David Pears
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199247707
- eISBN:
- 9780191714481
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247707.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book is a concise and readable study of five intertwined themes at the heart of Wittgenstein's thought, written by one of his most eminent interpreters. It offers penetrating investigations and ...
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This book is a concise and readable study of five intertwined themes at the heart of Wittgenstein's thought, written by one of his most eminent interpreters. It offers penetrating investigations and lucid explications of some of the most influential and yet puzzling writings of twentieth-century philosophy. It focuses on the idea of language as a picture of the world; the phenomenon of linguistic regularity; the famous ‘private language argument’; logical necessity; and ego and the self.Less
This book is a concise and readable study of five intertwined themes at the heart of Wittgenstein's thought, written by one of his most eminent interpreters. It offers penetrating investigations and lucid explications of some of the most influential and yet puzzling writings of twentieth-century philosophy. It focuses on the idea of language as a picture of the world; the phenomenon of linguistic regularity; the famous ‘private language argument’; logical necessity; and ego and the self.
David Pears
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244868
- eISBN:
- 9780191598210
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824486X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This is the second of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the Philosophical Investigations and other writings from 1929 onwards. Though ...
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This is the second of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the Philosophical Investigations and other writings from 1929 onwards. Though more selective in its coverage than the first volume (it deals mainly with Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology and the ego, the possibility of a private language and rule‐following), the book reveals with great clarity the style, method, and content of Wittgenstein's later thought. While this volume is independently comprehensible, Pears remains largely within the structural framework of the first volume and uncovers thereby the general overall configuration and internal organization of Wittgenstein's thought.Less
This is the second of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the Philosophical Investigations and other writings from 1929 onwards. Though more selective in its coverage than the first volume (it deals mainly with Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology and the ego, the possibility of a private language and rule‐following), the book reveals with great clarity the style, method, and content of Wittgenstein's later thought. While this volume is independently comprehensible, Pears remains largely within the structural framework of the first volume and uncovers thereby the general overall configuration and internal organization of Wittgenstein's thought.
David Pears
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244868
- eISBN:
- 9780191598210
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824486X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Shifts the discussion from Wittgenstein's treatment of sensations to his views on the method of re‐identifying them by means of a private language. Pears outlines Wittgenstein's private language ...
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Shifts the discussion from Wittgenstein's treatment of sensations to his views on the method of re‐identifying them by means of a private language. Pears outlines Wittgenstein's private language argument and argues that it is a reductio ad absurdum that applies to a language for sensations whose connections with the physical world have been severed.Less
Shifts the discussion from Wittgenstein's treatment of sensations to his views on the method of re‐identifying them by means of a private language. Pears outlines Wittgenstein's private language argument and argues that it is a reductio ad absurdum that applies to a language for sensations whose connections with the physical world have been severed.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops a symmetry between one simple form of Wittgenstein's private language argument against internalism and standard internalist complaints rooted in explanation and introspection, ...
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This chapter develops a symmetry between one simple form of Wittgenstein's private language argument against internalism and standard internalist complaints rooted in explanation and introspection, for instance arguments of McKinsey and Boghossian. It argues that all of these negative arguments should be answered by internalists and externalists through the same strategy. It also develops a positive account of our introspective access to our thoughts, partly by contrast with Wright's work.Less
This chapter develops a symmetry between one simple form of Wittgenstein's private language argument against internalism and standard internalist complaints rooted in explanation and introspection, for instance arguments of McKinsey and Boghossian. It argues that all of these negative arguments should be answered by internalists and externalists through the same strategy. It also develops a positive account of our introspective access to our thoughts, partly by contrast with Wright's work.
P. M. S Hacker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199245697
- eISBN:
- 9780191602245
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924569X.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Professor Saul Kripke argued that the ‘real’ private language argument terminates with section 202 of the Investigations and is concerned with the logical and epistemological character of following a ...
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Professor Saul Kripke argued that the ‘real’ private language argument terminates with section 202 of the Investigations and is concerned with the logical and epistemological character of following a rule. According to his interpretation, Wittgenstein is propounding a sceptical paradox concerning rule following, which he resolves by means of a Humean answer. Careful examination of Wittgenstein’s text and of his preparatory notebooks shows this interpretation to be very far from anything Wittgenstein intended.Less
Professor Saul Kripke argued that the ‘real’ private language argument terminates with section 202 of the Investigations and is concerned with the logical and epistemological character of following a rule. According to his interpretation, Wittgenstein is propounding a sceptical paradox concerning rule following, which he resolves by means of a Humean answer. Careful examination of Wittgenstein’s text and of his preparatory notebooks shows this interpretation to be very far from anything Wittgenstein intended.
Joseph Heath
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195370294
- eISBN:
- 9780199871230
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370294.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter attempts to provide further motivation for the model of deontic constraint proposed in the previous chapter, by filling in some of the background that informs the way that philosophers ...
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This chapter attempts to provide further motivation for the model of deontic constraint proposed in the previous chapter, by filling in some of the background that informs the way that philosophers use the terms “belief” and “desire.” The central difference between rational choice theorists and philosophers, in this regard, is that the latter think of beliefs and desires as propositional attitudes, and thus as fundamentally sentence-like in nature. Adopting this linguistically-informed perspective lends much greater plausibility to the introduction of principles as a third category of intentional state. Support for the view that all intentional states should be thought of as deontic statuses is presented.Less
This chapter attempts to provide further motivation for the model of deontic constraint proposed in the previous chapter, by filling in some of the background that informs the way that philosophers use the terms “belief” and “desire.” The central difference between rational choice theorists and philosophers, in this regard, is that the latter think of beliefs and desires as propositional attitudes, and thus as fundamentally sentence-like in nature. Adopting this linguistically-informed perspective lends much greater plausibility to the introduction of principles as a third category of intentional state. Support for the view that all intentional states should be thought of as deontic statuses is presented.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines externalism rooted in theoretical claims about the content of language-mediated thought, especially by a focus on Davidson's truth-based theory and Brandom's use-based theory. ...
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This chapter examines externalism rooted in theoretical claims about the content of language-mediated thought, especially by a focus on Davidson's truth-based theory and Brandom's use-based theory. It also considers other form of interpretationism, and many forms of Wittgenstein's private language argument. It develops an internalist response to these various externalist theories and arguments, which involves incorporation of internalist variants of their various externalist mechanisms.Less
This chapter examines externalism rooted in theoretical claims about the content of language-mediated thought, especially by a focus on Davidson's truth-based theory and Brandom's use-based theory. It also considers other form of interpretationism, and many forms of Wittgenstein's private language argument. It develops an internalist response to these various externalist theories and arguments, which involves incorporation of internalist variants of their various externalist mechanisms.
David Pears
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244868
- eISBN:
- 9780191598210
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824486X.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Having clarified the private language argument, Pears relates it to the earlier discussion of phenomenalism, which by itself constitutes a basis of objection against Wittgenstein's argument. Pears ...
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Having clarified the private language argument, Pears relates it to the earlier discussion of phenomenalism, which by itself constitutes a basis of objection against Wittgenstein's argument. Pears then works out the relation between the private language argument and the thesis that sensation language grafted on to a complex pre‐linguistic structure. These two discussions constitute the basis on which the deep structure of the private language argument is to be revealed.Less
Having clarified the private language argument, Pears relates it to the earlier discussion of phenomenalism, which by itself constitutes a basis of objection against Wittgenstein's argument. Pears then works out the relation between the private language argument and the thesis that sensation language grafted on to a complex pre‐linguistic structure. These two discussions constitute the basis on which the deep structure of the private language argument is to be revealed.
P. M. S Hacker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199245697
- eISBN:
- 9780191602245
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924569X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Consists of 13 thematically linked essays on different aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, by one of the leading commentators on his work. After an opening overview of Wittgenstein’s ...
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Consists of 13 thematically linked essays on different aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, by one of the leading commentators on his work. After an opening overview of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, the following essays fall into two classes: those that investigate connections between the philosophy of Wittgenstein and other philosophers and philosophical trends, and those which enter into some of the controversies that, over the last two decades, have raged over the interpretation of one aspect or another of Wittgenstein’s writings. The connections that are explored include the relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the humanistic and hermeneutic traditions in European philosophy, Wittgenstein’s response to Frazer’s Golden Bough and the interpretation of ritual actions, his attitude towards and criticisms of Frege (both in the Tractatus and in the later philosophy), the relationship between his ideas and those of members of the Vienna Circle on the matter of ostensive definition, and a comparison of Carnap’s conception of the elimination of metaphysics and of Strawson’s rehabilitation of metaphysics with Wittgenstein's later criticisms of metaphysics. The controversies into which Hacker enters include the Diamond–Conant interpretation of the Tractatus (which is shown to be inconsistent with the text of the Tractatus and with Wittgenstein’s explanations of and comments on his book), Winch's interpretation of the Tractatus conception of names, Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s discussion of following a rule (which is demonstrated to be remote from Wittgenstein’s intentions), and Malcolm’s defence of the idea that Wittgenstein claimed that mastery of a language logically requires that the language be shared with other speakers. These far-ranging essays, several of them difficult to find or not published elsewhere, shed much light on different aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought, and on the controversies that it has stimulated.Less
Consists of 13 thematically linked essays on different aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, by one of the leading commentators on his work. After an opening overview of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, the following essays fall into two classes: those that investigate connections between the philosophy of Wittgenstein and other philosophers and philosophical trends, and those which enter into some of the controversies that, over the last two decades, have raged over the interpretation of one aspect or another of Wittgenstein’s writings. The connections that are explored include the relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the humanistic and hermeneutic traditions in European philosophy, Wittgenstein’s response to Frazer’s Golden Bough and the interpretation of ritual actions, his attitude towards and criticisms of Frege (both in the Tractatus and in the later philosophy), the relationship between his ideas and those of members of the Vienna Circle on the matter of ostensive definition, and a comparison of Carnap’s conception of the elimination of metaphysics and of Strawson’s rehabilitation of metaphysics with Wittgenstein's later criticisms of metaphysics. The controversies into which Hacker enters include the Diamond–Conant interpretation of the Tractatus (which is shown to be inconsistent with the text of the Tractatus and with Wittgenstein’s explanations of and comments on his book), Winch's interpretation of the Tractatus conception of names, Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s discussion of following a rule (which is demonstrated to be remote from Wittgenstein’s intentions), and Malcolm’s defence of the idea that Wittgenstein claimed that mastery of a language logically requires that the language be shared with other speakers. These far-ranging essays, several of them difficult to find or not published elsewhere, shed much light on different aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought, and on the controversies that it has stimulated.
James Van Cleve
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199276011
- eISBN:
- 9780191706110
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter explores the analogy proposed by Thomas Reid between testimony and sense perception. It begins by trying to arrive at a correct understanding of the two principles he identifies as ...
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This chapter explores the analogy proposed by Thomas Reid between testimony and sense perception. It begins by trying to arrive at a correct understanding of the two principles he identifies as fundamental to our acquiring information from others: the principles of veracity and credulity. Next, it investigates the similarities Reid finds between perception and testimony considered as mechanisms of belief formation. Finally, it investigates whether the analogy between perception and testimony can be extended from psychology into epistemology. In particular, it discusses whether beliefs based on testimony, like beliefs based on sense perception, may be regarded as epistemologically basic or foundational. It concludes that although Reid's answer is yes (testimonial fundamentalism), the correct answer is no (testimonial reductionism).Less
This chapter explores the analogy proposed by Thomas Reid between testimony and sense perception. It begins by trying to arrive at a correct understanding of the two principles he identifies as fundamental to our acquiring information from others: the principles of veracity and credulity. Next, it investigates the similarities Reid finds between perception and testimony considered as mechanisms of belief formation. Finally, it investigates whether the analogy between perception and testimony can be extended from psychology into epistemology. In particular, it discusses whether beliefs based on testimony, like beliefs based on sense perception, may be regarded as epistemologically basic or foundational. It concludes that although Reid's answer is yes (testimonial fundamentalism), the correct answer is no (testimonial reductionism).
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199737666
- eISBN:
- 9780199933372
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737666.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
This chapter rejects its own prior interpretation Wittgenstein’s discussions of private language, according to which Wittgenstein’s goal is to provide an argument intended to establish the thesis ...
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This chapter rejects its own prior interpretation Wittgenstein’s discussions of private language, according to which Wittgenstein’s goal is to provide an argument intended to establish the thesis that a private language is impossible. The chapter here argues that Wittgenstein’s aim is importantly different: it is to show that the very idea of a private language lacks coherent content. The primary error Wittgenstein’s readers too often commit, according to this chapter, is to mistake some of Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks for philosophical remarks. Wittgenstein urges throughout his later work that mistaking a grammatical claim for a philosophical one is a common source of philosophical confusion. The grammatical claims the chapter has in mind in this case are some of the claims Wittgenstein makes using expressions such as “obeying a rule,” “private,” and “sensations.”Less
This chapter rejects its own prior interpretation Wittgenstein’s discussions of private language, according to which Wittgenstein’s goal is to provide an argument intended to establish the thesis that a private language is impossible. The chapter here argues that Wittgenstein’s aim is importantly different: it is to show that the very idea of a private language lacks coherent content. The primary error Wittgenstein’s readers too often commit, according to this chapter, is to mistake some of Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks for philosophical remarks. Wittgenstein urges throughout his later work that mistaking a grammatical claim for a philosophical one is a common source of philosophical confusion. The grammatical claims the chapter has in mind in this case are some of the claims Wittgenstein makes using expressions such as “obeying a rule,” “private,” and “sensations.”
Martin Kusch
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251223
- eISBN:
- 9780191601767
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251223.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Argues that normativity can only exist for interacting individuals. The various individualistic responses to the communitarian position regarding rule‐following fail without exception. Moreover, of ...
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Argues that normativity can only exist for interacting individuals. The various individualistic responses to the communitarian position regarding rule‐following fail without exception. Moreover, of different communitarian views the most plausible and defensible is this: an individual is able to follow a rule only if the individual is currently a participating member of a group in which the very same rule is followed by other members. It is this thesis that ultimately supports the communitarian epistemology proposed in this book. It is also the thesis which informs the views of language, truth, and objectivity that connect with this epistemology.Less
Argues that normativity can only exist for interacting individuals. The various individualistic responses to the communitarian position regarding rule‐following fail without exception. Moreover, of different communitarian views the most plausible and defensible is this: an individual is able to follow a rule only if the individual is currently a participating member of a group in which the very same rule is followed by other members. It is this thesis that ultimately supports the communitarian epistemology proposed in this book. It is also the thesis which informs the views of language, truth, and objectivity that connect with this epistemology.
William Child
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199665785
- eISBN:
- 9780191749261
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665785.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Cora Diamond has claimed that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus contains an early ‘private language argument’: an argument that private objects in other people’s minds can play no role in the language I use ...
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Cora Diamond has claimed that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus contains an early ‘private language argument’: an argument that private objects in other people’s minds can play no role in the language I use for talking about their sensations. She further claims that the Tractatus contains an early version of the later idea that an inner process stands in need of outward criteria. The chapter argues against these claims, on the grounds that they depend on an unwarranted construal of the Tractatus’s notion of use. It is further argued that Diamond’s interpretation makes a mystery of the relation between the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s 1929 account of sensation language, set out in Philosophical Remarks and elsewhere. Finally, the chapter considers and defends Michael Dummett’s contention that the Tractatus is a paradigm of semantic realism, in the light of Diamond’s claim that the Tractatus in fact suggests a form of anti-realism about sensation language.Less
Cora Diamond has claimed that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus contains an early ‘private language argument’: an argument that private objects in other people’s minds can play no role in the language I use for talking about their sensations. She further claims that the Tractatus contains an early version of the later idea that an inner process stands in need of outward criteria. The chapter argues against these claims, on the grounds that they depend on an unwarranted construal of the Tractatus’s notion of use. It is further argued that Diamond’s interpretation makes a mystery of the relation between the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s 1929 account of sensation language, set out in Philosophical Remarks and elsewhere. Finally, the chapter considers and defends Michael Dummett’s contention that the Tractatus is a paradigm of semantic realism, in the light of Diamond’s claim that the Tractatus in fact suggests a form of anti-realism about sensation language.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter gathers together the various elements of the correct internalist theory, which is called qualia empiricism. It shows how such a theory can reply to one characteristic form of private ...
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This chapter gathers together the various elements of the correct internalist theory, which is called qualia empiricism. It shows how such a theory can reply to one characteristic form of private language argument. And it contrasts this proposal with relatively close competitor proposals by Chalmers and Yablo. It propounds a kind of semantic two-dimensionalism, and is less centered on epistemological concerns than traditional forms of empiricism.Less
This chapter gathers together the various elements of the correct internalist theory, which is called qualia empiricism. It shows how such a theory can reply to one characteristic form of private language argument. And it contrasts this proposal with relatively close competitor proposals by Chalmers and Yablo. It propounds a kind of semantic two-dimensionalism, and is less centered on epistemological concerns than traditional forms of empiricism.
Michael Lemahieu
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780226420370
- eISBN:
- 9780226420547
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226420547.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein revolutionized twentieth-century philosophy of language; with The Adventures of Augie March, Saul Bellow created a new novelistic style. LeMahieu ...
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In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein revolutionized twentieth-century philosophy of language; with The Adventures of Augie March, Saul Bellow created a new novelistic style. LeMahieu suggests that despite their obvious generic differences, the revolutionary impact of the late Wittgenstein and the early Bellow gains its force from similar stylistic innovations. Both texts break with their respective authors’ earlier works and also with prevailing modernist dogma by employing a demotic voice. LeMahieu argues that the private language argument, one of the nodal points of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, offers a way of understanding the stylistic contradictions of Bellow’s work. Wittgenstein asks his readers to consider a language that refers “to what can only be known to the person speaking” and that remains inaccessible to any second person. Bellow’s novels dramatize Wittgenstein’s image of “human beings who spoke only in monologue.” The problem faced by Bellows’s protagonists as they seek to recover experiences of shared humanity in order to employ them ethically in a social contract is precisely the one Wittgenstein addresses in his private language argument: how to refer to a private feeling experienced in the past and go on to use it as a standard applicable to future emotion and behavior.Less
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein revolutionized twentieth-century philosophy of language; with The Adventures of Augie March, Saul Bellow created a new novelistic style. LeMahieu suggests that despite their obvious generic differences, the revolutionary impact of the late Wittgenstein and the early Bellow gains its force from similar stylistic innovations. Both texts break with their respective authors’ earlier works and also with prevailing modernist dogma by employing a demotic voice. LeMahieu argues that the private language argument, one of the nodal points of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, offers a way of understanding the stylistic contradictions of Bellow’s work. Wittgenstein asks his readers to consider a language that refers “to what can only be known to the person speaking” and that remains inaccessible to any second person. Bellow’s novels dramatize Wittgenstein’s image of “human beings who spoke only in monologue.” The problem faced by Bellows’s protagonists as they seek to recover experiences of shared humanity in order to employ them ethically in a social contract is precisely the one Wittgenstein addresses in his private language argument: how to refer to a private feeling experienced in the past and go on to use it as a standard applicable to future emotion and behavior.
Guy Robinson
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823222919
- eISBN:
- 9780823235513
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823222919.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Wittgenstein related the concept of following a rule with the limitations of a private language in his “private language argument.” This chapter attempts to answer a few of the questions that arose ...
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Wittgenstein related the concept of following a rule with the limitations of a private language in his “private language argument.” This chapter attempts to answer a few of the questions that arose from this argument: is rule-following, or more specifically, having a language, necessarily social in character? Is his argument valid only for a language that cannot be taught to others? Wittgenstein’s argument referred not only to a private language, but to “private objects” in general; this perhaps implies that something cannot be taught to another without a common ground of experience. A “revisionist” view would point out that an abstract pre-social language is conceptualized wherein the language pre-exists and will have been created by its users.Less
Wittgenstein related the concept of following a rule with the limitations of a private language in his “private language argument.” This chapter attempts to answer a few of the questions that arose from this argument: is rule-following, or more specifically, having a language, necessarily social in character? Is his argument valid only for a language that cannot be taught to others? Wittgenstein’s argument referred not only to a private language, but to “private objects” in general; this perhaps implies that something cannot be taught to another without a common ground of experience. A “revisionist” view would point out that an abstract pre-social language is conceptualized wherein the language pre-exists and will have been created by its users.
David Papineau
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243822
- eISBN:
- 9780191598166
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243824.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Explores the structure of phenomenal concepts. It examines how far they are expressed by everyday words, compares them to perceptual concepts, develops a quotational model of their workings, ...
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Explores the structure of phenomenal concepts. It examines how far they are expressed by everyday words, compares them to perceptual concepts, develops a quotational model of their workings, considers how far they give rise to incorrigible judgements, and discusses whether they violate Wittgenstein's “private language argument”.Less
Explores the structure of phenomenal concepts. It examines how far they are expressed by everyday words, compares them to perceptual concepts, develops a quotational model of their workings, considers how far they give rise to incorrigible judgements, and discusses whether they violate Wittgenstein's “private language argument”.
Geeta Ramana
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198097266
- eISBN:
- 9780199082766
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198097266.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In conclusion, we look at the how the three paradigms of consciousness that run through the book indicate different ways of conceiving the problem of consciousness and the relation of the mind with ...
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In conclusion, we look at the how the three paradigms of consciousness that run through the book indicate different ways of conceiving the problem of consciousness and the relation of the mind with the body. Classical Aristotelian, modern Cartesian, and contemporary linguistic paradigms are discussed and an example of an Indian paradigm is studied in detail to show how alternative perspectives can bring out interesting assumptions and viable distinctions to similar questions on the nature of the mind and the self. What different paradigms give us are tools to grasp philosophical problems, this book is an attempt to bring forth precisely those tools and the respective vocabulary to articulate some of the nagging issues that which have persisted in philosophical thought over a long period of time.Less
In conclusion, we look at the how the three paradigms of consciousness that run through the book indicate different ways of conceiving the problem of consciousness and the relation of the mind with the body. Classical Aristotelian, modern Cartesian, and contemporary linguistic paradigms are discussed and an example of an Indian paradigm is studied in detail to show how alternative perspectives can bring out interesting assumptions and viable distinctions to similar questions on the nature of the mind and the self. What different paradigms give us are tools to grasp philosophical problems, this book is an attempt to bring forth precisely those tools and the respective vocabulary to articulate some of the nagging issues that which have persisted in philosophical thought over a long period of time.
