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The Subject's Point of View

Katalin Farkas

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199230327
eISBN:
9780191710629
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This book defends a conception of the mind that is inspired by some of Descartes's writings. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended is not dualism — which is not adopted here — but ... More


The Nature and Reach of Privileged Access

Ram Neta

in Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199590728
eISBN:
9780191725456
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

It is generally assumed that an agent has some form of privileged epistemic access to her own narrowly individuated mental states (e.g., her sensory experiences and her beliefs), but that she does ... More


The Resiliency of the McKinsey Problem

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585861
eISBN:
9780191595332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0024
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter raises some new points that seem to strengthen the McKinsey Problem. These are eventually defused.


Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self‐Knowledge

Brian P. McLaughlin and Michael Tye

in Knowing Our Own Minds

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199241408
eISBN:
9780191598692
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199241406.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The paper defends the view that privileged access to our thoughts is compatible with content externalism against the charge, levelled by Michael McKinsey, Jessica Brown, and Paul Boghossian, that the ... More


Privileged Access and the Mark of the Mental

Katalin Farkas

in The Subject's Point of View

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199230327
eISBN:
9780191710629
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Our conception of the mind is essentially shaped by the Cartesian theory, and this book suggests this should be embraced, rather than overthrown. The chapter argues that we can abstract a method for ... More


Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585861
eISBN:
9780191595332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0023
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter contains the author's half of a point-counterpoint exchange with McKinsey in Blackwell's Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind.


Knowing Our Own Minds

Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald (eds)

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199241408
eISBN:
9780191598692
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199241406.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Self‐knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers, and a topic of special relevance to a broad range of issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. ... More


Brewer on the McKinsey Problem

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585861
eISBN:
9780191595332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0021
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses in great detail Bill Brewer's take on the McKinsey problem.


Understanding Commitments

John V. Kulvicki

in On Images: Their Structure and Content

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199290758
eISBN:
9780191604010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019929075X.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Aesthetics

Chapters 6 and 7 describe the features of pictures’ bare-bones and fleshed-out contents, and raise important questions about how the two relate to one another. This chapter suggests that the relation ... More


Knowing That I Am Thinking

Alex Byrne

in Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199590728
eISBN:
9780191725456
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

We often know that we are thinking, and what we are thinking about. That is a platitude, yet it is obscure how we know these things. The chapter defends the suggestion that one can know that one is ... More


Knowing Cognitive Selves

Christine McKinnon

in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199252732
eISBN:
9780191719288
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that the standard epistemological requirements of impartiality on the part of the knower, and passivity on the part of the thing under investigation, exclude from the purview of ... More


Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge

Jordi Fernández

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199664023
eISBN:
9780191748448
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664023.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

We all seem to know what mental states we are in. At any given moment, we know, for example, what we believe, and what we want. But how do we know that? The project of Transparent Minds is to explain ... More


Self-Knowledge for Desire

Jordi Fernández

in Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199664023
eISBN:
9780191748448
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664023.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter proposes an account of self-knowledge for desire according to which we attribute desires to ourselves based on our grounds for those desires. It is argued that this ‘bypass’ view ... More


Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief

Brie Gertler

in Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199590728
eISBN:
9780191725456
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Philosophers such as Gareth Evans and Richard Moran have argued that beliefs are transparent in that a rational thinker can determine whether she believes that p by directly considering whether p. ... More


Self-Knowledge for Belief

Jordi Fernández

in Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199664023
eISBN:
9780191748448
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664023.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter proposes an account of self-knowledge for belief according to which we attribute beliefs to ourselves based on our grounds for those beliefs. It is argued that this ‘bypass’ view ... More


The Elusiveness Thesis, Immunity to Error through Misidentification, and Privileged Access

José Luis Bermúdez

in The Bodily Self: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
September 2018
ISBN:
9780262037501
eISBN:
9780262344661
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262037501.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Two ideas have played a prominent role in philosophical discussions of self-knowledge. The first is the idea that we enjoy introspective ways of finding out about ourselves are fundamentally ... More


Wright On The McKinsey Problem

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585861
eISBN:
9780191595332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0022
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines Crispin Wright's take on the McKinsey problem.


Sensations

Richard Swinburne

in The Evolution of the Soul

Published in print:
1997
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198236986
eISBN:
9780191598593
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198236980.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Mental events consist in the instantiation of mental properties. Part 1 of this book (Chs. 2–7) analyses the different kinds of mental event that occur in humans and animals. This chapter analyses ... More


Discrimination and Self-Knowledge

Patrick Greenough

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744794
eISBN:
9780199933396
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The chapter shows that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, the chapter offers a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by ... More


Access

John Gibbons

in The Norm of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199673391
eISBN:
9780191751684
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673391.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 7 is about the relevant notion of accessibility. Most internalists about justification think that the facts that determine justification and our rational requirements must be accessible to ... More


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