Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, ...
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Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.Less
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.
Hagit Borer
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263905
- eISBN:
- 9780191718182
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263905.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This book explores the difference between words however defined and structures however constructed. It sets out to demonstrate over three volumes — of which this is the first — that the explanation ...
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This book explores the difference between words however defined and structures however constructed. It sets out to demonstrate over three volumes — of which this is the first — that the explanation of linguistic competence should be shifted from lexical entry to syntactic structure, from memory of words to manipulation of rules. Its reformulation of how grammar and lexicon interact has profound implications for linguistic, philosophical, and psychological theories about human mind and language. The book departs from both language specific constructional approaches and lexicalist approaches to argue that universal hierarchical structures determine interpretation, and that language variation emerges from the morphological and phonological properties of inflectional material. This volume applies this radical approach to nominal structure. Integrating research in syntax, semantics, and morphology, the volume argues that nominal structure is based on the syntactic realization of semantic notions such as classifier, quantity, and reference. In the process, this volume seeks to do away with lexical ambiguity and type-shifting. Among the topics the volume considers are the interpretation of proper names, the mass-count distinction, the weak-strong interpretation of quantifiers, partitive and measure phrases, and the structural representation of the definite article. In the process, the volume explores inter-language variation through the properties of the morpho-phonological system. The languages discussed include English, Chinese, Italian, and Hebrew.Less
This book explores the difference between words however defined and structures however constructed. It sets out to demonstrate over three volumes — of which this is the first — that the explanation of linguistic competence should be shifted from lexical entry to syntactic structure, from memory of words to manipulation of rules. Its reformulation of how grammar and lexicon interact has profound implications for linguistic, philosophical, and psychological theories about human mind and language. The book departs from both language specific constructional approaches and lexicalist approaches to argue that universal hierarchical structures determine interpretation, and that language variation emerges from the morphological and phonological properties of inflectional material. This volume applies this radical approach to nominal structure. Integrating research in syntax, semantics, and morphology, the volume argues that nominal structure is based on the syntactic realization of semantic notions such as classifier, quantity, and reference. In the process, this volume seeks to do away with lexical ambiguity and type-shifting. Among the topics the volume considers are the interpretation of proper names, the mass-count distinction, the weak-strong interpretation of quantifiers, partitive and measure phrases, and the structural representation of the definite article. In the process, the volume explores inter-language variation through the properties of the morpho-phonological system. The languages discussed include English, Chinese, Italian, and Hebrew.
Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159737
- eISBN:
- 9781400848133
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159737.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
The U.S. Constitution found in school textbooks and under glass in Washington is not the one enforced today by the Supreme Court. This book argues that since the nation's founding, but especially ...
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The U.S. Constitution found in school textbooks and under glass in Washington is not the one enforced today by the Supreme Court. This book argues that since the nation's founding, but especially since the 1930s, the courts have been cutting holes in the original Constitution and its amendments to eliminate the parts that protect liberty from the power of government. From the Commerce Clause, to the Necessary and Proper Clause, to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has rendered each of these provisions toothless. In the process, the written Constitution has been lost. This book establishes the original meaning of these lost clauses and offers a practical way to restore them to their central role in constraining government: adopting a “presumption of liberty” to give the benefit of the doubt to citizens when laws restrict their rightful exercises of liberty. It also provides a new, realistic and philosophically rigorous theory of constitutional legitimacy that justifies both interpreting the Constitution according to its original meaning and, where that meaning is vague or open-ended, construing it so as to better protect the rights retained by the people. The book disputes the conventional wisdom, posing a powerful challenge to which others must now respond. This updated edition features an afterword with further reflections on individual popular sovereignty, originalist interpretation, judicial engagement, and the gravitational force that original meaning has exerted on the Supreme Court in several recent cases.Less
The U.S. Constitution found in school textbooks and under glass in Washington is not the one enforced today by the Supreme Court. This book argues that since the nation's founding, but especially since the 1930s, the courts have been cutting holes in the original Constitution and its amendments to eliminate the parts that protect liberty from the power of government. From the Commerce Clause, to the Necessary and Proper Clause, to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has rendered each of these provisions toothless. In the process, the written Constitution has been lost. This book establishes the original meaning of these lost clauses and offers a practical way to restore them to their central role in constraining government: adopting a “presumption of liberty” to give the benefit of the doubt to citizens when laws restrict their rightful exercises of liberty. It also provides a new, realistic and philosophically rigorous theory of constitutional legitimacy that justifies both interpreting the Constitution according to its original meaning and, where that meaning is vague or open-ended, construing it so as to better protect the rights retained by the people. The book disputes the conventional wisdom, posing a powerful challenge to which others must now respond. This updated edition features an afterword with further reflections on individual popular sovereignty, originalist interpretation, judicial engagement, and the gravitational force that original meaning has exerted on the Supreme Court in several recent cases.
Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159737
- eISBN:
- 9781400848133
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159737.003.0008
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter examines whether the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution precludes or invites the exercise of judicial review of a federal law to see if it lies within the powers of Congress ...
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This chapter examines whether the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution precludes or invites the exercise of judicial review of a federal law to see if it lies within the powers of Congress to enact. Evaluating whether a federal law is constitutional must begin with whether Congress has acted within the powers it is granted in the Constitution. The chapter first provides an overview of the origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause before discussing the meaning of the term “proper.” It then examines the merits of applying the presumption of constitutionality to federal laws. In particular, it considers the original meaning of the constitutional provision giving Congress the power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”Less
This chapter examines whether the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution precludes or invites the exercise of judicial review of a federal law to see if it lies within the powers of Congress to enact. Evaluating whether a federal law is constitutional must begin with whether Congress has acted within the powers it is granted in the Constitution. The chapter first provides an overview of the origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause before discussing the meaning of the term “proper.” It then examines the merits of applying the presumption of constitutionality to federal laws. In particular, it considers the original meaning of the constitutional provision giving Congress the power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”
Alvin Plantinga
Matthew Davidson (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103762
- eISBN:
- 9780199833573
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103769.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William ...
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This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.Less
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244141
- eISBN:
- 9780191598241
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198244142.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re ...
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This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.Less
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.
Jennifer M. Welsh
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199267217
- eISBN:
- 9780191601118
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199267219.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This concluding chapter assesses the debate over humanitarian intervention in the light of the events of September 11, 2001. On the one hand, it can be argued that 9/11 has reversed the momentum ...
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This concluding chapter assesses the debate over humanitarian intervention in the light of the events of September 11, 2001. On the one hand, it can be argued that 9/11 has reversed the momentum behind the norm of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. In the course of waging the war on terrorism, the powers of sovereign states have been increased and the willingness of Western states to criticize the treatment of civilians within other sovereign jurisdictions appears to have weakened. On the other, there are three reasons why humanitarian intervention – and the issues associated with it – will continue to preoccupy scholars and statesmen in a post-September 11th world. First, the terrorist attacks of 2001 have reinforced the view that instability within or collapse of a state anywhere in the world can have implications that reach far wider than that particular region. Second, the debate about what constraints should be placed on the use of force – particularly those related to proper authority – are as relevant for the ‘war on terror’ as they are for humanitarian intervention. Finally, as the missions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 have shown, humanitarian rationale are all-important in justifying the use of force in international society, even when other motives are at work.Less
This concluding chapter assesses the debate over humanitarian intervention in the light of the events of September 11, 2001. On the one hand, it can be argued that 9/11 has reversed the momentum behind the norm of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. In the course of waging the war on terrorism, the powers of sovereign states have been increased and the willingness of Western states to criticize the treatment of civilians within other sovereign jurisdictions appears to have weakened. On the other, there are three reasons why humanitarian intervention – and the issues associated with it – will continue to preoccupy scholars and statesmen in a post-September 11th world. First, the terrorist attacks of 2001 have reinforced the view that instability within or collapse of a state anywhere in the world can have implications that reach far wider than that particular region. Second, the debate about what constraints should be placed on the use of force – particularly those related to proper authority – are as relevant for the ‘war on terror’ as they are for humanitarian intervention. Finally, as the missions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 have shown, humanitarian rationale are all-important in justifying the use of force in international society, even when other motives are at work.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge ...
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In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.Less
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.
Benjamin Morison
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247912
- eISBN:
- 9780191598067
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247919.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aims to explain as carefully as possible Aristotle's account of place given in the Physics, Book IV, Chs. 1‐5. Also aims to rehabilitate it as a piece of philosophy, after many centuries of its being ...
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Aims to explain as carefully as possible Aristotle's account of place given in the Physics, Book IV, Chs. 1‐5. Also aims to rehabilitate it as a piece of philosophy, after many centuries of its being dismissed as inadequate. Discusses the importance of the concept of place to natural philosophy, including the role of so‐called ‘natural’ places in the explanation of the natural motion of the elements. Offers a full reconstruction and interpretation of Zeno's paradox of place, which Aristotle took to be a crucial challenge to the coherence of the notion of place, as well as an assessment of Aristotle's treatment of Plato's account of space in the Timaeus. Outlines the different ways in which things are somewhere, implicit in Aristotle's solution to Zeno's paradox of place. This corresponds to the various meanings of the word ‘in’. The concept of being somewhere is of the first importance in understanding our practice of asking and answering where‐questions. The most fundamental way of being somewhere is to have a place––most bodies have a place, according to Aristotle. For a body to be somewhere, it must have a proper place, i.e. a place that only it occupies. Aristotle's definition of proper place (‘the first immobile limit of that which surrounds’) has been found wanting by many philosophers: the author offers an interpretation of the definition which overcomes the classic objections, including ancient worries about whether the universe is somewhere.Less
Aims to explain as carefully as possible Aristotle's account of place given in the Physics, Book IV, Chs. 1‐5. Also aims to rehabilitate it as a piece of philosophy, after many centuries of its being dismissed as inadequate. Discusses the importance of the concept of place to natural philosophy, including the role of so‐called ‘natural’ places in the explanation of the natural motion of the elements. Offers a full reconstruction and interpretation of Zeno's paradox of place, which Aristotle took to be a crucial challenge to the coherence of the notion of place, as well as an assessment of Aristotle's treatment of Plato's account of space in the Timaeus. Outlines the different ways in which things are somewhere, implicit in Aristotle's solution to Zeno's paradox of place. This corresponds to the various meanings of the word ‘in’. The concept of being somewhere is of the first importance in understanding our practice of asking and answering where‐questions. The most fundamental way of being somewhere is to have a place––most bodies have a place, according to Aristotle. For a body to be somewhere, it must have a proper place, i.e. a place that only it occupies. Aristotle's definition of proper place (‘the first immobile limit of that which surrounds’) has been found wanting by many philosophers: the author offers an interpretation of the definition which overcomes the classic objections, including ancient worries about whether the universe is somewhere.
John Hawthorne
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter argues that there is a tension in the semantic views held by certain antiphysicalists. These philosophers accept Fregean arguments against direct-reference theories of ordinary proper ...
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This chapter argues that there is a tension in the semantic views held by certain antiphysicalists. These philosophers accept Fregean arguments against direct-reference theories of ordinary proper names but maintain that phenomenal concepts refer directly. Against this semantic package, it is argued that the thought experiments that motivate a sense-reference distinction for ordinary proper names — roughly, Hesperus-Phosphorus stories — can be replicated at the level of direct phenomenal concepts. (A Hesperus-Phosphorus story is one in which one rationally believes both that object a has a property P and that object b lacks P, even though a = b.)Less
This chapter argues that there is a tension in the semantic views held by certain antiphysicalists. These philosophers accept Fregean arguments against direct-reference theories of ordinary proper names but maintain that phenomenal concepts refer directly. Against this semantic package, it is argued that the thought experiments that motivate a sense-reference distinction for ordinary proper names — roughly, Hesperus-Phosphorus stories — can be replicated at the level of direct phenomenal concepts. (A Hesperus-Phosphorus story is one in which one rationally believes both that object a has a property P and that object b lacks P, even though a = b.)
Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter defends an externalist analysis of justification, focusing on its proper function requirement. It identifies three ways a popular evidentialist view needs improvement, and argues that ...
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This chapter defends an externalist analysis of justification, focusing on its proper function requirement. It identifies three ways a popular evidentialist view needs improvement, and argues that the proper function analysis captures the recommended improvements. It then highlights some virtues of the analysis, including the fact that because it has no reliability requirement, it is an externalist position that avoids the usual objections to reliabilist accounts of justification. The chapter concludes by responding to several objections.Less
This chapter defends an externalist analysis of justification, focusing on its proper function requirement. It identifies three ways a popular evidentialist view needs improvement, and argues that the proper function analysis captures the recommended improvements. It then highlights some virtues of the analysis, including the fact that because it has no reliability requirement, it is an externalist position that avoids the usual objections to reliabilist accounts of justification. The chapter concludes by responding to several objections.
Paul Bloomfield
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195137132
- eISBN:
- 9780199833092
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195137132.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The book is a work in metaethics, constituting a defense of moral realism. The book begins with what I call a “modest transcendental argument” for the existence of the property of moral goodness ...
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The book is a work in metaethics, constituting a defense of moral realism. The book begins with what I call a “modest transcendental argument” for the existence of the property of moral goodness based on an acknowledgment of the possibility that personal moral failing may go forever undetected; as such this is an argument from error. The property of physical health, understood in terms of proper function, is used as a model for moral goodness. This anchors the moral ontology on foundations as solid as those found in the physical sciences. A moral epistemology is developed in which we may learn about goodness much in the way doctors and scientists may learn about healthiness. The semantics that emerges from this picture is multifaceted and nuanced enough to preserve complicated common sense semantic intuitions about how the word “good” is used in moral contexts. The position also implies a defense of an externalist theory about the relationship between the recognition of a moral consideration and motivation. The book closes with an appendix in which the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is questioned, and a nonreducible ontology for entropy is considered as an ontological model for both physical health and moral goodness.Less
The book is a work in metaethics, constituting a defense of moral realism. The book begins with what I call a “modest transcendental argument” for the existence of the property of moral goodness based on an acknowledgment of the possibility that personal moral failing may go forever undetected; as such this is an argument from error. The property of physical health, understood in terms of proper function, is used as a model for moral goodness. This anchors the moral ontology on foundations as solid as those found in the physical sciences. A moral epistemology is developed in which we may learn about goodness much in the way doctors and scientists may learn about healthiness. The semantics that emerges from this picture is multifaceted and nuanced enough to preserve complicated common sense semantic intuitions about how the word “good” is used in moral contexts. The position also implies a defense of an externalist theory about the relationship between the recognition of a moral consideration and motivation. The book closes with an appendix in which the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is questioned, and a nonreducible ontology for entropy is considered as an ontological model for both physical health and moral goodness.
Clark Ian
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198273257
- eISBN:
- 9780191684012
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198273257.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
What is war, and how should it be waged? Are there restraints on its conduct? What can philosophers contribute to the study of warfare? It might appear to some that the practical activity of the ...
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What is war, and how should it be waged? Are there restraints on its conduct? What can philosophers contribute to the study of warfare? It might appear to some that the practical activity of the battlefield is a universe away from the sedate reflections of the philosopher, but this book argues that there is an important relationship between the concept of war and notions about its proper conduct, and that the practice of war requires a sound philosophical understanding of its nature. The author begins by discussing two traditional doctrines: the just war and the limited war. The first specifies the legitimate ends and means of warfare, viewed in essentially moral terms. The second adopts a more explicitly political view, asserting a need for the means to be proportionate to the objectives of war. Fresh insight is offered into the contrasts and comparisons between these two traditions. An exploration follows of the applicability of such ideas to issues in contemporary warfare: war crimes, choice of targets, restrictions on weapons, guerrilla warfare, and the particular problems associated with nuclear strategy and deterrence. What emerges is a synthesis of philosophy, history of warfare, political theory, and contemporary strategy, which describes how the ideas that are central to the nature of war have developed in the context of changing social, political, and technological environments, and proposes a meeting ground for the integration of the philosophy and practice of war.Less
What is war, and how should it be waged? Are there restraints on its conduct? What can philosophers contribute to the study of warfare? It might appear to some that the practical activity of the battlefield is a universe away from the sedate reflections of the philosopher, but this book argues that there is an important relationship between the concept of war and notions about its proper conduct, and that the practice of war requires a sound philosophical understanding of its nature. The author begins by discussing two traditional doctrines: the just war and the limited war. The first specifies the legitimate ends and means of warfare, viewed in essentially moral terms. The second adopts a more explicitly political view, asserting a need for the means to be proportionate to the objectives of war. Fresh insight is offered into the contrasts and comparisons between these two traditions. An exploration follows of the applicability of such ideas to issues in contemporary warfare: war crimes, choice of targets, restrictions on weapons, guerrilla warfare, and the particular problems associated with nuclear strategy and deterrence. What emerges is a synthesis of philosophy, history of warfare, political theory, and contemporary strategy, which describes how the ideas that are central to the nature of war have developed in the context of changing social, political, and technological environments, and proposes a meeting ground for the integration of the philosophy and practice of war.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199603213
- eISBN:
- 9780191725388
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603213.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This is the third volume of the Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion series. As with the first two volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan ...
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This is the third volume of the Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion series. As with the first two volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion. This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged as an identifiable subfield within this time frame along with other emerging subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersect with issues in philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in our disciplines, while at the same time inviting greater interest in the work being done in the philosophy of religion. We thus present the third volume in this series, a volume containing contributions by an impressive group of philosophers on topics of central important to the philosophy of religion.Less
This is the third volume of the Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion series. As with the first two volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion. This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged as an identifiable subfield within this time frame along with other emerging subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersect with issues in philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in our disciplines, while at the same time inviting greater interest in the work being done in the philosophy of religion. We thus present the third volume in this series, a volume containing contributions by an impressive group of philosophers on topics of central important to the philosophy of religion.
Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159737
- eISBN:
- 9781400848133
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159737.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This book examines whether the U.S. Constitution—either as written or as actually applied—is legitimate. It argues that the most commonly held view of constitutional legitimacy—the “consent of the ...
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This book examines whether the U.S. Constitution—either as written or as actually applied—is legitimate. It argues that the most commonly held view of constitutional legitimacy—the “consent of the governed”—is wrong because it is a standard that no constitution can meet. It shows why holding the Constitution to this unattainable ideal both undermines its legitimacy and allows others to substitute their own meaning for that of the text. The book considers the notion of “natural rights” as “liberty rights,” along with the nature and scope of the so-called police power of states. Furthermore, it analyzes the original meaning of key provisions of the text that have been either distorted or excised entirely from the judges' Constitution and ignored: the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause in the original Constitution, the Ninth Amendment, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Less
This book examines whether the U.S. Constitution—either as written or as actually applied—is legitimate. It argues that the most commonly held view of constitutional legitimacy—the “consent of the governed”—is wrong because it is a standard that no constitution can meet. It shows why holding the Constitution to this unattainable ideal both undermines its legitimacy and allows others to substitute their own meaning for that of the text. The book considers the notion of “natural rights” as “liberty rights,” along with the nature and scope of the so-called police power of states. Furthermore, it analyzes the original meaning of key provisions of the text that have been either distorted or excised entirely from the judges' Constitution and ignored: the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause in the original Constitution, the Ninth Amendment, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159737
- eISBN:
- 9781400848133
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159737.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter examines what it takes to achieve constitutional legitimacy in the absence of consent by focusing on the effort of those who drafted and adopted the Constitution to constrain the fiction ...
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This chapter examines what it takes to achieve constitutional legitimacy in the absence of consent by focusing on the effort of those who drafted and adopted the Constitution to constrain the fiction of popular sovereignty they themselves accepted. The fiction of popular sovereignty originated as an antidote to the fiction of the divine right of the king. If the king obtained his authority from God, the Commons gained its authority from the people. Despite their rhetorical commitment to “popular sovereignty,” by the time the Constitution was written, its framers were convinced that pure majority rule or democracy was a bad idea. The chapter first considers democratic majoritarianism and and what James Madison called “the problem of faction” before discussing constitutional legitimacy in the absence of consent. It argues that a constitutional regime is legitimate only if it provides sufficient assurances that the laws it produces are “necessary and proper.”Less
This chapter examines what it takes to achieve constitutional legitimacy in the absence of consent by focusing on the effort of those who drafted and adopted the Constitution to constrain the fiction of popular sovereignty they themselves accepted. The fiction of popular sovereignty originated as an antidote to the fiction of the divine right of the king. If the king obtained his authority from God, the Commons gained its authority from the people. Despite their rhetorical commitment to “popular sovereignty,” by the time the Constitution was written, its framers were convinced that pure majority rule or democracy was a bad idea. The chapter first considers democratic majoritarianism and and what James Madison called “the problem of faction” before discussing constitutional legitimacy in the absence of consent. It argues that a constitutional regime is legitimate only if it provides sufficient assurances that the laws it produces are “necessary and proper.”
Pietro Bortone
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199556854
- eISBN:
- 9780191721571
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556854.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Historical Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
Chapter 4 begins the history of Greek prepositions, looking at Homeric and Classical Greek. We see prepositions competing with one another. The new “improper” prepositions ousting old “proper” ...
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Chapter 4 begins the history of Greek prepositions, looking at Homeric and Classical Greek. We see prepositions competing with one another. The new “improper” prepositions ousting old “proper” synonyms, while the semantic contribution and the extent of use of cases was diminishing. Above all, new prepositions were mainly or exclusively spatial.Less
Chapter 4 begins the history of Greek prepositions, looking at Homeric and Classical Greek. We see prepositions competing with one another. The new “improper” prepositions ousting old “proper” synonyms, while the semantic contribution and the extent of use of cases was diminishing. Above all, new prepositions were mainly or exclusively spatial.
Kent Bach
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331639
- eISBN:
- 9780199867981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331639.003.0002
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
The notions of linguistic reference and speaker reference are commonly used very loosely. In many cases what passes for reference falls short of it, and in many other cases a speaker uses an ...
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The notions of linguistic reference and speaker reference are commonly used very loosely. In many cases what passes for reference falls short of it, and in many other cases a speaker uses an expression to refer without the expression itself referring. Indexicals, demonstratives, proper names, and definite descriptions (and even indefinites) can all be used to refer, but they can all be used non-referentially as well. This chapter sets out criteria on the topic of what it takes for an expression to refer and for a speaker to refer in using an expression. It sketches out what is involved in conveying a reference and in understanding one, by explaining the roles of the speaker's intention, the hearer's inference, and the context of utterance.Less
The notions of linguistic reference and speaker reference are commonly used very loosely. In many cases what passes for reference falls short of it, and in many other cases a speaker uses an expression to refer without the expression itself referring. Indexicals, demonstratives, proper names, and definite descriptions (and even indefinites) can all be used to refer, but they can all be used non-referentially as well. This chapter sets out criteria on the topic of what it takes for an expression to refer and for a speaker to refer in using an expression. It sketches out what is involved in conveying a reference and in understanding one, by explaining the roles of the speaker's intention, the hearer's inference, and the context of utterance.
Karl Ameriks
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205349
- eISBN:
- 9780191709272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205349.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter contrasts Humean theories of moral motivation with Kant's Critical account. It argues that standard objections to Kant fail to take heed of his general theory of action and the intrinsic ...
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This chapter contrasts Humean theories of moral motivation with Kant's Critical account. It argues that standard objections to Kant fail to take heed of his general theory of action and the intrinsic difficulties in finding, on any sensible theory, a fully satisfactory ‘explanation’ of moral motivation. Kant's account of motivation must be understood in the context of his general theory of human subjectivity. Unlike contemporary quasi-Humean accounts, which depend on a two-part theory of belief and desire, Kant's theory presupposes a classical three-part distinction between cognizing, willing, and feeling. Although the second Critique is devoted specifically to what is called the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen), this faculty is not to be understood simply in terms of feeling, let alone the mere determinations of pleasure and pain. Instead, for Kant this faculty primarily designates the power of choice, which presupposes cognitive and affective components but is distinct from them.Less
This chapter contrasts Humean theories of moral motivation with Kant's Critical account. It argues that standard objections to Kant fail to take heed of his general theory of action and the intrinsic difficulties in finding, on any sensible theory, a fully satisfactory ‘explanation’ of moral motivation. Kant's account of motivation must be understood in the context of his general theory of human subjectivity. Unlike contemporary quasi-Humean accounts, which depend on a two-part theory of belief and desire, Kant's theory presupposes a classical three-part distinction between cognizing, willing, and feeling. Although the second Critique is devoted specifically to what is called the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen), this faculty is not to be understood simply in terms of feeling, let alone the mere determinations of pleasure and pain. Instead, for Kant this faculty primarily designates the power of choice, which presupposes cognitive and affective components but is distinct from them.
Alessandro Duranti and Jennifer F. Reynolds
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195327359
- eISBN:
- 9780199870639
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327359.003.0014
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
Bilingualism is a concept that relies on a variety of theoretical constructs, including the notions of “language,” “speakers,” and “community.” Subjecting these key notions to empirical and ...
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Bilingualism is a concept that relies on a variety of theoretical constructs, including the notions of “language,” “speakers,” and “community.” Subjecting these key notions to empirical and theoretical challenges, this study applies an anthropological approach to bilingualism's most emblematic phenomenon, code‐switching. Audio‐visual recordings of spontaneous interactions collected in a Samoan community in Southern California are examined. Three phenomena are considered: (1) the routine adoption of kinship terms (Dad and Mom) in Samoan discourse; (2) the “island‐like” status of proper names which are not adapted to the Samoan phonological register called “bad speech” spoken at home; (3) the code‐switching to Samoan words that do have an English equivalent and are associated with church activities. It is argued that these phenomena are indexes of social change, revealing that Samoan parents in the U.S. tend to take the child's point of view and that persons are constructed as less contextualized, more permanent entities.Less
Bilingualism is a concept that relies on a variety of theoretical constructs, including the notions of “language,” “speakers,” and “community.” Subjecting these key notions to empirical and theoretical challenges, this study applies an anthropological approach to bilingualism's most emblematic phenomenon, code‐switching. Audio‐visual recordings of spontaneous interactions collected in a Samoan community in Southern California are examined. Three phenomena are considered: (1) the routine adoption of kinship terms (Dad and Mom) in Samoan discourse; (2) the “island‐like” status of proper names which are not adapted to the Samoan phonological register called “bad speech” spoken at home; (3) the code‐switching to Samoan words that do have an English equivalent and are associated with church activities. It is argued that these phenomena are indexes of social change, revealing that Samoan parents in the U.S. tend to take the child's point of view and that persons are constructed as less contextualized, more permanent entities.
