Robert V. Dodge
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199857203
- eISBN:
- 9780199932597
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199857203.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
Thomas Schelling won the Nobel Prize “for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.” This came after he had taught a game theory and rational choice ...
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Thomas Schelling won the Nobel Prize “for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.” This came after he had taught a game theory and rational choice course for forty-five years at an advanced level. This book presents the concepts Schelling taught as they are useful tools for understanding decisions and consequences. Mathematics often makes game theory challenging but it is presented as something very simple in this book. Along with a summary of the material Schelling presented this book looks at problems from his course and similar less challenging questions. While considerable analysis is carried out with the basic game theory tool—the two-by-two matrix—much of the book is descriptive and rational decision-making is presented through stories and explanation. Chapter supplements are added to illuminate points presented by Schelling and two chapters are case studies for detailed analysis of strategic thinking. The story of professional basketball coach Phil Jackson concerns the conflict between self-interest and group interest of star players in a multi-person form of the prisoner's dilemma. The second study illustrates the most dangerous decision-making moment in history, the Cuban missile crisis. This book is based on Thomas Schelling's course, which has provided guidance and insight to a great number of people around the world in academic and leadership positions.Less
Thomas Schelling won the Nobel Prize “for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.” This came after he had taught a game theory and rational choice course for forty-five years at an advanced level. This book presents the concepts Schelling taught as they are useful tools for understanding decisions and consequences. Mathematics often makes game theory challenging but it is presented as something very simple in this book. Along with a summary of the material Schelling presented this book looks at problems from his course and similar less challenging questions. While considerable analysis is carried out with the basic game theory tool—the two-by-two matrix—much of the book is descriptive and rational decision-making is presented through stories and explanation. Chapter supplements are added to illuminate points presented by Schelling and two chapters are case studies for detailed analysis of strategic thinking. The story of professional basketball coach Phil Jackson concerns the conflict between self-interest and group interest of star players in a multi-person form of the prisoner's dilemma. The second study illustrates the most dangerous decision-making moment in history, the Cuban missile crisis. This book is based on Thomas Schelling's course, which has provided guidance and insight to a great number of people around the world in academic and leadership positions.
ROBERT V. DODGE
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199857203
- eISBN:
- 9780199932597
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199857203.003.0012
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter focuses on the best-known game in game theory, the prisoner's dilemma. It begins with the development of the game at the RAND Corporation. Classical economics is based on the idea that ...
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This chapter focuses on the best-known game in game theory, the prisoner's dilemma. It begins with the development of the game at the RAND Corporation. Classical economics is based on the idea that the greatest good is achieved by pursuing individual self-interest and this simple two-by-two game demonstrates that the “rational” choice could be to behave in a seemingly non-rational way; that the superior outcome could be achieved through cooperation. The standard story developed by Albert Tucker that gave the game the name “prisoner's dilemma” is described. The basic prisoner's dilemma matrix is presented and the ranking of utility payoffs is listed along with the names for the payoffs used by Sugden and many others: the “trust” payoff, the “nasty” payoff, the “sucker” payoff. Examples of the prisoner's dilemmas from everyday life and international relations are given, as is Schelling's struggle against the prisoner's dilemma of the Cold War arms race, where he worked to achieve gains in arms control. The final part of the chapter mentions references to the prisoner's dilemma in recent journalism from around the world, showing its wide acceptance as a term for situations in which individual self interest harms group benefit.Less
This chapter focuses on the best-known game in game theory, the prisoner's dilemma. It begins with the development of the game at the RAND Corporation. Classical economics is based on the idea that the greatest good is achieved by pursuing individual self-interest and this simple two-by-two game demonstrates that the “rational” choice could be to behave in a seemingly non-rational way; that the superior outcome could be achieved through cooperation. The standard story developed by Albert Tucker that gave the game the name “prisoner's dilemma” is described. The basic prisoner's dilemma matrix is presented and the ranking of utility payoffs is listed along with the names for the payoffs used by Sugden and many others: the “trust” payoff, the “nasty” payoff, the “sucker” payoff. Examples of the prisoner's dilemmas from everyday life and international relations are given, as is Schelling's struggle against the prisoner's dilemma of the Cold War arms race, where he worked to achieve gains in arms control. The final part of the chapter mentions references to the prisoner's dilemma in recent journalism from around the world, showing its wide acceptance as a term for situations in which individual self interest harms group benefit.
Andrew T Guzman
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195305562
- eISBN:
- 9780199867004
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305562.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter presents the basic theory of international law that is then used throughout the book. It explains how the forces of reputation, retaliation, and reciprocity (the Three Rs of Compliance) ...
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This chapter presents the basic theory of international law that is then used throughout the book. It explains how the forces of reputation, retaliation, and reciprocity (the Three Rs of Compliance) make international law work. It discusses the various types of problems that international law and international agreements seek to address, ranging from simple coordination problems to difficult prisoner's dilemma problems. The role of international tribunals in the operation of international law is also discussed, as are the particular challenges presented by multilateral agreements.Less
This chapter presents the basic theory of international law that is then used throughout the book. It explains how the forces of reputation, retaliation, and reciprocity (the Three Rs of Compliance) make international law work. It discusses the various types of problems that international law and international agreements seek to address, ranging from simple coordination problems to difficult prisoner's dilemma problems. The role of international tribunals in the operation of international law is also discussed, as are the particular challenges presented by multilateral agreements.
Stephen M. Gardiner
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282951
- eISBN:
- 9780191712319
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282951.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Contract theories — such as contractarianism and contractualism — seek to justify (and sometimes to explain) moral and political ideals and principles through the notion of ‘mutually agreeable ...
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Contract theories — such as contractarianism and contractualism — seek to justify (and sometimes to explain) moral and political ideals and principles through the notion of ‘mutually agreeable reciprocity or cooperation between equals’ (Darwall 2002). This chapter argues that such theories face fundamental difficulties in the intergenerational setting. Most prominently, the standard understanding of cooperation appears not to apply, and the intergenerational setting brings on a more severe collective action problem than the traditional prisoner's dilemma. Mainstream contract theorists (such as Gauthier and Rawls) have tried to overcome such difficulties by postulating some kind of chain of connection between generations. However, as this chapter maintains, thus far such attempts have proven inadequate. Given this, it seems either that mainstream contract theory needs to be rethought, or that a new, specifically intergenerational, contract theory is needed.Less
Contract theories — such as contractarianism and contractualism — seek to justify (and sometimes to explain) moral and political ideals and principles through the notion of ‘mutually agreeable reciprocity or cooperation between equals’ (Darwall 2002). This chapter argues that such theories face fundamental difficulties in the intergenerational setting. Most prominently, the standard understanding of cooperation appears not to apply, and the intergenerational setting brings on a more severe collective action problem than the traditional prisoner's dilemma. Mainstream contract theorists (such as Gauthier and Rawls) have tried to overcome such difficulties by postulating some kind of chain of connection between generations. However, as this chapter maintains, thus far such attempts have proven inadequate. Given this, it seems either that mainstream contract theory needs to be rethought, or that a new, specifically intergenerational, contract theory is needed.
Paul Weithman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195393033
- eISBN:
- 9780199894901
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195393033.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This book offers a fresh, rigorous and compelling interpretation of John Rawls's reasons for taking his so-called “political turn”. The book takes Rawls at his word that justice as fairness was ...
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This book offers a fresh, rigorous and compelling interpretation of John Rawls's reasons for taking his so-called “political turn”. The book takes Rawls at his word that justice as fairness was recast as a form of political liberalism because of inconsistencies Rawls found in his early treatment of social stability. The book argues that those inconsistencies are best seen by identifying one of the threats to stability with which the early Rawls was concerned: the generalized prisoner's dilemma. Showing how the Rawls of A Theory of Justice tried to avert that threat shows that the much-neglected third part of that book is of considerably greater philosophical interest than is generally appreciated. The book painstakingly reconstructs Rawls's attempts to show that a just society would stable, and just as carefully shows why Rawls came to think those arguments were inconsistent with other parts of his theory. The book then shows that the changes Rawls introduced into his view between Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism result from his attempt to remove the inconsistency and show that the hazard of the generalized prisoner's dilemma can be averted after all. Recovering Rawls's two treatments of stability helps to answer contested questions about the role of the original position and the foundations of justice of fairness.Less
This book offers a fresh, rigorous and compelling interpretation of John Rawls's reasons for taking his so-called “political turn”. The book takes Rawls at his word that justice as fairness was recast as a form of political liberalism because of inconsistencies Rawls found in his early treatment of social stability. The book argues that those inconsistencies are best seen by identifying one of the threats to stability with which the early Rawls was concerned: the generalized prisoner's dilemma. Showing how the Rawls of A Theory of Justice tried to avert that threat shows that the much-neglected third part of that book is of considerably greater philosophical interest than is generally appreciated. The book painstakingly reconstructs Rawls's attempts to show that a just society would stable, and just as carefully shows why Rawls came to think those arguments were inconsistent with other parts of his theory. The book then shows that the changes Rawls introduced into his view between Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism result from his attempt to remove the inconsistency and show that the hazard of the generalized prisoner's dilemma can be averted after all. Recovering Rawls's two treatments of stability helps to answer contested questions about the role of the original position and the foundations of justice of fairness.
ROBERT V. DODGE
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199857203
- eISBN:
- 9780199932597
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199857203.003.0013
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter is about the prisoner's dilemma as a repeated encounter. The best strategy is defection, or non-cooperation, if a single encounter is anticipated. In the event of repeated, or iterated ...
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This chapter is about the prisoner's dilemma as a repeated encounter. The best strategy is defection, or non-cooperation, if a single encounter is anticipated. In the event of repeated, or iterated play, evidence indicates that cooperation can evolve. The introduction to this chapter provides a story published following the death of the last British survivor of the Christmas truce from World War I in 1915. Much of the chapter is based on Robert Axelrod's contests that inspired his classic book, The Evolution of Cooperation. Axelrod's first tournament involved fifteen contestants from different disciplines competing in a round-robin tournament with 200 games, competing against each opponent submitting strategies for playing the prisoner's dilemma. There was a great variety in how the games went but the winner was the one with the simplest plan, which was based on the simple strategy in tit-for-tat. This strategy worked initially then the competitor was to do whatever his opponent did on their previous move. Axelrod ran a much larger second tournament, with sixty-two entrants from six countries. The strategy of tit-for-tat again won, defeating experts from many fields. Subtopics follow the main part of the chapter, including a look at how cooperation takes hold and difficulties; robustness; noise; and cooperation examples. A supplement comes from Axelrod's book that is research on prisoner's dilemma leading to cooperation emerging in many isolated areas along the trenches in the early stages of World War One.Less
This chapter is about the prisoner's dilemma as a repeated encounter. The best strategy is defection, or non-cooperation, if a single encounter is anticipated. In the event of repeated, or iterated play, evidence indicates that cooperation can evolve. The introduction to this chapter provides a story published following the death of the last British survivor of the Christmas truce from World War I in 1915. Much of the chapter is based on Robert Axelrod's contests that inspired his classic book, The Evolution of Cooperation. Axelrod's first tournament involved fifteen contestants from different disciplines competing in a round-robin tournament with 200 games, competing against each opponent submitting strategies for playing the prisoner's dilemma. There was a great variety in how the games went but the winner was the one with the simplest plan, which was based on the simple strategy in tit-for-tat. This strategy worked initially then the competitor was to do whatever his opponent did on their previous move. Axelrod ran a much larger second tournament, with sixty-two entrants from six countries. The strategy of tit-for-tat again won, defeating experts from many fields. Subtopics follow the main part of the chapter, including a look at how cooperation takes hold and difficulties; robustness; noise; and cooperation examples. A supplement comes from Axelrod's book that is research on prisoner's dilemma leading to cooperation emerging in many isolated areas along the trenches in the early stages of World War One.
Colin F. Camerer and Ernst Fehr
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199262052
- eISBN:
- 9780191601637
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199262055.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
The work of the cross‐cultural behavioural experiments project presented in this book is rooted in the logic of game theory and the practices of experimental economics, and this chapter provides an ...
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The work of the cross‐cultural behavioural experiments project presented in this book is rooted in the logic of game theory and the practices of experimental economics, and this chapter provides an introduction to the fundamentals of behavioural game theory, and the procedures and conventions of experimental economics. It starts by defining the main social preference terms used – self‐interest, altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion, and then sketches game theory in broad terms and describes some basic features of experimental design in economics. Seven games that have proved useful in examining social preferences are introduced; these are the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, the Public Goods Game, the Ultimatum Game, the Dictator Game, the Trust Game, the Gift Exchange Game, and the Third‐Party Punishment Game). The games are defined formally, indicating the aspects of social life that they express, and describing behavioural regularities found in experimental studies; these behavioural regularities are then interpreted in terms of preferences for reciprocity, inequity aversion, or altruism. The final sections of the chapter describe some other games anthropologists might find useful, and draw conclusions.Less
The work of the cross‐cultural behavioural experiments project presented in this book is rooted in the logic of game theory and the practices of experimental economics, and this chapter provides an introduction to the fundamentals of behavioural game theory, and the procedures and conventions of experimental economics. It starts by defining the main social preference terms used – self‐interest, altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion, and then sketches game theory in broad terms and describes some basic features of experimental design in economics. Seven games that have proved useful in examining social preferences are introduced; these are the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, the Public Goods Game, the Ultimatum Game, the Dictator Game, the Trust Game, the Gift Exchange Game, and the Third‐Party Punishment Game). The games are defined formally, indicating the aspects of social life that they express, and describing behavioural regularities found in experimental studies; these behavioural regularities are then interpreted in terms of preferences for reciprocity, inequity aversion, or altruism. The final sections of the chapter describe some other games anthropologists might find useful, and draw conclusions.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
In arguing for the need for the state, this chapter establishes factual parameters within which discussions of political obligations should be conducted. Certain theorists argue that political ...
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In arguing for the need for the state, this chapter establishes factual parameters within which discussions of political obligations should be conducted. Certain theorists argue that political obligations are not necessary, that various non-state organizations could fulfil the functions commonly assigned to states. However, these theorists do not satisfactorily address questions concerning the provision of essential public goods. Through detailed analysis of numerous alternative mechanisms, libertarian, free-market solutions are found to be unable to provide all necessary public goods. Similarly, technical solutions to N-person prisoner's dilemma are unsuccessful, because of the special conditions they require. Non-state mechanisms, such as the protective associations familiar from Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, are found to be unable to provide essential public goods, while the same is true of proposals based on a distinction between authority and legitimacy.Less
In arguing for the need for the state, this chapter establishes factual parameters within which discussions of political obligations should be conducted. Certain theorists argue that political obligations are not necessary, that various non-state organizations could fulfil the functions commonly assigned to states. However, these theorists do not satisfactorily address questions concerning the provision of essential public goods. Through detailed analysis of numerous alternative mechanisms, libertarian, free-market solutions are found to be unable to provide all necessary public goods. Similarly, technical solutions to N-person prisoner's dilemma are unsuccessful, because of the special conditions they require. Non-state mechanisms, such as the protective associations familiar from Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, are found to be unable to provide essential public goods, while the same is true of proposals based on a distinction between authority and legitimacy.
Andrew Guzman
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195305562
- eISBN:
- 9780199867004
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305562.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Applying rational-choice theory to international law and international relations, this book offers a comprehensive theory of the subject, how it operates, and why it works. Taking as a starting point ...
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Applying rational-choice theory to international law and international relations, this book offers a comprehensive theory of the subject, how it operates, and why it works. Taking as a starting point that states comply only when it is in their self‐interest to do so, the book demonstrates that international law nevertheless supports cooperation among states. This book develops a theory of international law to explain how concerns about reciprocal non‐compliance, retaliation, and reputation discourage states from violating their international legal commitments. By building a theory from the ground up, this book is able to address international law in all its forms, including treaties, customary international law, and “soft law.” It explains that contrary to conventional views on the subject, there is no stark difference between these different types of international law. Rather, each represents a position on a spectrum of commitment and is distinguished by the strength of the obligation it imposes. Once the various legal forms are recognized as different in degree rather than kind, other features of the system are easier to understand. The book discusses how the substantive content of an international agreement relates to its form, including whether the agreement provides for dispute resolution, monitoring, exit, escape, and reservations. With respect to customary international law, this book explains how and why such rules of law work, and how existing notions of custom must be adapted to accommodate the rational choice approach.Less
Applying rational-choice theory to international law and international relations, this book offers a comprehensive theory of the subject, how it operates, and why it works. Taking as a starting point that states comply only when it is in their self‐interest to do so, the book demonstrates that international law nevertheless supports cooperation among states. This book develops a theory of international law to explain how concerns about reciprocal non‐compliance, retaliation, and reputation discourage states from violating their international legal commitments. By building a theory from the ground up, this book is able to address international law in all its forms, including treaties, customary international law, and “soft law.” It explains that contrary to conventional views on the subject, there is no stark difference between these different types of international law. Rather, each represents a position on a spectrum of commitment and is distinguished by the strength of the obligation it imposes. Once the various legal forms are recognized as different in degree rather than kind, other features of the system are easier to understand. The book discusses how the substantive content of an international agreement relates to its form, including whether the agreement provides for dispute resolution, monitoring, exit, escape, and reservations. With respect to customary international law, this book explains how and why such rules of law work, and how existing notions of custom must be adapted to accommodate the rational choice approach.
Raimo Tuomela
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313390
- eISBN:
- 9780199870929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313390.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter contains an extensive discussion of cooperation, including accounts of both I-mode and we-mode cooperation. I-mode cooperation concerns the participants relevantly “shifting” their ...
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This chapter contains an extensive discussion of cooperation, including accounts of both I-mode and we-mode cooperation. I-mode cooperation concerns the participants relevantly “shifting” their I-mode goals and actions toward their partnersʼ goals and actions so that a shared goal outcome is reached. We-mode cooperation amounts to we-mode joint action. These two modes are compared and illustrated in terms of a simple game-theoretical public good acquisition model. It is shown that in some situations we-mode cooperation is preferable to both “progroup” and “plain” I-mode cooperation also on grounds of instrumental rationality. We-mode cooperation, by generally being more holistic and ingrained, gives more stability and order, involves respect-based trust, and also allows for more speed, creativity, and flexibility and better applicability to the large-group case. Because of the ingredient of collective commitment we-mode cooperation entails “strong,” group-sanctioned reciprocity, which helps to escape collective action dilemmas. From the group's point of view such dilemmas ideally do not even arise, although in real life people often do not act as proper group members but free-ride.Less
This chapter contains an extensive discussion of cooperation, including accounts of both I-mode and we-mode cooperation. I-mode cooperation concerns the participants relevantly “shifting” their I-mode goals and actions toward their partnersʼ goals and actions so that a shared goal outcome is reached. We-mode cooperation amounts to we-mode joint action. These two modes are compared and illustrated in terms of a simple game-theoretical public good acquisition model. It is shown that in some situations we-mode cooperation is preferable to both “progroup” and “plain” I-mode cooperation also on grounds of instrumental rationality. We-mode cooperation, by generally being more holistic and ingrained, gives more stability and order, involves respect-based trust, and also allows for more speed, creativity, and flexibility and better applicability to the large-group case. Because of the ingredient of collective commitment we-mode cooperation entails “strong,” group-sanctioned reciprocity, which helps to escape collective action dilemmas. From the group's point of view such dilemmas ideally do not even arise, although in real life people often do not act as proper group members but free-ride.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300574
- eISBN:
- 9780199783748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter uses the Prisoner's Dilemma as the linking idea in an overview of many of the topics covered later in the book. The basic ideas are that of a dominated strategy and a Pareto-efficient ...
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This chapter uses the Prisoner's Dilemma as the linking idea in an overview of many of the topics covered later in the book. The basic ideas are that of a dominated strategy and a Pareto-efficient outcome. Various fallacies that promote the latter notion over the former are considered. At the same time, the chapter introduces problems in the private provision of public goods, the economic theory of imperfect competition, repeated games, the tragedy of the commons, and mechanism design. The idea of a Nash equilibrium is introduced.Less
This chapter uses the Prisoner's Dilemma as the linking idea in an overview of many of the topics covered later in the book. The basic ideas are that of a dominated strategy and a Pareto-efficient outcome. Various fallacies that promote the latter notion over the former are considered. At the same time, the chapter introduces problems in the private provision of public goods, the economic theory of imperfect competition, repeated games, the tragedy of the commons, and mechanism design. The idea of a Nash equilibrium is introduced.
Paul Erickson, Judy L. Klein, Lorraine Daston, Paul Rebecca, Thomas Sturm, and Michael D. Gordin
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226046631
- eISBN:
- 9780226046778
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226046778.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
During the postwar era, discussions of conflict and cooperation, altruism and self-interest, war and peace returned consistently to the mathematical idiom of game theory. The famed “prisoner's ...
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During the postwar era, discussions of conflict and cooperation, altruism and self-interest, war and peace returned consistently to the mathematical idiom of game theory. The famed “prisoner's dilemma” (PD) game, in particular, would prove a constant point of reference in discussions of arms races and international conflict. Yet this fact presents a puzzle given how quickly critiques of game theory's brand of rationality emerged during the 1950s and 1960s. By examining the use of the PD game in three distinct contexts, this chapter sheds light on the remarkable persistence of game theory, even as the theory's empirical adequacy and normative desirability attracted criticism. Whether it was invoked in studies of teamwork and cooperation, the nuclear arms race, or the evolution of reciprocal altruism, PD's characteristic game matrix provided social, behavioral, and biological scientists with a structured language for debating some of the central problems of the day.Less
During the postwar era, discussions of conflict and cooperation, altruism and self-interest, war and peace returned consistently to the mathematical idiom of game theory. The famed “prisoner's dilemma” (PD) game, in particular, would prove a constant point of reference in discussions of arms races and international conflict. Yet this fact presents a puzzle given how quickly critiques of game theory's brand of rationality emerged during the 1950s and 1960s. By examining the use of the PD game in three distinct contexts, this chapter sheds light on the remarkable persistence of game theory, even as the theory's empirical adequacy and normative desirability attracted criticism. Whether it was invoked in studies of teamwork and cooperation, the nuclear arms race, or the evolution of reciprocal altruism, PD's characteristic game matrix provided social, behavioral, and biological scientists with a structured language for debating some of the central problems of the day.
Joseph Heath
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195370294
- eISBN:
- 9780199871230
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370294.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter examines how the consequentialism postulate, namely, the view that actions are valued only for the sake of their consequences, came to be enshrined in modern rational choice theory. It ...
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This chapter examines how the consequentialism postulate, namely, the view that actions are valued only for the sake of their consequences, came to be enshrined in modern rational choice theory. It goes on to consider some of the reasons that a rational action theory of this type gives rise to the so-called “problem of order.” The latter is analyzed under two rubrics, first the problem of multiple equilibria, and second, the problem of suboptimal equilibria. Taken together, these problems suggest that rational choice theory, in its canonical formulation, cannot serve as a general theory of rational action for the social sciences.Less
This chapter examines how the consequentialism postulate, namely, the view that actions are valued only for the sake of their consequences, came to be enshrined in modern rational choice theory. It goes on to consider some of the reasons that a rational action theory of this type gives rise to the so-called “problem of order.” The latter is analyzed under two rubrics, first the problem of multiple equilibria, and second, the problem of suboptimal equilibria. Taken together, these problems suggest that rational choice theory, in its canonical formulation, cannot serve as a general theory of rational action for the social sciences.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 1986
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198249085
- eISBN:
- 9780191598173
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824908X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Examines whether it is an objection to S that, in some cases, S is directly collectively self‐defeating; some bad defences of S and M ‐ why it is an objection to M that this theory is directly ...
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Examines whether it is an objection to S that, in some cases, S is directly collectively self‐defeating; some bad defences of S and M ‐ why it is an objection to M that this theory is directly collectively self‐defeating; how and why we ought to solve this problem by revising M. The different parts of moral theories are also explored.Less
Examines whether it is an objection to S that, in some cases, S is directly collectively self‐defeating; some bad defences of S and M ‐ why it is an objection to M that this theory is directly collectively self‐defeating; how and why we ought to solve this problem by revising M. The different parts of moral theories are also explored.
Lisa L. Martin
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130522
- eISBN:
- 9780199867363
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130529.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Over the past 15 years, the field of international relations has produced a great deal of work on international cooperation and international institutions. This work has immediate relevance for ...
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Over the past 15 years, the field of international relations has produced a great deal of work on international cooperation and international institutions. This work has immediate relevance for conceptualizing a new era and a new approach to international development cooperation. Once we understand development cooperation as a problem of providing global public goods, our attention is immediately drawn to the problems of strategic interaction and opportunistic behavior that confront states as they attempt to cooperate in the pursuit of mutually beneficial goals. Drawing on public goods models and related concerns, the literature on international cooperation identifies strategic problems that states must overcome if they are to cooperate effectively – and how international organizations can facilitate state efforts to cooperate, primarily through the provision of information. This chapter summarizes the central claims of political science about the conditions for international cooperation and the roles of international organizations and nonstate actors in helping states achieve the benefits of cooperation. It concludes that the most useful functions of international organizations involve the provision of information about state preferences and behavior – particularly about standards and causal knowledge.Less
Over the past 15 years, the field of international relations has produced a great deal of work on international cooperation and international institutions. This work has immediate relevance for conceptualizing a new era and a new approach to international development cooperation. Once we understand development cooperation as a problem of providing global public goods, our attention is immediately drawn to the problems of strategic interaction and opportunistic behavior that confront states as they attempt to cooperate in the pursuit of mutually beneficial goals. Drawing on public goods models and related concerns, the literature on international cooperation identifies strategic problems that states must overcome if they are to cooperate effectively – and how international organizations can facilitate state efforts to cooperate, primarily through the provision of information. This chapter summarizes the central claims of political science about the conditions for international cooperation and the roles of international organizations and nonstate actors in helping states achieve the benefits of cooperation. It concludes that the most useful functions of international organizations involve the provision of information about state preferences and behavior – particularly about standards and causal knowledge.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 1986
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198249085
- eISBN:
- 9780191598173
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824908X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Explains why C cannot be directly self‐defeating. Theories are agent‐relative if they give different agents different aims. Two such theories are S and Common Sense Morality, or M. It is often true ...
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Explains why C cannot be directly self‐defeating. Theories are agent‐relative if they give different agents different aims. Two such theories are S and Common Sense Morality, or M. It is often true that, if each of several people does what would be best for themselves, that would be worse for all these people. In such cases, S is directly collectively self‐defeating. In moral analogues of such cases, M is similarly self‐defeating. The chapter describes how these problems can have political, psychological, or moral solutions.Less
Explains why C cannot be directly self‐defeating. Theories are agent‐relative if they give different agents different aims. Two such theories are S and Common Sense Morality, or M. It is often true that, if each of several people does what would be best for themselves, that would be worse for all these people. In such cases, S is directly collectively self‐defeating. In moral analogues of such cases, M is similarly self‐defeating. The chapter describes how these problems can have political, psychological, or moral solutions.
Stephen M. Gardiner
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195379440
- eISBN:
- 9780199897100
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379440.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter continues the investigation of the global storm. The chapter asks the question: if the optimistic analysis fails for climate change, what are the alternatives? The chapter especially ...
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This chapter continues the investigation of the global storm. The chapter asks the question: if the optimistic analysis fails for climate change, what are the alternatives? The chapter especially looks at what might explain the last two decades of climate policy and hopes for a better model for the problem in the future. The chapter states that one option is to invoke the prisoner's dilemma and the model of the tragedy of the commons. The chapter explores the strengths and weaknesses of this account. The chapter considers the standard prisoner's dilemma model, and argues that climate change deviates from it in significant ways. It then claims that those deviations reflect important differences between the prisoner's dilemma and the tragedy of the commons metaphors. Climate change is an evolving tragedy, the chapter states. Finally the chapter looks at some issues raised by this analysis.Less
This chapter continues the investigation of the global storm. The chapter asks the question: if the optimistic analysis fails for climate change, what are the alternatives? The chapter especially looks at what might explain the last two decades of climate policy and hopes for a better model for the problem in the future. The chapter states that one option is to invoke the prisoner's dilemma and the model of the tragedy of the commons. The chapter explores the strengths and weaknesses of this account. The chapter considers the standard prisoner's dilemma model, and argues that climate change deviates from it in significant ways. It then claims that those deviations reflect important differences between the prisoner's dilemma and the tragedy of the commons metaphors. Climate change is an evolving tragedy, the chapter states. Finally the chapter looks at some issues raised by this analysis.
Paul Erickson
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780226097039
- eISBN:
- 9780226097206
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226097206.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
Game theory’s creators had suggested that the theory might serve as a positive, predictive depiction of human behavior, to be corroborated by experiment and experience. This was certainly how the ...
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Game theory’s creators had suggested that the theory might serve as a positive, predictive depiction of human behavior, to be corroborated by experiment and experience. This was certainly how the first generation of postwar mathematicians approached the theory, inventing interesting games like the famed “Prisoner’s Dilemma” in order to “test” alternative game-theoretic solutions. Even so, they frequently found themselves carefully selecting their subjects and experimental setups to best produce the desired behavioral phenomena. But while mathematicians remained the most visible apostles of game theory through the 1950s, researchers in the human sciences increasingly began to encounter and appropriate the theory, often in conjunction with cross-disciplinary research programs like “behavioral science” and attempts to create a unified study of human behavior with support from RAND, the Office of Naval Research, and private philanthropies like the Ford Foundation. For these researchers, game theory was often interpreted less as a foundation for testable predictions, and more as an analytic technique permitting them to use observed behavior to shed light on the underlying attitudes, values, or cognitive processes of individuals and groups alike.Less
Game theory’s creators had suggested that the theory might serve as a positive, predictive depiction of human behavior, to be corroborated by experiment and experience. This was certainly how the first generation of postwar mathematicians approached the theory, inventing interesting games like the famed “Prisoner’s Dilemma” in order to “test” alternative game-theoretic solutions. Even so, they frequently found themselves carefully selecting their subjects and experimental setups to best produce the desired behavioral phenomena. But while mathematicians remained the most visible apostles of game theory through the 1950s, researchers in the human sciences increasingly began to encounter and appropriate the theory, often in conjunction with cross-disciplinary research programs like “behavioral science” and attempts to create a unified study of human behavior with support from RAND, the Office of Naval Research, and private philanthropies like the Ford Foundation. For these researchers, game theory was often interpreted less as a foundation for testable predictions, and more as an analytic technique permitting them to use observed behavior to shed light on the underlying attitudes, values, or cognitive processes of individuals and groups alike.
Jeffrey Brand-Ballard
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195342291
- eISBN:
- 9780199867011
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342291.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter introduces new arguments for the thesis that judges have all-things-considered reasons to obey nonpermissive rules. These arguments appeal to the systemic effects of deviating from the ...
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This chapter introduces new arguments for the thesis that judges have all-things-considered reasons to obey nonpermissive rules. These arguments appeal to the systemic effects of deviating from the law: effects on individuals other than parties to the case. The point of departure is Alan H. Goldman’s defense of restrictive rule. As Goldman shows, judges are in a special kind of collective action problem: a multiplayer moral-moral prisoner’s dilemma. This chapter suggests that judges who possess good moral judgment constitute a group—Group O—the members of which share two collective intentions: to minimize suboptimal results throughout their legal system and to avoid reaching suboptimal results themselves. They can fulfill the second intention by deviating from the law in suboptimal-result cases, but a pattern of deviating from the law, even in such cases, causes mimetic failure—other judges will imitate Group O and deviate in optimal-result cases, thereby reaching suboptimal results. At some point the rate of deviation by Group O could encourage so much deviation by other judges that the suboptimal results reached by those judges would outweigh the suboptimal results avoided by Group O. That point is defined as the “deviation density threshold.”Less
This chapter introduces new arguments for the thesis that judges have all-things-considered reasons to obey nonpermissive rules. These arguments appeal to the systemic effects of deviating from the law: effects on individuals other than parties to the case. The point of departure is Alan H. Goldman’s defense of restrictive rule. As Goldman shows, judges are in a special kind of collective action problem: a multiplayer moral-moral prisoner’s dilemma. This chapter suggests that judges who possess good moral judgment constitute a group—Group O—the members of which share two collective intentions: to minimize suboptimal results throughout their legal system and to avoid reaching suboptimal results themselves. They can fulfill the second intention by deviating from the law in suboptimal-result cases, but a pattern of deviating from the law, even in such cases, causes mimetic failure—other judges will imitate Group O and deviate in optimal-result cases, thereby reaching suboptimal results. At some point the rate of deviation by Group O could encourage so much deviation by other judges that the suboptimal results reached by those judges would outweigh the suboptimal results avoided by Group O. That point is defined as the “deviation density threshold.”
Iwo Białynicki-Birula and Iwona Białynicka-Birula
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198531005
- eISBN:
- 9780191713033
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198531005.003.0011
- Subject:
- Physics, Theoretical, Computational, and Statistical Physics
The question how to play to win in a simple game of chance has lead to the creation of an elaborate game theory with deadly serious applications to war strategies and equally serious applications to ...
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The question how to play to win in a simple game of chance has lead to the creation of an elaborate game theory with deadly serious applications to war strategies and equally serious applications to economy. Despite its wide range of applications, game theory has some basic rules that can be explained with the help of a simple example: a TV contest. In this example we already encounter such notions as dominant strategy, minimax principle, and pure and mixed strategies.Less
The question how to play to win in a simple game of chance has lead to the creation of an elaborate game theory with deadly serious applications to war strategies and equally serious applications to economy. Despite its wide range of applications, game theory has some basic rules that can be explained with the help of a simple example: a TV contest. In this example we already encounter such notions as dominant strategy, minimax principle, and pure and mixed strategies.
