Roger M. Barker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576814
- eISBN:
- 9780191722509
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.001.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business, Corporate Governance and Accountability
The corporate governance systems of continental Europe have traditionally been quite different to those of the liberal market economies (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom). Company ...
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The corporate governance systems of continental Europe have traditionally been quite different to those of the liberal market economies (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom). Company ownership has been dominated by incumbent blockholders, with a relatively minor role for minority shareholders and institutional investors. However, since the mid‐1990s, European corporations have adopted many of the characteristics of the Anglo‐American shareholder model. Furthermore, such an increased shareholder orientation has coincided with a significant role for the Left in European government. This presents a puzzle, as conventional wisdom does not conceive of the European Left as the natural ally of pro‐shareholder capitalism. This book provides an analysis of this paradox by arguing that the postwar support of the European Left for the prevailing blockholder‐dominated corporate system depended on the willingness of blockholders to share economic rents with employees, both through higher wages and greater employment stability. However, during the 1990s, product markets became more competitive in many European countries. The sharing of rents between social actors became increasingly difficult to sustain. In such an environment, the Left chose to relinquish its traditional social partnership with blockholders and embraced many aspects of the shareholder model. The hypothesis is initially explored through a panel data econometric analysis of fifteen non‐liberal market economies. Subsequent case study chapters examine the political economy of recent corporate governance change in Germany and Italy.Less
The corporate governance systems of continental Europe have traditionally been quite different to those of the liberal market economies (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom). Company ownership has been dominated by incumbent blockholders, with a relatively minor role for minority shareholders and institutional investors. However, since the mid‐1990s, European corporations have adopted many of the characteristics of the Anglo‐American shareholder model. Furthermore, such an increased shareholder orientation has coincided with a significant role for the Left in European government. This presents a puzzle, as conventional wisdom does not conceive of the European Left as the natural ally of pro‐shareholder capitalism. This book provides an analysis of this paradox by arguing that the postwar support of the European Left for the prevailing blockholder‐dominated corporate system depended on the willingness of blockholders to share economic rents with employees, both through higher wages and greater employment stability. However, during the 1990s, product markets became more competitive in many European countries. The sharing of rents between social actors became increasingly difficult to sustain. In such an environment, the Left chose to relinquish its traditional social partnership with blockholders and embraced many aspects of the shareholder model. The hypothesis is initially explored through a panel data econometric analysis of fifteen non‐liberal market economies. Subsequent case study chapters examine the political economy of recent corporate governance change in Germany and Italy.
Roger M. Barker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576814
- eISBN:
- 9780191722509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.003.0005
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business, Corporate Governance and Accountability
An evaluation is made of potential ways in which product market competition can be operationalized as part of a panel data econometric analysis. As with corporate governance, it is necessary to ...
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An evaluation is made of potential ways in which product market competition can be operationalized as part of a panel data econometric analysis. As with corporate governance, it is necessary to identify suitable proxy variables. The OECD's NMR index is chosen as the most plausible measure of product market competition, an assessment reflected in its widespread utilization in the empirical economics literature.Less
An evaluation is made of potential ways in which product market competition can be operationalized as part of a panel data econometric analysis. As with corporate governance, it is necessary to identify suitable proxy variables. The OECD's NMR index is chosen as the most plausible measure of product market competition, an assessment reflected in its widespread utilization in the empirical economics literature.
Roger M. Barker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576814
- eISBN:
- 9780191722509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business, Corporate Governance and Accountability
An analytical framework is outlined with three social actors: blockholders, insider labor, and outsiders. Each has differing corporate governance preferences. Blockholders and insider labor are ...
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An analytical framework is outlined with three social actors: blockholders, insider labor, and outsiders. Each has differing corporate governance preferences. Blockholders and insider labor are represented by conservative and Left parties respectively. Outsiders do not have their own party, and represent a potential source of new votes for both parties. However, they require a commitment to pro‐shareholder corporate governance reform in order to win their support. As long as economic rents are substantial (due to low levels of product market competition), neither the Left nor conservative parties are willing to solicit the support of outsiders. Both of their core constituents benefit from the sharing of economic rents. However, if economic rents decline, insider labor no longer has an interest in sustaining a self-regulatory blockholder model of corporate governance. In contrast, conservative parties remain the apologists of the blockholder model.Less
An analytical framework is outlined with three social actors: blockholders, insider labor, and outsiders. Each has differing corporate governance preferences. Blockholders and insider labor are represented by conservative and Left parties respectively. Outsiders do not have their own party, and represent a potential source of new votes for both parties. However, they require a commitment to pro‐shareholder corporate governance reform in order to win their support. As long as economic rents are substantial (due to low levels of product market competition), neither the Left nor conservative parties are willing to solicit the support of outsiders. Both of their core constituents benefit from the sharing of economic rents. However, if economic rents decline, insider labor no longer has an interest in sustaining a self-regulatory blockholder model of corporate governance. In contrast, conservative parties remain the apologists of the blockholder model.
Roger M. Barker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576814
- eISBN:
- 9780191722509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.003.0006
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business, Corporate Governance and Accountability
A panel data econometric analysis of corporate governance change is undertaken utilizing a data set of fifteen nonliberal market economies covering the period 1975–2003. The results of this analysis ...
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A panel data econometric analysis of corporate governance change is undertaken utilizing a data set of fifteen nonliberal market economies covering the period 1975–2003. The results of this analysis suggested that the interaction of partisanship and competition is a highly significant determinant of corporate governance change. In particular, significant shifts in a pro‐shareholder direction are associated with Left government – but not conservative government – in the context of high levels of competition. In contrast, neither Left nor conservative government is associated with corporate governance change in a low‐competition environment.Less
A panel data econometric analysis of corporate governance change is undertaken utilizing a data set of fifteen nonliberal market economies covering the period 1975–2003. The results of this analysis suggested that the interaction of partisanship and competition is a highly significant determinant of corporate governance change. In particular, significant shifts in a pro‐shareholder direction are associated with Left government – but not conservative government – in the context of high levels of competition. In contrast, neither Left nor conservative government is associated with corporate governance change in a low‐competition environment.
Bruno Amable
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199261130
- eISBN:
- 9780191602474
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926113X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic Systems
This chapter presents results from cluster analyses of five institutional areas: product-market competition, the labour market, the financial sector, social protection, and the education system. It ...
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This chapter presents results from cluster analyses of five institutional areas: product-market competition, the labour market, the financial sector, social protection, and the education system. It is shown that the clusterings of countries are not necessarily identical to the theoretical typology of capitalism presented in the previous chapter. Usually, one specific institutional area (labour market, welfare state, etc.) is privileged even when others are taken into account, and the typologies derived are partial. Thus, it is necessary to take into account all the possible complementarities between the five institutional areas in order to come to an empirical classification of capitalism.Less
This chapter presents results from cluster analyses of five institutional areas: product-market competition, the labour market, the financial sector, social protection, and the education system. It is shown that the clusterings of countries are not necessarily identical to the theoretical typology of capitalism presented in the previous chapter. Usually, one specific institutional area (labour market, welfare state, etc.) is privileged even when others are taken into account, and the typologies derived are partial. Thus, it is necessary to take into account all the possible complementarities between the five institutional areas in order to come to an empirical classification of capitalism.
Gary S. Fields
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199794645
- eISBN:
- 9780199928606
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794645.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics, Financial Economics
This chapter explores globalization in the twenty-first century and the nature of labor markets in today's globalized world. Four points are made: First, for the most part, because of restrictions on ...
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This chapter explores globalization in the twenty-first century and the nature of labor markets in today's globalized world. Four points are made: First, for the most part, because of restrictions on international migration, poor people in the developing world are not able to sell their labor where it will command the highest return. Second, labor markets throughout the world are linked by an unprecedented degree of labor market competition. Third, labor markets are highly competitive because numerous industries face an unprecedented degree of product market competition on the global level. Such globalization increasingly limits the scope for national, subnational, and local action, e.g., individual country governments, individual labor unions, and so on. And fourth, in today's globalized world, few competitive advantages are sustainable; most advantages are likely to be short-lived.Less
This chapter explores globalization in the twenty-first century and the nature of labor markets in today's globalized world. Four points are made: First, for the most part, because of restrictions on international migration, poor people in the developing world are not able to sell their labor where it will command the highest return. Second, labor markets throughout the world are linked by an unprecedented degree of labor market competition. Third, labor markets are highly competitive because numerous industries face an unprecedented degree of product market competition on the global level. Such globalization increasingly limits the scope for national, subnational, and local action, e.g., individual country governments, individual labor unions, and so on. And fourth, in today's globalized world, few competitive advantages are sustainable; most advantages are likely to be short-lived.