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A Critique of Expressivism

Alan Thomas

in Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge

This chapter examines the expressive/projective strategy, which covers a family of views with interrelated common themes. The two most highly developed themes, norm expressivism (defended by Allan ... More

This chapter examines the expressive/projective strategy, which covers a family of views with interrelated common themes. The two most highly developed themes, norm expressivism (defended by Allan Gibbard) and projectivism (defended by Simon Blackburn), are considered. Both focus on the crucial issue of how we should understand our desire to explain the ethical within a generally naturalistic framework. One way in which the theories discussed in this chapter differ from earlier forms of non-cognitivism is that they are intended to constitute a general theory of normativity, which, while it is supposed to bolster some of the intuitions underlying the prevalent conception of value, does not exactly match the extension of that term. The non-cognitivists discussed in this chapter operate with a descriptive/normative distinction, not a fact/value distinction.Less

Ontological Reductionism

Alan Weir

in Truth Through Proof: A Formalist Foundation for Mathematics

The concepts of the previous chapter are applied to projectivism. The metaphysical content of projective sentences is given by the presence of internal attitudes but this content is no part of the ... More

The concepts of the previous chapter are applied to projectivism. The metaphysical content of projective sentences is given by the presence of internal attitudes but this content is no part of the informational content of the sentence. This grounds a form of ‘cognitivist projectivism’ in which projective utterances are used to make genuine truth-valued assertions thus avoiding the ‘Frege–Geach’ problem. A relatively deflationary notion of truth generates truth out of correctness, the latter interpreted non-normatively. The account is extended to a ‘hermeneutic anti-realism’ about fiction. The position is reductionist because the ontological commitments of the meta-theorist are narrower than those of the object language projective sentences. Representational modes of assertion are distinguished from non-representational and it is argued that existence assertions can be made in non-representational mode and denied in representational mode without inconsistency or any ordinary type of ambiguity.Less

 Objectification

Wolfgang Spohn

in The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications

The above account of natural modalities is forbiddingly subjectivistic; these modalities are explained only relative to a doxastic state, a ranking function. This chapter explores the extent to which ... More

The above account of natural modalities is forbiddingly subjectivistic; these modalities are explained only relative to a doxastic state, a ranking function. This chapter explores the extent to which this relativization can be undone; it thus carries a heavy philosophical weight. The issue is addressed in a fully general way. First it is defined what it means to call a feature of a ranking function objectifiable, i.e., what it means to uniquely reconstruct a ranking function and the way in which it realizes that feature from an objectively true or false proposition associated with that realization (so that the function can also be called true or false). Then it is proved that belief is objectifiable and that reasons are not. The main part provides two objectification methods for causation, one that works only for sufficient causes and another that even works for causal overdetermination. Subjective laws are objectifiable if and only if their assumptions about the single case are so. These are substantial results that, as is finally explained, complete the projectivistic strategy pursued in this book.Less

Projectivism without Error

Andy Egan

in Perceiving the World

This chapter argues that a theory according to which some of the content of perception is self-locating gives us the resources to cash out the central thought behind projectivism, without having to ... More

This chapter argues that a theory according to which some of the content of perception is self-locating gives us the resources to cash out the central thought behind projectivism, without having to go in for an error theory about the projected qualities. It first surveys some of the phenomena that might motivate what it takes to be the central projectivist thought, and then looks at some ways of cashing out just what it would amount to for the thought to be correct. It makes some objections to some of the standard sorts of projectivist accounts, and then advocates another way of cashing out the thought that it thinks, at least in certain cases, does a better job of both capturing the phenomena and underwriting the projectivist idea.Less

The Definition of Causation

Walter Ott

in Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy

Hume offers two definitions of causation. These are neither cointensive nor coextensive. This chapter surveys some attempts to reconcile them before dissolving the problem altogether. Since causation ... More

Hume offers two definitions of causation. These are neither cointensive nor coextensive. This chapter surveys some attempts to reconcile them before dissolving the problem altogether. Since causation is both a philosophical and a natural relation, it has a dual nature; it is, in other words, systematically ambiguous. This is not a fault in Hume's view but a vital element in its plausibility. The chapter goes on to ask whether Hume is a subjectivist or a projectivist about causation: does he think that all causal claims merely report our own reactions, or does he think that we are mistakenly projecting causal connections onto the world? There is no coherent way to conceive of causation as characterizing mind‐independent entities; but neither is there any reason to think that the subjectivity of causal claims robs them of their truth‐evaluable status. Although many of Hume's weapons were forged by his intellectual progenitors — the theory of relations, the argument from nonsense, and the “no necessary connection” argument, most importantly — Hume recasts them, and turns them against their realist inventors.Less

Moral Realism

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The ... More

This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The final section sketches a research program for moral realism that takes on and pursues Hume’s aim of explaining the ability to think in moral, and more broadly, normative, terms in a way that shows that the successful exercise of this ability is neither metaphysically nor epistemically mysterious.Less

Sensibility Theory and Projectivism

Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

This chapter explores the debate between contemporary projectivists or expressivists (such as Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard), and the advocates of sensibility theory (most notably John McDowell ... More

This chapter explores the debate between contemporary projectivists or expressivists (such as Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard), and the advocates of sensibility theory (most notably John McDowell and David Wiggins). Both positions are best viewed as forms of sentimentalism — the theory that evaluative concepts must be explicated by appeal to the sentiments. It argues that the sophisticated interpretation of such notions as “true” and “objective” that are offered by defenders of these competing views ultimately undermines the significance of their meta-ethical disputes over “cognitivism” and “realism” about value. Their fundamental disagreement lies in moral psychology; it concerns how best to understand the emotions to which sentimentalist theories must appeal.Less

Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap

Derk Pereboom

in Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism

Chapter 2 considers an important objection to the response to the knowledge argument developed in Chapter 1: it misconstrues the nature of our paradigmatic phenomenal concepts. In the response, I ... More

Chapter 2 considers an important objection to the response to the knowledge argument developed in Chapter 1: it misconstrues the nature of our paradigmatic phenomenal concepts. In the response, I propose an account of phenomenal concepts inspired by Hilary Putnam, Frank Jackson, and David Chalmers is proposed, and I develop a view about the content of phenomenal property representation analogous to the dual-content theory of secondary quality representation advanced by Chalmers. In addition, I contend that the response can withstand an objection that Sydney Shoemaker directs against projectivist accounts of sensory secondary quality representation. Finally, I argue that all of this provides the physicalist with an effective reply to those, like Joseph Levine and Robert Adams, who suggest that there is an explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal that we do not understand how to close.Less

Colour Eliminativism

Barry Maund

in Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate

This chapter argues that, with certain qualifications, the right theory of colour is a form of eliminativism. The first qualification is that the subject of colour is complex, and an adequate theory ... More

This chapter argues that, with certain qualifications, the right theory of colour is a form of eliminativism. The first qualification is that the subject of colour is complex, and an adequate theory of the subject, likewise, will be complex, containing both metaphysical and semantic theses. Eliminativism, rightly understood, comprises only a part of the story, but an indispensable part. The second qualification is that it has to be the right kind of eliminativism, for there are several varieties. This chapter argues that we can be ontological eliminativists, holding that there are no colours, as ordinarily understood, without being conceptual eliminativists. There are important reasons for retaining the concept, even if it is not instantiated—as well as for accepting a place for other concepts of colour.Less

The “Common Task”

George M. Young

in The Russian Cosmists: The Esoteric Futurism of Nikolai Fedorov and His Followers

This chapter discusses in more detail Fedorov’s thought as presented in his major work, The Philosophy of the Common Task. Focus is on the project of resurrecting the dead, in its radical aspects and ... More

This chapter discusses in more detail Fedorov’s thought as presented in his major work, The Philosophy of the Common Task. Focus is on the project of resurrecting the dead, in its radical aspects and ramifications, especially in relationship to the Western tradition of esotericism. The concepts of kinship, projectivism, regulation of nature, and all-unity are emphasized. The last section of the chapter discusses Fedorov’s legacy, especially in areas of technological innovation, space exploration, and reconstitution of the human organism.Less

Modality—Fundamental and Irreducible

Hale Bob

in Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them

Can modal propositions be analysed or paraphrased in non-modal terms? Even if such a conceptual reduction is not possible, can an ontological reduction be given, reducing modal facts to facts of some ... More

Can modal propositions be analysed or paraphrased in non-modal terms? Even if such a conceptual reduction is not possible, can an ontological reduction be given, reducing modal facts to facts of some other kind? The conditions which must be met for both kinds of reduction are examined, and it is argued that neither can be accomplished. In particular, it is argued that what may seem to be the most promising attempts at reduction—in terms of possible worlds understood combinatorially—are ultimately unsuccessful. Even if it is agreed that modal facts resist reduction in any strict sense, they may be held to supervene on non-modal facts. Alternatively, it may be held that modality should be understood in projectivist or other non-cognitivist terms. It is argued that there is no correct and non-trivial superveniencethesis which conflicts with the essay’s explanatory aim, and that there is no good reason, such as Blackburn’s Dilemma purports to provide, to embrace any such anti-realist position.Less

Introduction

Jonas Olson

in Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence

This chapter gives a rationale and a brief overview of the book. It is argued that moral projectivism is congenial to moral error theory. Moral projectivism is, however, compatible with a variety of ... More

This chapter gives a rationale and a brief overview of the book. It is argued that moral projectivism is congenial to moral error theory. Moral projectivism is, however, compatible with a variety of metaethical views, such as subjectivist and objectivist realism, and non-cognitivism. Different versions of moral error theory are distinguished. A broad distinction is made between standard moral error theory and moderate moral error theory. The problem of how to formulate standard moral error theory is discussed and a solution is proposed.Less

Hume: Projectivist, Realist, and Error Theorist

Jonas Olson

in Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence

This chapter argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary ... More

This chapter argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary moral thinking involves systematically erroneous beliefs about moral properties. These claims, on their face, seem difficult to square with one another but it is argued that on Hume’s view, they are reconcilable. The reconciliation is effected by making a distinction between Hume’s descriptive metaethics and his revisionary metaethics. It is argued that Hume is a projectivist and an error theorist in descriptive metaethics, while he is a projectivist and a subjectivist in revisionary metaethics. Finally, the moral error theories of Hume and Mackie are compared.Less

Patterns of Objectification

Richard Joyce

in Essays in Moral Skepticism

John Mackie holds that the widespread but erroneous belief that many of our actions are “objectively prescribed” is the result of the human “tendency to read our feelings into their objects.” He ... More

John Mackie holds that the widespread but erroneous belief that many of our actions are “objectively prescribed” is the result of the human “tendency to read our feelings into their objects.” He calls this “objectification.” (One might also call it “projectivism.”) This chapter examines the role that the thesis of moral objectification plays in Mackie’s endeavors to establish moral skepticism. The conclusion is that his well-known skeptical arguments (from relativity and queerness) leave matters undecided, and that a further supplementary thesis must be established in order to “explain away” those pro-morality intuitions that threaten to nullify the skeptical arguments’ force (via an application of a principle of epistemological conservatism). Moral objectification is designed to be that supplementary thesis. However, Mackie’s arguments in favor of this thesis are weak.Less

Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?

Richard Joyce

in Essays in Moral Skepticism

Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this essay) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) ... More

Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this essay) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (such as an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims, and must be tested as such. This chapter does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (for example, what is meant by “objective”?—what is meant by “experience”?).Less