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This book is a compendium of writings from the last ten years by one of the leading figures in aesthetics, Jerrold Levinson. It contains twenty-four essays and is divided into seven parts. The first is about issues relating to art in general, not specific to one art form. The second is about philosophical problems specific to music. The third part focuses on pictorial art, and the fourth on interpretation, in particular, the interpretation of literature. The remaining parts of the book discuss aesthetic properties, issues in historical aesthetics, humor, and intrinsic value.

In a capitalist economy, taxes are the most significant instrument by which the political system can put into practice a conception of economic justice. But conventional ideas about what constitutes tax fairness--found in the vigorous debates about tax policy going on in political and public policy circles, in economics and law--are misguided. In particular, the emphasis on distributing the tax burden relative to pretax income is a fundamental mistake. Taxation does not take from people what they already own. Property rights are the product of a set of laws and conventions, of which the tax system forms a central part, so the fairness of taxes can’t be evaluated by their impact on preexisting entitlements. Pretax income has no independent moral significance. Standards of justice should be applied not to the distribution of tax burdens but to the operation and results of the entire framework of economic institutions. The result is an entirely different understanding of a host of controversial issues, such as the estate tax, the tax treatment of marriage, “flat” versus progressive taxes, consumption versus income taxes, tax cuts for the wealthy, and negative income taxes for the poor.

This book addresses the question of how mental properties and other properties not thought of as physical can be instantiated in a world of which physicalism is true. In such a world, the instantiation of these properties must be ‘realized in’ something physical. One sort of realization is property realization, where the instantiation of the realized property is realized in the instantiation of some physical property — when a property is ‘multiply realized’, different instantiations of it can be realized in different physical properties. The account given of this is the ‘subset account’, which holds that one property realizes another in virtue of subset relations between their causal features. Another sort is microphysical realization, where the instantiation of a property is realized in a microphysical state of affairs. The accounts of these are designed to remove the threat that the causal efficacy of realized property is ‘preempted’ by their physical realizers. The book discusses the bearing of these accounts on the status of functional properties, on the nature of emergent properties, on the issue between ‘three-dimensionalist’ and ‘four-dimensionalist’ accounts of persisting entities, and on the status of ‘qualia’, the properties that give experiences their phenomenal character.

What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental natural properties have dispositional essences — they are potencies (pure powers). After explaining this proposal, the book goes on to show how this accounts for the existence of the laws of nature. A distinctive feature of this account is that it ensures that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This account has advantages over the regularity and nomic necessitation accounts associated with Lewis and Armstrong, while the dispositional essentialist view of properties has corresponding advantages over the categoricalist view of properties, according to which properties are quidditistic and do not have qualitative essences, merely primitive identity and difference. The relationship between potencies and modality, and also intentionality is explored. Other potential criticisms are raised and the view defended against them. For example it is claimed that if all properties are potencies, then a vicious regress ensues; it is shown that this does not follow. Geometrical and other ‘structural’ properties are raised as counterexamples, being properties that seem categorical; it is argued that this is the case only if one takes a particular view of the role of spacetime in physical theories. It is held that laws are metaphysically contingent whereas dispositional essentialism makes them necessary; it is argued that the contingency of laws is an illusion. An account of laws is developed in the face of Mumford's claim that neither dispositional essentialism nor science has need of laws.

This collection pays tribute to the highly influential work of Professor G.A. Cohen in the field of egalitarian political philosophy. He has a significant body of work spanning issues of Marxism and distributive justice, consistently characterized by original ideas and ingenious arguments. The volume includes essays on a number of significant topics, reflecting the wide-ranging themes of Professor Cohen’s work, but united in their concern for questions of social justice, pluralism, equality, and moral duty.

With urban poverty rising and affordable housing disappearing, the homeless and other “disorderly” people continue to occupy public space in many American cities. Concerned about the alleged ill effects their presence inflicts on property values and public safety, many cities have wholeheartedly embraced “zero-tolerance” or “broken window” policing efforts to clear the streets of unwanted people. Through an almost completely unnoticed set of practices, these people are banned from occupying certain spaces. Once zoned out, they are subject to arrest if they return—effectively banished from public places. This book offers an exploration of these new tactics that dramatically enhance the power of the police to monitor and arrest thousands of city dwellers. Drawing upon an extensive body of data, the chapters chart the rise of banishment in Seattle, a city on the leading edge of this emerging trend, to establish how it works and explore its ramifications. They demonstrate that, although the practice allows police and public officials to appear responsive to concerns about urban disorder, it is a highly questionable policy—it is expensive, does not reduce crime, and does not address the underlying conditions that generate urban poverty. Moreover, interviews with the banished themselves reveal that exclusion makes their lives and their path to self-sufficiency immeasurably more difficult. At a time when ever more cities and governments in the U.S. and Europe resort to the criminal justice system to solve complex social problems, the book provides a challenge to exclusionary strategies that diminish the life circumstances and the rights of those it targets.

The relationship between individuals and communities — all manner of communities, but especially the state — is a central preoccupation of property theory. Across a broad range of property thought — from utilitarian to Lockean to Hegelian — scholars have expended enormous effort explaining what owners can do with their property and the extent to which the community or the state can participate in those decisions. Discussions of property rights, from whatever perspective, necessarily reflect ideas about the proper domain and limits of individual and community power. Property stands so squarely at the intersection between the individual and community because systems of property are always the creation of some community. Moreover, systems of property have as their subject matter the allocation among community members of rights and duties with respect to resources that human beings need in order to survive and flourish. These allocative decisions are crucially important both to individuals, owners and non-owners alike, and to the community as a whole. In other words, whenever we discuss property, we are unavoidably discussing the architecture of community and of the individual's place within it. Even though the relationship between individuals and community stands at the conceptual center of property theory, the normative theories of community underlying discussions of property are frequently left implicit. This book aims to remedy this deficiency. With essays by property theorists from five different countries, it addresses various facets of the intersection between property and community.

This book describes and illustrates eleven powerful conversational strategies used by undercover police officers and cooperating witnesses who secretly tape-record targets in criminal investigations. Twelve actual criminal case studies are used as examples. These strategies creating illusion of guilt include the apparently deliberate use of semantic ambiguity, blocking the targets’ words (by creating static on the tape, interrupting them, speaking on their behalf, and manipulating the off/on switch); rapidly changing the subject before targets can respond (the “hit and run” strategy); contaminating the tape with irrelevant information that can make targets appear to be guilty; camouflaging illegality by making actions appear to be legal; isolating targets from important information that they need in order to make informed choices; inaccurately restating things the target has said; withholding crucial information from targets; lying to targets about critical information; and scripting targets in what to say on tape. These conversational strategies gain power from the fact that the targets do not know that they are being recorded, and often let things go right by them during the discourse. Nor do they know that the real audience of the conversations consists of later jury listeners, who do not know the full context of these conversations. Unlike everyday, unrecorded conversation, the most critical listening takes place at a future time and under very different circumstances. It is shown that undercover officers and their cooperating witnesses make use of essentially the same conversational strategies.

This book contains the texts of 17 lectures, delivered to the British Academy in 2001. Topics include Chinese Mountain Painting, prosperity and power in the age of Bede and Beowulf, Glyn Dwr, Shakespeare's sense of an exit, learning, liberty, poetry, social ethics, the House of Savoy during the Risorgimento, the disease of language and the language of disease, Gertrude Stein's differential syntax, Keith Douglas, Common Law's approach to property, Welfare-to-Work and genes.

This book is intended to be read at any stage in the dissertation process, but will be particularly useful in the early stages of preparation for a social work dissertation, and as a reference resource throughout. The book is a guide to successful dissertation completion. Content includes a brief history and overview of social work doctoral education in the United States, the importance of values in social work, and the relationship between personal, research, and social work values. Chapter 2 addresses issues in selecting and working with the dissertation supervisor and committee, as well as the role and tasks of all three parties in successful completion of the dissertation. In Chapter 3 strategies for researching, and evaluating the literature, as well as writing the literature review are discussed. In addition, the relevance of theory to social work research is examined. Chapter 4 describes ethical issues in social research and requirements for the protection of human subjects. In addition, an overview of both quantitative and qualitative research methods is provided. In Chapter 5 sample design and sample size are discussed in relation to both quantitative and qualitative research. The significance of the psychometric properties of measurement instruments is also discussed. Chapter 6 addresses issues in data collection, data management, and data analysis in qualitative and quantitative research. Finally Chapter 7 presents strategies for dissertation writing including structure and content, as well as data presentation.

Some of our beliefs are fundamentally about ourselves: these are beliefs about who we are, where we are, and which features we have. Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions. Propositions are things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. The main thesis of this book is that this supposition is mistaken and must be replaced with another view about content. The view that belief contents are propositions breaks down in the face of belief about the self, or so-called de se belief. On the view defended here, the content of a de se belief is a property that the believer reflexively takes himself or herself to have. The relation of self-ascription connects believers and such properties. Unlike propositions, properties lack absolute truth values that do not vary with time, place, or person. This book offers a sustained defense of the property theory of content, according to which the content of every cognitive attitude is a property rather than a proposition. The theory is supported with some new arguments, defended from various objections, and applied to some important problems and puzzles in the philosophy of mind.

Compares the market for property insurance in five European countries, Britain, Spain, France, Switzerland, and Germany. The comparisons are of particular interest, as the regulatory frameworks vary widely from country to country and so do the market outcomes, both in terms of premium level and in terms of available insurance cover. In particular, the state insurance monopolies in Spain and parts of Switzerland permit property owners to obtain global cover against a wide range of natural damages (including floods) at a very low premium rate. The premiums of private insurance companies are much higher because they typically spend more than one third of premium income on commissions and administrative costs. State monopolies are considerably more efficient in this respect.

In several countries, insurance against occurrences such as floods is not available in competitive insurance systems, or it is offered only to the better risks. This is probably due to problems of adverse selection. For compulsory state monopolies, adverse selection is not an issue.

This book defends a conception of the mind that is inspired by some of Descartes's writings. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended is not dualism — which is not adopted here — but internalism about the mind. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted thesis of externalism, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view that the mind is autonomous with respect to its environment: although it is obviously influenced by things in the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. The first part of the book argues that privileged accessibility is the mark of the mental, and that this thesis is strongly tied to criteria of personhood. The second part argues that internalism is best formulated as the thesis that mental features are determined by the phenomenal properties of our conscious mental life, and that the externalist denial of this thesis is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge. Hence, externalism is in conflict with the conception of the mind and personhood defended in the first part of the book. Supporters of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; this book answers these criticisms and argues for an uncompromising internalist Cartesian theory of the mind.

Studying institutional change regardless of whether it is focused on transitional or developing economies, may prove most fruitful when focused on its structuring of the means of production—land, labour, and capital. This book does exactly that: it singles out land as an object of study and places it in the context of one of the world’s largest and most populous countries undergoing institutional reform, the People’s Republic of China. The book argues that private property protected by law, the principle of ‘getting-the-prices-right’, and the emergence of effectively functioning markets can not be imposed, but are the outcome of a society’s historical development and institutional fabric. In other words, the creation of institutions that are trusted and perceived as ‘credible’ in the eyes of social actors hinges in part on choice and timing in relation to the constellation of socio-economic and political parameters. It is demonstrated that disregarding these might result in the establishment of ‘empty institutions’ that have little effect on social actors’ actions, and can even cause rising inequality, bad land stewardship, and social conflict. The book concludes that the key to understanding China’s successes in rural reforms lies in the state’s hands-off approach and upholding an intentional institutional ambiguity that allowed for local, credible institutions to arise.

Why have some countries been able to escape the usual dead end of international development efforts and build explosively growing capitalist economies? Based on years of fieldwork, this book provides an account of the first generation of entrepreneurs in Vietnam in comparison to those in other transition countries. Focusing on the emergence of private land development firms in Ho Chi Minh City, this book shows how within seven years the private sector produced the majority of all new houses in the real estate market. This book demonstrates that capitalist entrepreneurialism was not the result of state initiative, properly incentivized policies, or individual personality traits. Rather, a society-wide reconstruction of cognitive paradigms enabled entrepreneurs to emerge and transform Vietnam from a poor, centrally planned economy into one of the fastest growing, market economies in the world.

Governments, farmers, homeowners, and academics around the world agree that property rights are important. But what happens when the state fails to enforce them? This book describes how a variety of non-state actors define and enforce property rights in Sub-Saharan Africa when the state is weak or absent. Examining the roles played by traditional leaders, entrepreneurial bureaucrats, NGOs, and specialists in violence, this text argues that organic institutions can be helpful or predatory, depending on their incentives and context. Because organically developed institutions are not assumed to be either good or bad, the book develops a set of measurement criteria to assess which types of property regimes and enforcement mechanisms are helpful and which are harmful to social welfare. It focuses on the politics of property rights enforcement in both rural and urban communities in Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda. Describing what happens in specific communities, the book provocatively challenges the fallacy of legalism—the idea that changes in property law will lead to changes in property rights on the ground—arguing instead that states which change their property laws face challenges in implementation when they do not control the authority structures in local communities. The book provides new information about competitors to state power in Sub-Saharan Africa and the challenges of providing secure and defensible property rights.

This book offers answers to the following questions. What does reality encompass? Is reality exclusively physical? Or does reality include non‐physical — mental, and perhaps ‘abstract’ — aspects? What is it to be physical or mental — or to be an abstract entity? What are the elements of being, reality’s building blocks? How is the manifest image we inherit from our culture and refine in the special sciences related to the scientific image as we have it in fundamental physics? Can physics be understood as providing a ‘theory of everything’, or do the various sciences make up a hierarchy corresponding to autonomous levels of reality? Is our conscious human perspective on the universe in the universe or at its limits? What, if anything, makes ordinary truths, truths of the special sciences, and truths of mathematics true? And what is it for an assertion or judgment to be ‘made true’? Answers to these questions are framed in terms of a comprehensive ontology of substances and properties inspired by Descartes, Locke, their successors, and their more recent exemplars. Substances are simple, lacking parts that are themselves substances. Properties are modes (tropes), particular ways particular substances are, not universals. Arrangements of propertied substances serve as truthmakers for all the truths that have truthmakers. The deep story about the nature of these truthmakers is addressed by fundamental physics.

Corporate networks form part of the institutional structure of markets and the business environment, enabling firms to coordinate their behaviour and regulate competition. Networks perform a number of economic functions: they reduce information asymmetries and uncertainty, and facilitate the redistribution of risk between banks, firms, and investors. Within these networks, firms collectively monitor one another and owners supervise their managers. This book analyses comparative data on interlocking directorates and capital networks between large corporations in the United States and five countries in Europe: Germany, Great Britain, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. The structure of corporate networks is shaped by the traditions, culture, and institutions of a country. Corporate networks may be considered as a configuration of firms that are connected to one another by managers (interlocks), or as a configuration of managers who meet each other on the board of directors (network of the economic elite). The resources on which the dominance of the economic elite is based are bureaucratic power, property rights, and social capital. Bureaucratic control over a company is linked with property rights in the context of specific network configurations that vary between countries and lead to differing forms of managerial control. In the transitional economies, the type of capitalism that is evolving somewhat resembles Western managerial capitalism, but with certain significant differences. Privatization created a relatively high concentration of ownership. There is no clear-cut separation of ownership and control, but rather a balance of power between managers and owners.

Physics reveals a world composed of events arranged in a fixed configuration, like locations on a map. But where are we ourselves, the creatures who construct the map, to be found in the world it presents? Where, in this seamless fabric presented by physics do we find the fleeting, centered world of experience, rich in color, sound, and sentiment, that we know from the inside? The question of the relationship between the world of physics and the world as seen through human eyes is one of the deepest, and most difficult in philosophy. The difficulty has many aspects. The world of physics is fixed and eternal; the world of experience is transient and changing. The world of physics is structure described in mathematical terms; the world of experience is rich with qualitative properties that can't be captured in mathematical description. The world of physics has no built-in perspective; the world of experience is always experience to a particular someone, from a standpoint in space and time. The problem spans metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and ethics, and expresses itself in the wider culture in the perceived clash between humanist and scientific views of the self. This book displays in a new way the common structure of these different aspects of the problem. An account of the structure of self-locating knowledge serves as the keystone for a broad vision of the place of the self in the physical universe. The vision preserves the completeness and closure of physical description, while leaving room for features of ourselves and our subjective views of the world that are at once real and incommunicable.