapter deals with noncritical resonances. A short pattern is resonant at i if lsubscript i plus 1 = bᵢ. This property depends only on the associated prototype, so resonance is actually a property of prototypes. A first (middle) row entry is also called aᵢ critical if it is equal to one of its four neighbors, which are lᵢ, lsubscript i plus 1, bᵢ, and bsubscript i minus 1. We say that the resonance at i is critical if either aᵢ or asubscript i plus 1 is critical. The chapter introduces the relevant theorem, stating that if t is a strict pattern with no critical resonances, then t′ is also strict with no critical resonances. It also chooses a pair of canonical indexings of Γ = Γₜ and Δ′ = Δsubscript tprime.
Nikolas Gisborne
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577798
- eISBN:
- 9780191722417
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577798.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Syntax and Morphology
This chapter is a discussion of the polysemy of see, which is concerned with two main questions: how to model polysemy in a default inheritance based theory; and how fine‐grained an analysis of ...
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This chapter is a discussion of the polysemy of see, which is concerned with two main questions: how to model polysemy in a default inheritance based theory; and how fine‐grained an analysis of polysemy needs to be in order to understand the differences between examples such as we saw him cross the road and we saw that he was crossing the road. The analysis presents a subtle and detailed account of the polysemy of see, and argues for a model which relies on a theoretical innovation, the sublexeme. The sublexeme allows the model to keep information about a verb's sense and about its argument linking properties tightly bound together.Less
This chapter is a discussion of the polysemy of see, which is concerned with two main questions: how to model polysemy in a default inheritance based theory; and how fine‐grained an analysis of polysemy needs to be in order to understand the differences between examples such as we saw him cross the road and we saw that he was crossing the road. The analysis presents a subtle and detailed account of the polysemy of see, and argues for a model which relies on a theoretical innovation, the sublexeme. The sublexeme allows the model to keep information about a verb's sense and about its argument linking properties tightly bound together.
Adele Goldberg
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199268511
- eISBN:
- 9780191708428
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268511.003.0008
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Theoretical Linguistics
A recognition of general properties of categorization can be used to illuminate the functional underpinnings of aspects of grammar that appear at first to be arbitrary syntactic facts. One such case, ...
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A recognition of general properties of categorization can be used to illuminate the functional underpinnings of aspects of grammar that appear at first to be arbitrary syntactic facts. One such case, that of Subject-Auxiliary Inversion (SAI) is investigated in this chapter which builds on previous accounts that have offered insightful generalizations about the function of SAI constructions. It is argued that a case that is apparently somewhat exceptional — that of exclamatives — is actually strongly motivated as well. Formal restrictions on SAI are addressed and accounted for by a functional account. The implication of this work is that synchronic functional motivations often lurk behind seemingly syntactic brute facts, and can be used to explain many aspects of grammar that appear otherwise to be wholly idiosyncratic.Less
A recognition of general properties of categorization can be used to illuminate the functional underpinnings of aspects of grammar that appear at first to be arbitrary syntactic facts. One such case, that of Subject-Auxiliary Inversion (SAI) is investigated in this chapter which builds on previous accounts that have offered insightful generalizations about the function of SAI constructions. It is argued that a case that is apparently somewhat exceptional — that of exclamatives — is actually strongly motivated as well. Formal restrictions on SAI are addressed and accounted for by a functional account. The implication of this work is that synchronic functional motivations often lurk behind seemingly syntactic brute facts, and can be used to explain many aspects of grammar that appear otherwise to be wholly idiosyncratic.
Ronald W. Langacker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331967
- eISBN:
- 9780199868209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.003.0010
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
Personal pronouns and proper names are inherently grounded. The structure of other nominals tends to reflect semantic function, with the head noun as core, grounding as the outermost layer, and ...
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Personal pronouns and proper names are inherently grounded. The structure of other nominals tends to reflect semantic function, with the head noun as core, grounding as the outermost layer, and modifiers in between. Noun modification is varied both semantically and in its structural implementation. When nominal and relational expressions combine grammatically, there is often a discrepancy between the nominal expression's profile and the entity which participates most directly in the relationship—its active zone with respect to that relationship. Noun classes have varying degrees of semantic motivation. Distributional classes, defined by participation in particular patterns, may be semantically arbitrary. While gender-type classes have semantic prototypes, the class as a whole is defined by a consistent set of grammatical behaviors. In a usage based approach, such classes are characterized by families of constructional schemas. Noun classifiers likewise have prototypical values semantically extended to a range of other cases. They represent a distinct kind of nominal structure in which the classifier functions as a schematic head noun. Classifiers are related to quantifier constructions allowing the unitization of a mass. Nouns bear various kinds of grammatical markings. Most intrinsic to nouns are elements deriving them from other classes. There is no sharp distinction between such derivation and noun inflection. Markings of gender and number are intermediate. More extrinsic are markings indicating a nominal's role in higher-level grammatical constructions. These are meaningful in a symbolic account of grammar. Such an account accommodates both agreement—the multiple realization of semantic specifications—and cases where multiple specifications are realized by a single, unanalyzable form. Analyzability is a matter of degree.Less
Personal pronouns and proper names are inherently grounded. The structure of other nominals tends to reflect semantic function, with the head noun as core, grounding as the outermost layer, and modifiers in between. Noun modification is varied both semantically and in its structural implementation. When nominal and relational expressions combine grammatically, there is often a discrepancy between the nominal expression's profile and the entity which participates most directly in the relationship—its active zone with respect to that relationship. Noun classes have varying degrees of semantic motivation. Distributional classes, defined by participation in particular patterns, may be semantically arbitrary. While gender-type classes have semantic prototypes, the class as a whole is defined by a consistent set of grammatical behaviors. In a usage based approach, such classes are characterized by families of constructional schemas. Noun classifiers likewise have prototypical values semantically extended to a range of other cases. They represent a distinct kind of nominal structure in which the classifier functions as a schematic head noun. Classifiers are related to quantifier constructions allowing the unitization of a mass. Nouns bear various kinds of grammatical markings. Most intrinsic to nouns are elements deriving them from other classes. There is no sharp distinction between such derivation and noun inflection. Markings of gender and number are intermediate. More extrinsic are markings indicating a nominal's role in higher-level grammatical constructions. These are meaningful in a symbolic account of grammar. Such an account accommodates both agreement—the multiple realization of semantic specifications—and cases where multiple specifications are realized by a single, unanalyzable form. Analyzability is a matter of degree.
Ronald W. Langacker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331967
- eISBN:
- 9780199868209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.003.0011
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
A full clause profiles a grounded instance of a process type. Conceptual archetypes function as the prototypical values of basic clause types and clausal elements. Languages naturally differ in their ...
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A full clause profiles a grounded instance of a process type. Conceptual archetypes function as the prototypical values of basic clause types and clausal elements. Languages naturally differ in their implementation of this general characterization, and within a language clauses are varied and complex. Subject and object are defined schematically as trajector and landmark, i.e. primary and secondary focal participant. In most languages a particular semantic role represents the typical choice of trajector: either agent or theme (a patient-like participant). Each is the starting point along a natural path: the path of energy flow in the case of agent, and a path based on conceptual autonomy in the case of theme. In varied proportions and for different grammatical phenomena, every language makes some use of these two basic strategies. This is the basis for nominative/accusative, ergative/absolutive, and agent/patient organization. It can be argued that subject is a grammatical universal when defined abstractly in terms of primary focal prominence. In addition to the most typical clausal organization, every language offers a variety of alternatives for special purposes. Voice alternations (such as active, passive, and middle) pertain to the semantic role of the participant focused as trajector. The trajector can also be a non-participant, e.g. a setting or location. There is comparable variation in the choice of landmark, resulting in different kinds of objects. In agent-oriented languages, clauses which choose the theme as trajector represent an important secondary option. The verb of a clause is often complex. In addition to incorporating nominal or adverbial elements, the verb can exhibit layers of morphological derivation, be a phrase instead of a single word, or even consist in a series of verb-like elements.Less
A full clause profiles a grounded instance of a process type. Conceptual archetypes function as the prototypical values of basic clause types and clausal elements. Languages naturally differ in their implementation of this general characterization, and within a language clauses are varied and complex. Subject and object are defined schematically as trajector and landmark, i.e. primary and secondary focal participant. In most languages a particular semantic role represents the typical choice of trajector: either agent or theme (a patient-like participant). Each is the starting point along a natural path: the path of energy flow in the case of agent, and a path based on conceptual autonomy in the case of theme. In varied proportions and for different grammatical phenomena, every language makes some use of these two basic strategies. This is the basis for nominative/accusative, ergative/absolutive, and agent/patient organization. It can be argued that subject is a grammatical universal when defined abstractly in terms of primary focal prominence. In addition to the most typical clausal organization, every language offers a variety of alternatives for special purposes. Voice alternations (such as active, passive, and middle) pertain to the semantic role of the participant focused as trajector. The trajector can also be a non-participant, e.g. a setting or location. There is comparable variation in the choice of landmark, resulting in different kinds of objects. In agent-oriented languages, clauses which choose the theme as trajector represent an important secondary option. The verb of a clause is often complex. In addition to incorporating nominal or adverbial elements, the verb can exhibit layers of morphological derivation, be a phrase instead of a single word, or even consist in a series of verb-like elements.
Ronald W. Langacker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331967
- eISBN:
- 9780199868209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.003.0002
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
Without contradiction, linguistic meaning is seen as residing in conceptualization and as having a social-interactive basis. Conceptualization is fundamentally imagistic rather than propositional. ...
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Without contradiction, linguistic meaning is seen as residing in conceptualization and as having a social-interactive basis. Conceptualization is fundamentally imagistic rather than propositional. Instead of there being a unique set of semantic primitives, there are different kinds of elemental conceptions, each basic in its own respect. Certain fundamental grammatical notions are semantically characterized both schematically, in terms of basic cognitive abilities, and prototypically, in terms of experientially grounded conceptual archetypes. Linguistic meanings do not reflect the world in any direct or straightforward manner, but rather embody particular ways of construing the situations described, often involving imagination and mental constructions. There is no specific boundary between linguistic and extralinguistic aspects of lexical meanings (which are better likened metaphorically to encyclopedia entries rather than dictionary entries), nor between semantics and pragmatics. Hence semantics is only partially (not fully) compositional. An expression derives its meaning by flexibly invoking an open-ended set of cognitive domains, i.e. concepts or conceptual complexes of any degree of complexity. These domains are connected in various ways, e.g. by overlap, inclusion, and metaphorical correspondences. There is no clear distinction between domains and mental spaces.Less
Without contradiction, linguistic meaning is seen as residing in conceptualization and as having a social-interactive basis. Conceptualization is fundamentally imagistic rather than propositional. Instead of there being a unique set of semantic primitives, there are different kinds of elemental conceptions, each basic in its own respect. Certain fundamental grammatical notions are semantically characterized both schematically, in terms of basic cognitive abilities, and prototypically, in terms of experientially grounded conceptual archetypes. Linguistic meanings do not reflect the world in any direct or straightforward manner, but rather embody particular ways of construing the situations described, often involving imagination and mental constructions. There is no specific boundary between linguistic and extralinguistic aspects of lexical meanings (which are better likened metaphorically to encyclopedia entries rather than dictionary entries), nor between semantics and pragmatics. Hence semantics is only partially (not fully) compositional. An expression derives its meaning by flexibly invoking an open-ended set of cognitive domains, i.e. concepts or conceptual complexes of any degree of complexity. These domains are connected in various ways, e.g. by overlap, inclusion, and metaphorical correspondences. There is no clear distinction between domains and mental spaces.
Ronald W. Langacker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331967
- eISBN:
- 9780199868209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
The standard doctrine that basic grammatical classes (parts of speech) are not semantically definable rests on erroneous assumptions about the nature of linguistic meaning. With a proper view of ...
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The standard doctrine that basic grammatical classes (parts of speech) are not semantically definable rests on erroneous assumptions about the nature of linguistic meaning. With a proper view of meaning, basic categories—notably noun and verb—have plausible conceptual characterizations at both the prototype level (for typical examples) and the schema level (valid for all instances). The prototypes are based on conceptual archetypes: objects for nouns, and actions for verbs. The schemas are independent of any particular conceptual content, residing instead in basic cognitive abilities immanent in the archetypes: for nouns, grouping and reification; in the case of verbs, the ability to apprend relationships and to track their evolution through time. An expression's grammatical category specifically depends on the nature of its profile (not its overall content). Thus a noun profiles a thing (defined abstractly as any product of grouping and reification), while a verb profiles a process (a relationship tracked through time). Expressions that profile non-processual relationships include adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, infinitives, and participles. Relational expressions can be categorized in different ways, depending on factors like the number and type of focused participants, whether the profiled relation is simplex or complex, and whether it is apprehended holistically or sequentially. These characterizations prove efficacious in describing how relational expressions function as noun modifiers and in clausal organization.Less
The standard doctrine that basic grammatical classes (parts of speech) are not semantically definable rests on erroneous assumptions about the nature of linguistic meaning. With a proper view of meaning, basic categories—notably noun and verb—have plausible conceptual characterizations at both the prototype level (for typical examples) and the schema level (valid for all instances). The prototypes are based on conceptual archetypes: objects for nouns, and actions for verbs. The schemas are independent of any particular conceptual content, residing instead in basic cognitive abilities immanent in the archetypes: for nouns, grouping and reification; in the case of verbs, the ability to apprend relationships and to track their evolution through time. An expression's grammatical category specifically depends on the nature of its profile (not its overall content). Thus a noun profiles a thing (defined abstractly as any product of grouping and reification), while a verb profiles a process (a relationship tracked through time). Expressions that profile non-processual relationships include adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, infinitives, and participles. Relational expressions can be categorized in different ways, depending on factors like the number and type of focused participants, whether the profiled relation is simplex or complex, and whether it is apprehended holistically or sequentially. These characterizations prove efficacious in describing how relational expressions function as noun modifiers and in clausal organization.
Lowell Edmunds
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691165127
- eISBN:
- 9781400874224
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691165127.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, Folk Literature
This chapter examines the divine twins, the “Dioscuri,” to which Helen is variously related in the mythology. After reviewing the evidence for the theft of Helen and her rescue by the Dioscuri, the ...
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This chapter examines the divine twins, the “Dioscuri,” to which Helen is variously related in the mythology. After reviewing the evidence for the theft of Helen and her rescue by the Dioscuri, the chapter studies the Indo-European background of the trio, and attempts to reconstruct an Indo-European prototype story. Turning back to the Greeks, the chapter asks if the evidence for the three characters suggests some more primordial trio lying behind the rescue story. However, the chapter abandons the search for Indo-European or primordial prototypes of the story for want of sufficient evidence, though it argues that, nevertheless, one does not have to deny every kind of Indo-European explanation.Less
This chapter examines the divine twins, the “Dioscuri,” to which Helen is variously related in the mythology. After reviewing the evidence for the theft of Helen and her rescue by the Dioscuri, the chapter studies the Indo-European background of the trio, and attempts to reconstruct an Indo-European prototype story. Turning back to the Greeks, the chapter asks if the evidence for the three characters suggests some more primordial trio lying behind the rescue story. However, the chapter abandons the search for Indo-European or primordial prototypes of the story for want of sufficient evidence, though it argues that, nevertheless, one does not have to deny every kind of Indo-European explanation.
William Croft
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198299554
- eISBN:
- 9780191708091
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198299554.003.0002
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
Most grammatical theories assume that the parts of speech — noun, verb, adjective — are categories of particular languages, but may be absent in some languages. But standard analyses are arbitrary ...
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Most grammatical theories assume that the parts of speech — noun, verb, adjective — are categories of particular languages, but may be absent in some languages. But standard analyses are arbitrary and inconsistent about the constructions used to define syntactic categories, which leads some theorists to lump words into fewer categories and others to split words into more categories. One can be rigorous and consistent in analysis by using the same constructions across languages, namely the constructions denoting the propositional acts of reference, predication and modification, and comparing the structural coding and behavioral potential of semantic classes of lexical roots. This rigorous approach leads to universal prototypes for noun (reference to an object), verb (predication of an action), and adjective (modification by a property). Language-specific categories are represented as semantic maps on a universal conceptual space, constrained by the part of speech prototypes.Less
Most grammatical theories assume that the parts of speech — noun, verb, adjective — are categories of particular languages, but may be absent in some languages. But standard analyses are arbitrary and inconsistent about the constructions used to define syntactic categories, which leads some theorists to lump words into fewer categories and others to split words into more categories. One can be rigorous and consistent in analysis by using the same constructions across languages, namely the constructions denoting the propositional acts of reference, predication and modification, and comparing the structural coding and behavioral potential of semantic classes of lexical roots. This rigorous approach leads to universal prototypes for noun (reference to an object), verb (predication of an action), and adjective (modification by a property). Language-specific categories are represented as semantic maps on a universal conceptual space, constrained by the part of speech prototypes.
Sam Glucksberg
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195111095
- eISBN:
- 9780199872107
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195111095.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Are idioms just long words or do they share syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties with language in general? Four classes of idioms are identified: (1) non-compositional/opaque, which cannot ...
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Are idioms just long words or do they share syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties with language in general? Four classes of idioms are identified: (1) non-compositional/opaque, which cannot be analyzed either semantically or syntactically and whose meanings cannot be derived, e.g., “by and large”; (2) compositional/opaque, which can be syntactically analyzed but whose meanings also cannot be derived e.g., “kick the bucket”; (3) compositional/transparent, which can be both syntactically and semantically analyzed and whose meanings can be mapped onto their constituent words, e.g., “spill the beans”, and (4) quasi-metaphorical, which behave just as do metaphors, e.g., “don't give up the ship”. A quasi-metaphorical idiom uses a prototypical instance of a category of events (surrendering) to refer to a specific instance of surrendering, just as metaphors use a prototypical category member to refer to a new member of that category, e.g., “shark” as the class of predators to identify “lawyer” as a new member of that class. These four idiom types share a common property: they are understood more quickly than comparable literal expressions, presumably because they can be understood via memory retrieval, while literal expressions require syntactic and semantic analyses.Less
Are idioms just long words or do they share syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties with language in general? Four classes of idioms are identified: (1) non-compositional/opaque, which cannot be analyzed either semantically or syntactically and whose meanings cannot be derived, e.g., “by and large”; (2) compositional/opaque, which can be syntactically analyzed but whose meanings also cannot be derived e.g., “kick the bucket”; (3) compositional/transparent, which can be both syntactically and semantically analyzed and whose meanings can be mapped onto their constituent words, e.g., “spill the beans”, and (4) quasi-metaphorical, which behave just as do metaphors, e.g., “don't give up the ship”. A quasi-metaphorical idiom uses a prototypical instance of a category of events (surrendering) to refer to a specific instance of surrendering, just as metaphors use a prototypical category member to refer to a new member of that category, e.g., “shark” as the class of predators to identify “lawyer” as a new member of that class. These four idiom types share a common property: they are understood more quickly than comparable literal expressions, presumably because they can be understood via memory retrieval, while literal expressions require syntactic and semantic analyses.
Solly Angel
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195158687
- eISBN:
- 9780199849826
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158687.003.0010
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Innovation
By early 1988, Solly Angel already had a patent application pending and a novel design for a personal scale, and he was resolved to make New York City into his home base for the scale venture. The ...
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By early 1988, Solly Angel already had a patent application pending and a novel design for a personal scale, and he was resolved to make New York City into his home base for the scale venture. The most critical part of the plan would be the assembly of a working prototype of a thin and lightweight scale that actually measured weight. All of the experiments, both at Harry's and at Altas', were conducted with large batteries or with an external power supply. He traveled to Amsterdam with a working prototype of the thin scale. For a moment there in Groningen, the scale quest was transformed into a struggle for the liberation of the suffering masses from the vacillating tyranny of scales that did not care enough about their users to tell them the honest truth, even if it were the simple fact of their correct weight, or the correct change in their weight since they last weighed themselves.Less
By early 1988, Solly Angel already had a patent application pending and a novel design for a personal scale, and he was resolved to make New York City into his home base for the scale venture. The most critical part of the plan would be the assembly of a working prototype of a thin and lightweight scale that actually measured weight. All of the experiments, both at Harry's and at Altas', were conducted with large batteries or with an external power supply. He traveled to Amsterdam with a working prototype of the thin scale. For a moment there in Groningen, the scale quest was transformed into a struggle for the liberation of the suffering masses from the vacillating tyranny of scales that did not care enough about their users to tell them the honest truth, even if it were the simple fact of their correct weight, or the correct change in their weight since they last weighed themselves.
Ben Brubaker, Daniel Bump, and Solomon Friedberg
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691150659
- eISBN:
- 9781400838998
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691150659.003.0011
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Combinatorics / Graph Theory / Discrete Mathematics
This chapter divides the prototypes into much smaller units called types. It fixes a top and bottom row, and therefore a cartoon. For each episode ε of the cartoon, the chapter fixes an integer ...
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This chapter divides the prototypes into much smaller units called types. It fixes a top and bottom row, and therefore a cartoon. For each episode ε of the cartoon, the chapter fixes an integer κsubscript Greek small letter epsilon. Then the set of all short Gelfand-Tsetlin patterns with the given top and bottom rows is called a type. Thus two patterns are in the same type if and only if they have the same top and bottom rows (and hence the same cartoon), and if the sum of the first (middle) row elements in each episode is the same for both patterns. The possible episodes may be grouped into four classes: Class I, II, III, and IV.Less
This chapter divides the prototypes into much smaller units called types. It fixes a top and bottom row, and therefore a cartoon. For each episode ε of the cartoon, the chapter fixes an integer κsubscript Greek small letter epsilon. Then the set of all short Gelfand-Tsetlin patterns with the given top and bottom rows is called a type. Thus two patterns are in the same type if and only if they have the same top and bottom rows (and hence the same cartoon), and if the sum of the first (middle) row elements in each episode is the same for both patterns. The possible episodes may be grouped into four classes: Class I, II, III, and IV.
Bradley C. Love and Marc Tomlinson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199549221
- eISBN:
- 9780191724152
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199549221.003.04
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This chapter reviews the relative merits of a variety of category learning models. These include rule-based models, prototype-based models, exemplar-based models, hybrid models, and multiple systems ...
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This chapter reviews the relative merits of a variety of category learning models. These include rule-based models, prototype-based models, exemplar-based models, hybrid models, and multiple systems models. All of these models have played a critical role in driving advances in theory and in the design of key experiments. The development of new models is informed by the failings of preceding models.Less
This chapter reviews the relative merits of a variety of category learning models. These include rule-based models, prototype-based models, exemplar-based models, hybrid models, and multiple systems models. All of these models have played a critical role in driving advances in theory and in the design of key experiments. The development of new models is informed by the failings of preceding models.
Frank Graziano
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195136401
- eISBN:
- 9780199835164
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195136403.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
Considers the ways in which sanctity is constructed in folklore, hagiography, iconography, and testimony taken during processes for canonization. Detailed analysis elucidates how an unrealized ideal ...
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Considers the ways in which sanctity is constructed in folklore, hagiography, iconography, and testimony taken during processes for canonization. Detailed analysis elucidates how an unrealized ideal constructed textually serves as the model for aspirants to sanctity, how this prototype becomes a palimpsest as over the centuries new textually constructed lives are embedded, how tautology contributes to perceptions of sanctity, and how true saints are distinguished from impostors. The case material includes saints Catherine of Siena, Mariana of Jesus, and Teresa of Avila, in addition to Rose of Lima.Less
Considers the ways in which sanctity is constructed in folklore, hagiography, iconography, and testimony taken during processes for canonization. Detailed analysis elucidates how an unrealized ideal constructed textually serves as the model for aspirants to sanctity, how this prototype becomes a palimpsest as over the centuries new textually constructed lives are embedded, how tautology contributes to perceptions of sanctity, and how true saints are distinguished from impostors. The case material includes saints Catherine of Siena, Mariana of Jesus, and Teresa of Avila, in addition to Rose of Lima.
János Kornai
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198287766
- eISBN:
- 9780191596551
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198287763.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic Systems
This chapter begins with an outline of the Marxian image of socialism, and of the three socialist‐system prototypes: the revolutionary‐transitional system (the transition from capitalism to ...
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This chapter begins with an outline of the Marxian image of socialism, and of the three socialist‐system prototypes: the revolutionary‐transitional system (the transition from capitalism to socialism), the classical system (or classical socialism), and the reform system (or reform socialism). This is followed by short analyses of the system before the socialist revolution, and of the revolutionary transition towards the classical system.Less
This chapter begins with an outline of the Marxian image of socialism, and of the three socialist‐system prototypes: the revolutionary‐transitional system (the transition from capitalism to socialism), the classical system (or classical socialism), and the reform system (or reform socialism). This is followed by short analyses of the system before the socialist revolution, and of the revolutionary transition towards the classical system.
Irit Mevorach
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199544721
- eISBN:
- 9780191705564
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199544721.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Company and Commercial Law
This chapter attempts to classify certain prototypes of MEG insolvency, hence, enabling some measure of generalization across cases and scenarios. The prototypes are described along three key factors ...
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This chapter attempts to classify certain prototypes of MEG insolvency, hence, enabling some measure of generalization across cases and scenarios. The prototypes are described along three key factors identified in this chapter as relevant to the issue of insolvency within MEGs — the insolvency scenario dimension (i.e., which companies are involved in the process), the integration dimension (the level of inter-dependence among the group member) and the dimension of centralization (the extent to which the MEG was centrally managed and controlled). As the dimensions selected are first and foremost relevant for the issue of international insolvency of the MEG, the result is a suitable taxonomy that facilitates discussion in the subsequent chapters on desirable linking measures for insolvency within MEGs.Less
This chapter attempts to classify certain prototypes of MEG insolvency, hence, enabling some measure of generalization across cases and scenarios. The prototypes are described along three key factors identified in this chapter as relevant to the issue of insolvency within MEGs — the insolvency scenario dimension (i.e., which companies are involved in the process), the integration dimension (the level of inter-dependence among the group member) and the dimension of centralization (the extent to which the MEG was centrally managed and controlled). As the dimensions selected are first and foremost relevant for the issue of international insolvency of the MEG, the result is a suitable taxonomy that facilitates discussion in the subsequent chapters on desirable linking measures for insolvency within MEGs.
