Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 1-4 of 4 items

  • Keywords: private monitoring x
Clear All Modify Search

View:

 Almost Public Monitoring Games

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0013
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter provides a detailed treatment of work on games with almost-public monitoring. The chapter introduces the key distinction between strategies with bounded and unbounded recall, showing ... More


 Private Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0012
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter introduces and illustrates the basic issues that arise in games with private monitoring. It discusses and presents the two basic approaches to equilibrium analysis in games with private ... More


Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated ... More


 Belief‐Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring Games

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0014
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter presents belief-free equilibria in private monitoring games. The chapter provides examples based on the prisoners’ dilemma and develops the notion of self-generation for private ... More


View: