Richard Gaskin
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287253
- eISBN:
- 9780191603969
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287252.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
John McDowell’s attempt to revive the doctrine of empiricism in a ‘minimal’ or ‘transcendental’ form is seriously undermined by inadequacies in the way he conceives what he styles the ‘order of ...
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John McDowell’s attempt to revive the doctrine of empiricism in a ‘minimal’ or ‘transcendental’ form is seriously undermined by inadequacies in the way he conceives what he styles the ‘order of justification’ connecting world, experience, and judgement. For example, his conception of the roles played by causation and nature in this order is threatened with vacuity. The requirements of self-consciousness and verbal articulacy which he places on subjects participating in the justificatory relation between experience and judgement are unwarranted, and have the implausible consequence that infants and non-human animals are excluded from the ‘order of justification’, and thus deprived of experience of the world. Above all, McDowell’s position is vitiated by a substantial error he commits in the philosophy of language: following ancient tradition rather than Frege’s radical departure from that tradition, he locates concepts at the level of sense rather than at the level of reference in the semantical hierarchy. This error generates an unwanted Kantian transcendental idealism which in effect delivers a reductio ad absurdum of McDowell’s metaphysical economy. To correct this mistake, Frege must first be followed in his location of concepts at the level of reference. Second, one must move beyond Frege to locate not only concepts but also propositions at that level. This, in turn, requires the serious consideration of an idea which McDowell mentions only to reject, that of objects as speaking to us ‘in the world’s own language’. Despite the correction recommended here, if empiricism is to have any chance of success, it must be still more minimal in its pretensions than McDowell allows. In particular, it must abandon the individualistic and intellectualistic construction which McDowell places on the ‘order of justification’.Less
John McDowell’s attempt to revive the doctrine of empiricism in a ‘minimal’ or ‘transcendental’ form is seriously undermined by inadequacies in the way he conceives what he styles the ‘order of justification’ connecting world, experience, and judgement. For example, his conception of the roles played by causation and nature in this order is threatened with vacuity. The requirements of self-consciousness and verbal articulacy which he places on subjects participating in the justificatory relation between experience and judgement are unwarranted, and have the implausible consequence that infants and non-human animals are excluded from the ‘order of justification’, and thus deprived of experience of the world. Above all, McDowell’s position is vitiated by a substantial error he commits in the philosophy of language: following ancient tradition rather than Frege’s radical departure from that tradition, he locates concepts at the level of sense rather than at the level of reference in the semantical hierarchy. This error generates an unwanted Kantian transcendental idealism which in effect delivers a reductio ad absurdum of McDowell’s metaphysical economy. To correct this mistake, Frege must first be followed in his location of concepts at the level of reference. Second, one must move beyond Frege to locate not only concepts but also propositions at that level. This, in turn, requires the serious consideration of an idea which McDowell mentions only to reject, that of objects as speaking to us ‘in the world’s own language’. Despite the correction recommended here, if empiricism is to have any chance of success, it must be still more minimal in its pretensions than McDowell allows. In particular, it must abandon the individualistic and intellectualistic construction which McDowell places on the ‘order of justification’.
Jeffrey C. King
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199226061
- eISBN:
- 9780191710377
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, ...
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Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.Less
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.
Jeffrey C. King
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199226061
- eISBN:
- 9780191710377
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter begins with a brief analysis of why philosophers believe in propositions. The main purpose of the book is then discussed, which is to formulate and defend a detailed account ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a brief analysis of why philosophers believe in propositions. The main purpose of the book is then discussed, which is to formulate and defend a detailed account of the metaphysical nature of propositions. In so doing, it discusses some oppositions to propositions as well. It is argued that there is no mystery about what propositions are. Given rather minimal assumptions it follows that propostions exist, and we can begin to see how and why they have truth conditions and so represent the world as being a certain way. An overview of the chapters included in the volume is presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief analysis of why philosophers believe in propositions. The main purpose of the book is then discussed, which is to formulate and defend a detailed account of the metaphysical nature of propositions. In so doing, it discusses some oppositions to propositions as well. It is argued that there is no mystery about what propositions are. Given rather minimal assumptions it follows that propostions exist, and we can begin to see how and why they have truth conditions and so represent the world as being a certain way. An overview of the chapters included in the volume is presented.
Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199560554
- eISBN:
- 9780191720963
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560554.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Relativism has dominated many intellectual circles, past and present, but the 20th century saw it banished to the fringes of mainstream analytic philosophy. Of late, however, it is making something ...
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Relativism has dominated many intellectual circles, past and present, but the 20th century saw it banished to the fringes of mainstream analytic philosophy. Of late, however, it is making something of a comeback within that loosely configured tradition, a comeback that attempts to capitalize on some important ideas in foundational semantics. This book aims not merely to combat analytic relativism but also to combat the foundational ideas in semantics that led to its revival. Doing so requires a proper understanding of the significance of possible worlds semantics, an examination of the relation between truth and the flow of time, an account of putatively relevant data from attitude and speech act reporting, and a careful treatment of various operators. This book contrasts relativism with a view according to which the contents of thought and talk are propositions that instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth simpliciter and falsity simpliciter. Such propositions, it argues, are the semantic values of sentences (relative to context), the objects of illocutionary acts, and, unsurprisingly, the objects of propositional attitudes.Less
Relativism has dominated many intellectual circles, past and present, but the 20th century saw it banished to the fringes of mainstream analytic philosophy. Of late, however, it is making something of a comeback within that loosely configured tradition, a comeback that attempts to capitalize on some important ideas in foundational semantics. This book aims not merely to combat analytic relativism but also to combat the foundational ideas in semantics that led to its revival. Doing so requires a proper understanding of the significance of possible worlds semantics, an examination of the relation between truth and the flow of time, an account of putatively relevant data from attitude and speech act reporting, and a careful treatment of various operators. This book contrasts relativism with a view according to which the contents of thought and talk are propositions that instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth simpliciter and falsity simpliciter. Such propositions, it argues, are the semantic values of sentences (relative to context), the objects of illocutionary acts, and, unsurprisingly, the objects of propositional attitudes.
Neil Feit
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195341362
- eISBN:
- 9780199866922
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Some of our beliefs are fundamentally about ourselves: these are beliefs about who we are, where we are, and which features we have. Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs ...
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Some of our beliefs are fundamentally about ourselves: these are beliefs about who we are, where we are, and which features we have. Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions. Propositions are things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. The main thesis of this book is that this supposition is mistaken and must be replaced with another view about content. The view that belief contents are propositions breaks down in the face of belief about the self, or so-called de se belief. On the view defended here, the content of a de se belief is a property that the believer reflexively takes himself or herself to have. The relation of self-ascription connects believers and such properties. Unlike propositions, properties lack absolute truth values that do not vary with time, place, or person. This book offers a sustained defense of the property theory of content, according to which the content of every cognitive attitude is a property rather than a proposition. The theory is supported with some new arguments, defended from various objections, and applied to some important problems and puzzles in the philosophy of mind.Less
Some of our beliefs are fundamentally about ourselves: these are beliefs about who we are, where we are, and which features we have. Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions. Propositions are things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. The main thesis of this book is that this supposition is mistaken and must be replaced with another view about content. The view that belief contents are propositions breaks down in the face of belief about the self, or so-called de se belief. On the view defended here, the content of a de se belief is a property that the believer reflexively takes himself or herself to have. The relation of self-ascription connects believers and such properties. Unlike propositions, properties lack absolute truth values that do not vary with time, place, or person. This book offers a sustained defense of the property theory of content, according to which the content of every cognitive attitude is a property rather than a proposition. The theory is supported with some new arguments, defended from various objections, and applied to some important problems and puzzles in the philosophy of mind.
Richard Gaskin
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199239450
- eISBN:
- 9780191716997
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239450.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is about the philosophy of language. It analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express — what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of ...
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This book is about the philosophy of language. It analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express — what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of word-meanings respectively. Since it identifies the world with all the true and false propositions, the book's account of the unity of the proposition has significant implications for our understanding of the nature of reality. The book argues that the unity of the proposition is constituted by a certain infinitistic structure known in the tradition as ‘Bradley's regress’. Usually, Bradley's regress has been regarded as vicious, but the book argues that it is the metaphysical ground of the propositional unity, and gives us an important insight into the fundamental make-up of the world.Less
This book is about the philosophy of language. It analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express — what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of word-meanings respectively. Since it identifies the world with all the true and false propositions, the book's account of the unity of the proposition has significant implications for our understanding of the nature of reality. The book argues that the unity of the proposition is constituted by a certain infinitistic structure known in the tradition as ‘Bradley's regress’. Usually, Bradley's regress has been regarded as vicious, but the book argues that it is the metaphysical ground of the propositional unity, and gives us an important insight into the fundamental make-up of the world.
Michael Potter
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199215836
- eISBN:
- 9780191721243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
From a single proposition p we form its negation not-p. From two propositions p and q we form various further propositions, e.g., p or q, p and q, etc.; similarly (though less often) with three or ...
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From a single proposition p we form its negation not-p. From two propositions p and q we form various further propositions, e.g., p or q, p and q, etc.; similarly (though less often) with three or more propositions. For each such method of forming propositions it is common to speak of a certain truth-function as corresponding to it. On the one hand, there is a function which takes senses of propositions as inputs and returns the sense of a proposition as output. On the other hand, there is a truth-function, i.e., a function taking some finite number of truth-values as arguments and giving a single truth-value as value, which is representable by a truth-table or truth-diagram. This chapter discusses the relationship between the two.Less
From a single proposition p we form its negation not-p. From two propositions p and q we form various further propositions, e.g., p or q, p and q, etc.; similarly (though less often) with three or more propositions. For each such method of forming propositions it is common to speak of a certain truth-function as corresponding to it. On the one hand, there is a function which takes senses of propositions as inputs and returns the sense of a proposition as output. On the other hand, there is a truth-function, i.e., a function taking some finite number of truth-values as arguments and giving a single truth-value as value, which is representable by a truth-table or truth-diagram. This chapter discusses the relationship between the two.
Berit Brogaard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199796908
- eISBN:
- 9780199933235
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
What are the things that we assert, believe, and desire? The orthodox view among philosophers is eternalism: these are contents that have their truth-values eternally. Transient Truths provides the ...
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What are the things that we assert, believe, and desire? The orthodox view among philosophers is eternalism: these are contents that have their truth-values eternally. Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world. Berit Brogaard argues that temporal contents are contents and propositions in the full sense. This project involves a thorough analysis of how we talk about and retain mental states over time, an examination of how the phenomenology of mental states bears on the content of mental states, an analysis of how we pass on information in temporally extended conversations, and a revival of a Priorian tense logic. The view suggests a broader view according to which some types of representation have a determinate truth-value only relative to features about the subject who does the representing. If this view is right, successful semantic representation requires an eye on our own position in the world.Less
What are the things that we assert, believe, and desire? The orthodox view among philosophers is eternalism: these are contents that have their truth-values eternally. Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world. Berit Brogaard argues that temporal contents are contents and propositions in the full sense. This project involves a thorough analysis of how we talk about and retain mental states over time, an examination of how the phenomenology of mental states bears on the content of mental states, an analysis of how we pass on information in temporally extended conversations, and a revival of a Priorian tense logic. The view suggests a broader view according to which some types of representation have a determinate truth-value only relative to features about the subject who does the representing. If this view is right, successful semantic representation requires an eye on our own position in the world.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199596218
- eISBN:
- 9780191595783
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596218.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Thought, to be thought at all, must be about a world independent of us. But thinking takes capacities for thought, which inevitably shape thought's objects. What would count as something being ...
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Thought, to be thought at all, must be about a world independent of us. But thinking takes capacities for thought, which inevitably shape thought's objects. What would count as something being green—so when it would be true that it was—is identified, somehow, by what those who have being green in mind, are prepared to recognize. Which can make it seem that what is true, and what not, is not independent of us. In which case our thought is not really about an independent world—so not really thought at all. Two apparent truisms thus form an apparent paradox. Much philosophy, from Locke to Quine, from Kant to Frege to Wittgenstein, to Putnam, to John McDowell, is a response to this, often dominated by it. This book contains eleven chapters, each working in its own way towards dissolving this air of paradox, and towards giving the role of the parochial in our thought—features of our thought which need not belong to all thought—its proper, unthreatening, due.Less
Thought, to be thought at all, must be about a world independent of us. But thinking takes capacities for thought, which inevitably shape thought's objects. What would count as something being green—so when it would be true that it was—is identified, somehow, by what those who have being green in mind, are prepared to recognize. Which can make it seem that what is true, and what not, is not independent of us. In which case our thought is not really about an independent world—so not really thought at all. Two apparent truisms thus form an apparent paradox. Much philosophy, from Locke to Quine, from Kant to Frege to Wittgenstein, to Putnam, to John McDowell, is a response to this, often dominated by it. This book contains eleven chapters, each working in its own way towards dissolving this air of paradox, and towards giving the role of the parochial in our thought—features of our thought which need not belong to all thought—its proper, unthreatening, due.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so ...
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The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so truthmaker Maximalism should be accepted. It need not be a one—one correspondence. ‘What are your truthmakers?’ is superior to Quine's question ‘What do you quantify over?’ Minimalist theories of truth, descending from Frank Ramsey, are rejected. Minimal truthmakers, however, are not rejected except in the case of infinities. The relation of truths to their truthmakers is an internal one, depending solely on the terms involved, truth and truthmaker. Truthbearers, that is truths, are true propositions, but propositions are no more than what is believed, supposes that, entertains that, etc., what philosophers call ‘intentional objects’. They can include impossibilities. There is no realm of propositions. The important Entailment Principle says that if a proposition entails some further proposition, then a truthmaker for the premise is also truthmaker for the conclusion. This casts significant light on the nature of valid argument.Less
The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so truthmaker Maximalism should be accepted. It need not be a one—one correspondence. ‘What are your truthmakers?’ is superior to Quine's question ‘What do you quantify over?’ Minimalist theories of truth, descending from Frank Ramsey, are rejected. Minimal truthmakers, however, are not rejected except in the case of infinities. The relation of truths to their truthmakers is an internal one, depending solely on the terms involved, truth and truthmaker. Truthbearers, that is truths, are true propositions, but propositions are no more than what is believed, supposes that, entertains that, etc., what philosophers call ‘intentional objects’. They can include impossibilities. There is no realm of propositions. The important Entailment Principle says that if a proposition entails some further proposition, then a truthmaker for the premise is also truthmaker for the conclusion. This casts significant light on the nature of valid argument.
A. N. Prior
P. T. Geach and A. J. P. Kenny (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1971
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243540
- eISBN:
- 9780191680694
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243540.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
This book is divided into two parts. The first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The ...
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This book is divided into two parts. The first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief.Less
This book is divided into two parts. The first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief.
Mark Eli Kalderon
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199275977
- eISBN:
- 9780191706066
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275977.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — ...
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Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded as something to be debunked by philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and makes public our noncognitive attitudes. The realist fiction might be understood as a philosophical misconception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical. There is, however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of debunking, but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in accepting a moral sentence competent speakers do not believe the moral proposition expressed but rather adopt the relevant non-cognitive attitudes. Noncognitivism, in its primary sense, is a claim about moral acceptance: the acceptance of a moral sentence is not moral belief but is some other attitude. Standardly, non-cognitivism has been linked to non-factualism — the claim that the content of a moral sentence does not consist in its expressing a moral proposition. Indeed, the terms ‘noncognitivism’ and ‘nonfactualism’ have been used interchangeably. But this misses an important possibility, since moral content may be representational but the acceptance of moral sentences might not be belief in the moral proposition expressed. This possibility constitutes a novel form of noncognitivism: moral fictionalism. Whereas nonfactualists seek to debunk the realist fiction of a moral subject matter, the moral fictionalist claims that that fiction stands in no need of debunking but is the means by which the noncognitive attitudes involved in moral acceptance are conveyed by moral utterance. Moral fictionalism is noncognitivism without a non-representational semantics.Less
Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded as something to be debunked by philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and makes public our noncognitive attitudes. The realist fiction might be understood as a philosophical misconception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical. There is, however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of debunking, but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in accepting a moral sentence competent speakers do not believe the moral proposition expressed but rather adopt the relevant non-cognitive attitudes. Noncognitivism, in its primary sense, is a claim about moral acceptance: the acceptance of a moral sentence is not moral belief but is some other attitude. Standardly, non-cognitivism has been linked to non-factualism — the claim that the content of a moral sentence does not consist in its expressing a moral proposition. Indeed, the terms ‘noncognitivism’ and ‘nonfactualism’ have been used interchangeably. But this misses an important possibility, since moral content may be representational but the acceptance of moral sentences might not be belief in the moral proposition expressed. This possibility constitutes a novel form of noncognitivism: moral fictionalism. Whereas nonfactualists seek to debunk the realist fiction of a moral subject matter, the moral fictionalist claims that that fiction stands in no need of debunking but is the means by which the noncognitive attitudes involved in moral acceptance are conveyed by moral utterance. Moral fictionalism is noncognitivism without a non-representational semantics.
Sarah Waterlow
- Published in print:
- 1982
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246565
- eISBN:
- 9780191681011
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246565.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the charge that Aristotle merges modal with extensional concepts is baseless. His doctrines A' and B' link possibility and necessity with realization at some and at all ...
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This chapter argues that the charge that Aristotle merges modal with extensional concepts is baseless. His doctrines A' and B' link possibility and necessity with realization at some and at all times. Correctly interpreted, these propositions support the opposite view: that for him, these connections are syntheses of irreducibly different concepts. There is his temporalized approach to modality, where possibility is seen as relative to an actual state of affairs in the history of the universe. Time has a bearing here, since the possibility itself belongs at the time, as would the realization should it occur. The discussion argues that this is his only conception of possibility. A' and B' in the versions considered here depend on the non-formal assumptions cogent only in the archaic context of Aristotle's organic metaphysics of substance.Less
This chapter argues that the charge that Aristotle merges modal with extensional concepts is baseless. His doctrines A' and B' link possibility and necessity with realization at some and at all times. Correctly interpreted, these propositions support the opposite view: that for him, these connections are syntheses of irreducibly different concepts. There is his temporalized approach to modality, where possibility is seen as relative to an actual state of affairs in the history of the universe. Time has a bearing here, since the possibility itself belongs at the time, as would the realization should it occur. The discussion argues that this is his only conception of possibility. A' and B' in the versions considered here depend on the non-formal assumptions cogent only in the archaic context of Aristotle's organic metaphysics of substance.
Alvin Plantinga
Matthew Davidson (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103762
- eISBN:
- 9780199833573
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103769.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William ...
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This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.Less
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.
C. W. A. Whitaker
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199254194
- eISBN:
- 9780191598654
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254192.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The De Interpretatione is one of Aristotle's core works, containing highly influential analyses of the basic elements of language and the nature of truth and falsehood, as well as the famous ...
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The De Interpretatione is one of Aristotle's core works, containing highly influential analyses of the basic elements of language and the nature of truth and falsehood, as well as the famous Sea‐battle paradox. As a whole, however, the treatise has been neglected; attention has concentrated on a few oases of interest, and scholars have been satisfied with the medieval view that the treatise is a discussion of the proposition, and forms the second part of the Organon, building on the categories and anticipating the formal logic of the Analytics. This book argues that the subject of the De Interpretatione is not the proposition, as has conventionally been supposed, but the contradictory pair of assertions, and that it is oriented not towards the formal logic of the Analytics, but to the Topics and Sophistic Refutations, the works in which Aristotle describes dialectic, the method of argument consisting in the asking and answering of dialectical questions. In posing a dialectical question, the questioner presents a contradictory pair of assertions and invites the answerer to select one or the other as true, hoping in the end to lead to a refutation, i.e. a proof that the contradictory of the answerer's thesis is true, and therefore the thesis itself is false. The ability to assign assertions to their pairs correctly, and to know in which cases the truth of one member of a pair does not imply the falsehood of the other, are vital tasks for the dialectician. The De Interpretatione's discussion of contradiction thus provides the theoretical background essential for dialectic.Less
The De Interpretatione is one of Aristotle's core works, containing highly influential analyses of the basic elements of language and the nature of truth and falsehood, as well as the famous Sea‐battle paradox. As a whole, however, the treatise has been neglected; attention has concentrated on a few oases of interest, and scholars have been satisfied with the medieval view that the treatise is a discussion of the proposition, and forms the second part of the Organon, building on the categories and anticipating the formal logic of the Analytics. This book argues that the subject of the De Interpretatione is not the proposition, as has conventionally been supposed, but the contradictory pair of assertions, and that it is oriented not towards the formal logic of the Analytics, but to the Topics and Sophistic Refutations, the works in which Aristotle describes dialectic, the method of argument consisting in the asking and answering of dialectical questions. In posing a dialectical question, the questioner presents a contradictory pair of assertions and invites the answerer to select one or the other as true, hoping in the end to lead to a refutation, i.e. a proof that the contradictory of the answerer's thesis is true, and therefore the thesis itself is false. The ability to assign assertions to their pairs correctly, and to know in which cases the truth of one member of a pair does not imply the falsehood of the other, are vital tasks for the dialectician. The De Interpretatione's discussion of contradiction thus provides the theoretical background essential for dialectic.
Stephen Schiffer
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257768
- eISBN:
- 9780191602313
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257760.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
There exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and they are what the book calls pleonastic propositions. The book is about what these propositions are in themselves, and about their place ...
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There exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and they are what the book calls pleonastic propositions. The book is about what these propositions are in themselves, and about their place in nature, language, and thought. Chapters 1 and 2 advance the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the relation between content-involving facts and underlying physical facts; vagueness and indeterminacy; conditionals; normative discourse; and the role of pleonastic propositions in explanation, prediction, and knowledge acquisition.Less
There exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and they are what the book calls pleonastic propositions. The book is about what these propositions are in themselves, and about their place in nature, language, and thought. Chapters 1 and 2 advance the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the relation between content-involving facts and underlying physical facts; vagueness and indeterminacy; conditionals; normative discourse; and the role of pleonastic propositions in explanation, prediction, and knowledge acquisition.
Gyula Klima
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195176223
- eISBN:
- 9780199871957
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176223.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
This chapter provides a systematic discussion of Buridan’s nominalist semantics of propositions and sentential nominalizations. The chapter argues that despite its incompleteness, Buridan’s theory is ...
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This chapter provides a systematic discussion of Buridan’s nominalist semantics of propositions and sentential nominalizations. The chapter argues that despite its incompleteness, Buridan’s theory is still “nominalism’s best shot” at a semantics of propositions without buying into a philosophically and theologically dubious ontology of dicta, enuntiabilia, complexe significabilia, real propositions, or states of affairs.Less
This chapter provides a systematic discussion of Buridan’s nominalist semantics of propositions and sentential nominalizations. The chapter argues that despite its incompleteness, Buridan’s theory is still “nominalism’s best shot” at a semantics of propositions without buying into a philosophically and theologically dubious ontology of dicta, enuntiabilia, complexe significabilia, real propositions, or states of affairs.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A connection between metaphysical realism and the idea that truth is single and indivisible (alethic monism) is proposed. It is argued that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and truth ...
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A connection between metaphysical realism and the idea that truth is single and indivisible (alethic monism) is proposed. It is argued that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and truth itself is ineliminable. It is urged that truthmakers are many and do not all belong to the same ontological category. The need to posit facts or states of affairs as truthmakers, as proposed by D. M. Armstrong, is questioned. The unity of truth is related to the principle of non-contradiction, and the unpalatable ontological implications of relativism are examined.Less
A connection between metaphysical realism and the idea that truth is single and indivisible (alethic monism) is proposed. It is argued that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and truth itself is ineliminable. It is urged that truthmakers are many and do not all belong to the same ontological category. The need to posit facts or states of affairs as truthmakers, as proposed by D. M. Armstrong, is questioned. The unity of truth is related to the principle of non-contradiction, and the unpalatable ontological implications of relativism are examined.
Stephen Neale
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247158
- eISBN:
- 9780191598081
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247153.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book is an original examination of attempts to dislodge a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations of slices of reality. Representations ...
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This book is an original examination of attempts to dislodge a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations of slices of reality. Representations that are accurate are usually said to be true, to correspond to the facts—this is the foundation of correspondence theories of truth. A number of prominent philosophers have tried to undermine the idea that propositions, facts, and correspondence can play any useful role in philosophy, and formal arguments have been advanced to demonstrate that, under seemingly uncontroversial conditions, such entities collapse into an undifferentiated unity. The demise of individual facts is meant to herald the dawn of a new era in philosophy, in which debates about scepticism, realism, subjectivity, representational and computational theories of mind, possible worlds, and divergent conceptual schemes that represent reality in different ways to different persons, periods, or cultures evaporate through lack of subject matter. By carefully untangling a host of intersecting metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and logical issues, and providing original analyses of key aspects of the work of Donald Davidson, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Kurt Gödel (to each of whom a chapter is dedicated), Stephen Neale demonstrates that arguments for the collapse of facts are considerably more complex and interesting than ever imagined. A number of deep semantic facts emerge along with a powerful proof: while it is technically possible to avoid the collapse of facts, rescue the idea of representations of reality, and thereby face anew the problems raised by the sceptic or the relativist, doing so requires making some tough semantic decisions about predicates and descriptions. It is simply impossible, Neale shows, to invoke representations, facts, states, or propositions without making hard choices—choices that may send many philosophers scurrying back to the drawing board. The book will be crucial to future work in metaphysics, the philosophy of language and mind, and logic, and will have profound implications far beyond.Less
This book is an original examination of attempts to dislodge a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations of slices of reality. Representations that are accurate are usually said to be true, to correspond to the facts—this is the foundation of correspondence theories of truth. A number of prominent philosophers have tried to undermine the idea that propositions, facts, and correspondence can play any useful role in philosophy, and formal arguments have been advanced to demonstrate that, under seemingly uncontroversial conditions, such entities collapse into an undifferentiated unity. The demise of individual facts is meant to herald the dawn of a new era in philosophy, in which debates about scepticism, realism, subjectivity, representational and computational theories of mind, possible worlds, and divergent conceptual schemes that represent reality in different ways to different persons, periods, or cultures evaporate through lack of subject matter. By carefully untangling a host of intersecting metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and logical issues, and providing original analyses of key aspects of the work of Donald Davidson, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Kurt Gödel (to each of whom a chapter is dedicated), Stephen Neale demonstrates that arguments for the collapse of facts are considerably more complex and interesting than ever imagined. A number of deep semantic facts emerge along with a powerful proof: while it is technically possible to avoid the collapse of facts, rescue the idea of representations of reality, and thereby face anew the problems raised by the sceptic or the relativist, doing so requires making some tough semantic decisions about predicates and descriptions. It is simply impossible, Neale shows, to invoke representations, facts, states, or propositions without making hard choices—choices that may send many philosophers scurrying back to the drawing board. The book will be crucial to future work in metaphysics, the philosophy of language and mind, and logic, and will have profound implications far beyond.
Robert J. Stainton
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199250387
- eISBN:
- 9780191719523
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199250387.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter focuses on language-thought relations. It argues that grasping a proposition does not require deploying internally a sentence of natural language that expresses it. This alone threatens ...
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This chapter focuses on language-thought relations. It argues that grasping a proposition does not require deploying internally a sentence of natural language that expresses it. This alone threatens the view that thought is inner speech. It then considers a specific subcase, viz. where the proposition so grasped is part of an argument. It points out that, if premises/conclusions can be conveyed sub-sententially, then there are things that are not items of natural language but which have logical form.Less
This chapter focuses on language-thought relations. It argues that grasping a proposition does not require deploying internally a sentence of natural language that expresses it. This alone threatens the view that thought is inner speech. It then considers a specific subcase, viz. where the proposition so grasped is part of an argument. It points out that, if premises/conclusions can be conveyed sub-sententially, then there are things that are not items of natural language but which have logical form.
