Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the ...
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This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the theoretical framework for the revision of cognitivism. Part II examines the challenge to the revised form of cognitivism developed from two sophisticated forms of non-cognitivist strategy: expressive/projective strategy and non-objectivism. Part III develops proposals for the solution of the problems described in Parts I and II. Part IV focuses on the work of John Rawls.Less
This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the theoretical framework for the revision of cognitivism. Part II examines the challenge to the revised form of cognitivism developed from two sophisticated forms of non-cognitivist strategy: expressive/projective strategy and non-objectivism. Part III develops proposals for the solution of the problems described in Parts I and II. Part IV focuses on the work of John Rawls.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the expressive/projective strategy, which covers a family of views with interrelated common themes. The two most highly developed themes, norm expressivism (defended by Allan ...
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This chapter examines the expressive/projective strategy, which covers a family of views with interrelated common themes. The two most highly developed themes, norm expressivism (defended by Allan Gibbard) and projectivism (defended by Simon Blackburn), are considered. Both focus on the crucial issue of how we should understand our desire to explain the ethical within a generally naturalistic framework. One way in which the theories discussed in this chapter differ from earlier forms of non-cognitivism is that they are intended to constitute a general theory of normativity, which, while it is supposed to bolster some of the intuitions underlying the prevalent conception of value, does not exactly match the extension of that term. The non-cognitivists discussed in this chapter operate with a descriptive/normative distinction, not a fact/value distinction.Less
This chapter examines the expressive/projective strategy, which covers a family of views with interrelated common themes. The two most highly developed themes, norm expressivism (defended by Allan Gibbard) and projectivism (defended by Simon Blackburn), are considered. Both focus on the crucial issue of how we should understand our desire to explain the ethical within a generally naturalistic framework. One way in which the theories discussed in this chapter differ from earlier forms of non-cognitivism is that they are intended to constitute a general theory of normativity, which, while it is supposed to bolster some of the intuitions underlying the prevalent conception of value, does not exactly match the extension of that term. The non-cognitivists discussed in this chapter operate with a descriptive/normative distinction, not a fact/value distinction.
Alan Weir
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199541492
- eISBN:
- 9780191594915
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199541492.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The concepts of the previous chapter are applied to projectivism. The metaphysical content of projective sentences is given by the presence of internal attitudes but this content is no part of the ...
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The concepts of the previous chapter are applied to projectivism. The metaphysical content of projective sentences is given by the presence of internal attitudes but this content is no part of the informational content of the sentence. This grounds a form of ‘cognitivist projectivism’ in which projective utterances are used to make genuine truth-valued assertions thus avoiding the ‘Frege–Geach’ problem. A relatively deflationary notion of truth generates truth out of correctness, the latter interpreted non-normatively. The account is extended to a ‘hermeneutic anti-realism’ about fiction. The position is reductionist because the ontological commitments of the meta-theorist are narrower than those of the object language projective sentences. Representational modes of assertion are distinguished from non-representational and it is argued that existence assertions can be made in non-representational mode and denied in representational mode without inconsistency or any ordinary type of ambiguity.Less
The concepts of the previous chapter are applied to projectivism. The metaphysical content of projective sentences is given by the presence of internal attitudes but this content is no part of the informational content of the sentence. This grounds a form of ‘cognitivist projectivism’ in which projective utterances are used to make genuine truth-valued assertions thus avoiding the ‘Frege–Geach’ problem. A relatively deflationary notion of truth generates truth out of correctness, the latter interpreted non-normatively. The account is extended to a ‘hermeneutic anti-realism’ about fiction. The position is reductionist because the ontological commitments of the meta-theorist are narrower than those of the object language projective sentences. Representational modes of assertion are distinguished from non-representational and it is argued that existence assertions can be made in non-representational mode and denied in representational mode without inconsistency or any ordinary type of ambiguity.
Alan Weir
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199541492
- eISBN:
- 9780191594915
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199541492.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book defends an anti-platonist philosophy of mathematics derived from game formalism. Classic formalists claimed implausibly that mathematical utterances are truth-valueless moves in a game. ...
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This book defends an anti-platonist philosophy of mathematics derived from game formalism. Classic formalists claimed implausibly that mathematical utterances are truth-valueless moves in a game. This study aims to develop a more satisfactory successor to game formalism utilizing a widely accepted, broadly neo-Fregean framework, in which the proposition expressed by an utterance is a function of both sense and background circumstance. This framework allows for sentences whose truth-conditions are not representational, which are made true or false by conditions residing in the circumstances of utterances but not transparently in the sense. Applications to projectivism and fiction pave the way for the claim that mathematical utterances are made true or false by the existence of concrete proofs or refutations, though these truth-making conditions form no part of their sense or informational content. The position is compared with rivals, an account of the applicability of mathematics developed, and a new account of the nature of idealization proffered in which it is argued that the finitistic limitations Gödel placed on proofs are without rational justification. Finally a non-classical logical system is provided in which excluded middle fails, yet enough logical power remains to recapture the results of standard mathematics.Less
This book defends an anti-platonist philosophy of mathematics derived from game formalism. Classic formalists claimed implausibly that mathematical utterances are truth-valueless moves in a game. This study aims to develop a more satisfactory successor to game formalism utilizing a widely accepted, broadly neo-Fregean framework, in which the proposition expressed by an utterance is a function of both sense and background circumstance. This framework allows for sentences whose truth-conditions are not representational, which are made true or false by conditions residing in the circumstances of utterances but not transparently in the sense. Applications to projectivism and fiction pave the way for the claim that mathematical utterances are made true or false by the existence of concrete proofs or refutations, though these truth-making conditions form no part of their sense or informational content. The position is compared with rivals, an account of the applicability of mathematics developed, and a new account of the nature of idealization proffered in which it is argued that the finitistic limitations Gödel placed on proofs are without rational justification. Finally a non-classical logical system is provided in which excluded middle fails, yet enough logical power remains to recapture the results of standard mathematics.
Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The above account of natural modalities is forbiddingly subjectivistic; these modalities are explained only relative to a doxastic state, a ranking function. This chapter explores the extent to which ...
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The above account of natural modalities is forbiddingly subjectivistic; these modalities are explained only relative to a doxastic state, a ranking function. This chapter explores the extent to which this relativization can be undone; it thus carries a heavy philosophical weight. The issue is addressed in a fully general way. First it is defined what it means to call a feature of a ranking function objectifiable, i.e., what it means to uniquely reconstruct a ranking function and the way in which it realizes that feature from an objectively true or false proposition associated with that realization (so that the function can also be called true or false). Then it is proved that belief is objectifiable and that reasons are not. The main part provides two objectification methods for causation, one that works only for sufficient causes and another that even works for causal overdetermination. Subjective laws are objectifiable if and only if their assumptions about the single case are so. These are substantial results that, as is finally explained, complete the projectivistic strategy pursued in this book.Less
The above account of natural modalities is forbiddingly subjectivistic; these modalities are explained only relative to a doxastic state, a ranking function. This chapter explores the extent to which this relativization can be undone; it thus carries a heavy philosophical weight. The issue is addressed in a fully general way. First it is defined what it means to call a feature of a ranking function objectifiable, i.e., what it means to uniquely reconstruct a ranking function and the way in which it realizes that feature from an objectively true or false proposition associated with that realization (so that the function can also be called true or false). Then it is proved that belief is objectifiable and that reasons are not. The main part provides two objectification methods for causation, one that works only for sufficient causes and another that even works for causal overdetermination. Subjective laws are objectifiable if and only if their assumptions about the single case are so. These are substantial results that, as is finally explained, complete the projectivistic strategy pursued in this book.
Andy Egan
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195386196
- eISBN:
- 9780199866748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195386196.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter argues that a theory according to which some of the content of perception is self-locating gives us the resources to cash out the central thought behind projectivism, without having to ...
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This chapter argues that a theory according to which some of the content of perception is self-locating gives us the resources to cash out the central thought behind projectivism, without having to go in for an error theory about the projected qualities. It first surveys some of the phenomena that might motivate what it takes to be the central projectivist thought, and then looks at some ways of cashing out just what it would amount to for the thought to be correct. It makes some objections to some of the standard sorts of projectivist accounts, and then advocates another way of cashing out the thought that it thinks, at least in certain cases, does a better job of both capturing the phenomena and underwriting the projectivist idea.Less
This chapter argues that a theory according to which some of the content of perception is self-locating gives us the resources to cash out the central thought behind projectivism, without having to go in for an error theory about the projected qualities. It first surveys some of the phenomena that might motivate what it takes to be the central projectivist thought, and then looks at some ways of cashing out just what it would amount to for the thought to be correct. It makes some objections to some of the standard sorts of projectivist accounts, and then advocates another way of cashing out the thought that it thinks, at least in certain cases, does a better job of both capturing the phenomena and underwriting the projectivist idea.
Walter Ott
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570430
- eISBN:
- 9780191722394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570430.003.0028
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Hume offers two definitions of causation. These are neither cointensive nor coextensive. This chapter surveys some attempts to reconcile them before dissolving the problem altogether. Since causation ...
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Hume offers two definitions of causation. These are neither cointensive nor coextensive. This chapter surveys some attempts to reconcile them before dissolving the problem altogether. Since causation is both a philosophical and a natural relation, it has a dual nature; it is, in other words, systematically ambiguous. This is not a fault in Hume's view but a vital element in its plausibility. The chapter goes on to ask whether Hume is a subjectivist or a projectivist about causation: does he think that all causal claims merely report our own reactions, or does he think that we are mistakenly projecting causal connections onto the world? There is no coherent way to conceive of causation as characterizing mind‐independent entities; but neither is there any reason to think that the subjectivity of causal claims robs them of their truth‐evaluable status. Although many of Hume's weapons were forged by his intellectual progenitors — the theory of relations, the argument from nonsense, and the “no necessary connection” argument, most importantly — Hume recasts them, and turns them against their realist inventors.Less
Hume offers two definitions of causation. These are neither cointensive nor coextensive. This chapter surveys some attempts to reconcile them before dissolving the problem altogether. Since causation is both a philosophical and a natural relation, it has a dual nature; it is, in other words, systematically ambiguous. This is not a fault in Hume's view but a vital element in its plausibility. The chapter goes on to ask whether Hume is a subjectivist or a projectivist about causation: does he think that all causal claims merely report our own reactions, or does he think that we are mistakenly projecting causal connections onto the world? There is no coherent way to conceive of causation as characterizing mind‐independent entities; but neither is there any reason to think that the subjectivity of causal claims robs them of their truth‐evaluable status. Although many of Hume's weapons were forged by his intellectual progenitors — the theory of relations, the argument from nonsense, and the “no necessary connection” argument, most importantly — Hume recasts them, and turns them against their realist inventors.
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
David Copp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The ...
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This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The final section sketches a research program for moral realism that takes on and pursues Hume’s aim of explaining the ability to think in moral, and more broadly, normative, terms in a way that shows that the successful exercise of this ability is neither metaphysically nor epistemically mysterious.Less
This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The final section sketches a research program for moral realism that takes on and pursues Hume’s aim of explaining the ability to think in moral, and more broadly, normative, terms in a way that shows that the successful exercise of this ability is neither metaphysically nor epistemically mysterious.
Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson
David Copp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores the debate between contemporary projectivists or expressivists (such as Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard), and the advocates of sensibility theory (most notably John McDowell ...
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This chapter explores the debate between contemporary projectivists or expressivists (such as Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard), and the advocates of sensibility theory (most notably John McDowell and David Wiggins). Both positions are best viewed as forms of sentimentalism — the theory that evaluative concepts must be explicated by appeal to the sentiments. It argues that the sophisticated interpretation of such notions as “true” and “objective” that are offered by defenders of these competing views ultimately undermines the significance of their meta-ethical disputes over “cognitivism” and “realism” about value. Their fundamental disagreement lies in moral psychology; it concerns how best to understand the emotions to which sentimentalist theories must appeal.Less
This chapter explores the debate between contemporary projectivists or expressivists (such as Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard), and the advocates of sensibility theory (most notably John McDowell and David Wiggins). Both positions are best viewed as forms of sentimentalism — the theory that evaluative concepts must be explicated by appeal to the sentiments. It argues that the sophisticated interpretation of such notions as “true” and “objective” that are offered by defenders of these competing views ultimately undermines the significance of their meta-ethical disputes over “cognitivism” and “realism” about value. Their fundamental disagreement lies in moral psychology; it concerns how best to understand the emotions to which sentimentalist theories must appeal.
Derk Pereboom
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199764037
- eISBN:
- 9780199895243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Chapter 2 considers an important objection to the response to the knowledge argument developed in Chapter 1: it misconstrues the nature of our paradigmatic phenomenal concepts. In the response, I ...
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Chapter 2 considers an important objection to the response to the knowledge argument developed in Chapter 1: it misconstrues the nature of our paradigmatic phenomenal concepts. In the response, I propose an account of phenomenal concepts inspired by Hilary Putnam, Frank Jackson, and David Chalmers is proposed, and I develop a view about the content of phenomenal property representation analogous to the dual-content theory of secondary quality representation advanced by Chalmers. In addition, I contend that the response can withstand an objection that Sydney Shoemaker directs against projectivist accounts of sensory secondary quality representation. Finally, I argue that all of this provides the physicalist with an effective reply to those, like Joseph Levine and Robert Adams, who suggest that there is an explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal that we do not understand how to close.Less
Chapter 2 considers an important objection to the response to the knowledge argument developed in Chapter 1: it misconstrues the nature of our paradigmatic phenomenal concepts. In the response, I propose an account of phenomenal concepts inspired by Hilary Putnam, Frank Jackson, and David Chalmers is proposed, and I develop a view about the content of phenomenal property representation analogous to the dual-content theory of secondary quality representation advanced by Chalmers. In addition, I contend that the response can withstand an objection that Sydney Shoemaker directs against projectivist accounts of sensory secondary quality representation. Finally, I argue that all of this provides the physicalist with an effective reply to those, like Joseph Levine and Robert Adams, who suggest that there is an explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal that we do not understand how to close.
Jonas Olson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198701934
- eISBN:
- 9780191771620
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book examines moral error theory of the kind advocated by J. L. Mackie. Part I (History) gives a historical background to the debate. The moral error theories of David Hume and of some more or ...
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This book examines moral error theory of the kind advocated by J. L. Mackie. Part I (History) gives a historical background to the debate. The moral error theories of David Hume and of some more or less influential twentieth-century philosophers, including Axel Hägerström, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Richard Robinson, are discussed. It is argued that the early cases for moral error theory are suggestive but that they would have been stronger had they included something like Mackie’s arguments that moral properties and facts are metaphysically queer. Part II (Critique) focuses on these arguments. Four queerness arguments are identified, concerning supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity. It is argued that while the first three are not compelling, the fourth has considerable force, especially when combined with debunking explanations of why we tend to believe that there are moral properties and facts when in fact there are none. One conclusion of Part II is that a plausible error theory takes the form of an error theory about irreducible normativity. Part III (Defence) considers challenges according to which that kind of error theory has problematic ramifications regarding hypothetical reasons, epistemic reasons, and deliberation. The book closes with a discussion of the upshots of moral error theory for ordinary moral thought and talk, and for normative theorizing. Moral abolitionism and moral fictionalism are rejected, and moral conservationism is introduced and defended.Less
This book examines moral error theory of the kind advocated by J. L. Mackie. Part I (History) gives a historical background to the debate. The moral error theories of David Hume and of some more or less influential twentieth-century philosophers, including Axel Hägerström, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Richard Robinson, are discussed. It is argued that the early cases for moral error theory are suggestive but that they would have been stronger had they included something like Mackie’s arguments that moral properties and facts are metaphysically queer. Part II (Critique) focuses on these arguments. Four queerness arguments are identified, concerning supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity. It is argued that while the first three are not compelling, the fourth has considerable force, especially when combined with debunking explanations of why we tend to believe that there are moral properties and facts when in fact there are none. One conclusion of Part II is that a plausible error theory takes the form of an error theory about irreducible normativity. Part III (Defence) considers challenges according to which that kind of error theory has problematic ramifications regarding hypothetical reasons, epistemic reasons, and deliberation. The book closes with a discussion of the upshots of moral error theory for ordinary moral thought and talk, and for normative theorizing. Moral abolitionism and moral fictionalism are rejected, and moral conservationism is introduced and defended.
Barry Maund
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556151
- eISBN:
- 9780191725548
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556151.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that, with certain qualifications, the right theory of colour is a form of eliminativism. The first qualification is that the subject of colour is complex, and an adequate theory ...
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This chapter argues that, with certain qualifications, the right theory of colour is a form of eliminativism. The first qualification is that the subject of colour is complex, and an adequate theory of the subject, likewise, will be complex, containing both metaphysical and semantic theses. Eliminativism, rightly understood, comprises only a part of the story, but an indispensable part. The second qualification is that it has to be the right kind of eliminativism, for there are several varieties. This chapter argues that we can be ontological eliminativists, holding that there are no colours, as ordinarily understood, without being conceptual eliminativists. There are important reasons for retaining the concept, even if it is not instantiated—as well as for accepting a place for other concepts of colour.Less
This chapter argues that, with certain qualifications, the right theory of colour is a form of eliminativism. The first qualification is that the subject of colour is complex, and an adequate theory of the subject, likewise, will be complex, containing both metaphysical and semantic theses. Eliminativism, rightly understood, comprises only a part of the story, but an indispensable part. The second qualification is that it has to be the right kind of eliminativism, for there are several varieties. This chapter argues that we can be ontological eliminativists, holding that there are no colours, as ordinarily understood, without being conceptual eliminativists. There are important reasons for retaining the concept, even if it is not instantiated—as well as for accepting a place for other concepts of colour.
George M. Young
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199892945
- eISBN:
- 9780199950577
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199892945.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter discusses in more detail Fedorov’s thought as presented in his major work, The Philosophy of the Common Task. Focus is on the project of resurrecting the dead, in its radical aspects and ...
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This chapter discusses in more detail Fedorov’s thought as presented in his major work, The Philosophy of the Common Task. Focus is on the project of resurrecting the dead, in its radical aspects and ramifications, especially in relationship to the Western tradition of esotericism. The concepts of kinship, projectivism, regulation of nature, and all-unity are emphasized. The last section of the chapter discusses Fedorov’s legacy, especially in areas of technological innovation, space exploration, and reconstitution of the human organism.Less
This chapter discusses in more detail Fedorov’s thought as presented in his major work, The Philosophy of the Common Task. Focus is on the project of resurrecting the dead, in its radical aspects and ramifications, especially in relationship to the Western tradition of esotericism. The concepts of kinship, projectivism, regulation of nature, and all-unity are emphasized. The last section of the chapter discusses Fedorov’s legacy, especially in areas of technological innovation, space exploration, and reconstitution of the human organism.
Richard Joyce
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198754879
- eISBN:
- 9780191819865
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754879.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Moral skepticism is the view that there is no such thing as moral knowledge. One form of skepticism (error theory) holds that moral judgments are all false. Another holds that moral judgments are ...
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Moral skepticism is the view that there is no such thing as moral knowledge. One form of skepticism (error theory) holds that moral judgments are all false. Another holds that moral judgments are unjustified (and perhaps unjustifiable). This book examines facets of the many debates over moral skepticism: usually in a sympathetic tone and sometimes in the spirit of confident promotion. The collection is divided into three parts. Chapters of the first part deal with aspects of the metaethical debate over the error-theoretic view of morality. Part two discusses the evolution of morality, both as an empirical hypothesis and as playing a supportive role in establishing the skeptical thesis that moral judgments lack justification. The final part of the collection consists of chapters discussing moral projectivism and moral fictionalism. This collection follows the development of ideas over the period of a decade, and presents a coherent and nuanced picture of modern moral skepticism.Less
Moral skepticism is the view that there is no such thing as moral knowledge. One form of skepticism (error theory) holds that moral judgments are all false. Another holds that moral judgments are unjustified (and perhaps unjustifiable). This book examines facets of the many debates over moral skepticism: usually in a sympathetic tone and sometimes in the spirit of confident promotion. The collection is divided into three parts. Chapters of the first part deal with aspects of the metaethical debate over the error-theoretic view of morality. Part two discusses the evolution of morality, both as an empirical hypothesis and as playing a supportive role in establishing the skeptical thesis that moral judgments lack justification. The final part of the collection consists of chapters discussing moral projectivism and moral fictionalism. This collection follows the development of ideas over the period of a decade, and presents a coherent and nuanced picture of modern moral skepticism.
Hale Bob
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199669578
- eISBN:
- 9780191765186
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669578.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Can modal propositions be analysed or paraphrased in non-modal terms? Even if such a conceptual reduction is not possible, can an ontological reduction be given, reducing modal facts to facts of some ...
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Can modal propositions be analysed or paraphrased in non-modal terms? Even if such a conceptual reduction is not possible, can an ontological reduction be given, reducing modal facts to facts of some other kind? The conditions which must be met for both kinds of reduction are examined, and it is argued that neither can be accomplished. In particular, it is argued that what may seem to be the most promising attempts at reduction—in terms of possible worlds understood combinatorially—are ultimately unsuccessful. Even if it is agreed that modal facts resist reduction in any strict sense, they may be held to supervene on non-modal facts. Alternatively, it may be held that modality should be understood in projectivist or other non-cognitivist terms. It is argued that there is no correct and non-trivial superveniencethesis which conflicts with the essay’s explanatory aim, and that there is no good reason, such as Blackburn’s Dilemma purports to provide, to embrace any such anti-realist position.Less
Can modal propositions be analysed or paraphrased in non-modal terms? Even if such a conceptual reduction is not possible, can an ontological reduction be given, reducing modal facts to facts of some other kind? The conditions which must be met for both kinds of reduction are examined, and it is argued that neither can be accomplished. In particular, it is argued that what may seem to be the most promising attempts at reduction—in terms of possible worlds understood combinatorially—are ultimately unsuccessful. Even if it is agreed that modal facts resist reduction in any strict sense, they may be held to supervene on non-modal facts. Alternatively, it may be held that modality should be understood in projectivist or other non-cognitivist terms. It is argued that there is no correct and non-trivial superveniencethesis which conflicts with the essay’s explanatory aim, and that there is no good reason, such as Blackburn’s Dilemma purports to provide, to embrace any such anti-realist position.
Jonas Olson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198701934
- eISBN:
- 9780191771620
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter gives a rationale and a brief overview of the book. It is argued that moral projectivism is congenial to moral error theory. Moral projectivism is, however, compatible with a variety of ...
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This chapter gives a rationale and a brief overview of the book. It is argued that moral projectivism is congenial to moral error theory. Moral projectivism is, however, compatible with a variety of metaethical views, such as subjectivist and objectivist realism, and non-cognitivism. Different versions of moral error theory are distinguished. A broad distinction is made between standard moral error theory and moderate moral error theory. The problem of how to formulate standard moral error theory is discussed and a solution is proposed.Less
This chapter gives a rationale and a brief overview of the book. It is argued that moral projectivism is congenial to moral error theory. Moral projectivism is, however, compatible with a variety of metaethical views, such as subjectivist and objectivist realism, and non-cognitivism. Different versions of moral error theory are distinguished. A broad distinction is made between standard moral error theory and moderate moral error theory. The problem of how to formulate standard moral error theory is discussed and a solution is proposed.
Jonas Olson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198701934
- eISBN:
- 9780191771620
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary ...
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This chapter argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary moral thinking involves systematically erroneous beliefs about moral properties. These claims, on their face, seem difficult to square with one another but it is argued that on Hume’s view, they are reconcilable. The reconciliation is effected by making a distinction between Hume’s descriptive metaethics and his revisionary metaethics. It is argued that Hume is a projectivist and an error theorist in descriptive metaethics, while he is a projectivist and a subjectivist in revisionary metaethics. Finally, the moral error theories of Hume and Mackie are compared.Less
This chapter argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary moral thinking involves systematically erroneous beliefs about moral properties. These claims, on their face, seem difficult to square with one another but it is argued that on Hume’s view, they are reconcilable. The reconciliation is effected by making a distinction between Hume’s descriptive metaethics and his revisionary metaethics. It is argued that Hume is a projectivist and an error theorist in descriptive metaethics, while he is a projectivist and a subjectivist in revisionary metaethics. Finally, the moral error theories of Hume and Mackie are compared.
Robert N. Johnson and Michael Smith (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198723172
- eISBN:
- 9780191789717
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198723172.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Best known to the general public for his attempts to make philosophy accessible to those with little or no formal training, Simon Blackburn’s reputation in academic circles is based on a lifetime ...
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Best known to the general public for his attempts to make philosophy accessible to those with little or no formal training, Simon Blackburn’s reputation in academic circles is based on a lifetime pursuit of a projectivist and anti-realist research program in the spirit of the great David Hume. According to Blackburn, we must always try first to understand and explain what we are doing when we think and talk as we do. Sometimes the most fundamental answer will be that we are expressing our beliefs about how the world is. Other times a more fundamental answer will be available: that we are expressing our attitudes of approval, our habits of mind, or some other non-cognitive state. Blackburn’s research program reaches into nearly all of the main areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and moral psychology. This volume of critical essays by some of the most influential philosophers working today documents the whole range and influence of Blackburn’s work, and poses some novel challenges for him.Less
Best known to the general public for his attempts to make philosophy accessible to those with little or no formal training, Simon Blackburn’s reputation in academic circles is based on a lifetime pursuit of a projectivist and anti-realist research program in the spirit of the great David Hume. According to Blackburn, we must always try first to understand and explain what we are doing when we think and talk as we do. Sometimes the most fundamental answer will be that we are expressing our beliefs about how the world is. Other times a more fundamental answer will be available: that we are expressing our attitudes of approval, our habits of mind, or some other non-cognitive state. Blackburn’s research program reaches into nearly all of the main areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and moral psychology. This volume of critical essays by some of the most influential philosophers working today documents the whole range and influence of Blackburn’s work, and poses some novel challenges for him.
Richard Joyce
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198754879
- eISBN:
- 9780191819865
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754879.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
John Mackie holds that the widespread but erroneous belief that many of our actions are “objectively prescribed” is the result of the human “tendency to read our feelings into their objects.” He ...
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John Mackie holds that the widespread but erroneous belief that many of our actions are “objectively prescribed” is the result of the human “tendency to read our feelings into their objects.” He calls this “objectification.” (One might also call it “projectivism.”) This chapter examines the role that the thesis of moral objectification plays in Mackie’s endeavors to establish moral skepticism. The conclusion is that his well-known skeptical arguments (from relativity and queerness) leave matters undecided, and that a further supplementary thesis must be established in order to “explain away” those pro-morality intuitions that threaten to nullify the skeptical arguments’ force (via an application of a principle of epistemological conservatism). Moral objectification is designed to be that supplementary thesis. However, Mackie’s arguments in favor of this thesis are weak.Less
John Mackie holds that the widespread but erroneous belief that many of our actions are “objectively prescribed” is the result of the human “tendency to read our feelings into their objects.” He calls this “objectification.” (One might also call it “projectivism.”) This chapter examines the role that the thesis of moral objectification plays in Mackie’s endeavors to establish moral skepticism. The conclusion is that his well-known skeptical arguments (from relativity and queerness) leave matters undecided, and that a further supplementary thesis must be established in order to “explain away” those pro-morality intuitions that threaten to nullify the skeptical arguments’ force (via an application of a principle of epistemological conservatism). Moral objectification is designed to be that supplementary thesis. However, Mackie’s arguments in favor of this thesis are weak.
Richard Joyce
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198754879
- eISBN:
- 9780191819865
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754879.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this essay) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) ...
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Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this essay) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (such as an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims, and must be tested as such. This chapter does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (for example, what is meant by “objective”?—what is meant by “experience”?).Less
Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this essay) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (such as an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims, and must be tested as such. This chapter does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (for example, what is meant by “objective”?—what is meant by “experience”?).