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This chapter challenges the assumption that business is necessarily conducted as self-interested action in the pursuit of profit. To examine how profit-oriented firms and businesspeople make sense of their interested action, the chapter analyzes their discourses and strategies of action in contemporary American business associations. Then, exploring the meaning-making about business that actually goes on in these settings, it shows that businesspeople often understand themselves as disinterested rather than self-interested actors. They often think of what they are doing in terms of technical expertise, professionalism, stewardship of the public good and occupational community, and these vocabularies of motive are a constitutive part of many business identities. The chapter argues that the pursuit of strategic interest in competitive profit seeking is conditioned by and relies on institutions and discourses transcending strategic interests, and that such institutions and discourses make capitalist economic action routinely meaningful.

One of the most controversial recent debates in finance among politicians, policymakers, financial economists, and the media concerns the contribution of private equity (PE) in society. The PE industry has grown dramatically over the last few decades despite critics challenging the fabric of the economic model by portraying PE companies as heartless, profit-seeking barbarians. This chapter investigates this controversial topic, going beyond just the story-telling to examine the economics and benefits of PE. Overall, PE firms mitigate agency costs between the managers and shareholders, infuse good governance and better management practices, improve operating performances, and create new jobs, enabling value creation for both the investee companies and their investors. Hence, the widely held belief that the PE model is detrimental to the economy might be false.

This chapter examines the formative stage of the defense industry of the Soviet Union during the early 1920s. It explains that competition and profit-seeking were never strong features of the Russian defense industry before the Revolution, and were only accentuated after World War I and the Russian Civil War. Despite this, the defense industry failed to adapt to market conditions and became heavily dependent on budgetary subsidies. The chapter also discusses how the Red Army became enthusiastic advocates of forced industrialization.

This book examines what happened within America's airline industry after the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Written more than a decade after 9/11, the book seeks to reconceptualize the idea of risk and safety by comparing aviation with other risk management professions, particularly finance. It argues that the commercial airline industry has prioritized profit seeking at the expense of safety. More specifically, it contends that airline safety has not often been the main concern in aviation industry decision making and that airline executives, industry regulators, politicians, watchdog groups, or even the flying public have not paid enough attention to the issue of safety. With no government intervention or regulatory supervision on the horizon, the book asks whether the airline industry can also crash the way Wall Street did in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008.

This chapter traces the roots of safety-related problems in the U.S. airline industry. It provides a historical background on air traffic control and highlights the power struggle between pilot influence and airplane controllability within airlines and manufacturers over the issue of aircraft design. It also analyzes the financial crisis of 2008 in order to look for trends that may prove helpful in identifying problems in the aviation industry, with particular emphasis on signs of gamesmanship and short-term profit seeking that have become so pervasive in post-9/11 aviation. Finally, it looks at a number of airline accidents to highlight some of the imperfections in air traffic regulations. It argues that regulators often did not pay enough attention to airline safety, reacting only and conducting investigations after several accidents and numerous fatalities.

This chapter examines the escalating risk taking and short-term profit seeking in the airline industry reminiscent of Wall Street strategies that led to the financial crisis of 2008. Airlines and financial institutions were originally intended to operate as public utilities of a sort. Whereas air carriers moved passengers and cargo around the world, Wall Street matched investors seeking profits with companies needing capital. This chapter considers how management and regulation of aviation and finance became extremely complex. It looks at the emergence of a new breed of airline and financial industry executives intent on expanding their business empires and making quick profits for themselves. It also discusses factors that are affecting airline safety in ways seen previously in Wall Street by highlighting the commonalities of several airline accidents that occurred in the post-deregulation period, the same period in which risks began to escalate exponentially in the financial sector.

This chapter discusses the state of the U.S. airline industry today. It begins by assessing the results of interviews conducted between September 2010 and July 2011 regarding pilots' perceptions about aviation safety, airlines' customer service, and working more hours for less money. It then considers the real life of an airline employee, especially a pilot, by focusing on the airline seniority system. It also examines the divide-and-conquer strategy intended to create organizational discord as a management tool for airline executives, along with its consequences for employees and airline safety, by looking at the experience of airline labor unions. It argues that airline employees today are cognizant of the potential impact of the escalating risks that have become commonplace in aviation in the post-9/11 period, and that they do not want to be responsible for the next crash brought on by myopic cost-cutting measures implemented by aviation executives who are fixated on short-term profit seeking at the expense of the safety of their passengers.

This epilogue considers a number of ways to stop airlines from prioritizing profit seeking and make them focus more on safety concerns, with an eye towards reconceptualizing the idea of airline safety before it is too late. It first considers the evidence showing that, while air carriers may have suffered financially in the immediate post-9/11 period, airline executives managed to maximize their own profits without much trouble. It explains how airline executives authorized costly expenditures while furloughing employees, eliminating pensions, and cutting workers' wages and benefits. It argues that no one seems to care much about airline employees' concerns regarding aviation safety and that instability in the airline industry was caused by weak regulatory oversight, ineffective managerial strategies, and self-serving executives. This epilogue concludes by describing the idea of conscious capitalism that major airlines can adopt by focusing on three key areas that must be addressed immediately to avert a disaster similar to the financial crisis of 2008: government, regulators, and the flying public.

In this chapter the terms of the plebiscitum Claudianum are examined. This law forbade senators and their families from owning sea-going vessels with a capacity of more than 300 amphorae. This measure, dating from 219–218 BC, has been the subject of extensive discussion and interpretation. It had long been accepted that the measure effectively prevented senators from engaging in trade and even from seeking profit, particularly through economic channels. Some scholars have contended that the law must have been a response to problems that arose when commercial activity was linked to provincial administration and the signing of contracts. In effect, it was a way of preventing senators from having anything to do with the transport of grain obtained through taxes—a hypothesis endorsed here and examined in greater depth.