Saskia Lettmaier
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199569977
- eISBN:
- 9780191722066
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199569977.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Legal History
While common law actions for breach of promise of marriage originated in the mid-seventeenth century, it was not until the ‘long nineteenth century’ that they saw their rise to prominence and their ...
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While common law actions for breach of promise of marriage originated in the mid-seventeenth century, it was not until the ‘long nineteenth century’ that they saw their rise to prominence and their subsequent fall from favour. This monograph ties the story of the action's rise and fall between 1800 and 1940 to changes in the prevalent conception of woman, her ideal role in society, sexual relations, and the family, arguing that the idiosyncratic nineteenth-century breach-of-promise suit (a luxuriant blend of both contract and tort) and Victorian notions of ideal femininity were uneasily and fatally, but nonetheless inextricably, entwined. It classifies the ninteenth-century breach-of-promise action as a ‘codification’ of the contemporaneous ideal of true womanhood and explores the longer-term implications of this infusion of mythologized femininity for the law, in particular for the position of plaintiffs. Surveying three consecutive time periods – the early nineteenth century, the high Victorian, and the post-Victorian periods – and adopting an interdisciplinary approach that combines the perspectives of legal history, social history, and literary analysis, it argues that the feminizing process, by shaping a cause of action in accordance with an ideal at odds with the very notion of women going to law, imported a fatal structural inconsistency that at first remained obscured, but ultimately vulgarized and undid the cause of action. Alongside more than two hundred and fifty real-life breach-of-promise cases, the book examines literary and cinematic renditions of the breach-of-promise theme, by artists ranging from Charles Dickens to P. G. Wodehouse, in order to expose the subtle yet unmistakable ways in which what happened (and what changed) in the breach-of-promise courtroom influenced the changing representation of the breach-of-promise plaintiff in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century literature and film.Less
While common law actions for breach of promise of marriage originated in the mid-seventeenth century, it was not until the ‘long nineteenth century’ that they saw their rise to prominence and their subsequent fall from favour. This monograph ties the story of the action's rise and fall between 1800 and 1940 to changes in the prevalent conception of woman, her ideal role in society, sexual relations, and the family, arguing that the idiosyncratic nineteenth-century breach-of-promise suit (a luxuriant blend of both contract and tort) and Victorian notions of ideal femininity were uneasily and fatally, but nonetheless inextricably, entwined. It classifies the ninteenth-century breach-of-promise action as a ‘codification’ of the contemporaneous ideal of true womanhood and explores the longer-term implications of this infusion of mythologized femininity for the law, in particular for the position of plaintiffs. Surveying three consecutive time periods – the early nineteenth century, the high Victorian, and the post-Victorian periods – and adopting an interdisciplinary approach that combines the perspectives of legal history, social history, and literary analysis, it argues that the feminizing process, by shaping a cause of action in accordance with an ideal at odds with the very notion of women going to law, imported a fatal structural inconsistency that at first remained obscured, but ultimately vulgarized and undid the cause of action. Alongside more than two hundred and fifty real-life breach-of-promise cases, the book examines literary and cinematic renditions of the breach-of-promise theme, by artists ranging from Charles Dickens to P. G. Wodehouse, in order to expose the subtle yet unmistakable ways in which what happened (and what changed) in the breach-of-promise courtroom influenced the changing representation of the breach-of-promise plaintiff in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century literature and film.
Elizabeth Brake
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199774142
- eISBN:
- 9780199933228
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199774142.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Even in secular contexts, marriage retains sacramental connotations. Yet what is its moral significance? This book examines its morally salient features – promise, commitment, care, and contract – ...
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Even in secular contexts, marriage retains sacramental connotations. Yet what is its moral significance? This book examines its morally salient features – promise, commitment, care, and contract – with surprising results. In Part One, “De-Moralizing Marriage,” essays on promise and commitment argue that we cannot promise to love and so wedding vows are (mostly) failed promises, and that marriage may be a poor commitment strategy. The book contends with philosophical defenses of marriage to argue that marriage has no inherent moral significance. Further, privileging marriage sustains amatonormative discrimination – discrimination against non-amorous or non-exclusive caring relationships such as friendships, adult care networks, or polyamorous groups. The discussion raises issues of independent interest for the moral philosopher such as the limits of promising and nature of commitment. The central argument of Part Two, “Democratizing Marriage,” is that liberal reasons for recognizing same-sex marriage also require recognition of polyamorists, polygamists, friends, urban tribes, and adult care networks. Political liberalism requires the disestablishment of monogamous amatonormative marriage. Under public reason, a liberal state must refrain from basing law solely on moral or religious doctrines; but only such doctrines could furnish reason for restricting marriage to male-female couples or romantic dyads. Restrictions on marriage should be minimized. But there is a strong rationale for minimal marriage: social supports for care are a matter of fundamental justice. Part Two responds to challenges posed by property division, polygyny, and parenting, builds on feminist, queer, and anti-racist critiques of marriage, and argues for the compatibility of liberalism and feminism.Less
Even in secular contexts, marriage retains sacramental connotations. Yet what is its moral significance? This book examines its morally salient features – promise, commitment, care, and contract – with surprising results. In Part One, “De-Moralizing Marriage,” essays on promise and commitment argue that we cannot promise to love and so wedding vows are (mostly) failed promises, and that marriage may be a poor commitment strategy. The book contends with philosophical defenses of marriage to argue that marriage has no inherent moral significance. Further, privileging marriage sustains amatonormative discrimination – discrimination against non-amorous or non-exclusive caring relationships such as friendships, adult care networks, or polyamorous groups. The discussion raises issues of independent interest for the moral philosopher such as the limits of promising and nature of commitment. The central argument of Part Two, “Democratizing Marriage,” is that liberal reasons for recognizing same-sex marriage also require recognition of polyamorists, polygamists, friends, urban tribes, and adult care networks. Political liberalism requires the disestablishment of monogamous amatonormative marriage. Under public reason, a liberal state must refrain from basing law solely on moral or religious doctrines; but only such doctrines could furnish reason for restricting marriage to male-female couples or romantic dyads. Restrictions on marriage should be minimized. But there is a strong rationale for minimal marriage: social supports for care are a matter of fundamental justice. Part Two responds to challenges posed by property division, polygyny, and parenting, builds on feminist, queer, and anti-racist critiques of marriage, and argues for the compatibility of liberalism and feminism.
David Owens
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199691500
- eISBN:
- 9780191744938
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book affirms the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. These are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative ...
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This book affirms the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. These are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative environment. Philosophers from Hume to Scanlon have supposed that when we make promises, give our consent, etc. our real interest is in controlling (or being able to anticipate) what people will actually do and that our interest in rights and obligations is a by-product of this more fundamental interest. In fact, we value for its own sake the ability to decide who is obliged to do what, to determine when blame is appropriate, to settle whether an act wrongs us. This book describes how we control the rights and obligations of ourselves and of those around us. We do so by making friends and thereby creating the rights and obligations of friendship. We do so by making promises and so binding ourselves to perform. We do so by consenting to medical treatment and thereby giving the doctor the right to go ahead. The normative character of our world matters to us on its own account. To make sense of promise, consent, friendship, and other related phenomena we must acknowledge that normative interests are amongst our fundamental interests. We must also rethink the psychology of human agency and the nature of social convention.Less
This book affirms the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. These are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative environment. Philosophers from Hume to Scanlon have supposed that when we make promises, give our consent, etc. our real interest is in controlling (or being able to anticipate) what people will actually do and that our interest in rights and obligations is a by-product of this more fundamental interest. In fact, we value for its own sake the ability to decide who is obliged to do what, to determine when blame is appropriate, to settle whether an act wrongs us. This book describes how we control the rights and obligations of ourselves and of those around us. We do so by making friends and thereby creating the rights and obligations of friendship. We do so by making promises and so binding ourselves to perform. We do so by consenting to medical treatment and thereby giving the doctor the right to go ahead. The normative character of our world matters to us on its own account. To make sense of promise, consent, friendship, and other related phenomena we must acknowledge that normative interests are amongst our fundamental interests. We must also rethink the psychology of human agency and the nature of social convention.
R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199753673
- eISBN:
- 9780199918829
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753673.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
A collection of fifteen new papers on themes from the philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. The contributions include discussions of issues in metaethics and the theory of value (reasons and reasoning, ...
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A collection of fifteen new papers on themes from the philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. The contributions include discussions of issues in metaethics and the theory of value (reasons and reasoning, valuing, desire and action); normative ethics (contractualism, aggregation, promising, tolerance); political philosophy (conservatism, global justice, freedom of expression, distribution), and the theory of responsibility (psychopathy, blame, and opprobrium). Contributors: Christine M. Korsgaard, Samuel Scheffler, Niko Kolodny, Michael Smith, Pamela Hieronymi, Rahul Kumar, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Angela M. Smith, G. A. Cohen, Charles R. Beitz, Joshua Cohen, Aaron James, Gary Watson, Susan Wolf, and R. Jay Wallace. Together, the papers contribute to a deeper understanding of Scanlon’s views, while advancing the discussion of the important issues addressed in his ground-breaking work.Less
A collection of fifteen new papers on themes from the philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. The contributions include discussions of issues in metaethics and the theory of value (reasons and reasoning, valuing, desire and action); normative ethics (contractualism, aggregation, promising, tolerance); political philosophy (conservatism, global justice, freedom of expression, distribution), and the theory of responsibility (psychopathy, blame, and opprobrium). Contributors: Christine M. Korsgaard, Samuel Scheffler, Niko Kolodny, Michael Smith, Pamela Hieronymi, Rahul Kumar, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Angela M. Smith, G. A. Cohen, Charles R. Beitz, Joshua Cohen, Aaron James, Gary Watson, Susan Wolf, and R. Jay Wallace. Together, the papers contribute to a deeper understanding of Scanlon’s views, while advancing the discussion of the important issues addressed in his ground-breaking work.
H. A. Prichard
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250196
- eISBN:
- 9780191598265
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250197.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The act of exchanging one thing for another seems to involve a promise. The confidence needed to relinquish something one has on the understanding that one will receive what another has in exchange ...
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The act of exchanging one thing for another seems to involve a promise. The confidence needed to relinquish something one has on the understanding that one will receive what another has in exchange can be expressed in terms of resolve. In binding oneself, one thinks that if the other binds himself or herself to perform a given action (if he or she finds a certain condition fulfilled), then he or she will do that action (if he or she finds the condition fulfilled). In cases in which one person's action does not precede the other's, one's promise involves thinking that if the other binds himself or herself, then he or she will carry out the promised action.Less
The act of exchanging one thing for another seems to involve a promise. The confidence needed to relinquish something one has on the understanding that one will receive what another has in exchange can be expressed in terms of resolve. In binding oneself, one thinks that if the other binds himself or herself to perform a given action (if he or she finds a certain condition fulfilled), then he or she will do that action (if he or she finds the condition fulfilled). In cases in which one person's action does not precede the other's, one's promise involves thinking that if the other binds himself or herself, then he or she will carry out the promised action.
Joanna L. Grossman and Lawrence M. Friedman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149820
- eISBN:
- 9781400839773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149820.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Family Law
This chapter considers the decline and fall of a group of closely related causes of action: breach of promise of marriage, alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and perhaps even civil and ...
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This chapter considers the decline and fall of a group of closely related causes of action: breach of promise of marriage, alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and perhaps even civil and criminal actions for “seduction.” The story here is tangled and complex; no one factor explains why these causes of action lost ground. But they are connected with the social meaning of marriage, and very notably, with one striking twentieth-century development: the sexual revolution—specifically, the end of the idea that only married people were entitled, legitimately, to have sexual intercourse. These causes of action lived in the shadow of traditional marriage, and depended for their validity on traditional marriage. As it declined, they too receded into history, although not entirely.Less
This chapter considers the decline and fall of a group of closely related causes of action: breach of promise of marriage, alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and perhaps even civil and criminal actions for “seduction.” The story here is tangled and complex; no one factor explains why these causes of action lost ground. But they are connected with the social meaning of marriage, and very notably, with one striking twentieth-century development: the sexual revolution—specifically, the end of the idea that only married people were entitled, legitimately, to have sexual intercourse. These causes of action lived in the shadow of traditional marriage, and depended for their validity on traditional marriage. As it declined, they too receded into history, although not entirely.
Hanoch Sheinman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195377958
- eISBN:
- 9780199893836
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377958.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Promises are routinely treated as a useful philosophical laboratory for testing moral, volitional, and social phenomena. Recently, they have also come to be treated as a philosophical topic in their ...
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Promises are routinely treated as a useful philosophical laboratory for testing moral, volitional, and social phenomena. Recently, they have also come to be treated as a philosophical topic in their own right. This book comprises fifteen chapters to the philosophical discussion of promises and agreements, and a context-providing introduction. Some of the chapters emphasize what's special or distinct about promises; others simply treat promises as a useful example of a general phenomenon they wish to illuminate. Most of the chapters focus on promises, but others discuss (or also discuss) contracts, conventions, and agreements. Most of the chapters focus on promises to another; but one chapter focuses on promises to oneself. Several chapters explore some broadly consequentialist perspective. Most chapters focus on perfectly good promises, but some chapters focus on rather problematic promises. Most of the chapters are largely ahistorical, but others are historically informed. The final section of the introduction (Chapter 1) gives an overview of the collection.Less
Promises are routinely treated as a useful philosophical laboratory for testing moral, volitional, and social phenomena. Recently, they have also come to be treated as a philosophical topic in their own right. This book comprises fifteen chapters to the philosophical discussion of promises and agreements, and a context-providing introduction. Some of the chapters emphasize what's special or distinct about promises; others simply treat promises as a useful example of a general phenomenon they wish to illuminate. Most of the chapters focus on promises, but others discuss (or also discuss) contracts, conventions, and agreements. Most of the chapters focus on promises to another; but one chapter focuses on promises to oneself. Several chapters explore some broadly consequentialist perspective. Most chapters focus on perfectly good promises, but some chapters focus on rather problematic promises. Most of the chapters are largely ahistorical, but others are historically informed. The final section of the introduction (Chapter 1) gives an overview of the collection.
Paul U. Unschuld
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520257658
- eISBN:
- 9780520944701
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520257658.003.0082
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Medical Anthropology
This chapter marks the journey of medicine from its transitional stage, to the present, opening ways to the golden future. It is technology and new natural sciences that made way for the field of ...
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This chapter marks the journey of medicine from its transitional stage, to the present, opening ways to the golden future. It is technology and new natural sciences that made way for the field of medicine to receive the transit visa for the present with the promise of a golden future. The successes of this technology are applicable all over the world. The new medicine also received this transit visa because of a breathtaking production of successes of its own. These successes were also reality: unmistakable and above all interculturally evident. The factors included the increasingly detailed exact knowledge of the interior of the body and surgery, the knowledge of the pathogens and the successful struggle to control epidemics. The question is whether the old cage, which has providing security and stability to the field of medicine, can be placed parallel to the new cage.Less
This chapter marks the journey of medicine from its transitional stage, to the present, opening ways to the golden future. It is technology and new natural sciences that made way for the field of medicine to receive the transit visa for the present with the promise of a golden future. The successes of this technology are applicable all over the world. The new medicine also received this transit visa because of a breathtaking production of successes of its own. These successes were also reality: unmistakable and above all interculturally evident. The factors included the increasingly detailed exact knowledge of the interior of the body and surgery, the knowledge of the pathogens and the successful struggle to control epidemics. The question is whether the old cage, which has providing security and stability to the field of medicine, can be placed parallel to the new cage.
Stephen Spector
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195368024
- eISBN:
- 9780199867646
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368024.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society, Judaism
This chapter surveys the reasons that evangelicals give for their Christian Zionism. Most prominently, they cite God’s promise in Genesis 12:3 that he will bless those who bless the Jews and curse ...
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This chapter surveys the reasons that evangelicals give for their Christian Zionism. Most prominently, they cite God’s promise in Genesis 12:3 that he will bless those who bless the Jews and curse those who curse them. They note as well that, in the Bible, God’s covenant is with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the ancestors of the Jews, not with Ishmael, the progenitor of the Arabs. They say that Israel is God’s prophetic clock: the Jews’ return to the Holy Land is the sure sign that God’s promises and prophecies are true and are coming to pass in our lifetime. Several evangelical leaders also observe that God will judge the nations at the end of time on the basis of how they treated the Jews. A number of Christian Zionists add that God mysteriously implanted in them a love for Israel and the Jewish people. Many evangelicals express gratitude to the Jews for giving them the basis of Christianity, and also remorse at the Church’s history of anti-Semitism. They join these motives to secular ones, including reliance on Israel as the frontline ally against Islamist terrorism.Less
This chapter surveys the reasons that evangelicals give for their Christian Zionism. Most prominently, they cite God’s promise in Genesis 12:3 that he will bless those who bless the Jews and curse those who curse them. They note as well that, in the Bible, God’s covenant is with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the ancestors of the Jews, not with Ishmael, the progenitor of the Arabs. They say that Israel is God’s prophetic clock: the Jews’ return to the Holy Land is the sure sign that God’s promises and prophecies are true and are coming to pass in our lifetime. Several evangelical leaders also observe that God will judge the nations at the end of time on the basis of how they treated the Jews. A number of Christian Zionists add that God mysteriously implanted in them a love for Israel and the Jewish people. Many evangelicals express gratitude to the Jews for giving them the basis of Christianity, and also remorse at the Church’s history of anti-Semitism. They join these motives to secular ones, including reliance on Israel as the frontline ally against Islamist terrorism.
Stephen Spector
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195368024
- eISBN:
- 9780199867646
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368024.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society, Judaism
This chapter addresses criticisms of Christian Zionism. There are four principal charges: First, that evangelical Christians support aliyah (Jewish emigration to Israel) mainly because it speeds the ...
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This chapter addresses criticisms of Christian Zionism. There are four principal charges: First, that evangelical Christians support aliyah (Jewish emigration to Israel) mainly because it speeds the battle of Armageddon, the mass conversion or death of the Jews, and Christ’s Millennial kingdom. Second, that evangelicals’ true motive is to convert the Jews. Third, that Christian Zionist theology distorts Christianity: that it misunderstands biblical covenants and ignores the scriptural emphasis on doing justice, relieving suffering, and showing compassion to the oppressed, who, in this view, are the Palestinians. The fourth major criticism is that the evangelical Zionists’ biblical worldview allies them with extreme right-wing Israeli politicians in opposing any exchange of land for peace. The chapter discusses efforts to evangelize Jews, and notes the beliefs of Messianic Jews. It examines the claim by some evangelicals that Christians are the heirs to God’s promises to Israel; that the covenantal promises to the Jews are conditional; and that modern Israel is not the fulfillment of prophecy. The chapter notes the role of the Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center in opposing Christian Zionism and Israeli policies. It also considers the limits on empathy toward the other in this conflict.Less
This chapter addresses criticisms of Christian Zionism. There are four principal charges: First, that evangelical Christians support aliyah (Jewish emigration to Israel) mainly because it speeds the battle of Armageddon, the mass conversion or death of the Jews, and Christ’s Millennial kingdom. Second, that evangelicals’ true motive is to convert the Jews. Third, that Christian Zionist theology distorts Christianity: that it misunderstands biblical covenants and ignores the scriptural emphasis on doing justice, relieving suffering, and showing compassion to the oppressed, who, in this view, are the Palestinians. The fourth major criticism is that the evangelical Zionists’ biblical worldview allies them with extreme right-wing Israeli politicians in opposing any exchange of land for peace. The chapter discusses efforts to evangelize Jews, and notes the beliefs of Messianic Jews. It examines the claim by some evangelicals that Christians are the heirs to God’s promises to Israel; that the covenantal promises to the Jews are conditional; and that modern Israel is not the fulfillment of prophecy. The chapter notes the role of the Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center in opposing Christian Zionism and Israeli policies. It also considers the limits on empathy toward the other in this conflict.
Elizabeth Brake
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199774142
- eISBN:
- 9780199933228
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199774142.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter examines the marriage promise. What do spouses promise, and under what conditions might they be excused from this promise? The answers to these questions have implications for the ...
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This chapter examines the marriage promise. What do spouses promise, and under what conditions might they be excused from this promise? The answers to these questions have implications for the morality of divorce, as well as sexual exclusivity and other marital obligations. Here I emphasize the diversity of marriages, arguing that the promise made in marriage depends on spouses’ intentions – but not all intentions are promises. A vow sometimes taken as central to marriage – to love, honor, and cherish – is not a possible subject of promise at all. Likewise, promises to take on spousal roles presuppose a robust and shared understanding of the moral content of that role – something many modern spouses may lack. Many wedding vows are thus not promises but failed attempts at promising. This casts doubt upon the idea that the distinctive moral significance of marriage is promissory.Less
This chapter examines the marriage promise. What do spouses promise, and under what conditions might they be excused from this promise? The answers to these questions have implications for the morality of divorce, as well as sexual exclusivity and other marital obligations. Here I emphasize the diversity of marriages, arguing that the promise made in marriage depends on spouses’ intentions – but not all intentions are promises. A vow sometimes taken as central to marriage – to love, honor, and cherish – is not a possible subject of promise at all. Likewise, promises to take on spousal roles presuppose a robust and shared understanding of the moral content of that role – something many modern spouses may lack. Many wedding vows are thus not promises but failed attempts at promising. This casts doubt upon the idea that the distinctive moral significance of marriage is promissory.
David J. Gerber
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199228225
- eISBN:
- 9780191711350
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228225.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Competition Law
This chapter ties together the preceding sections of the book. It takes a longer and broader view of the trajectories of national competition law experience and analyzes how they have been ...
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This chapter ties together the preceding sections of the book. It takes a longer and broader view of the trajectories of national competition law experience and analyzes how they have been intertwined with transnational competition law developments. These interrelationships shape the dynamics of global competition law development and, in order to be effective, any competition law regime for global markets must be based on them. The chapter evaluates the promise of global competition law development and the obstacles to creating a more effective legal framework for global economic relations. It concludes that the early 21st century represents a major point of transition in economic and political relations, and thus a ‘constitutional moment’ in which competition law can contribute to meeting human needs and enriching economic and political opportunities around the world.Less
This chapter ties together the preceding sections of the book. It takes a longer and broader view of the trajectories of national competition law experience and analyzes how they have been intertwined with transnational competition law developments. These interrelationships shape the dynamics of global competition law development and, in order to be effective, any competition law regime for global markets must be based on them. The chapter evaluates the promise of global competition law development and the obstacles to creating a more effective legal framework for global economic relations. It concludes that the early 21st century represents a major point of transition in economic and political relations, and thus a ‘constitutional moment’ in which competition law can contribute to meeting human needs and enriching economic and political opportunities around the world.
Russell Hardin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199232567
- eISBN:
- 9780191715976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232567.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter addresses the strategic categories of the problems typically faced in moral and political choice. It is argued that while Hume's discussion of artificial virtues is well understood by ...
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This chapter addresses the strategic categories of the problems typically faced in moral and political choice. It is argued that while Hume's discussion of artificial virtues is well understood by many writers, the full scope and significance of his strategic analysis is not generally recognized. Topics discussed include the argument that Hume's categories are very consistently ordered as though they were derived or described game theoretically, benevolence, distributive justice, promise-keeping, collective action, and coordination.Less
This chapter addresses the strategic categories of the problems typically faced in moral and political choice. It is argued that while Hume's discussion of artificial virtues is well understood by many writers, the full scope and significance of his strategic analysis is not generally recognized. Topics discussed include the argument that Hume's categories are very consistently ordered as though they were derived or described game theoretically, benevolence, distributive justice, promise-keeping, collective action, and coordination.
Jeffrey Brand-Ballard
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195342291
- eISBN:
- 9780199867011
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342291.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter evaluates and rejects the claim that judges must adhere to the law in suboptimal-result cases because they swore a solemn oath of office to uphold the law. The relationship between oaths ...
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This chapter evaluates and rejects the claim that judges must adhere to the law in suboptimal-result cases because they swore a solemn oath of office to uphold the law. The relationship between oaths and promises is discussed. The basic point is that a promise to perform an otherwise immoral act does not give the promisor a reason to perform it. This principle is supported via examples and extended examination of current theories of promise keeping, including deflationary theories, consequentialist theories, free-rider theories, and reliance theories. It is suggested, however, that taking an oath may satisfy an INUS condition on acquiring judicial duties in realistic legal systems.Less
This chapter evaluates and rejects the claim that judges must adhere to the law in suboptimal-result cases because they swore a solemn oath of office to uphold the law. The relationship between oaths and promises is discussed. The basic point is that a promise to perform an otherwise immoral act does not give the promisor a reason to perform it. This principle is supported via examples and extended examination of current theories of promise keeping, including deflationary theories, consequentialist theories, free-rider theories, and reliance theories. It is suggested, however, that taking an oath may satisfy an INUS condition on acquiring judicial duties in realistic legal systems.
EYAL ZAMIR and BARAK MEDINA
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195372168
- eISBN:
- 9780199776078
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372168.003.09
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter discusses contract law. Ordinarily, market transactions do not involve infringements of deontological constraints. For this reason (and since they usually involve money or easily ...
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This chapter discusses contract law. Ordinarily, market transactions do not involve infringements of deontological constraints. For this reason (and since they usually involve money or easily monetized goods), standard cost-benefit analysis is particularly apt for analyzing contract law. Nevertheless, it is argued that certain deontological constraints apply to contracting behavior and that combining deontological constraints with economic analysis of contract law, may be fruitful. The chapter briefly surveys the deontological constraints pertinent to contract law and critically examines the standard economic response to them. It then demonstrates how deontological constraints may be integrated with economic analysis of the contracting stage, focusing on the doctrines of mistake and misrepresentation. Last, it highlights the differences between economic and deontological analyses of contract performance and breach, and discusses the difficulties facing integration of deontological constraints with the economic analysis of contract remedies, given the current state of the pertinent theories.Less
This chapter discusses contract law. Ordinarily, market transactions do not involve infringements of deontological constraints. For this reason (and since they usually involve money or easily monetized goods), standard cost-benefit analysis is particularly apt for analyzing contract law. Nevertheless, it is argued that certain deontological constraints apply to contracting behavior and that combining deontological constraints with economic analysis of contract law, may be fruitful. The chapter briefly surveys the deontological constraints pertinent to contract law and critically examines the standard economic response to them. It then demonstrates how deontological constraints may be integrated with economic analysis of the contracting stage, focusing on the doctrines of mistake and misrepresentation. Last, it highlights the differences between economic and deontological analyses of contract performance and breach, and discusses the difficulties facing integration of deontological constraints with the economic analysis of contract remedies, given the current state of the pertinent theories.
Saskia Lettmaier
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199569977
- eISBN:
- 9780191722066
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199569977.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Legal History
This chapter considers the wider implications of the infusion of mythologized femininity for the law, in particular for the position of plaintiffs. It suggests that the feminizing process imported a ...
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This chapter considers the wider implications of the infusion of mythologized femininity for the law, in particular for the position of plaintiffs. It suggests that the feminizing process imported a contradiction to the centre of the action and lodged an inconsistency at the very heart of the plaintiff. By virtue of her position as litigant – come to a public court of law to take legal action about and obtain pecuniary damages for a romantic grievance – a woman bringing a breach-of-promise suit put herself in direct opposition to the central tenets of the very femininity the Victorians valorized, and in accordance with which the ninteenth-century cause of action was shaped. As both a legal codification of true womanhood and a platform for not so very true women, the nineteenth-century breach-of-promise action may thus be seen as beset from its inception by a fatal structural inconsistency.Less
This chapter considers the wider implications of the infusion of mythologized femininity for the law, in particular for the position of plaintiffs. It suggests that the feminizing process imported a contradiction to the centre of the action and lodged an inconsistency at the very heart of the plaintiff. By virtue of her position as litigant – come to a public court of law to take legal action about and obtain pecuniary damages for a romantic grievance – a woman bringing a breach-of-promise suit put herself in direct opposition to the central tenets of the very femininity the Victorians valorized, and in accordance with which the ninteenth-century cause of action was shaped. As both a legal codification of true womanhood and a platform for not so very true women, the nineteenth-century breach-of-promise action may thus be seen as beset from its inception by a fatal structural inconsistency.
Saskia Lettmaier
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199569977
- eISBN:
- 9780191722066
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199569977.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Legal History
This chapter considers the high Victorian abandonment of the previously employed strategies of containment and the attendant exposure of the structural inconsistency. It demonstrates that as the ...
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This chapter considers the high Victorian abandonment of the previously employed strategies of containment and the attendant exposure of the structural inconsistency. It demonstrates that as the structural inconsistency was rendered more visible, so the breach-of-promise action and, more particularly, the breach-of-promise plaintiff became targets of cultural exclusion and attack. Plaintiff success was dampened and breach-of-promise fiction started to thrive on an exploitation of the structural inconsistency. The plaintiff of the high Victorian period is the ideal corrupted, a pinchbeck angel. Her outwardly perfect womanhood is shown to be inwardly flawed, hollow, and vicious. In the high Victorian period, breach-of-promise comedy takes on the features of satire as it dramatizes the utter lack of coherence between surface appearance and reality, between professions of virtue and the practices that contradict them.Less
This chapter considers the high Victorian abandonment of the previously employed strategies of containment and the attendant exposure of the structural inconsistency. It demonstrates that as the structural inconsistency was rendered more visible, so the breach-of-promise action and, more particularly, the breach-of-promise plaintiff became targets of cultural exclusion and attack. Plaintiff success was dampened and breach-of-promise fiction started to thrive on an exploitation of the structural inconsistency. The plaintiff of the high Victorian period is the ideal corrupted, a pinchbeck angel. Her outwardly perfect womanhood is shown to be inwardly flawed, hollow, and vicious. In the high Victorian period, breach-of-promise comedy takes on the features of satire as it dramatizes the utter lack of coherence between surface appearance and reality, between professions of virtue and the practices that contradict them.
Saskia Lettmaier
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199569977
- eISBN:
- 9780191722066
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199569977.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Legal History
This chapter explores the post-Victorian period, beginning after 1900. It reveals that, as the feminine ideal veered away from the nineteenth-century definition of true womanhood towards the ...
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This chapter explores the post-Victorian period, beginning after 1900. It reveals that, as the feminine ideal veered away from the nineteenth-century definition of true womanhood towards the twentieth-century vision of woman as autonomous, energetic, and competent, the breach-of-promise action was turned into a legal anachronism: a musty bit of common law machinery only rarely called into action after the 1920s and 1930s. Although the cause of action was not formally abolished in England until 1970, the age of breach of promise was effectively over with the paradigm shift in the feminine ideal. In the literary and cinematic versions of this final, post-Victorian period, breach of promise assumes symbolic meaning, signifying a conception of the nature and status of women which was, quite simply, passé.Less
This chapter explores the post-Victorian period, beginning after 1900. It reveals that, as the feminine ideal veered away from the nineteenth-century definition of true womanhood towards the twentieth-century vision of woman as autonomous, energetic, and competent, the breach-of-promise action was turned into a legal anachronism: a musty bit of common law machinery only rarely called into action after the 1920s and 1930s. Although the cause of action was not formally abolished in England until 1970, the age of breach of promise was effectively over with the paradigm shift in the feminine ideal. In the literary and cinematic versions of this final, post-Victorian period, breach of promise assumes symbolic meaning, signifying a conception of the nature and status of women which was, quite simply, passé.
Gregory B. Graybill
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199589487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594588
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589487.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
In his Commentary on Romans of 1532, Melanchthon began to teach that the human will had limited freedom in both the temporal and spiritual realms. He further fleshed this out in the Loci communes of ...
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In his Commentary on Romans of 1532, Melanchthon began to teach that the human will had limited freedom in both the temporal and spiritual realms. He further fleshed this out in the Loci communes of 1533–5, where he articulated an evangelical doctrine of free will—meaning that the will (in conjunction with the Word and Spirit) had some freedom in the choice of faith in Jesus, but that such a decision was then still tied to a doctrine of forensic justification by imputed righteousness.Less
In his Commentary on Romans of 1532, Melanchthon began to teach that the human will had limited freedom in both the temporal and spiritual realms. He further fleshed this out in the Loci communes of 1533–5, where he articulated an evangelical doctrine of free will—meaning that the will (in conjunction with the Word and Spirit) had some freedom in the choice of faith in Jesus, but that such a decision was then still tied to a doctrine of forensic justification by imputed righteousness.
Seana Valentine Shiffrin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199753673
- eISBN:
- 9780199918829
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753673.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Immoral, conflicting, and redundant promises raise important but neglected issues for any theory of promising. The paper investigates what resources expectation theories of promising, such as ...
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Immoral, conflicting, and redundant promises raise important but neglected issues for any theory of promising. The paper investigates what resources expectation theories of promising, such as Scanlon’s, have to deal with these under-explored problem cases. It contrasts them with the resources available to rights-transfer theories of promising, offering a welcome occasion for the refinement and clearer articulation of rights-transfer theories. The paper acknowledges that these cases appear to pose special challenges for rights-transfer theories, but ones, I contend, that it can meet. Although at first blush, Scanlon’s theory seems to handle these cases more straightforwardly than rights-transfer theories, Scanlon’s theory may oversimplify what is, in fact, rugged moral terrain.Less
Immoral, conflicting, and redundant promises raise important but neglected issues for any theory of promising. The paper investigates what resources expectation theories of promising, such as Scanlon’s, have to deal with these under-explored problem cases. It contrasts them with the resources available to rights-transfer theories of promising, offering a welcome occasion for the refinement and clearer articulation of rights-transfer theories. The paper acknowledges that these cases appear to pose special challenges for rights-transfer theories, but ones, I contend, that it can meet. Although at first blush, Scanlon’s theory seems to handle these cases more straightforwardly than rights-transfer theories, Scanlon’s theory may oversimplify what is, in fact, rugged moral terrain.
