Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, ...
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Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.Less
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.
Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter defends an externalist analysis of justification, focusing on its proper function requirement. It identifies three ways a popular evidentialist view needs improvement, and argues that ...
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This chapter defends an externalist analysis of justification, focusing on its proper function requirement. It identifies three ways a popular evidentialist view needs improvement, and argues that the proper function analysis captures the recommended improvements. It then highlights some virtues of the analysis, including the fact that because it has no reliability requirement, it is an externalist position that avoids the usual objections to reliabilist accounts of justification. The chapter concludes by responding to several objections.Less
This chapter defends an externalist analysis of justification, focusing on its proper function requirement. It identifies three ways a popular evidentialist view needs improvement, and argues that the proper function analysis captures the recommended improvements. It then highlights some virtues of the analysis, including the fact that because it has no reliability requirement, it is an externalist position that avoids the usual objections to reliabilist accounts of justification. The chapter concludes by responding to several objections.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge ...
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In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.Less
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.
Michael C. Rea
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199247608
- eISBN:
- 9780191601804
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247609.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In an earlier chapter, the author argues that naturalists can justifiably accept realism about material objects only if the methods of science justify belief in intrinsic modal properties. One ...
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In an earlier chapter, the author argues that naturalists can justifiably accept realism about material objects only if the methods of science justify belief in intrinsic modal properties. One suggestion as to how they might do this is as follows: beliefs attributing intrinsic modal properties to material objects are justified because their truth provides a good explanation for the existence of proper functions in nature. This examines this suggestion and argues that, except in the case of objects that are the products of design, proper functions are not empirically detectable.Less
In an earlier chapter, the author argues that naturalists can justifiably accept realism about material objects only if the methods of science justify belief in intrinsic modal properties. One suggestion as to how they might do this is as follows: beliefs attributing intrinsic modal properties to material objects are justified because their truth provides a good explanation for the existence of proper functions in nature. This examines this suggestion and argues that, except in the case of objects that are the products of design, proper functions are not empirically detectable.
Randal Rauser
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199214600
- eISBN:
- 9780191706509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214600.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Alvin Plantinga's moderate foundationalism is rooted philosophically in Thomas Reid's common‐sense realism, while its theological background is found in the emphasis within Reformed theology upon ...
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Alvin Plantinga's moderate foundationalism is rooted philosophically in Thomas Reid's common‐sense realism, while its theological background is found in the emphasis within Reformed theology upon faith as knowledge mediated through the sensus divinitatis. Plantinga offers a theory of warrant (as opposed to justification) that assumes externalism and is predicated on the concept of proper function (and so a designer). This theory can be combined with a realist view of concept acquisition through the process of divine illumination. Plantinga's specific account of warranted Christian belief combines the function of the sensus with the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit upon the reading of Scripture. While the theory can also be used to provide an account of prima facie warrant for non‐Christian belief systems (e.g. Mormonism), further work can be done to fine‐tune the theory and make it specific to Christian belief.Less
Alvin Plantinga's moderate foundationalism is rooted philosophically in Thomas Reid's common‐sense realism, while its theological background is found in the emphasis within Reformed theology upon faith as knowledge mediated through the sensus divinitatis. Plantinga offers a theory of warrant (as opposed to justification) that assumes externalism and is predicated on the concept of proper function (and so a designer). This theory can be combined with a realist view of concept acquisition through the process of divine illumination. Plantinga's specific account of warranted Christian belief combines the function of the sensus with the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit upon the reading of Scripture. While the theory can also be used to provide an account of prima facie warrant for non‐Christian belief systems (e.g. Mormonism), further work can be done to fine‐tune the theory and make it specific to Christian belief.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The account of warrant I propose, utilizing the notion of proper function as it does, is an example of naturalistic epistemology: it invokes no kind of normativity not to be found in the natural ...
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The account of warrant I propose, utilizing the notion of proper function as it does, is an example of naturalistic epistemology: it invokes no kind of normativity not to be found in the natural sciences; in this chapter and the next, I argue that naturalism in epistemology can flourish only in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. To do so, I argue that there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation or account of the notion of proper function (or related notions like purpose, malfunction, design plan, etc.). I consider proposals for such an account that can be drawn from the work of John Pollock, Ruth Millikan, and John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter, but find in each case that the proposed account is inadequate. I then consider the possibility that the notion of proper function (and related notions) should be thought of as useful fictions. After some critical comments about this possibility, I proceed to point out that if one (1) is convinced that there really is such a thing as warrant and that there really is (for natural organisms) such a thing as proper function, and also (2) thinks that there is no naturalistic analysis of these notions, then one has a powerful argument against naturalism.Less
The account of warrant I propose, utilizing the notion of proper function as it does, is an example of naturalistic epistemology: it invokes no kind of normativity not to be found in the natural sciences; in this chapter and the next, I argue that naturalism in epistemology can flourish only in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. To do so, I argue that there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation or account of the notion of proper function (or related notions like purpose, malfunction, design plan, etc.). I consider proposals for such an account that can be drawn from the work of John Pollock, Ruth Millikan, and John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter, but find in each case that the proposed account is inadequate. I then consider the possibility that the notion of proper function (and related notions) should be thought of as useful fictions. After some critical comments about this possibility, I proceed to point out that if one (1) is convinced that there really is such a thing as warrant and that there really is (for natural organisms) such a thing as proper function, and also (2) thinks that there is no naturalistic analysis of these notions, then one has a powerful argument against naturalism.
Paul Bloomfield
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195137132
- eISBN:
- 9780199833092
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195137132.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The book is a work in metaethics, constituting a defense of moral realism. The book begins with what I call a “modest transcendental argument” for the existence of the property of moral goodness ...
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The book is a work in metaethics, constituting a defense of moral realism. The book begins with what I call a “modest transcendental argument” for the existence of the property of moral goodness based on an acknowledgment of the possibility that personal moral failing may go forever undetected; as such this is an argument from error. The property of physical health, understood in terms of proper function, is used as a model for moral goodness. This anchors the moral ontology on foundations as solid as those found in the physical sciences. A moral epistemology is developed in which we may learn about goodness much in the way doctors and scientists may learn about healthiness. The semantics that emerges from this picture is multifaceted and nuanced enough to preserve complicated common sense semantic intuitions about how the word “good” is used in moral contexts. The position also implies a defense of an externalist theory about the relationship between the recognition of a moral consideration and motivation. The book closes with an appendix in which the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is questioned, and a nonreducible ontology for entropy is considered as an ontological model for both physical health and moral goodness.Less
The book is a work in metaethics, constituting a defense of moral realism. The book begins with what I call a “modest transcendental argument” for the existence of the property of moral goodness based on an acknowledgment of the possibility that personal moral failing may go forever undetected; as such this is an argument from error. The property of physical health, understood in terms of proper function, is used as a model for moral goodness. This anchors the moral ontology on foundations as solid as those found in the physical sciences. A moral epistemology is developed in which we may learn about goodness much in the way doctors and scientists may learn about healthiness. The semantics that emerges from this picture is multifaceted and nuanced enough to preserve complicated common sense semantic intuitions about how the word “good” is used in moral contexts. The position also implies a defense of an externalist theory about the relationship between the recognition of a moral consideration and motivation. The book closes with an appendix in which the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is questioned, and a nonreducible ontology for entropy is considered as an ontological model for both physical health and moral goodness.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In Warrant: The Current Debate, I canvassed contemporary accounts of warrant (that quantity enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief), and found them inadequate. In this ...
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In Warrant: The Current Debate, I canvassed contemporary accounts of warrant (that quantity enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief), and found them inadequate. In this chapter, I begin to develop my own account of warrant. After introducing the notions of proper function, a cognitive environment, and a design plan, I arrive at the following first approximation of warrant: a belief B has warrant for an agent S if and only if the relevant segments of S's cognitive design plan (the segments involved in the production of B) are functioning properly in a cognitive environment, sufficiently similar to that for which they were designed, and the modules of the design plan governing the production of B are (1) aimed at truth, and (2) such that there is a high objective probability that a belief formed in accordance with those modules (in that sort of cognitive environment) is true. (I add, moreover, that in these conditions the degree of firmness with which S holds B is proportional to the degree of warrant B has for S).Less
In Warrant: The Current Debate, I canvassed contemporary accounts of warrant (that quantity enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief), and found them inadequate. In this chapter, I begin to develop my own account of warrant. After introducing the notions of proper function, a cognitive environment, and a design plan, I arrive at the following first approximation of warrant: a belief B has warrant for an agent S if and only if the relevant segments of S's cognitive design plan (the segments involved in the production of B) are functioning properly in a cognitive environment, sufficiently similar to that for which they were designed, and the modules of the design plan governing the production of B are (1) aimed at truth, and (2) such that there is a high objective probability that a belief formed in accordance with those modules (in that sort of cognitive environment) is true. (I add, moreover, that in these conditions the degree of firmness with which S holds B is proportional to the degree of warrant B has for S).
Peter J. Graham
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199603213
- eISBN:
- 9780191725388
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603213.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In Warrant and Proper Function and in Knowledge of God, Alvin Plantinga provides an intelligent design argument for the existence of God. Plantina's key premise is that “naturalism” cannot account ...
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In Warrant and Proper Function and in Knowledge of God, Alvin Plantinga provides an intelligent design argument for the existence of God. Plantina's key premise is that “naturalism” cannot account for the proper functions of natural traits, but God as intelligent designer can. His argument for this premise relies on a thought experiment involving a Hitler-like madman and his henchmen. This chapter criticizes Platinga's thought experiment through careful attention to both intelligent design and natural selection as sources of functions and standards for normal functioning.Less
In Warrant and Proper Function and in Knowledge of God, Alvin Plantinga provides an intelligent design argument for the existence of God. Plantina's key premise is that “naturalism” cannot account for the proper functions of natural traits, but God as intelligent designer can. His argument for this premise relies on a thought experiment involving a Hitler-like madman and his henchmen. This chapter criticizes Platinga's thought experiment through careful attention to both intelligent design and natural selection as sources of functions and standards for normal functioning.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195131932
- eISBN:
- 9780199867486
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195131932.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Among objections to Christian belief, we can distinguish between de facto objections and de jure objections, i.e., between those that claim that Christian belief is false (de facto objections) and ...
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Among objections to Christian belief, we can distinguish between de facto objections and de jure objections, i.e., between those that claim that Christian belief is false (de facto objections) and those that claim that Christian belief, whether or not true, is at any rate unjustifiable, or rationally unjustified, or irrational, or not intellectually respectable, or in some other way rationally unacceptable (de jure objections). In this chapter, I ask whether there is a viable de jure objection to Christian belief formulated in terms of rationality, i.e., I ask whether the objection that Christian belief is not rational is a strong one. In order to assess this sort of objection, we must be clear on what is meant by the term “rational,” and so I distinguish several senses of that term: (1) Aristotelian rationality, (2) rationality as proper function, (3) rationality as within or conforming to the deliverances of reason, (4) means–end rationality, (5) deontological rationality, and (6) William Alston's practical rationality. I conclude that there is no viable de jure objection to Christian belief in terms of any of these senses of rationality, with a possible exception of the second – rationality as proper function. In the next chapter (Ch. 5), I begin to explore this remaining possibility and take up the question of the relation between proper function, warrant, and de jure objections to Christian belief.Less
Among objections to Christian belief, we can distinguish between de facto objections and de jure objections, i.e., between those that claim that Christian belief is false (de facto objections) and those that claim that Christian belief, whether or not true, is at any rate unjustifiable, or rationally unjustified, or irrational, or not intellectually respectable, or in some other way rationally unacceptable (de jure objections). In this chapter, I ask whether there is a viable de jure objection to Christian belief formulated in terms of rationality, i.e., I ask whether the objection that Christian belief is not rational is a strong one. In order to assess this sort of objection, we must be clear on what is meant by the term “rational,” and so I distinguish several senses of that term: (1) Aristotelian rationality, (2) rationality as proper function, (3) rationality as within or conforming to the deliverances of reason, (4) means–end rationality, (5) deontological rationality, and (6) William Alston's practical rationality. I conclude that there is no viable de jure objection to Christian belief in terms of any of these senses of rationality, with a possible exception of the second – rationality as proper function. In the next chapter (Ch. 5), I begin to explore this remaining possibility and take up the question of the relation between proper function, warrant, and de jure objections to Christian belief.
Jennifer Greenwood
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029780
- eISBN:
- 9780262329828
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029780.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter focuses on intentionality, specifically, on how mental states acquire their intentional contents (their ‘aboutness’). In previous chapters it was noted that the affect expressions and ...
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This chapter focuses on intentionality, specifically, on how mental states acquire their intentional contents (their ‘aboutness’). In previous chapters it was noted that the affect expressions and STBPs of human neonates are interpreted as or function as assistance/attention soliciting devices by preadapted caregivers. Given this, the chapter focuses on theories of function and biosemantics (a naturalistic theory of intentionality). Both theories adopted are due to Millikan (1984, 2004); the first relates to Proper Function and, the second, to natural, intentional and linguistic signs. Her theory explains how one sign type can emerge from another through a bootstrapping process. The analyses demonstrate that representations are defined by the way they function, not just in the head, but in wider cognitive systems which include representation-producing devices, objects in the environment and representation-consuming devices.Less
This chapter focuses on intentionality, specifically, on how mental states acquire their intentional contents (their ‘aboutness’). In previous chapters it was noted that the affect expressions and STBPs of human neonates are interpreted as or function as assistance/attention soliciting devices by preadapted caregivers. Given this, the chapter focuses on theories of function and biosemantics (a naturalistic theory of intentionality). Both theories adopted are due to Millikan (1984, 2004); the first relates to Proper Function and, the second, to natural, intentional and linguistic signs. Her theory explains how one sign type can emerge from another through a bootstrapping process. The analyses demonstrate that representations are defined by the way they function, not just in the head, but in wider cognitive systems which include representation-producing devices, objects in the environment and representation-consuming devices.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243792
- eISBN:
- 9780191598524
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243794.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Knowledge is (strongly) warranted (strong) true belief. For the internalist, a belief being warranted is it being justified (in the sense of the belief being rendered inductively probable by other ...
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Knowledge is (strongly) warranted (strong) true belief. For the internalist, a belief being warranted is it being justified (in the sense of the belief being rendered inductively probable by other beliefs and ultimately by basic beliefs), where the justification does not proceed through or otherwise depend on a false belief. For the main kind of externalist, the reliabilist, a belief being warranted is it being produced by a type of process that normally produces true beliefs. For Plantinga, the central element in a belief being warranted is it being produced by a properly functioning cognitive process; but I argue that his account reduces to a reliabilist account. Knowledge is only more worth having than strong true belief if warrant is intrinsically valuable (i.e. valuable in itself, in addition to the fact that it has led to truth). Internalist warrant is intrinsically valuable, but externalist warrant is not. .Less
Knowledge is (strongly) warranted (strong) true belief. For the internalist, a belief being warranted is it being justified (in the sense of the belief being rendered inductively probable by other beliefs and ultimately by basic beliefs), where the justification does not proceed through or otherwise depend on a false belief. For the main kind of externalist, the reliabilist, a belief being warranted is it being produced by a type of process that normally produces true beliefs. For Plantinga, the central element in a belief being warranted is it being produced by a properly functioning cognitive process; but I argue that his account reduces to a reliabilist account. Knowledge is only more worth having than strong true belief if warrant is intrinsically valuable (i.e. valuable in itself, in addition to the fact that it has led to truth). Internalist warrant is intrinsically valuable, but externalist warrant is not. .
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078626
- eISBN:
- 9780199833559
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078624.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter, I take stock of the arguments and conclusions of the previous nine chapters, noting that the idea of proper function figures prominently in the difficulties from which the main ...
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In this chapter, I take stock of the arguments and conclusions of the previous nine chapters, noting that the idea of proper function figures prominently in the difficulties from which the main current views of warrant suffer. This fact suggests that the notion of proper function is much more deeply involved in our idea of warrant than is currently recognized. In Warrant and Proper Function, I shall examine this suggestion in detail; in this chapter, (the final chapter of Warrant: The Current Debate), I give an outline of the content of Warrant and Proper Function. In so doing, I introduce the claim that the paradigmatic cases of a belief's having warrant are cases such that (1) the belief is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly (i.e., functioning in accord with the cognizer's design plan), (2) the cognitive environment in which the belief is produced is one sufficiently similar to the environment for which the relevant cognitive faculty or faculties were designed, (3) the belief is such that the purpose of the module of the faculties producing the belief is to produce true beliefs, and (4) the design plan in question is a good one.Less
In this chapter, I take stock of the arguments and conclusions of the previous nine chapters, noting that the idea of proper function figures prominently in the difficulties from which the main current views of warrant suffer. This fact suggests that the notion of proper function is much more deeply involved in our idea of warrant than is currently recognized. In Warrant and Proper Function, I shall examine this suggestion in detail; in this chapter, (the final chapter of Warrant: The Current Debate), I give an outline of the content of Warrant and Proper Function. In so doing, I introduce the claim that the paradigmatic cases of a belief's having warrant are cases such that (1) the belief is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly (i.e., functioning in accord with the cognizer's design plan), (2) the cognitive environment in which the belief is produced is one sufficiently similar to the environment for which the relevant cognitive faculty or faculties were designed, (3) the belief is such that the purpose of the module of the faculties producing the belief is to produce true beliefs, and (4) the design plan in question is a good one.
Paul Bloomfield
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195137132
- eISBN:
- 9780199833092
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195137132.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The property of physical health is presented as a model for moral goodness, and a primer on being healthy follows. Healthiness is understood in terms of proper biological function. Conventionalism ...
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The property of physical health is presented as a model for moral goodness, and a primer on being healthy follows. Healthiness is understood in terms of proper biological function. Conventionalism and relativism, two bugbears of moral realism, are discussed in relation to healthiness and found not to arouse suspicion about the reality of physical health. By analogy, these can be accommodated by moral realism. A discussion of the supervenience and reduction of goodness and health follows, and the chapter ends with a discussion of S. Blackburn's challenge to moral realism based on supervenience.Less
The property of physical health is presented as a model for moral goodness, and a primer on being healthy follows. Healthiness is understood in terms of proper biological function. Conventionalism and relativism, two bugbears of moral realism, are discussed in relation to healthiness and found not to arouse suspicion about the reality of physical health. By analogy, these can be accommodated by moral realism. A discussion of the supervenience and reduction of goodness and health follows, and the chapter ends with a discussion of S. Blackburn's challenge to moral realism based on supervenience.
Maarten Franssen
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262113212
- eISBN:
- 9780262255271
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262113212.003.0007
- Subject:
- Biology, Biomathematics / Statistics and Data Analysis / Complexity Studies
This chapter examines the role that is played in the debate on what is and what is not the adequate theory of function, by the claim that “function” is an inherently normative concept. It explores ...
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This chapter examines the role that is played in the debate on what is and what is not the adequate theory of function, by the claim that “function” is an inherently normative concept. It explores exactly how the theories that claim to be able to account for the normativity of function go about doing this. This chapter shows that the proponents of proper function (PF) -type theories do not treat their preferred concept of “function” as being inherently normative. It suggests that systems-with-a-design (SD) theory's central notion of “type fixation” be given a stronger naturalistic footing.Less
This chapter examines the role that is played in the debate on what is and what is not the adequate theory of function, by the claim that “function” is an inherently normative concept. It explores exactly how the theories that claim to be able to account for the normativity of function go about doing this. This chapter shows that the proponents of proper function (PF) -type theories do not treat their preferred concept of “function” as being inherently normative. It suggests that systems-with-a-design (SD) theory's central notion of “type fixation” be given a stronger naturalistic footing.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078626
- eISBN:
- 9780199833559
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078624.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
As I use the term, externalism is the complement of internalism; the externalist denies that in order for one of my beliefs to have warrant for me, I must have some sort of special or privileged ...
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As I use the term, externalism is the complement of internalism; the externalist denies that in order for one of my beliefs to have warrant for me, I must have some sort of special or privileged access to the fact that I have warrant, or to its ground. Recent epistemology has seen a flurry of interest in reliabilism, a particular species of externalism, and in this chapter, I examine three externalist and reliabilist accounts of warrant: those offered or suggested by William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman. After introducing the notion of Alstonian justification, I point out that Alstonian justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for warrant (largely due to the possibility of cognitive malfunction). I then briefly outline Dretske's account of knowledge, Goldman's earlier version of reliabilism, and (giving a somewhat more lengthy treatment) Goldman's later version of reliabilism. I conclude that the views of both Dretske and Goldman suffer because they fail to pay explicit attention to the notion of the proper function of our cognitive equipment.Less
As I use the term, externalism is the complement of internalism; the externalist denies that in order for one of my beliefs to have warrant for me, I must have some sort of special or privileged access to the fact that I have warrant, or to its ground. Recent epistemology has seen a flurry of interest in reliabilism, a particular species of externalism, and in this chapter, I examine three externalist and reliabilist accounts of warrant: those offered or suggested by William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman. After introducing the notion of Alstonian justification, I point out that Alstonian justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for warrant (largely due to the possibility of cognitive malfunction). I then briefly outline Dretske's account of knowledge, Goldman's earlier version of reliabilism, and (giving a somewhat more lengthy treatment) Goldman's later version of reliabilism. I conclude that the views of both Dretske and Goldman suffer because they fail to pay explicit attention to the notion of the proper function of our cognitive equipment.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter, I (1) examine the contrast between foundationalism and coherentism, and (2) consider evidentialism, a special variety of foundationalism. After arguing that the central tenet of ...
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In this chapter, I (1) examine the contrast between foundationalism and coherentism, and (2) consider evidentialism, a special variety of foundationalism. After arguing that the central tenet of coherentism is that the sole source of warrant is coherence, I argue that coherentism is mistaken and endorse foundationalism. I then offer some brief comments on the inadequacy of classical foundationalism and contrast classical foundationalism to the sort of foundationalism I endorse, which I call Reidian foundationalism. I next turn to an examination of evidentialism, specifically the evidentialism of William Alston, Richard Feldman and Earl Conee (which version of evidentialism I refer to as the AFC view). Taking “evidence” in a sufficiently broad sense, I concur with the AFC view in its claim that whenever some belief B has warrant for an agent S, it is the case that S has evidence for B; I also argue, however, that having evidence is not sufficient for warrant – proper function is also required (and here I part company with the AFC view).Less
In this chapter, I (1) examine the contrast between foundationalism and coherentism, and (2) consider evidentialism, a special variety of foundationalism. After arguing that the central tenet of coherentism is that the sole source of warrant is coherence, I argue that coherentism is mistaken and endorse foundationalism. I then offer some brief comments on the inadequacy of classical foundationalism and contrast classical foundationalism to the sort of foundationalism I endorse, which I call Reidian foundationalism. I next turn to an examination of evidentialism, specifically the evidentialism of William Alston, Richard Feldman and Earl Conee (which version of evidentialism I refer to as the AFC view). Taking “evidence” in a sufficiently broad sense, I concur with the AFC view in its claim that whenever some belief B has warrant for an agent S, it is the case that S has evidence for B; I also argue, however, that having evidence is not sufficient for warrant – proper function is also required (and here I part company with the AFC view).
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199603213
- eISBN:
- 9780191725388
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603213.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This is the third volume of the Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion series. As with the first two volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan ...
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This is the third volume of the Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion series. As with the first two volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion. This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged as an identifiable subfield within this time frame along with other emerging subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersect with issues in philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in our disciplines, while at the same time inviting greater interest in the work being done in the philosophy of religion. We thus present the third volume in this series, a volume containing contributions by an impressive group of philosophers on topics of central important to the philosophy of religion.Less
This is the third volume of the Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion series. As with the first two volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion. This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged as an identifiable subfield within this time frame along with other emerging subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersect with issues in philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in our disciplines, while at the same time inviting greater interest in the work being done in the philosophy of religion. We thus present the third volume in this series, a volume containing contributions by an impressive group of philosophers on topics of central important to the philosophy of religion.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Broadly taken, the term “induction” denotes our whole nondeductive procedure of acquiring, maintaining, and discarding beliefs about what is so far unobserved or undetected or unknown. In this ...
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Broadly taken, the term “induction” denotes our whole nondeductive procedure of acquiring, maintaining, and discarding beliefs about what is so far unobserved or undetected or unknown. In this chapter, I examine induction from the perspective of my account of warrant. I first take up what is now referred to as “the old riddle of induction,” rejecting David Hume's claim that inductive reasoning is not rationally justified and defending the view that beliefs formed on the basis of inductive reasoning can have warrant. I then turn to Nelson Goodman's ruminations on grue and the “new riddle of induction,” which is the question: what makes a property projectible? I reject Goodman's own solution to this problem, examine other inadequate solutions, and then suggest that an answer can be found by making reference to the proper function of the human intellect; projectible properties are just those properties that a properly functioning adult human being in our circumstances will in fact project.Less
Broadly taken, the term “induction” denotes our whole nondeductive procedure of acquiring, maintaining, and discarding beliefs about what is so far unobserved or undetected or unknown. In this chapter, I examine induction from the perspective of my account of warrant. I first take up what is now referred to as “the old riddle of induction,” rejecting David Hume's claim that inductive reasoning is not rationally justified and defending the view that beliefs formed on the basis of inductive reasoning can have warrant. I then turn to Nelson Goodman's ruminations on grue and the “new riddle of induction,” which is the question: what makes a property projectible? I reject Goodman's own solution to this problem, examine other inadequate solutions, and then suggest that an answer can be found by making reference to the proper function of the human intellect; projectible properties are just those properties that a properly functioning adult human being in our circumstances will in fact project.
Jesse Couenhoven
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199948697
- eISBN:
- 9780199345977
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199948697.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter seeks to clarify how we can be responsible for inherited sins or virtues. “Augustinian compatibilism” contends that we are responsible for our beliefs and loves, and (in)actions ...
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This chapter seeks to clarify how we can be responsible for inherited sins or virtues. “Augustinian compatibilism” contends that we are responsible for our beliefs and loves, and (in)actions motivated by them, when we are properly functioning. Because we are social creatures, dependent, and not simply self-made, we are responsible for aspects of our identities that have been given to us. We may be more responsible for what we choose, but we can be at least minimally responsible for what we do not voluntarily control, but nevertheless believe or desire, when we are not malfunctioning (for instance: we are reason-responsive). This claim is developed by considering how we should think about responsibility and blame in cases of autism, antisocial personality disorder, kleptomania, and schizophrenia. I argue that disease does not necessarily excuse us from responsibility or blame. Indeed, when one is infected with immoral beliefs and loves, that indicts.Less
This chapter seeks to clarify how we can be responsible for inherited sins or virtues. “Augustinian compatibilism” contends that we are responsible for our beliefs and loves, and (in)actions motivated by them, when we are properly functioning. Because we are social creatures, dependent, and not simply self-made, we are responsible for aspects of our identities that have been given to us. We may be more responsible for what we choose, but we can be at least minimally responsible for what we do not voluntarily control, but nevertheless believe or desire, when we are not malfunctioning (for instance: we are reason-responsive). This claim is developed by considering how we should think about responsibility and blame in cases of autism, antisocial personality disorder, kleptomania, and schizophrenia. I argue that disease does not necessarily excuse us from responsibility or blame. Indeed, when one is infected with immoral beliefs and loves, that indicts.