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This chapter investigates the magnitude, features, and attributes of investment in various segments of the economy based on (i) ownership (e.g., public or private sectors); (ii) the nature of industries (e.g., industry, agriculture, trade, and service); (iii) the type of industry (e.g., social overhead capital and manufacturing); (iv) the capital-, technology-, and labor-intensities of industry; (v) the scale of investment; and (vi) the goals of investment by various economic entities, e.g., organizations and nationals. The analysis of investments in social overhead capital is further broken down according to transportation, communications, and electric power industries, while manufacturing is examined based on the types of goods produced, namely, light and heavy, and chemical industries. These not only reflected the transformation of Korean economy, but also showed the goals of investment. The volume, investors, and the nature of investment underscored the contributions made by different economic entities, such as the government, and different nationalities, namely, the Japanese, non-Japanese “foreigners”, and Koreans, in forging the country's capital formation, which reveal the underlying forces for the structural changes in the economy over time.

This chapter examines the economic reforms for capital formation and economic transformation, as well as the estimation of aggregate investment in Korea under Japanese rule between 1905 and 1945. The reform measures examined are those that removed economic and political obstacles, and those that established a new infrastructure to accommodate the workings of a government-controlled but market-oriented economy aimed at promoting capital formation and economic development. The estimation of investment considered not only the aggregate sum, but also the different nationalities (namely, Japanese, foreigners, and Koreans). The chapter also evaluates the impact of foreign investment, especially that of the Japanese, on Korean investment in terms of catalytic, linkage, oppression effects, as well as the benefits derived from external economies. Investment in human capital is assessed in terms of the overall expansion of the school system, student enrollments, and educational opportunities for Japanese and Koreans. The analysis includes private education, particularly that of the Christian missionaries, which played an important role in educating future Korean leaders.

This chapter investigates how foreign influences through trade, investment, and other forms of interaction affected the capital formation and economic transformation of Korea during the 30-year transitional period between the opening of the country to the outside world in 1876 and when it became a Japanese protectorate in 1904. It examines the extent to which the infusion of foreign resources, Western technology, and education from foreign countries played a major role as the purveyors of Western thought, technology, investment, and the forces of change and innovation. Korea's responses to the encroaching new foreign forces in terms of domestic institutional reforms and public investments including investment in human capital are assessed. The responses of the private sector, including the Korean people (e.g., society's elites (yangban), merchants, craftsmen, and common citizens) during the transitional period are analyzed. The chapter also examines the question of whether Korea had the motivation to transform into a modern economy. The last part of the chapter assesses Korea's national income, consumption, and savings during the transitional period as a result of foreign incursion.

This chapter examines another foreign investor that chose not to renegotiate. Although the investor proceeded to arbitration ahead of the Karaha Bodas Company (KBC), the driving force appears to have been its insurance from the US government agency the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Like KBC's owners, this investor showed no interest in maintaining business prospects in Indonesia or elsewhere in the developing world. US intervention was particularly strong in this case and may have contributed to deteriorating relations with Indonesia at a time when cooperation between the two countries was of growing importance in the battle against radical Islamic terrorism.

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of investments made by rich countries in major infrastructure projects in developing countries during the 1990s. This was followed by disputes between foreign investors and governments, as well as a growing sense of disenchantment in emerging markets with foreign investment on the investor side. The issues of international property rights, privatization, business strategy, negotiations, and changing attitudes towards private investment in developing countries are then considered.

This chapter analyses the scope and limitations of the principle of national property over natural resources of the subsoil established by Art 27 of the Mexican Constitution. It discusses the difference between state and national property from a comparative perspective. In addition, it describes the evolution of the constitutional and legal framework regarding the role private investment has played in the public monopoly of oil exploration and exploitation. From this analysis, the chapter proposes the adoption of a new approach to make effective the principle of national sovereignty over oil resources without excluding the possibility of private investment participating in oil exploration and exploitation.

The goals of the managed economy were maintenance of Britain's power and influence, full employment, stable prices, a sound balance of payments, and increased prosperity. Effective management of the economy depended upon effective control of public expenditure, the level of which limited the scope for tax reliefs, although Treasury officials were keen to reduce high rates of direct taxation so as to encourage enterprise and investment in the private sector. Inflationary influences in the economy included the boom in private investment from 1954 to 1957 and trade unionists' demands for higher wages. The traditional system of public finance was under strain, and it is not surprising that at the end of the 1950s the Treasury should have been seeking ways in which to improve its control over expenditure.

Historically, Japan invested, and continues to invest, a greater proportion of its gross domestic product (GDP) in gross fixed capital formation than comparable industrialized countries. General government gross fixed capital formation accounted for about a fifth of the total, but on a rising trend in the 1990s, reaching 6.7% of GDP in fiscal year 1995, as government made repeated attempts to kick-start the economy with public works spending. As private investment declined after the collapse of the bubble economy, general government claimed an increasing proportion. Public investment by central government was planned and financed partly through the General Account Budget, partly through the Fiscal Investment Loan Programme (FILP), and partly through some of the thirty-eight Special Accounts. Some of the public investment schemes financed by public banks and finance corporations, and public corporations and special companies, apart from substantial FILP funding, were self-financed and/or financed by approved borrowing in domestic and overseas capital markets. This chapter discusses how Japan had become a public works state by the 1990s.

This chapter looks at the immediate origins of the ICSID Convention, in the years 1955 to 1962. It discusses the proposed multilateral approaches to the promotion of private foreign investment, the World Bank's consideration of proposals, the role of ‘Black's Bank’ in the settlement of investment disputes, and the Bank begins to work on the initiative.

This chapter explores the role of human capital in the regional location of the software industry, focusing on private investment in the software exports industry of India during 1990–2003. The data support the significant effect of human capital on the growth of software exports even when other relevant factors are controlled. Pronounced differences in stocks of relevant human capital (that is, engineers) across Indian states have driven software exports from these states. The bulk of inter-state variations cannot be explained by the willingness of states to invest in engineering colleges. Instead, states which allowed private engineering colleges to enter early gained an early advantage that has persisted for almost fifteen years. In addition, the regional growth of the software exports industry is associated with the initial as well as current size of the electronics hardware industry.

Precisely how have PPPs underperformed? This chapter reviews global evidence relating to: (i) how widely PPPs are actually used in developing countries; (ii) the commercial profitability associated with these projects; (iii) the costs and complexities of project preparation; (iv) the ability of such projects to generate private investment finance; (v) the pro-poor benefits of these projects; and (vi) the institutional and political problems that limit project success. In light of this evidence, how practical are recent efforts by international organizations to promote increases in the number and size of PPPs in developing countries. The G20’s recent advocacy of “transformational” PPPs as mechanisms for dealing effectively with infrastructure challenges in low-income countries is an example of this kind of PPP promotion.

This chapter discusses that the demand for all sources of energy is growing in Mexico. It adds that financial resources are needed to support the investments which will satisfy the demands. It notes that the growing incorporation of Mexico into the global economy demands the privatisation of the energy sector. It explains that the challenge for Mexico in the twenty-first century is to design a new legal regime which allows the participation of private investment, but at the same time guarantees the national sovereignty of the resources, and the sustainable development in the sector.

This chapter reports new evidence on differentials in growth rates among the Indian states, and a preliminary analysis of the reasons for these differentials. The performance of the major states in the postreform period 1991–92 to 1998–99 is reviewed and compares it with performance in the previous decade. The influence of economic reforms at the national level on the growth rate of individual states depended on the net effect of forces. Private investment is one of the principal drivers of growth. Public investment and state plan expenditure are not nearly as obviously correlated with growth as many would have expected. The central government has a major role in developing infrastructure in the poorer states by influencing its own expenditure on infrastructure to help overtake infrastructure bottlenecks in the poorer states as quickly as possible. It noted that trade, payment, industrial, fiscal, and financial policies affected growth of states.

This chapter explores how the postwar reality is complicated, and a major aspect of that complexity was the different balance, in different places and moments of time, between public and private power and resources. Although there was little escaping the necessity of involving private investment in urban redevelopment, the authority of the public realm over private sector activity varied and made a difference. The chapter follows the evolution of the liberal city-building project over the postwar period, with particular attention to the shifting balance of power between the public and private realms, its implications, and, through this case, the historical evolution of postwar liberalism.

This chapter provides an overview of innovative policies for agriculture, with the purpose of highlighting aspects of interest to the energy sector. It also presents a summary of global agricultural research investments, with particular attention to public versus private investments and their distribution between developed and less-developed countries. The chapter furthermore outlines the history of U.S. public investment in agriculture. It raises a number of important issues around the role of intellectual property rights and public or private partnership in framing innovation. The importance of government regulation and its dual responsibilities of ensuring public safety and promoting technological advances are also described. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the factors influencing technological adoption in agriculture.

This chapter focuses on three cases of incorporation of private investment into Argentina’s oil industry: Juan Domingo Peron’s attempt in 1954, Arturo Frondizi’s oil contracts in 1958–1962, and the industry’s reform in the administration of Carlos Menem in the 1990s. In an effort to explain the failed attempts to incorporate private capital into the industry and the reasons for the renegotiation and cancellation of contracts between the state and the oil companies, the chapter leaves aside the external framework in order to focus on internal issues. This chapter also explains changes in the roles of private investors—both domestic and foreign—in the Argentinean oil industry by focusing on events internal to Argentina. This approach differs from many studies of changes in business and government relations in oil and other mineral industries, most of which draw heavily on shifts in the international industry.

The objective of this book is not to discuss whether natural resources turn out to be good or bad, but rather to address a related issue: the problem that countries face in setting up a credible and stable regime for private investment to exploit these resources. Even if governments have the capacity to develop the resources on their own, many lack the technical knowledge to do so or the large sums of capital required to undertake the investments. For these reasons, countries may rely on multinational corporations (MNCs) to discover and develop these resources. In doing so, they become a host country (HC) to a foreign firm, and the assistance of a second party introduces an attendant conflict of interest. A central and persistent problem here is the limit on the enforceability for contracts with a sovereign government, unlike contracts between private parties.

This chapter investigates gentrification in Cairo in the context of a city where the wealthy are opting for new gated developments. It argues that the recent interest in investing in downtown is akin to more conventional processes of gentrification, however the conditions in Cairo make these prospects for gentrification difficult to realise - gentrification limited.