Ian P. Howard and Brian J. Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195367607
- eISBN:
- 9780199867264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367607.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology
Much can be learned about the visual system by studying clinical defects and abnormalities. This chapter reviews defects of depth perception that result from brain damage or genetic defects such as ...
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Much can be learned about the visual system by studying clinical defects and abnormalities. This chapter reviews defects of depth perception that result from brain damage or genetic defects such as albinism, with particular attention paid to the signs and symptoms of loss of binocularity. The discussions cover stereoanomalies; brain damage and stereopsis; abnormal interocular transfer; binocularity and proprioception; and albinism.Less
Much can be learned about the visual system by studying clinical defects and abnormalities. This chapter reviews defects of depth perception that result from brain damage or genetic defects such as albinism, with particular attention paid to the signs and symptoms of loss of binocularity. The discussions cover stereoanomalies; brain damage and stereopsis; abnormal interocular transfer; binocularity and proprioception; and albinism.
Ian P. Howard and Brian J. Rogers
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195084764
- eISBN:
- 9780199871049
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195084764.003.0015
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter begins with a discussion of the development of the visual system and the development of binocular vision. It then covers stereoanomalies, brain damage and stereopsis, the effects of dark ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of the development of the visual system and the development of binocular vision. It then covers stereoanomalies, brain damage and stereopsis, the effects of dark rearing, monocular deprivation, amblyopia, binocularity in the stereoblind, proprioception, and albinism.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of the development of the visual system and the development of binocular vision. It then covers stereoanomalies, brain damage and stereopsis, the effects of dark rearing, monocular deprivation, amblyopia, binocularity in the stereoblind, proprioception, and albinism.
Mark L. Latash
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195333169
- eISBN:
- 9780199864195
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333169.003.0003
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Sensory and Motor Systems, Techniques
The third part of the book starts with a review of the contribution of two great scientists, Israel Gelfand and Michael Tsetlin, to motor control. The notions of hierarchical control and structural ...
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The third part of the book starts with a review of the contribution of two great scientists, Israel Gelfand and Michael Tsetlin, to motor control. The notions of hierarchical control and structural units are introduced, and the principle of minimal interaction is described as a governing principle for the control of multi-element systems. Further, two views on the control of voluntary movements are contrasted. The first one operates with motor programs and internal models. The alternative view assumes that the controller defines parameters of the system, not its performance variables. The equilibrium-point hypothesis is introduced first at a single-muscle level, and then it is generalized for multi-muscle systems. A number of misconceptions about the equilibrium-point hypothesis are reviewed. This Part also contains six Digressions that present brief overviews of such topics as muscle properties, information transmission in the central nervous system, proprioception, reflexes, brain imaging, and adaptation to force fields.Less
The third part of the book starts with a review of the contribution of two great scientists, Israel Gelfand and Michael Tsetlin, to motor control. The notions of hierarchical control and structural units are introduced, and the principle of minimal interaction is described as a governing principle for the control of multi-element systems. Further, two views on the control of voluntary movements are contrasted. The first one operates with motor programs and internal models. The alternative view assumes that the controller defines parameters of the system, not its performance variables. The equilibrium-point hypothesis is introduced first at a single-muscle level, and then it is generalized for multi-muscle systems. A number of misconceptions about the equilibrium-point hypothesis are reviewed. This Part also contains six Digressions that present brief overviews of such topics as muscle properties, information transmission in the central nervous system, proprioception, reflexes, brain imaging, and adaptation to force fields.
José Luis Bermúdez
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explores the dialectic between discussions of bodily awareness in the phenomenological tradition and in contemporary philosophy of mind and scientific psychology. It shows, with ...
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This chapter explores the dialectic between discussions of bodily awareness in the phenomenological tradition and in contemporary philosophy of mind and scientific psychology. It shows, with particular reference to Merleau–Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, how phenomenological insights into bodily awareness and its role in agency can be developed and illuminated by research into somatic proprioception and motor control. The chapter presents a taxonomy of different types and levels of bodily awareness, and a model of the spatiality of bodily awareness that explains some of the fundamental differences that Merleau–Ponty identified between our experience of our bodies and our experience of non-bodily objects. The key to these differences is that bodily locations are given on a non-Cartesian frame of reference. The final section shows how this way of thinking about the phenomenology of bodily awareness has interesting and fruitful connections with current thinking about motor control.Less
This chapter explores the dialectic between discussions of bodily awareness in the phenomenological tradition and in contemporary philosophy of mind and scientific psychology. It shows, with particular reference to Merleau–Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, how phenomenological insights into bodily awareness and its role in agency can be developed and illuminated by research into somatic proprioception and motor control. The chapter presents a taxonomy of different types and levels of bodily awareness, and a model of the spatiality of bodily awareness that explains some of the fundamental differences that Merleau–Ponty identified between our experience of our bodies and our experience of non-bodily objects. The key to these differences is that bodily locations are given on a non-Cartesian frame of reference. The final section shows how this way of thinking about the phenomenology of bodily awareness has interesting and fruitful connections with current thinking about motor control.
Carlo Semenza
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199234110
- eISBN:
- 9780191594250
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234110.003.12
- Subject:
- Psychology, Neuropsychology, Clinical Psychology
This chapter begins with a discussion of the various pathological conditions involved in disorders of awareness and representation of body parts. It then discusses autotopagnosia, personal neglect ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of the various pathological conditions involved in disorders of awareness and representation of body parts. It then discusses autotopagnosia, personal neglect and related disorders, alien hand syndrome, altered muscular proprioception, phantom limb and related phenomena, and body-specific cognitive biases in eating disorders.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of the various pathological conditions involved in disorders of awareness and representation of body parts. It then discusses autotopagnosia, personal neglect and related disorders, alien hand syndrome, altered muscular proprioception, phantom limb and related phenomena, and body-specific cognitive biases in eating disorders.
Andrew J. Bremner, Nicholas P. Holmes, and Charles Spence
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199586059
- eISBN:
- 9780191741470
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586059.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This chapter reviews research directed at tracking the development of multisensory representations of the body, limbs, and the near-to-hand environment in infancy and early childhood. The focus is on ...
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This chapter reviews research directed at tracking the development of multisensory representations of the body, limbs, and the near-to-hand environment in infancy and early childhood. The focus is on the development of the multisensory processes involved in the representation of the body in a canonical posture, and more dynamic forms of multisensory integration which are required to represent the body as it moves and adopts different postures. These kinds of representation form the basis of action on the environment. The chapter argues that an understanding of the development of multisensory representations of the body and peripersonal space has important implications both for theories of perceptual and cognitive development.Less
This chapter reviews research directed at tracking the development of multisensory representations of the body, limbs, and the near-to-hand environment in infancy and early childhood. The focus is on the development of the multisensory processes involved in the representation of the body in a canonical posture, and more dynamic forms of multisensory integration which are required to represent the body as it moves and adopts different postures. These kinds of representation form the basis of action on the environment. The chapter argues that an understanding of the development of multisensory representations of the body and peripersonal space has important implications both for theories of perceptual and cognitive development.
José Luis Bermúdez
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262037501
- eISBN:
- 9780262344661
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037501.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
How can we be aware of ourselves both as physical objects and as thinking, experiencing subjects? What role does the experience of the body play in generating our sense of self? What is the role of ...
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How can we be aware of ourselves both as physical objects and as thinking, experiencing subjects? What role does the experience of the body play in generating our sense of self? What is the role of action and agency in the construction of the bodily self?
These questions have been a rich subject of interdisciplinary debate among philosophers, neuroscientists, experimental psychologists, and cognitive scientists for several decades. José Luis Bermúdez been a significant contributor to these debates since the 1990’s, when he authored The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (MIT Press, 1998) and co-edited The Body and the Self (MIT Press, 1995) with Anthony Marcel and Naomi Eilan.
The Bodily Self is a selection of essays all focused on different aspects of the role of the body in self-consciousness, prefaced by a substantial introduction outlining common themes across the essays. The essays have been published in a wide range of journals and edited volumes. Putting them together brings out a wide-ranging, thematically consistent perspective on a set of topics and problems that remain firmly of interest across the cognitive and behavioral sciences.Less
How can we be aware of ourselves both as physical objects and as thinking, experiencing subjects? What role does the experience of the body play in generating our sense of self? What is the role of action and agency in the construction of the bodily self?
These questions have been a rich subject of interdisciplinary debate among philosophers, neuroscientists, experimental psychologists, and cognitive scientists for several decades. José Luis Bermúdez been a significant contributor to these debates since the 1990’s, when he authored The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (MIT Press, 1998) and co-edited The Body and the Self (MIT Press, 1995) with Anthony Marcel and Naomi Eilan.
The Bodily Self is a selection of essays all focused on different aspects of the role of the body in self-consciousness, prefaced by a substantial introduction outlining common themes across the essays. The essays have been published in a wide range of journals and edited volumes. Putting them together brings out a wide-ranging, thematically consistent perspective on a set of topics and problems that remain firmly of interest across the cognitive and behavioral sciences.
Ingmar Persson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276905
- eISBN:
- 9780191603198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276900.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter contends that one’s perception of one’s own body from the inside, in proprioception, plays a prominent role in one’s self-reference by means of ‘I’ and, thus, in one’s conception of ...
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This chapter contends that one’s perception of one’s own body from the inside, in proprioception, plays a prominent role in one’s self-reference by means of ‘I’ and, thus, in one’s conception of one’s self. It describes this perception of our own bodies as a perception of a three-dimensional solid which forms the centrepiece of our perceptual world. The chapter ends by criticizing various kinds of immaterialism or non-reductionism which take personal identity to consist in the identity of a subject of some sort of continuity of consciousness which could obtain in the absence of any bodily or physical underpinning.Less
This chapter contends that one’s perception of one’s own body from the inside, in proprioception, plays a prominent role in one’s self-reference by means of ‘I’ and, thus, in one’s conception of one’s self. It describes this perception of our own bodies as a perception of a three-dimensional solid which forms the centrepiece of our perceptual world. The chapter ends by criticizing various kinds of immaterialism or non-reductionism which take personal identity to consist in the identity of a subject of some sort of continuity of consciousness which could obtain in the absence of any bodily or physical underpinning.
Shaun Gallagher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199271948
- eISBN:
- 9780191603112
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199271941.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book contributes to the idea that to have an understanding of the mind, consciousness, or cognition, a detailed scientific and phenomenological understanding of the body is essential. There is ...
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This book contributes to the idea that to have an understanding of the mind, consciousness, or cognition, a detailed scientific and phenomenological understanding of the body is essential. There is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioral expressions in psychology, design concerns in artificial intelligence and robotics, and debates about embodied experience in the phenomenology and philosophy of mind. This book helps to formulate this common vocabulary by developing a conceptual framework that avoids both the overly reductionistic approaches that explain everything in terms of bottom-up neuronal mechanisms, and the inflationistic approaches that explain everything in terms of Cartesian, top-down cognitive states. Through discussions of neonate imitation, the Molyneux problem, gesture, self-awareness, free will, social cognition and intersubjectivity, as well as pathologies such as deafferentation, unilateral neglect, phantom limb, autism and schizophrenia, the book proposes to remap the conceptual landscape by revitalizing the concepts of body image and body schema, proprioception, ecological experience, intermodal perception, and enactive concepts of ownership and agency for action. Informed by both philosophical theory and scientific evidence, it addresses two basic sets of questions that concern the structure of embodied experience. First, questions about the phenomenal aspects of that structure, specifically the relatively regular and constant phenomenal features found in the content of experience. Second, questions about aspects of the structure of consciousness that are more hidden, those that may be more difficult to get at because they happen before one knows it, and do not normally enter into the phenomenal content of experience in an explicit way.Less
This book contributes to the idea that to have an understanding of the mind, consciousness, or cognition, a detailed scientific and phenomenological understanding of the body is essential. There is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioral expressions in psychology, design concerns in artificial intelligence and robotics, and debates about embodied experience in the phenomenology and philosophy of mind. This book helps to formulate this common vocabulary by developing a conceptual framework that avoids both the overly reductionistic approaches that explain everything in terms of bottom-up neuronal mechanisms, and the inflationistic approaches that explain everything in terms of Cartesian, top-down cognitive states. Through discussions of neonate imitation, the Molyneux problem, gesture, self-awareness, free will, social cognition and intersubjectivity, as well as pathologies such as deafferentation, unilateral neglect, phantom limb, autism and schizophrenia, the book proposes to remap the conceptual landscape by revitalizing the concepts of body image and body schema, proprioception, ecological experience, intermodal perception, and enactive concepts of ownership and agency for action. Informed by both philosophical theory and scientific evidence, it addresses two basic sets of questions that concern the structure of embodied experience. First, questions about the phenomenal aspects of that structure, specifically the relatively regular and constant phenomenal features found in the content of experience. Second, questions about aspects of the structure of consciousness that are more hidden, those that may be more difficult to get at because they happen before one knows it, and do not normally enter into the phenomenal content of experience in an explicit way.
Brian O'Shaughnessy
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256723
- eISBN:
- 9780191598135
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256721.003.0024
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Proprioception is true perceiving. It and touch form a closely linked mutually dependent yet diverse pair. The puzzle whereby the demands upon the Attention of proprioception are no distraction in ...
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Proprioception is true perceiving. It and touch form a closely linked mutually dependent yet diverse pair. The puzzle whereby the demands upon the Attention of proprioception are no distraction in instrumental action is resoluble through the fact that the internal active content within an instrumental deed is a harmonious hierarchy. The ‘long‐term body image’ is a causally posited something whose content encompasses body shape, which is a necessary but insufficient condition of proprioception of body shape and posture. It is distinct from the ‘short‐term body image’, which designates the internal content of the proprioceptive perception of the body at any moment. The main philosophical problem consists in assembling a bona fide veridical concept of the long‐term image. Reasons for positing it begin with the common content in the short‐term images over lengthy periods. But they must be supplemented by the fact that bodily sensations do not represent body shape, being already dependent on body‐awareness for both individuation and position. Only through hypothesizing a long‐term image can one make sense of proprioception. Reasons are given for believing (1) the body image is a dispositional psychological phenomenon, (2) it is one and the same when explaining proprioception and sensation‐location, (3) it is an empirical postulate, and (4) even though it falls short of being an a priori necessity, it is as deeply embedded in animal existence as proprioception.Less
Proprioception is true perceiving. It and touch form a closely linked mutually dependent yet diverse pair. The puzzle whereby the demands upon the Attention of proprioception are no distraction in instrumental action is resoluble through the fact that the internal active content within an instrumental deed is a harmonious hierarchy. The ‘long‐term body image’ is a causally posited something whose content encompasses body shape, which is a necessary but insufficient condition of proprioception of body shape and posture. It is distinct from the ‘short‐term body image’, which designates the internal content of the proprioceptive perception of the body at any moment. The main philosophical problem consists in assembling a bona fide veridical concept of the long‐term image. Reasons for positing it begin with the common content in the short‐term images over lengthy periods. But they must be supplemented by the fact that bodily sensations do not represent body shape, being already dependent on body‐awareness for both individuation and position. Only through hypothesizing a long‐term image can one make sense of proprioception. Reasons are given for believing (1) the body image is a dispositional psychological phenomenon, (2) it is one and the same when explaining proprioception and sensation‐location, (3) it is an empirical postulate, and (4) even though it falls short of being an a priori necessity, it is as deeply embedded in animal existence as proprioception.
Brian O'Shaughnessy
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256723
- eISBN:
- 9780191598135
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256721.003.0025
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In a way this is the most fundamental of the senses, being as necessary to animality as the capacity for bodily action. It is of central import for this sense that bodily sensations do not represent ...
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In a way this is the most fundamental of the senses, being as necessary to animality as the capacity for bodily action. It is of central import for this sense that bodily sensations do not represent bodily or tactile space. The varieties of touch, which range from point‐contact to exploration across space and time of the shape of objects, are characterized. Since we perceive simple object shapes through awareness of the shape of bodily movements, space‐representationalism must be true in simple cases, and while more complex cases differ they are yet constituted out of such representational relations. Then both the shape one seems to perceive, and what one actually perceives and discovers, depend on what one knows and assumes concerning the shape and stability of one's body and the object. This dependence of perceptual inquiry and discovery upon a fund of knowledge is found throughout the senses. It points to the existence of a measure of innate knowledge concerning the environment. The mutual dependence of proprioception and the sense of touch is demonstrated, and disposes of the theory that body‐awareness precedes all other awareness.Less
In a way this is the most fundamental of the senses, being as necessary to animality as the capacity for bodily action. It is of central import for this sense that bodily sensations do not represent bodily or tactile space. The varieties of touch, which range from point‐contact to exploration across space and time of the shape of objects, are characterized. Since we perceive simple object shapes through awareness of the shape of bodily movements, space‐representationalism must be true in simple cases, and while more complex cases differ they are yet constituted out of such representational relations. Then both the shape one seems to perceive, and what one actually perceives and discovers, depend on what one knows and assumes concerning the shape and stability of one's body and the object. This dependence of perceptual inquiry and discovery upon a fund of knowledge is found throughout the senses. It points to the existence of a measure of innate knowledge concerning the environment. The mutual dependence of proprioception and the sense of touch is demonstrated, and disposes of the theory that body‐awareness precedes all other awareness.
Shaun Gallager (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199271948
- eISBN:
- 9780191603112
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199271941.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
An understanding of both the scientific and phenomenological details of embodiment helps to explain relations among consciousness, cognition and self. Clear distinctions between proprioceptive ...
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An understanding of both the scientific and phenomenological details of embodiment helps to explain relations among consciousness, cognition and self. Clear distinctions between proprioceptive information and proprioceptive awareness, body image and body schema, movement and action can help remap discussions of brain mechanisms, behavioral expressions, and the phenomenology of embodied experience.Less
An understanding of both the scientific and phenomenological details of embodiment helps to explain relations among consciousness, cognition and self. Clear distinctions between proprioceptive information and proprioceptive awareness, body image and body schema, movement and action can help remap discussions of brain mechanisms, behavioral expressions, and the phenomenology of embodied experience.
Shaun Gallager (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199271948
- eISBN:
- 9780191603112
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199271941.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Cases of neglect and deafferentation provide clarification of how the body schema works in normal cases. A case history of a deafferented subject lacking proprioception below the neck is presented. ...
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Cases of neglect and deafferentation provide clarification of how the body schema works in normal cases. A case history of a deafferented subject lacking proprioception below the neck is presented. The importance of proprioception for motor control, and for the establishment of an egocentric spatial framework for perception and action is discussed.Less
Cases of neglect and deafferentation provide clarification of how the body schema works in normal cases. A case history of a deafferented subject lacking proprioception below the neck is presented. The importance of proprioception for motor control, and for the establishment of an egocentric spatial framework for perception and action is discussed.
Helen E. Ross and Cornelis Plug
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198508625
- eISBN:
- 9780191584893
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198508625.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The idea that there might be some sensorimotor interaction in the moon illusion is relatively new, and probably goes back to George Berkeley who argued that both size and distance perception are ...
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The idea that there might be some sensorimotor interaction in the moon illusion is relatively new, and probably goes back to George Berkeley who argued that both size and distance perception are ultimately based on eye movements and tactile exploration. The sensory aspect of sensorimotor systems is commonly known as proprioception. The proprioceptive mechanisms that contribute to the observer’s knowledge of his own bodily orientation include the vestibular system (the balance organs of the inner ear), the pressure receptors in the skin, and the receptors in the muscles, tendons, and joints. This chapter considers the assumption that proprioceptive information interacts in some way with the visual perception of size and distance, with changes in the observer’s bodily orientation contributing to the moon illusion. The relation between tactile-kinaesthetic space and visual space is controversial, but may not be relevant to the celestial bodies which can only be perceived in visual space.Less
The idea that there might be some sensorimotor interaction in the moon illusion is relatively new, and probably goes back to George Berkeley who argued that both size and distance perception are ultimately based on eye movements and tactile exploration. The sensory aspect of sensorimotor systems is commonly known as proprioception. The proprioceptive mechanisms that contribute to the observer’s knowledge of his own bodily orientation include the vestibular system (the balance organs of the inner ear), the pressure receptors in the skin, and the receptors in the muscles, tendons, and joints. This chapter considers the assumption that proprioceptive information interacts in some way with the visual perception of size and distance, with changes in the observer’s bodily orientation contributing to the moon illusion. The relation between tactile-kinaesthetic space and visual space is controversial, but may not be relevant to the celestial bodies which can only be perceived in visual space.
Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695614
- eISBN:
- 9780191731952
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695614.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Hume argued that we had no idea of power because there was no original experience from which an impression had come. This chapter takes on Hume’s challenge and, in an eclectic tradition developed ...
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Hume argued that we had no idea of power because there was no original experience from which an impression had come. This chapter takes on Hume’s challenge and, in an eclectic tradition developed through Locke, Heidegger and Armstrong, the chapter argues that we have direct awareness of causation, and the dispositional modality it involves, in agency. We are both causal agents and patients through our embodiment. There are reasons why Humeans have been able to resist this argument. One is the assumption that cause and effect are temporally separated, which we have already rejected, and the other is a faulty account of willing or volition that follows form this. This allows Humeans to claim that in our experience we at best would know a constant conjunction between willing and act. But this is both psychologically and philosophically implausible. Instead the chapter offers an integrated account of agency in which acting is possible only if cause and effect are found in one and the same proprioceptive experience, complete with appropriate feedback mechanisms. As well as giving us direct experience of causation, the chapter claims that this also reveals is dispositional nature. In one and the same experience, we can feel that towards which an action tends but also that it can be prevented.Less
Hume argued that we had no idea of power because there was no original experience from which an impression had come. This chapter takes on Hume’s challenge and, in an eclectic tradition developed through Locke, Heidegger and Armstrong, the chapter argues that we have direct awareness of causation, and the dispositional modality it involves, in agency. We are both causal agents and patients through our embodiment. There are reasons why Humeans have been able to resist this argument. One is the assumption that cause and effect are temporally separated, which we have already rejected, and the other is a faulty account of willing or volition that follows form this. This allows Humeans to claim that in our experience we at best would know a constant conjunction between willing and act. But this is both psychologically and philosophically implausible. Instead the chapter offers an integrated account of agency in which acting is possible only if cause and effect are found in one and the same proprioceptive experience, complete with appropriate feedback mechanisms. As well as giving us direct experience of causation, the chapter claims that this also reveals is dispositional nature. In one and the same experience, we can feel that towards which an action tends but also that it can be prevented.
José Luis Bermúdez
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199590728
- eISBN:
- 9780191725456
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explores philosophical accounts of the sense of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ in the light of what is termed the symmetry constraint upon the sense of ‘I’. The symmetry constraint ...
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This chapter explores philosophical accounts of the sense of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ in the light of what is termed the symmetry constraint upon the sense of ‘I’. The symmetry constraint requires that we preserve the possible token-equivalence of ‘I’ and other personal pronouns with respect to same-saying and relative to a particular context so that it must be possible, in suitable contexts, for you to say using ‘you’ what I would say using ‘I’. The symmetry constraint turns out to be incompatible, for example, with Gareth Evans's proposal to elucidate the sense of ‘I’ in terms of the speaker's sensitivity to forms of self-specifying information that have the property of being immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. The chapter proposes an alternative way of doing justice to the insight that the sense of ‘I’ reflects a distinctive way of being presented to oneself. On this proposal, the distinctive way in which I am presented to myself can be systematically related to the distinctive way in which I am presented to you. What matters is not that I am in receipt of distinctive types of information about myself, but rather that I have a distinctive ability to locate myself in objective space.Less
This chapter explores philosophical accounts of the sense of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ in the light of what is termed the symmetry constraint upon the sense of ‘I’. The symmetry constraint requires that we preserve the possible token-equivalence of ‘I’ and other personal pronouns with respect to same-saying and relative to a particular context so that it must be possible, in suitable contexts, for you to say using ‘you’ what I would say using ‘I’. The symmetry constraint turns out to be incompatible, for example, with Gareth Evans's proposal to elucidate the sense of ‘I’ in terms of the speaker's sensitivity to forms of self-specifying information that have the property of being immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. The chapter proposes an alternative way of doing justice to the insight that the sense of ‘I’ reflects a distinctive way of being presented to oneself. On this proposal, the distinctive way in which I am presented to myself can be systematically related to the distinctive way in which I am presented to you. What matters is not that I am in receipt of distinctive types of information about myself, but rather that I have a distinctive ability to locate myself in objective space.
Alex Byrne
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199590728
- eISBN:
- 9780191725456
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
We often know that we are thinking, and what we are thinking about. That is a platitude, yet it is obscure how we know these things. The chapter defends the suggestion that one can know that one is ...
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We often know that we are thinking, and what we are thinking about. That is a platitude, yet it is obscure how we know these things. The chapter defends the suggestion that one can know that one is thinking about x by “hearing” oneself speak about x in inner speech.Less
We often know that we are thinking, and what we are thinking about. That is a platitude, yet it is obscure how we know these things. The chapter defends the suggestion that one can know that one is thinking about x by “hearing” oneself speak about x in inner speech.
Robert Briscoe
Fiona Macpherson (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780197266441
- eISBN:
- 9780191884207
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception, active control of camera movement is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory ...
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According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception, active control of camera movement is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the way stimulation in the substituting modality varies as a function of self-initiated, bodily action. This chapter, by contrast, approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the subject’s perceptual systems. Given all of the endogenous and exogenous evidence available to those systems, what is the most probable source of stimulation in the substituting modality? From this perspective, active control over the camera’s movements matters for rather different reasons. Most importantly, it generates proprioceptive and efference-copy based information about the camera’s body-relative position necessary to make use of the spatial cues present in the stimulation that the subject receives for purposes of egocentric object localization.Less
According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception, active control of camera movement is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the way stimulation in the substituting modality varies as a function of self-initiated, bodily action. This chapter, by contrast, approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the subject’s perceptual systems. Given all of the endogenous and exogenous evidence available to those systems, what is the most probable source of stimulation in the substituting modality? From this perspective, active control over the camera’s movements matters for rather different reasons. Most importantly, it generates proprioceptive and efference-copy based information about the camera’s body-relative position necessary to make use of the spatial cues present in the stimulation that the subject receives for purposes of egocentric object localization.
Jacques Droulez and Valérie Cornilleau-pélèl
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198547853
- eISBN:
- 9780191724268
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198547853.003.0234
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Sensory and Motor Systems
This chapter is an attempt to provide a common conceptual and computational framework for neurophysiologists and roboticians who are faced, in spite of their different motivation, with the similar ...
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This chapter is an attempt to provide a common conceptual and computational framework for neurophysiologists and roboticians who are faced, in spite of their different motivation, with the similar problem of combining several signals issued from sensors having various geometrical and dynamical properties. For animals and robots, motion is a fundamental source of information about their interaction with the environment. Animals (and some robots, now) have at their disposal a dedicated sensory system, devoted to the detection of their own 3D movement: the vestibular system. However, the vestibular organs fail to detect self-movement at low frequency and have to be complemented by other information sources such as vision, proprioception, or efferent copies of motor commands. The visual system is particularly useful for estimating the displacement and the 3D shape of other mobile objects, as well as the 3D structure of the environment. Many theoretical studies have been proposed to account for the ability of biological organisms to perceive 3D movement, or to build robots that are able to move and avoid unexpected obstacles. One of the central question in this context is the way in which the various signals are fused, and, more generally, how the 3D processing of individual sensors may dynamically interact.Less
This chapter is an attempt to provide a common conceptual and computational framework for neurophysiologists and roboticians who are faced, in spite of their different motivation, with the similar problem of combining several signals issued from sensors having various geometrical and dynamical properties. For animals and robots, motion is a fundamental source of information about their interaction with the environment. Animals (and some robots, now) have at their disposal a dedicated sensory system, devoted to the detection of their own 3D movement: the vestibular system. However, the vestibular organs fail to detect self-movement at low frequency and have to be complemented by other information sources such as vision, proprioception, or efferent copies of motor commands. The visual system is particularly useful for estimating the displacement and the 3D shape of other mobile objects, as well as the 3D structure of the environment. Many theoretical studies have been proposed to account for the ability of biological organisms to perceive 3D movement, or to build robots that are able to move and avoid unexpected obstacles. One of the central question in this context is the way in which the various signals are fused, and, more generally, how the 3D processing of individual sensors may dynamically interact.
Amber Jamilla Musser
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781479807031
- eISBN:
- 9781479845491
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9781479807031.003.0002
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Gay and Lesbian Studies
This chapter focuses on the sculpted vulvas of Judy Chicago’s The Dinner Party (1979) and Kara Walker’s A Subtlety (2014) in order to draw out some of the issues that underlie the representational ...
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This chapter focuses on the sculpted vulvas of Judy Chicago’s The Dinner Party (1979) and Kara Walker’s A Subtlety (2014) in order to draw out some of the issues that underlie the representational politics that surround the black vulva. Though these installations diverge in many ways, this chapter argues that they enable a meditation on the possibility of Luce Irigaray’s permeable, dialogic selfhood—selves that illustrate the impossibility of a border between self and Other—rendering porosity and the labial as important for an ethics of mutual vulnerability. Yet this chapter also cautions against forgetting asymmetries of power. Reading across the installations and the controversy over Walker’s installation in particular forces us to acknowledge that the differences between pleasure in vulnerability and the sensation of racial violation are related to the differences between the structures of our epistemologies of gender and race. Dwelling on the sensuality that inheres in A Subtlety, however, offers a way to reorient porosity by thinking with the dimension of smell as one site of the installation’s excess. The scalar, in turn, allows us to imagine formulations of brown jouissance in relation to fleshiness that exceeds the individual in multiple directions.Less
This chapter focuses on the sculpted vulvas of Judy Chicago’s The Dinner Party (1979) and Kara Walker’s A Subtlety (2014) in order to draw out some of the issues that underlie the representational politics that surround the black vulva. Though these installations diverge in many ways, this chapter argues that they enable a meditation on the possibility of Luce Irigaray’s permeable, dialogic selfhood—selves that illustrate the impossibility of a border between self and Other—rendering porosity and the labial as important for an ethics of mutual vulnerability. Yet this chapter also cautions against forgetting asymmetries of power. Reading across the installations and the controversy over Walker’s installation in particular forces us to acknowledge that the differences between pleasure in vulnerability and the sensation of racial violation are related to the differences between the structures of our epistemologies of gender and race. Dwelling on the sensuality that inheres in A Subtlety, however, offers a way to reorient porosity by thinking with the dimension of smell as one site of the installation’s excess. The scalar, in turn, allows us to imagine formulations of brown jouissance in relation to fleshiness that exceeds the individual in multiple directions.
